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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by defendants Nos. 1 and 8 against a preliminary decree in a suit for partition instituted in 1964 by the plaintiff, Chanchala. The dispute concerns partition of properties described in Schedules A, B, C and D and arises from an extended family pedigree descending from one Bidyadhar, whose sons included Madhu and Jayram. Jayram's sons included Jagannath (defendant No. 1), Krushna (deceased 1947) — husband of the plaintiff Chanchala — and others.

The plaintiff sought specified fractional shares: eight annas in Schedules A and D (subject to certain exclusions), four annas in Schedule B and one anna in Schedule C, on the basis that Jayram had particular shares in the family properties. Defendants 1 and 8 primarily defended on the ground that Krushna had been given in adoption in infancy to his maternal uncle Lokanath Swain, thereby severing Krushna's rights in the natal family and extinguishing the plaintiff's claim. They also asserted that certain lots in Schedule A belonged exclusively to defendants 1 and 8 and that the suit was not maintainable as a suit for partial partition because not all family properties were included.

The Subordinate Judge rejected the adoption plea (also treating an assumed adoption as invalid for want of proved custom), accepted defendants' exclusive claim to three specific A-schedule items (lots 2, 5 and 7) but rejected their claim to lot 13, and held the suit for partial partition maintainable. The Subordinate Judge passed a preliminary decree awarding to the plaintiff: an eight annas share in the A-schedule property subject to the exclusions noted by the court, a four annas share in Schedule B, a one-anna share in Schedule C, and an eight annas share in the D-schedule movables subject to specified procedural directions. Defendants 1 and 8 appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Krushna (the plaintiff's deceased husband) was validly given in adoption to his maternal uncle Lokanath Swain, thereby depriving him (and consequently the plaintiff) of rights in the natal family property.
  2. If adoption is established, whether such an adoption would be valid in law (specifically whether adoption by a maternal uncle without established custom is valid).
  3. Whether a suit for partial partition is maintainable when not all family properties are included in the plaint.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Defendants No. 1 and 8) — principal contentions

  • Krushna was given in adoption to his maternal uncle Lokanath Swain soon after birth (on the twenty-first day), and therefore Krushna lost rights in the original family; the plaintiff has no right to shares in the natal family properties.
  • Certain items in Schedule A (lot Nos. 2, 5 and 7) did not belong to the family: lots 2, 7 and 13 were purchased by defendant No. 1 out of his own funds and lot No. 5 was purchased by defendant No. 8 from her stridhan (the court ultimately accepted the claim relating to lots 2, 5 and 7 but rejected it as to lot 13).
  • The suit is not maintainable as a suit for partial partition because some family properties were omitted from the plaint schedules.
  • Evidence of the adoption included oral testimony of witnesses said to have attended the adoption ceremony and documentary entries (e.g., voter list entries asserted to relate to the village of the alleged adoptive father).

Respondent (Plaintiff Chanchala) — principal contentions

  • The plaintiff asserted her entitlement as successor to her late husband Krushna (son of Javaram Mohanty) to specified fractional shares in the properties (eight annas in A and D subject to exclusions, four annas in B, one anna in C) on the basis that Krushna belonged to the natal family and was not adopted.
  • The plaintiff challenged the sufficiency and credibility of evidence offered to prove adoption and relied on documentary entries (school admission register entry Ext. 1 and plaint in a certificate case Ext. 4) and other circumstances to show that Krushna was treated as the son of Javaram Mohanty in earlier records and proceedings.
  • The plaintiff argued that she was an illiterate widow without access to full family documents and that she had claimed partition only as to properties known to her; this circumstance justified a partial partition suit in the facts of the case.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis concentrated primarily on the adoption plea and on whether the suit for partial partition was maintainable. The reasoning proceeded in identifiable steps:

  1. Evaluation of oral testimony on the adoption:
    • The contesting defendants produced four witnesses said to have witnessed the alleged giving-and-taking ceremony on the twenty-first day after Krushna's birth: D.W.1 (Lokanath Swain, the alleged adoptive father), D.W.2 (a barber purported to have officiated), D.W.6 (a resident of Bondala), and D.W.8 (Jagannath, defendant No. 1).
    • The court found material inconsistencies and suspicious contradictions among these accounts. Examples: D.W.1 had stated in a previous suit that the barber who attended the ceremony was dead, yet D.W.2 later claimed he was that barber; D.W.2 had not given the same account in the earlier suit and invented a story of his father's attendance to reconcile discrepancies; D.W.6's account contained an implausible theatrical exchange that undermined his credibility; D.W.8's present testimony differed from his earlier testimony in another suit (in which he had said the adoption occurred when the child was 4 or 5 years old).
    • The court concluded that the oral evidence as a whole was "discrepant and untrustworthy" and therefore could not establish the adoption.
  2. Examination of circumstantial and documentary evidence:
    • The court considered the significance of long recognition evidence (that long recognition can create a presumption of adoption) but observed that the defendants did not rely on a scenario where all witnesses were dead; given available eyewitnesses, their testimony had to stand scrutiny and failed.
    • Family circumstances of Lokanath Swain weighed against the likelihood of adoption: he had earlier married, had children (two daughters older than Krushna), later took a second, much younger wife and had children with her, including male children. The court found it unlikely that Lokanath — not impotent and expecting more children — would adopt a boy at that time, and these facts strengthened disbelief of the adoption in light of weak testimonial evidence.
    • Documentary entries were examined and used against the adoption theory:
      • Ext. 6 (school admission register) records Lokanath's son Sarat admitted on 4-1-1934; Lokanath's explanation that he never admitted his sons in school but taught them at home was disbelieved by the court.
      • Ext. 1 (bondala school admission entry) described "Batakrushna Mohanty son of Javaram Mohanty"; plaintiff produced evidence that Krushna was also known as Batakrushna, suggesting this entry referred to the plaintiff's husband and thus contradicting adoption to Lokanath.
      • Ext. 4 (plaint in a 1926 certificate case) described Krushna as son of Javaram Mohanty and as a minor represented by his mother; the fact that official court documents from earlier proceedings described Krushna as Javaram's son undermined the claim that Krushna had been removed from that family by adoption as early as 1925.
      • Exts. 7(a) and 8 (endorsement and receipt on a 1926 mortgage bond) were tendered by the defendants but the court found corrections to the dates and the signature denials by defendant No.1, and noted lack of direct proof (the alleged custodian son of Ananda Pradhan was not examined). The court refused to place weight on these documents.
      • Ext. A/1 (a 1958 voter's list entry) was not accepted as proof linking the plaintiff permanently to Bhimraipur or as verifying adoption because the certified copy appeared to relate to a different locality and Lokanath's name was absent from the relevant voter list entry.
    • The court also noted that two daughters of Lokanath who were older than Krushna were not examined; the omission was significant in assessing whether an adoption took place and further weakened the defendants' case.
    • The fact that Krushna died at Lokanath's house did not, by itself, demonstrate adoption — the plaintiff explained he may have been there on a casual visit when he fell ill — and the court accepted that the circumstance did not prove adoption.
  3. Burden and standard of proof:
    • The court emphasized that the onus lay heavily on defendant No. 1 to establish an adoption that would cut off natal rights; evidentiary deficiencies and contradictions meant the defendants failed to discharge that onus.
    • The court acknowledged that, under Hindu law, actual giving and taking are ordinarily necessary and that long recognition may suffice where direct proof is impossible, but observed that here direct witnesses were available and inconsistent, so the ordinary rules required careful scrutiny which cast the defendants' proofs as inadequate.
  4. Maintainability of partial partition suit:
    • The court recognized the general rule that partition suits should include the entire family property but noted recognized exceptions: where excluded portions are not in the possession of coparceners, are impartible, or are held jointly with strangers; in such cases, partial partition can be allowed.
    • The court accepted the plaintiff's explanation that, as an illiterate widow without possession of family documents, she pleaded partition only as to properties known to her, and that such omission did not render the suit non-maintainable in the circumstances presented.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The appellate court affirmed the judgment and preliminary decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Direct consequences and practical implications for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The plea that Krushna was adopted by Lokanath Swain was rejected for lack of cogent and satisfactory evidence; the court did not find it necessary to decide the separate question of the legal validity of such an adoption in law because the fact of adoption itself was not proved.
  • The Subordinate Judge's decree confirming the plaintiff's title was upheld: the plaintiff's claim to an eight annas share in the A-schedule properties (excluding the specific items found to be exclusively owned by defendants), a four annas share in Schedule B, a one-anna share in Schedule C, and an eight annas share in the D-schedule movables (subject to the commissioner’s inventory/list substitution and directions) stands.
  • The court held that the suit as framed was maintainable despite the omission of some family properties, given the plaintiff's circumstances; no dismissal on the ground of partiality was ordered.
  • No new legal precedent was stated beyond application of established principles: the court applied existing principles regarding proof of adoption and recognized exceptions permitting partial partition; the opinion primarily resolves the factual dispute in favour of the plaintiff and upholds the lower court's factual findings and decree.

Disposition in the court below and on appeal: the Subordinate Judge's decree was upheld and the appeal dismissed; S.K. Ray, A.C.J. concurred.

    Jagannath Mohanty And Another v. Chanchala Bewa And Others

    Patra, J.:— This is an appeal by defendants 1 and 8 and arises out of a suit for partition. In order to appreciate the controversy in the present case, it is necessary to set down the family pedigree which is shown below:;

    2. One Bidyadhar had four sons, namely, Madhu. Gopinath. Gangadhar and Eka-dasi. Madhu had three sons, namely, Gopal. Jayram and Nanda. Of them, Nanda died long ago and we are not concerned with that branch. Jayram died in the year 1930. Jagannath defendant No. 1 is the eldest son of Jayram and Swarnalata defendant No. 8 is Jagannath's wife. Jayram had another son by name Krushna who died in the year 1947 and the plaintiff Chanchala is admittedly Krushna's widow. Defendant No. 2 is the son of Gopal and defendants 3 and 4 are grandsons of Gopinath. Defendant No. 5 is the grandson of Gangadhar. Defendants 6 and 7 represent Ekadasi's branch being in great grandson and son respectively. In the year 1964. Chanchala Instituted the suit for partition giving pise to this appeal claiming an eight annas share in the properties covered by Schedules A and D. a four annas share in the property covered by Schedule B and one anna share in the C schedule property. According to her, after Bidyadhar's death, his properties were divided amongst his sons. The B schedule property fell to Madhu's share and the C schedule property remained undivided. Jayram therefore had an eight annas share in the schedule B property and consequently the plaintiff claimed a four annas share therein. In the C schedule property Madhu had a four annas share and consequently Jayram had two annas share therein. The plaintiff therefore claimed a one anna share in the C schedule property. So far as properties covered by schedules A and D are concerned, it is the plaintiff's case that these properties belonged exclusively to Jayram and consequently the plaintiff claimed an eight annas share therein. Defendants 9 to 21 were impleaded in the suit as alienees of some of the properties forming the subject-matter of the suit.

    3. The substantial defence raised by defendants 1 and 8 was that a few days after the birth of the plaintiff's husband Krushna he had been taken in adoption by his maternal uncle Lokanath Swain (D.W 1) and that consequently Krushna lost all rights he had in the original family with the result that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share. It was stated that lot Nos. 2, 5, 7 and 13 of schedule A did not belong to the family lots 2, 7 and 13 having been purchased by defendant No. 1 out of his own funds and lot No. 5 having been purchased by defendant. No. 8 from out of her Stridhan. It was further contended that as some of the properties which belonged to the family have not been included in the plaint schedules, the suit for partial partition is not maintainable in law. Certain other averments were made in the written statement which after consideration by the learned Subordinate Judge have been rejected by him and the correctness of the same is not challenged before us. It is therefore, unnecessary to make any detailed reference to the same. Defendants 15 and 21 filed written statements supporting the case of defendants 1 and 8. Defendants 9 to 13 without admitting any of the plaint allegations stated that they would have no objection if a decree for partition was passed in the suit.

    4. The learned Subordinate Judge disbelieved the plea of the contesting defendants that Krushna had been adopted by his maternal uncle Lokanath. He also held that even assuming that the adoption in fact took place, an adoption by a maternal uncle of his nephew is not valid in the absence of a custom to that effect and no such custom has been established. He accepted the plea of defendants 1 and 8 regarding their claim to lot Nos. 2, 5 and 7 of the A schedule property but rejected their claim regarding lot No. 13 of that schedule. Regarding the maintainability of the suit he held that a suit for partial partition is maintainable under certain circumstances and that such circumstances exist in this case. In the result, he passed a preliminary decree declaring the plaintiff's title to an eight annas share in the plaint A schedule property excluding therefrom the three items in respect of which he held that defendants 1 and 8 had exclusive title, a four annas share in the plaint B schedule property and a one anna share in the plaint C schedule property. So far as plaint D schedule movables are concerned, he directed that the list should be substituted by the list of inventor/prepared by the Commissioner and certain other directions which the learned Subordinate Judge had given and directed that an eight annas share therein be allotted to the plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 8 being aggrieved by the decision have filed this appeal.

    5. The substantial question that was argued before us is the one relating to the alleged adoption of Krushna by his maternal uncle Loknath (D.W 1). Undoubtedly a very serious onus lay upon defendant No. 1 to establish it and the sole question for consideration is whether the evidence on record is sufficient to establish that the adoption did take place. Although the exact date of birth of Krushna is not on record, there is no dispute that he was born sometime about the year 1925 at village Bondala. According to the contesting defendants it is on the twenty-first day of the birth of Krushna that he was given in adoption to his maternal uncle.

    6. The four witnesses who speak-about the giving and taking ceremony at the alleged adoption are D.Ws 1, 2, 6 and 8. D.W 1 being the maternal uncle and D.W 2 being the person who is said to have officiated as barber at the ceremony. D.W 8 is defendant No. 1 and D.W 6 is a resident of Bondala. D.W 1 described the ceremony thus:—

    “There was Satyanalrayan Puja on the occasion of 21st day ceremony of Krushna in village Bondala where and when I took him as my adopted son, Puja and Pala were performed on the ceremony. After it was over Jairam made over Krushna to me saying that as you asked for the son I hereby give you. I accepted Krushna as my son. Rasananda Barik acted as my barber.”

    7. D.W 1 says that immediately after the adoption ceremony, he did not bring the boy to his village Bada Bhimraipur but it was a year after the adoption that he brought Krushna and his mother to Bada Bhimraipur where they staved for about a month. As the boy was suckling the mother's breast, he was not kept by D.W 1 at his house on that occasion but mother and the child returned to Bondala. It was only when the boy was five years old that D.W 1 brought him to his house where he lived thereafter till his death in 1947. In the year 1960, the present defendant No. 1 Jagannath Mohanty had filed Title suit No. 138 of 1960 in the Court of the Munsif Jaipur against Sadananda Mohanty and two others of village Bondala for a declaration of his title to certain lands and for confirmation of his Possession therein. The defendants in that suit had contended inter alia that the suit was bad for non-joinder of Parties as Chanchala (the present plaintiff) the widow of the brother of the plaintiff in that such was a necessary party thereto. The plaintiff in that suit countered this contention on the ground that Chanchala's husband Krushna had been adopted by his maternal uncle. This maternal uncle who is D.W 1 in the present litigation was examined as P.W 4 in that suit. There he had deposed that the person who officiated as barber at the adoption ceremony was dead. During the cross-examination of D.W 1 his attention was drawn to his previous statement which has been marked as Ext. 11(b). D.W 2 is Rasananda Barik who claims that in the capacity of a barber of D.W 1 he accompanied Lokanath to Bondala and attended the adoption ceremony. It seems by then he was only 10 to 11 years old. He admits that by the time the ceremony took place, his own father was alive. D.W 2 was also examined P.W 5 in the previous suit (T.S 138/60). But he did not depose in that suit that he had attended the adoption ceremony. In fact, as earlier pointed out the statement of Lokanath (D.W 1) in that suit was that the barber who attended the adoption ceremony alone with him was dead. Obviously in an attempt to reconcile these two statements, D.W 2 stated that his father also had been to Bondala on the day the adoption ceremony took place. But he left the village at 4 p.m because he had to attend a Sudhi ceremony. This is altogether a new story and if there was any truth in the statement now made by D.W 2 that he had attended the adoption ceremony nothing prevented him from saving so in the previous suit. We are, therefore, not prepared to place any reliance on the evidence of D.W 2 that he had witnessed the alleged adoption ceremony. D.W 6 claims to be another witness who was present at the adoption ceremony. His version is as follows:

    “I attended the 21st day ceremony of Krushna on which date the adoption took place. Pothi Puja was performed by a Brahmin Boli Panda in the Thakura-ghar on the front verandah. Jayaram brought the child to the place of puja. After the child was placed at the place of worship Lokanath requested Javaram to give the baby to him and thereafter Jairam said I have not made up my mind. How can I give? But Lokanath said he would adopt. Javaram made over the child to Lokanath.”

    8. If adoption had really taken place on the day as alleged such a decision to give the boy in adoption must have been taken much earlier than the day on which the adoption is said to have taken place. If that be so there would be no occasion for Javaram to say that “I have not made up my mind. How can I give?” This dramatic touch which D.W 6 wanted to lend to his evidence only exposes its hollowness and shows that the evidence given by this witness cannot be relied upon. In view of the categorical statement of D.W 1 that the witnesses to the adoption of Krushna are all dead, it appears to us that such of the witnesses as are now coming forward to depose about the adoption cannot be believed. The last witness who speaks about the adoption ceremony is defendant No. 1 examined as D.W 8. He states that his brother Krushna was adopted on his 21st day by his uncle and that after the Puja his father brought the child to the place of worship and handed over the child to his maternal uncle Lokanath who accepted the child in adoption. In the previous suit (T.S 138/60”) however where he was examined as P.W 3 he stated that Krushna was aged 4 or 5 years when his adoption took place and that after Satvanaravan Pala was over, his mother gave the child to his maternal uncle (Exts. 12 and 12.c).

    9. Having carefully considered the evidence regarding the alleged adoption ceremony we are satisfied that the evidence is so discrepant and untrustworthy that no reliance can be placed on the same. Mr. H.G Panda, learned Advocate for appellants contends that this adoption had taken place round about the year 1925 and as it was sought to be proved about 40 years thereafter in 1967, every allowance for the absence of any evidence to prove such a fact has to be favourably entertained. Doubtless under the Hindu Law, giving and receiving of the boy are rather absolutely necessary for the validity of an adoption and it is therefore to be satisfactorily proved that the boy was given by his natural father and received by the adoptive father. Cases may arise where after a very long lapse of time a dispute may arise as to whether such an adoption had taken place and it is conceivable that at that distance of time persons who had witnessed the adoption ceremony are dead. It is therefore impossible in such cases to prove; by direct testimony that giving and taking ceremony had actually taken place, and on that ground the adoption cannot be disbelieved. One has in such circumstances to rely on circumstantial evidence. Long recognition as an adopted son raises a strong presumption regarding the validity of the adoption. Evidence showing that the boy was treated by relations including the person who later on challenges the same, for a long time as the adopted son at a time when there was no controversy is sufficient to prove the adoption although evidence of actual giving and taking is not forthcoming. But it is not the defendant's case that persons who were present at the adoption ceremony are all dead. At least four witnesses have come forward to say that they were present at the alleged adoption ceremony. When such is the case, the evidence has to be scrutinised like any other evidence and so scrutinised we find that it is absolutely unworthy of credence.

    10. A number of witnesses have been examined some on the defendant's side to say that Krushna was living in the house of Lokanath Swain as his son and some on the plaintiff's side to say that Krushna was never adopted by Lokanath, that he was never living in his house and that he was all along staving in his father's house at Bondala. It is in evidence that Lokanath Swain has two daughters who are older in age than Krushna. If Lokanath had ever adopted Krushna these two daughters should have surely known about it. It is significant that they were not examined in the suit. The contesting defendants sought to make capital of the fact that Krushna died in the house of Lokanath a fact not denied by the plaintiff. While the defendants would say that Krushna was living in the house of Lokanath Swain all along and died there, it is the plaintiff's case that Krushna had been on a casual visit to his uncle's house where he fell ill and died. There is nothing unusual about such an explanation. At any rate, this single circumstance would not in any way help the defendants to establish that Krushna was the adopted son of Lokanath Swain.

    11. Lokanath Swain the alleged adoptive father of Krushna had married twice. Through his first wife he had two daughters and three sons. These three sons died but the daughters are alive. Shortly thereafter his first wife died Lokanath was then about 36 years old. He married a second wife who was then 17 to 18 years old. According to D.W 1 a year after he married the second wife he had taken Krushna in adoption. It is year stronsly contended by Mr. Swain appearing for the respondents that it is highly unlikely that when Lokanath was only 36 years old and married a second wife, he would have thought of taking a boy in adoption. This is not a case where Lokanath had found himself to be impotent. He had as many as five children born through his first wife although unfortunately the three sons died one after the other. He had taken a second wife who at the time of marriage was only 17 to 18 years old and he must have naturally expected at that time that some issues would be born through her. In fact, three issues were born through his second wife, the eldest one a male child been born two years after the second marriage. That male child died immediately after birth, the second issue was also a male child and he lived upto his 14th year. His name was Sarat. It is true that if there is otherwise very satisfactory and unimpeachable evidence about the adoption the circumstances discussed above would not be sufficient to falsify such evidence. But, as indicated above, the evidence adduced on the: defendant's side regarding the actual adoption being highly unsatisfactory, the circumstances discussed above only go to strengthen the plaintiff's contention that not only was there no satisfactory evidence about the adoption, but that the circumstantial evidence also shows that there could not have been any adoption.

    12. Lokanath was a teacher of his village school. Ext. 6 is the entry in the School Admission Register showing that his son Sarat was admitted in the School on 4-1-1934. This entry said to be in the hand-writing of Adikanda Misra the Head Pandit of the School was proved by P.W 4. If Lokanath had adopted Krushna one would naturally expect Lokanath to get him admitted in the School and if in the Admission Register Krushna would have been described as the son of Lokanath that would have been a very strong piece of evidence in your of the defendants. But there is no evidence to show that Krushna ever read in the Primary School at Bhimraipur. It is obviously to get over this difficulty that Lokanath stated that he never got any of his sons admitted in the School but only taught them at home. This statement cannot be believed. Although by the time Lokanath was examined in Court Ext. 6 was already there, he did not deny that this entry did not relate to his son Sarat. On the other hand the plaintiff relies on Ext. 1 which is an entry in the Admission Register of the Bondala School showing that one Batakrushna Mohanty son of Javaram Mohanty had been admitted in that school. Evidence is let in on the plaintiff's side to show that Krushna the husband of the plaintiff was also known as Batakrushna. If this evidence is believed and it is held, that Ext. 1 relates to the plaintiff's husband, it would completely belie the defendant's case that Krushna had been adopted by Lokanath and had been living in his house at Bhimraipur. There is no evidence to show that besides Javaram Mohanty the father of defendant No. 1 there was any other Javaram Mohanty in village Bondala whose son could be Batakrushna referred to in Ext. 1. It, therefore, appears to us that there is some truth in the plaintiff's case that Krushna was also known as Batakrushna and that Ext. 1 reates to the plaintiffs husband.

    13. The appellants rely on Ext. A/1 an entry in the Voter's list of 1958. It is said that this list relates to Bhimraipur village. Ext. A/1 shows that one Chanchala Bewa wife of Krushna Chandra Swain was registered as a voter of that village, D.W 3 proves this entry. We get it from D.W 3 that Bhimraipur is included in Rameswar Grama Panchavat. But Ext. A the certified copy of the voter's list shows that it is in respect of mouza Raha Dada comprised, in Gopinathpur Grama Panchavat. It is therefore difficult to accept Ext. A as relating to Bhimraipur village. Assuming that Ext. A relates to Bhimraipur, it is significant that the name of Lokanath Swain D.W 1 does not find mention in the Voter's List. If as is now contended by the appellants, the plaintiff, after the death of her husband was living in the house of Lokanath one would naturally expect that Lokanath Swain's name also should find place in the voter's list in respect of house No. 22 against which Chanchala's name is mentioned Ext. A/1 therefore does not in any way help the appellants.

    14. On the plaintiff-respondent's side reliance is placed on Ext. 7.a and Ext. 8. Ext. 7 is a mortgage bond of the year 1926 executed by one Ananda Pradhan in favour of Javaram Mohanty the father of defendant No. 1. P.W 5 has deposed that when the mortgage was discharged defendant No. 1 Jagannath Mohanty on behalf of himself and his brother Krushna made the endorsement Ext. 7.a on the bond and returned it to Ananda Pradhan, Apart from making this endorsement on the bond Jagannath on behalf of himself and his minor brother Krushna is also alleged to have passed the receipt Ext. 8 to Ananda Pradhan. Exts. 7 and 8 are said to have been obtained from Ananda Pradhan's son. Defendant No. 1 was confronted with these two documents and he denied the signatures purporting to be his on these two documents. We find on examination of these documents that the dates put on Exts. 7(a) and 8 had been corrected. We therefore do not consider it safe to place any reliance on these two documents especially when defendant No. 1 had denied the signatures to be his. Moreover, P.W 5 does not say that he was present when Ext. 7.a and Ext. 8 were executed. No explanation has been offered as to why the son of Ananda Pradhan from whose custody Exts. 7 and 8 are said to have been obtained was not examined to prove the entries.

    15. Another document on which reliance is placed on the plaintiff-respondent's side is Ext. 4 which is a plaint in a certificate case started against defendant No. 1 and his brother Krushna and some others in the year 1926 by the Darpan Darna Estate. In that plaint, Krushna Mohanty is described as the son of Javaram Mohanty and being minor was represented by his mother Sadhabi Bewa. P.W 2 has proved this plaint as being in the handwriting of one Naravan Mohanty a clerk in Naib Tahasildar's office and it bears the seal of the Certificate Officer. Its genuineness cannot therefore be doubted. If as is alleged, Krushna had been adopted by Lokanath and he therefore ceased to be a member of his natural family as long ago as in the year 1925, it is not explained how in the year 1936 he could have been sued along with other members of his natural family for recovery of rent and how in the plaint Ext. 4 he could have been described as the son of Javaram Mohanty. This is a circumstance which belies the story of the alleged adoption.

    16. The plaintiff's husband was admittedly the son of Javaram Mohanty and the vounger brother of defendant No. 1. It is on that footing that she has filed the suit for partition claiming a share in Jayaram's properties. Defendant No. 1 seeks to defeat her claim on the allegation that her husband had been adopted by his maternal uncle Lokanath Swain and the onus lay upon him to establish by satisfactory evidence that such adoption had taken place. After a careful examination of the evidence on record both oral and documentary, we are satisfied that not only defendant No. 1 has failed to establish adoption by cogent and satisfactory evidence but that the circumstances indicate that no such adoption could have taken place. The learned subordinate Judge was therefore, correct in rejecting the plea of adoption. In view of this finding, it is unnecessary for us to answer the further question whether the adoption if true is valid in law.

    17. The only other substantial contention urged on behalf of the appellants is that all the terms of family properties having not been included in the suit a suit for partial partition is not maintainable. Although as a general rule, a suit for partition must comprise the entire family property still there are exceptions to this rule which have been recognised. A suit for partial partition has been allowed when the portion excluded is not in the possession of coparcener and may consequently be deemed not to be available for partition.

    18. A suit for partial partition has also been accented when the Portion excepted is impartible property. The rule has also been relaxed when the portion is held jointly with strangers who have no interest in the family partition. The relief claimed by the plaintiff in the Present suit is to carve out certain specific shares from out of the interest which her father-in-law Javaram had in certain properties and to allot the same to her. If she has left out any Property in which Javaram had an interest it may be possible to construe that she has relinquished her right to a share in that Property, and if in future she claims any share therein, it may be possible to resist her claim on the ground that she had previously relinquished her right therein. The plaintiff is an illiterate widow who is not in possession of the documents relating to the family properties and consequently not in a Position to know all the properties which her family possessed. She has therefore, sought for partition in respect of only such of the properties which to her knowledge belonged to the family. In the circumstances, therefore, we see no reason why the entire suit should be dismissed on the ground that some other Items of property in which the family has an interest have not been included in the suit. We, therefore, overrule this contention and hold that the suit as framed, was maintainable.

    19. In the result, we would uphold the judgment and decree passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge and dismiss this appeal with costs.

    20. S.K Ray, A.C.J:— I agree.

    21. Appeal dismissed.

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    Jagannath Mohanty And Another v. Chanchala Bewa And Others
    (Sep 22, 1972)