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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for the murder of Beni Ganda (the deceased) by blows with an axe and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. The prosecution case, briefly, is that on the morning of 2-3-1966 a group including the deceased, Tiari Gandani (p.w.12), her husband (p.w.14) and others were returning from Lesunbahal when two assailants approached: one armed with an axe and the other with a knife. P.w.12 witnessed the entire incident; other witnesses (p.ws 11, 14, 15 and 16) saw parts of the occurrence. The attacker with the axe allegedly dealt multiple blows, including a fatal blow to the neck, while the other assailant stabbed the deceased. The deceased died instantaneously at the spot.

The F.I.R. (Ext. 14) was lodged the same day at Titlagarh Police Station. After investigation and committal proceedings the appellant and one Bhima Bag stood trial on a charge under section 302/31 IPC. The trial court acquitted Bhima Bag (benefit of doubt) and convicted the appellant under section 302 IPC, imposing life imprisonment. The appellant appealed.

The post-mortem (p.w.2) recorded multiple external and internal injuries, including a near-severance at the level of the 2nd and 3rd cervical vertebrae, which the doctor opined could have caused instantaneous death. The prosecution led eyewitness evidence, a test identification parade (T.I. parade) conducted by a Magistrate (p.w.3), seizure of an axe (M.O VI) and a silken napkin (M.O VIII) stained with human blood, serological and chemical reports confirming blood on the exhibits, and evidence that the appellant was on casual leave for the period of occurrence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction under section 302 IPC was justified on the evidence led (eyewitness testimony, medical evidence and corroborative circumstances).
  2. Whether the test identification parade (T.I. parade) in which the appellant was identified was conducted in a lawful and reliable manner, despite deviation from the recommended procedure in Rule 236(a) of Chapter XI of the Orissa Police Manual and the putting up of more than one suspect together.
  3. What weight should be given to prior test identification proceedings in light of the surrounding circumstances and applicable principles (including the relevance of identification parades under section 162 CrPC and the need for corroboration).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The T.I. parade was not conducted in the proper, legal and desired manner: two suspects were mixed together for identification in a single parade and only 13 others were mixed with them, contrary to Rule 236(a) of the Orissa Police Manual (which recommends mixing each suspect with eight to ten men of similar dress, age, religion and social status).
  • The appellant alleged that the Magistrate conducting the parade pointed him out to witnesses, enabling identification; alternatively, the parade permitted chance or tutored identification.
  • In his statement under section 342 CrPC the appellant denied the allegations and claimed the case was foisted by the police because he had not paid a demand of Rs. 600/- to them.

Prosecution's Position / Evidence (as described in the opinion)

  • Eyewitness evidence: p.w.12 saw the entire occurrence; p.ws 11, 14, 15 and 16 saw parts. All identified the appellant in Court as the person who struck the deceased with an axe.
  • T.I. parade evidence: a Magistrate (p.w.3) conducted a T.I. inside Titlagarh Jail on 16-3-1966; the two suspects were mixed with 13 under-trial prisoners (total 15 persons). Witnesses were called in one by one; the suspects' positions were changed for each witness; no police officer was present inside the jail during the parade.
  • Forensic and circumstantial corroboration: an axe (M.O VI) seized from a nearby paddy field bore human blood stains (chemical/serological reports Ext. 24, 25); a silken napkin (M.O VIII) seized nearby also bore human blood stains though it was not positively identified as belonging to the appellant; the appellant was on casual leave for the relevant dates and there was no evidence he remained at his place of work, which the court considered a corroborative circumstance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asharfi v. State, A.I.R. 1961 All. 153 Approved observations (from Satya Narain) about desirable procedures for identification parades — preferably putting up each suspect separately mixed with a large number (about 9–10) of innocent men; deprecated putting several suspects together in one parade as likely to cause confusion. The court described the Asharfi observations as salutary and wholesome guidance. It noted that, despite these observations, the Asharfi court accepted and acted upon identification parade evidence that deviated from the ideal procedure. The present court relied on Asharfi to say the ideal practice is desirable but not an absolute rule invalidating a parade on slight deviation.
Satya Narain v. State, A.I.R. 1953 All. 385 Desai J.'s statement that the proper way to hold identification proceedings is to put up each suspect separately and mix with as large a number of innocent men as possible (in any case not less than 9–10). The court cited this authority as laying down the proper procedure as desirable guidance for conducting T.I. parades. The decision was used to support the proposition that Rule 236(a) represents a desirable practice but is not necessarily an imperative legal requirement that will void a parade on slight non-observance.
Budhsen v. State of U.P., 1970 2 SCC 128 Explains that evidence of prior test identification is relevant but not substantive evidence; it belongs to investigation stage, is inherently weaker, and courts should normally seek corroboration of in-court identification; identification parades are governed by section 162 CrPC. S.K. Ray, J. quoted this passage and used its principles to explain the legal character of test identification parades, the need for corroboration, and why the prior T.I. parade in the present case (held before a Magistrate) supported the in-court identifications. The court relied on Budhsen to show that prior identification, properly conducted, strengthens trustworthiness and may be acted upon when corroborated.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the medical evidence, eyewitness testimony, the circumstances of the identification parade, and corroborative material. The principal steps in the court's analysis were:

  1. Medical evidence: The post-mortem by p.w.2 recorded multiple cut/incised and penetrating injuries, notably an incised wound at the level of the 2nd and 3rd cervical vertebrae that almost severed the neck; the doctor opined the injuries were ante-mortem and that the neck injury alone could have caused instantaneous death. From this the court concluded the death was homicidal.
  2. Eyewitness testimony: P.w.12 claimed to have seen the entire incident and the appellant assaulting the deceased with an axe. Other eyewitnesses (p.ws 11, 14, 15 and 16) saw parts and supported the account. The trial court had found, after considering identification and corroborative evidence, that the appellant was the person who delivered the fatal axe blow; the appellate court examined and upheld that finding.
  3. Challenge to identification parade: The defence attacked the T.I. parade on the grounds of non-observance of Rule 236(a) (mixing suspects with the recommended number of persons and separately staging suspects) and alleged that the Magistrate pointed out the appellant. The court analysed Rule 236(a) and concluded it is an executive instruction binding on police officers (authoritative guidance) but not an inflexible legal rule that ipso facto invalidates identification evidence upon slight deviation.
  4. Precedent and practice: The court reviewed Asharfi and Satya Narain which recommend putting up each suspect separately mixed with a large number of innocent persons (about 9–10), and acknowledged those recommendations as desirable. However, Asharfi itself accepted evidence from parades that deviated from the ideal. Thus, the court held that non-observance of the precise numerical recommendation does not automatically vitiate a parade.
  5. Specific facts of the T.I. parade: The T.I. parade here was conducted by a First Class Magistrate (p.w.3) inside Titlagarh Jail where the two suspects were mixed with 13 under-trial prisoners (15 persons total). Witnesses were called in one by one, positions of suspects were changed, only two jail clerks were present inside, and no police officer was present near the witnesses outside the jail. The court found these safeguards significant and found nothing on record to support the allegation that the Magistrate had pointed out the appellant.
  6. Credibility of the Magistrate and witnesses: The court rejected defence contentions that p.w.3's testimony was unreliable because some parade details did not appear in his formal report (Ext. 5). The court accepted that minor details may not be memorized without reference to records, but the Magistrate could reliably remember substantive matters about where and how the parade was conducted. No basis existed to draw an adverse inference against this responsible public servant.
  7. Corroboration and circumstantial evidence: The court took into account corroborative material — the axe (M.O VI) and silken napkin (M.O VIII) seized from a nearby paddy field stained with human blood (per chemical/serological reports). Although no one positively identified the napkin as belonging to the appellant, these seizures close to the scene with bloodstains were considered significant. Additionally, the appellant's leave from his employment during the period of the offence was treated as a circumstance supporting the prosecution case.
  8. Weight of identification evidence: The court applied the principle (as articulated in Budhsen) that prior test identification is investigatory in character and not substantive but can strengthen in-court identification when properly conducted. The court concluded that, on the whole, the T.I. parade and subsequent in-court identifications were reliable: witnesses had opportunity to observe (p.w.12 in particular was in close proximity), the parade was conducted with reasonable safeguards, and there was supporting corroboration.
  9. Final assessment: Having considered medical, ocular and corroborative evidence and the manner of the T.I. parade, the court concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the assailant who inflicted the fatal axe blow and that the murder charge was proved.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court upheld the conviction under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life; the appeal was dismissed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the appellant's conviction and life sentence (under section 302 IPC) stand affirmed by the appellate Court.
  • The court emphasized that recommended procedures for identification parades (such as those in Rule 236(a) of the Orissa Police Manual and the guidance in Satya Narain and Asharfi) are salutary and should be followed, but a slight deviation from those recommendations does not automatically vitiate a parade if the court is satisfied the parade was conducted fairly and the identification is reliable.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; rather it applies existing principles (including those in Budhsen, Satya Narain and Asharfi) to the facts and finds the identification and other evidence sufficiently trustworthy to sustain the conviction.

    Sadhu Bag v. The State .

    S. Acharya, J.:— The appellant stands convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code for having murdered one Beni Ganda with axe and has been sentenced thereunder to undergo R.I for life.

    2. The prosecution case, in short, is that Tiari Gandani, p.w 12, and her husband p.w 14, along with some others, had gone to the house of p.w 12's father at Lesunbahal in connection with some marriage negotiation. In the morning of 2-3-1966 they, along with the deceased and p.ws 11, 15 and 10, were returning from Lesunbahal. After they had crossed village Ghodar and when p.w 12 and the deceased were just approaching the Nektimunda Nala, p.w 12 saw that from the left side of the road two persons, one of whom had held and axe and the other a knife, came running, and each of them picked up a stone from the road side and scolded her father (deceased Beni Ganda) in filthy language and were about to throw stones at him. Her father was receding back while appealing to those persons not to assault him. At that time one of the two accused persons who held an axe threw away the stone and with the axe in his hand dealt an axe blow on the head of p.w 12's father, Beni Ganda. The other man with the knife with him stabbed Beni Ganda in his right side. On seeing this p.w 12 shouted out that her father was being killed and called out to her maternal uncle Machhu Suna (p.w 11) and her husband p.w 14, who were walking ahead of them, to come running to that place. When she appealed to the assailants not to assault her father, the assilant who held the axe dealt another axe blow on the back of the neck of her father as a result of which he fell down on the ground with profusely bleeding injuries on his bead and neck. The other assailant, who held the knife, dragged away p.w 12 from that place and pushed her aside. Then the man with the axe dealt some more axe blows on her father, and the other man stabbed her father with the knife in his hand. P.ws 11, 14 and 15, who came running to that place in response to the call and shouts of p.w 12 were threatened by the assailants by the show of the knife and the axe and were asked not to come near the spot. On being afraid of the situation and the threatening attitude of the assailants p.ws 11, 14 and 15 went away from that place. The assailants then left the place. Beni Ganda instantaneously died at the spot on receiving the above mentioned blows. Thereafter p.w 14 (the husband of p.w 12) came there, and many others, on receiving information from p.w 14, gradually assembled at the spot. After a while p.w 12 along with others went to the Titlagarh Police Station (six miles away from the place of occurrence) and there lodged the F.I.R Ext. 14 on the same day at 2.30 p.m After investigation and the commitment proceeding the appellant and one Bhima Bag (since acquitted) stood their trial on a charge under section 302/31, Indian Penal Code. The trial Court acquitted the said Bhima Bag by giving him the benefit of doubt, and convicted the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him thereunder as stated above. The accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellant Sadhu Bag in his statement under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code refuted all the allegations against him, and stated that this false case was foisted against him by the police as he could not pay Rs. 600/- to the police as demanded by them. With regard to the prosecution evidence that he was identified in a T.I parade conducted by a Magistrate, he alleged that he could be so identified only because the said Magistrate pointed him out to the witness identifying him in the said parade.

    3. The doctor p.w 2 who held the post mortem examination on the dead body of Beni Ganda on 3-3-1966 at 12 O'clook found the following external injuries on his person:

    (1) One incised wound at the level of the second and third carvical vertebral dividing the neck which is attached to the body only by a tag of skin of the front and left side of the neck.

    (2) One incised wound 2¼″ × gaping bone deep lying almost vertically in the left side of the forehead and frontal region of the skull beginning from a point 1″ above the left eye brow.

    (3) One incised wound 2″ × ½″ × ½″ deep lying vertically in the right supra scapular region of the back.

    (4) One incised wound 1½″ × ½″ deep lying vertically on the left side of the back in the 8th inter-costal space one and half inch from the mid-line.

    (5) One incised wound 1″ × ½″ × ½″ lying in the right 8th inter-costal space in the back one inch away from the mid-line.

    (6) One panetrating wound 1¼″ × ¾″ × 3½″ deep obliquely in the right loin.

    (7) One penetrating wound 1″ × ¾″ entering into the abdominal cavity in the right iliac phosa and through this wound a portion of the omentum and mesentery of the small intestine have come out.

    (8) One incised wound 3″ × ½″ × ½″ deep lying vertically in the outer aspect of the lower third of the left thigh 3″ above the knee joint.

    4. P.w 2 speaks only about the following interna 1 injuries.

    (1) All the important structures of the neck including the spinal cord have been fully divided at the level of the 2nd and 3rd cervical vertebrae. The neck is attached to the trunk only by a tag of akin of the left and front side of the neck.

    (2) There is extra vessasion of large amount of blood in the suboutineous tissue of the right loin.

    (3) About one ounce of blood was deposited in the right iliac phosa of the abdomen which has trick-led inside from the external injury.

    5. It is evident from the above that the doctor did not dissect all the different parts of the deadbody having the other external injuries. He has opined that all the injuries found by him were ante mortem in nature; external injuries 1 to 4 and 8 could have been caused by the axe sent to him and external injuries 5 to 7 could have been caused by the knife sent to him; injury No. 1 could be possible by one or more strokes; and that on receiving the above mentioned injuries the deceased might have died instantaneously. In cross-examination he has further stated, and it is also quite obvious, that external injury No. 1, by which the head was almost severed from the body, was alone sufficient to cause instataneous death. Probably because of the nature of this injury and the obviously conclusions following therefrom, the doctor did not proceed to examine the internal consequences of the other external injuries. He proved his post mortem report Ext. 3.

    6. On a perusal of the evidence of p.w 2 and his post mortem report Ext. 3 we are convinced that the death of the deceased was homicidal.

    7. P.w 12 saw the entire occurrence from the beginning to the end, and p.ws 11, 14, 15 and 16 saw the occurrence in parts. Mr. Ray, the learned counsel for the appellant, apart from questioning the prosecution evidence relating to the identification of the appellant, which I will advert to later, did not contest any other aspects of the eye-witness version of the occurrence as testified to by the above-mentioned p.ws 9. On a perusal of their evidence and that of the doctor p.w 2 we are satisfied that it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that two assailant deal-several blows on the deceased, one with an axe and the other with a knife, as a result of which he sustained the several bleeding injuries on his person found by the doctor and died instantaneously at the spot. The Court below, on a consideration and discussion of the evidence of identification together with other relevant evidence supporting the same, baa arrived at the unequovocal finding that it was the appellant who with an axe dealt the fatal blow on the neck of the deceased. Of the several injuries on the deceased caused by an axe, the ante mortem external injury no. 1 on the neck, as stated above, was alone sufficient to cause his instantaneous death. On the above findings the Court below has arrived at the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of the offence of murder.

    8. Mr. Ray as stated above without assailing any other finding challenged only the finding of the Court below relating to the identification to of the appellant. In that connection he urged that the T.I parade was not conducted in the proper, legal and desired manner as both the suspect's were mixed up put up for identification in one T.I parade and they were only with 13 others, thus contravening the provisions of rule 236(a) of Chapter XI of the Orissa Police Manual. The portion of this rule relevant to the above contention is: “On arrival the suspect shall mixed up with eight or ten men of similar dress, age, religion and social status.” Mr. Ray has not been able to show that non-observance of the provisions of the aforesaid rule would amount to an illegality, ipso facto, invalidating the parade in its entirety, rendering evidence thereof inadmissible in the case. The preface to the Orissa Police Manual shows that the rule's contained therein are binding only on police officers, and serve as authoritative guidance for other officers of the Government. The above rule, therefore, is an executive instruction indicating certain desirable things to be done in holding and conducting a T.I parade. The purpose underlying the rule of mixing a large number of persons with the suspects in a T.I parade is to eliminate the possibilities of chance identification or identification by extraneous aid, thereby rendering evidence of identification more weighty, reliable and authentic. No hard and fast rule of law is or can be laid down as to the proportion in which others have to be mixed with the suspects, but at the same time care must be taken to mix as large number of other persons as possible in order to obviate to the maximum extent the above unwanted and undesirable possibilities which nullify the very purpose for which such a parade is conducted.

    9. The provision in Rule 236(a) of mixing 8 to 10 persons with each suspect is wholesome and desirable, but it cannot be be said that it is such an imperative rule that merely on slight deviation from the same the parade is vitiated, of on that account alone evidence thereof should be disregarded. The above rule as is evident therefrom makes a flexible provision for mixing 8 to 10 persons with each suspect, and it does not state that in no ease two or more suspects can be put together for identification in one parade.

    10. Mr. Ray in support of his above-mentioned contention cited the decision in Asharfi v. State . A.I.R 1961 All. 153., wherein their Lordships, while laying down various desirable things in connection with an identification parade, have accepted with approval the observations made by Desai, J. in the case reported in Satya Narain v. State . A.I.R 1953 All. 385., to the effect that the proper way to hold identification proceedings is to put up each suspect separately for identification, mixed up with as large a number of innocent men as possible, in any case not less than 9 to 10. As each witness comes up for identification it will be seen whether he identifies the suspect or not. In Asharfi's case their Lordships were dealing with two identification parades, la one two suspects were mixed with 20 under-trial prisoners and in the other 4 suspects were mixed up with 40 under-trial prisoners. Their Lordships deprecated the practice of putting up several suspects together in one parade consequently making the parade large and unwieldy, thereby causing confusion for even a most honest witness. In expressing approval for the above and some other views of Desai J. in Satya Narain v. State, their Lordships have stated that if the procedure mentioned therein is adopted the proceedings will be made as simple as possibles no complication of innocent men being picked up in the parade would arise, an honest witness will have every chance of displaying his integrity and artificial means of judging Veracity will be avoided to a large extent. Saying bo they hoped that the U.P Government would incorporate the said procedure as a rule in its standing instructions. All that has been stated in the above decision in connection with the identification parade are salutary and wholesome requiring utmost care and efforts for the observance of the same.

    11. Their Lordships, after laying down the above and certain other desirable things in connection with identification parades, ultimately accepted and acted upon the evidence of the two above-mentioned parades of the nature and character stated above.

    12. In the present case the T.I parade was conducted by p.w 3, a Magistrate, First Class, inside the Titlagarh Jail on 16-3-1966 at 3.30 p.m P.w 3 has testified to the fact that in that parade, held inside the jail, the two suspects were mixed up with 13 under-trial prisoners of the same stature, complexsion, height, physique and dress. Accordingly the witnesses were required to identify the two suspects from amongst the 15 such persons in that parade. All of them were wearing Dhotis and none of them had any other clothings on his body. The 5 witnesses who came to identify the suspects were kept outside the jail and they were called inside the jail one after another to identify the suspects. The position of the suspects in the parade was changed for each witness. Apart from p.w 3, only two clerks of the said jail were present inside the jail during the T.I parade and no police officer was present anywhere near that place or near about the witnesses outside the jail. P.ws 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16, the five witnesses who came to identify the suspects have testified to the fact that they had no prior acquaintance with the two assailants and that they for the first time saw them during the said occurrence. The testimony of p.w 12 to the above effect gets corroboration from her similar statements in the F.I.R

    13. Mr. Ray questioned the credibility of the evidence of p.w 3 on the ground that though in cross-examination he stated that it was not possible for him to state all details about the T.I parade without reference to the case record, in his examination-in-chief he stated various details about the same even though there was no mention of these facts in hie report, Ext. 5, drawn up in that connection. There is no substance in the above contention. On reading his entire evidence it is quite clear that all that he meant by stating as above in his cross-examination is that, it was not possible for him to state all the minute details relating to the T.I parade, such as the names of the witnesses, the names of the suspects, the actual number of persons mixed up in the T.I parade, the names of other persons present at that place and other such details which one cannot possibly remember without reference to the relevant reports and connected case records. It is always possible for a man of average intelligence (and p.w 3 can reasonably be expected to be one such person) to remember the place where he conducted a T.I parade, the place where the witnesses for identification were waiting and such other important features and details about the parade. Merely because in his examination-in-chief he mentioned about some such important details which do not find place in his report Ext. 5, it cannot be said that this witness, a Magistrate of the First Class, falsely stated those things from his imagination though they were not within his knowledge, and thus violated the solemn oath taken by him in the witness box. There is nothing on record on which any such adverse inference can be drawn against p.w 3, a responsible public servant of the class and category on which the society and the law of the land repose confidence. On the above consideration we do not find any substance in the above contention.

    14. On a perusal of the evidence of p.w 3 and that of the identifying witnesses we are satisfied that the appellant was properly identified in the T.I parade without any mistake. Nothing convincing could be shown on which it can be said that the identifying witnesses had a prior opportunity of seeing the appellant any where after the occurrence or that they were tutored by somebody or had access to extraneous aid, which enabled them to identify the appellant in the said parade. The appellant's allegation that the witnesses identified him in the parade on being pointed out by the Magistrate is entirely baseless and unworthy of credence. The very fact that four of the witnesses could not identify another suspect mixed up in the parade renders improbable the possibility of tutoring. In Court also the appellant was identified by all the eye-witnesses as the person who assaulted the deceased with an axe.

    15. On a careful perusal of the evidence of the Magistrate, p.w 3, and that of the eye-witnesses identifying the appellant in the parade we are convinced that the T.I parade was conducted in a fair and proper manner and all the witnesses correctly identified the appellant in that parade without any fumbling or bungling. On all the above considerations we do not find any merit in the above contentions raised by Mr. Ray in this connection.

    16. Apart from the above evidence of identification, some of the eye-witnesses have also deposed that at the time of the occurrence the appellant had a silken napkin around his waist. A silken napkin, M.O VIII, was seized from a paddy field at a close distance from the place where the deadbody was lying. The chemical examiner's report, Ext. 24, and the Serologist's report, Ext. 25, shows that the silken napkin, M.O VIII, bad stains of human blood. Of course nobody has identified the seized silken napkin, M.O VIII, as belonging to the appellant.

    17. All the eye-witnesses have consistently stated that it was the appellant who dealt blows on the deceased with an axe. An axe, M.O VI, was seized from the aforesaid paddy field from where M.O VIII was seized. This axe, on chemical examination and serological test was found to have stains of human blood. The seisure M.O VI & M.O VIII with the stains of human blood from a place not far from the deadbody in the context of the evidence mentioned above is also of some significance.

    18. It is also in evidence that the appellant, who was serving as a gardner in the P.W.D Inspection Bunglow at Eayagada, was on casual leave for three days from 2-3-1966 to to 4-3-1966 (occurrence on 2-3-1966) and there is no evidence to the contrary to show that during the said period he stayed back at Rayagada and did not avail of the said leave granted to him. This is again another circumstance which lends support to the prosecution case.

    19. As stated above Mr. Ray did not assail the findings of the Court below on any other ground except the finding relating to the identification of the appellant discussed above. We have gone through the evidence on record, and we are thoroughly satisfied that the finding of the Court below that it is the appellant who with an axe dealt several blows on the deceased and particularly the fatal axe blow on his neck, as a result of which he instantaneously died at the spot, is perfectly justified and correct. We are satisfied that the charge of murder against the appellant has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt and so his conviction under section 302, Indian Penal Code and the sentence passed thereunder are perfectly justified and are hereby upheld.

    20. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.

    S.K Ray, J.:— I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. But I would like to add a few words as to the law of identification and the reasons why I am of the opinion that the evidence of identification led in Court shall be acted upon in this case.

    21. Identification of accused in a test identification parade held before a Magistrate in course of police investigation is a relevant fact, but such evidence is not sustantive evidence in the sense that that is not evidence led in Court in course of trial. It is pertinent to quote a passage on this aspect of the law from a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Budhsen v. State of U.P . 1970 2 SCC 128. The passage runs thus:

    “The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The evidence in order to carry conviction should ordinarily clarify as to how and under what circumstances he came to pick out the particular accused person and the details of the part which the accused played in the crime in question with reasonable particularity. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding. There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule, when, or example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness, on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the investigation stage. They are generally held during the course of investigation with the primary object of enabling the witnesses to identify persons concerned in the offence, who were not previously known to them. This serves to satisfy the investigating officers of the bona fides of the prosecution witnesses and also to furnish evidence to corroborate their testimony in Court. Identification proceedings in their legal effect amount simply to this that certain persons are brought to jail or some other place and make statements either express or implied that certain individuals whom they point out are persons whom the recognise as having been concerned in the crime. They do not consitute substantive evidence. These parades are essentially governed by section 162, Criminal Procedure Code.”

    22. To take the evidence of prior test identification in a parade from out of the prohibited ambit of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code it is held by a Magistrate. In this case p.ws 11, 12, 14 and 15 have identified the appellant as the accused who was holding an axe and dealt the deceased blows with it. As the evidence stands. P.w 12 was in close proximity of this appellant while he was kilting her father with the axe, and had, therefore opportunity to observe the physiognomy of the appellant more closely than the other witnesses. P.ws 11, 14 and 15 also came near the place of murder and had been threatended away by the accused. These witnesses in fact asked the accused not to assault the deceased and were threatened in return. Thus, they came face to face with the accused persons. It was broad daylight and so their chances of identification were good. It will be further seen that these witnesses identified the appellant in the prior test identification parade held on 2-3-1966. Thereafter, they again identified them in Court about two years later. Identification in Court related not only to the identification of the accused as the assailant, but also to the details of the part the accused played in the crime and the weapon used by him, at the time of commission of murder. There was a long lapse of time of about two years between the time of test identification parade held on 2-3-1966 or the identification made in committing Court on 23-1-1966 and the Court identification held in January, 1963, and yet the witnesses correctly identified the appellant with reference to the part played by him and the weapon used by him at the time of murder. This is a circumstance reinforcing the trustwothiness of the testimony of these witnesses, viz. p.ws 11, 12, 14 and 15, relating to identification. The further corroboration of the identification evidence is afforded by the fact that the appellant who was granted casual leave from 3-6-1986 to 4-6-1966, gave a false denial when questioned about his whereabouts during that period. The fact that he was granted casual leave for those days is a fact within the special knowledge of the accused and his false reply, therefore, impliedly strengthens the identification evidence. Even without the aforesaid corroborative circumstances, the testimony of p.w 12 in particular, could be safely relied upon in regard to the identification of the appellant and his part played in the occurrence.

    23. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Sadhu Bag v. The State .
    (Feb 14, 1972)