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citation codes
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  • provisions of cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act
  • cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act. Registration
  • Section 65(2) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Section 85 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.6.
  • Section 8(b) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Section 85 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.
  • Section 35 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Article 12, Limitation Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act
  • cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act. Registration
  • Section 65(2) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Section 85 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.6.
  • Section 8(b) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Section 85 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.
  • Section 35 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Article 12, Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Puri dismissing his suit for a declaration of his right in respect of twelve annas interest in a house standing on plot No. 1068 in the town of Puri and for other consequential reliefs.

The disputed property was a lease-hold house on plot No. 1068 within the town Khasmahal of Puri Collectorate, originally settled with Gadadhar Sahu, who constructed the building. The house was held to be joint property of Gadadhar Sahu and his three brothers, members of a Hindu joint family, a fact not challenged on appeal.

The plaintiff, a businessman and moneylender, had instituted a suit (M.S No. 137 of 34) against Gadadhar Sahu and his brothers for recovery of Rs. 12,653-8-0 for goods supplied on credit. Before an attachment order was served, the parties compromised, and a compromise decree was passed on 30th July 1934. The decree did not expressly incorporate a charge over the disputed house, but the petition of compromise, attached to the decree, referred to such a charge. Later, on 16th February 1939, the court ordered the petition to be made part of the decree, but no evidence was led about this order, and the lower court did not accept the endorsement as sufficient proof.

Following default by the judgment-debtors, the plaintiff filed execution proceedings, and in execution of the decree, purchased the disputed house on 16th September 1937, obtaining symbolic possession on 29th April 1938. His title was based on this court sale.

Respondent 1, a lawyer and moneylender, claimed to have purchased the entire house earlier, on 13th February 1935, in a certificate sale arising from a certificate filed by Income-tax authorities against Gadadhar Sahu for tax dues. The three brothers objected to this sale under Section 35 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act, but their objection was rejected on 15th November 1935. Respondent 2 purchased the property from respondent 1 subsequently.

The plaintiff's purchase in 1937 was later than respondent 1's purchase in 1935, which would ordinarily prevail. The plaintiff argued that a charge was created in his favour by the compromise decree and that the certificate sale affected only Gadadhar Sahu's one-fourth share, leaving the brothers' shares unaffected and thus transferable to the plaintiff by the civil court sale.

The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on three grounds: (i) Gadadhar Sahu represented the joint family in the certificate proceeding and the entire family interest passed by the sale; (ii) the charge claimed by the plaintiff was invalid as it was not created by a registered instrument nor incorporated in the operative part of the decree; and (iii) the suit was barred by limitation under Article 12 of the Limitation Act, not brought within one year from the appellate order rejecting the brothers' claim under Section 85 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Gadadhar Sahu effectively represented the joint Hindu family in the certificate proceedings such that the entire family interest in the disputed house passed by the certificate sale.
  2. Whether a valid charge was created in favour of the plaintiff by the compromise decree in respect of the disputed house, despite the absence of registration and incorporation in the operative portion of the decree.
  3. Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, considering the timeline of certificate proceedings and appeals.
  4. The priority of title between the plaintiff's court sale purchase and respondent 1's certificate sale purchase.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • A charge was created in his favour over the disputed house at the time of the compromise decree dated 30th July 1934.
  • The certificate sale affected only Gadadhar Sahu's one-fourth share, and the shares of the other three brothers remained unaffected.
  • The rights of the brothers were transferred to him by the civil court sale dated 16th September 1937.
  • He relied on the contention that the compromise was effected during attachment proceedings and thus registration was not compulsory under clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, citing Govindaswami v. Basu.

Respondent 1's Arguments

  • He purchased the entire disputed house in a certificate sale dated 13th February 1935, prior to the plaintiff's purchase.
  • Gadadhar Sahu represented the joint family in the certificate proceedings, so the entire family interest passed by the certificate sale.
  • The objection filed by the brothers under Section 35 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act was rejected, confirming the validity of the certificate sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lalchand v. Sheogobind, A.I.R(16) 1929 Pat. 741 (8 Pat. 788) A Karta of a Hindu family can effectively represent the family in certificate proceedings even if not expressly named as such. The court accepted that Gadadhar Sahu effectively represented the joint family in the certificate proceedings, so the entire family interest passed by the certificate sale.
Hari Prasad v. Lal Behari, A.I.R(27) 1910 Pat. 328 (19 Pat. 618 F.B) Support for the principle that a Karta represents the Hindu family in legal proceedings. Reinforced the court's acceptance of Gadadhar Sahu's representation of the joint family.
Kameshwar Singh v. Ishwari Prasad, A.I.R(27) 1910 Pat. 692 (189 I.C 111) Same principle regarding representation of Hindu joint family. Supported the conclusion regarding the certificate sale's effect on the entire joint family interest.
Govindaswami v. Basu, A.I.R(22) 1935 Mad. 232 (58 Mad. 781) Registration under clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act is not compulsory for a charge created in interlocutory proceedings in a money suit involving attachment before judgment. The court rejected this view, aligning with a later Bombay High Court decision, holding registration is compulsory for creating such a charge.
Chhotibai v. Mansukhlal, A.I.R(28) 1911 Bom. 1 (I.L.R 1911 Bom. 34) Dissent from the Madras view, holding registration is compulsory for such charges. The court agreed with this later Bombay High Court view, requiring registration for creating a charge in compromise petitions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined whether Gadadhar Sahu represented the entire joint family in the certificate proceedings. Applying settled principles and precedents, the court held that Gadadhar Sahu, as Karta, effectively represented the joint family, so the entire family interest passed by the certificate sale dated 13th February 1935.

Regarding the charge claimed by the plaintiff under the compromise decree, the court noted the compromise decree did not expressly create a charge in its operative portion; the reference to a charge was only in the attached petition of compromise. The court held that such a charge could not be created without a registered instrument, and registration was compulsory under the Registration Act. The plaintiff's reliance on a Madras decision to avoid registration was rejected in favor of a binding Bombay High Court decision.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a charge was created by the compromise, it was subordinate to the prior charge created by the Crown under Section 8(b) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act, since notice under Section 7 was served before the compromise.

On the limitation issue, the court found the suit barred by limitation. Although the lower court applied Article 12 of the Limitation Act, the appellate court held Article 13 was the appropriate provision, which prescribes a one-year limitation period from the date of the appellate order. The plaintiff's suit, filed years after the dismissal of the appeal by the Collector, was therefore time-barred.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim failed both on the ground of prior title of respondent 1 by certificate sale and on limitation.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The court's decision confirms that in certificate proceedings, a Karta can represent the entire Hindu joint family, causing the entire family interest to pass by sale. It also clarifies that charges purportedly created by compromise decrees must be registered to be valid and that prior statutory charges under the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act take precedence. Finally, limitation periods under the Limitation Act apply strictly to such suits, barring delayed claims.

The direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit for declaration of interest in the disputed house fails. No new precedent was established beyond application of existing principles.

    Mani Sahoo v. Lokanath Misra

    Narasimham, J.:— This is a plaintiff's appeal against the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Puri dismissing his suit for a declaration of his right in respect of twelve annas interest in a house standing on plot No. 1068 in the town of Puri and for other consequential reliefs.

    2. The said plot is within the town Khasmahal of Puri Collectorate and was settled by the Knasmahal with one Gadadhar Sahu who constructed a building thereon. One of the points agitated in the lower Court was that the house was the exclusive property of Gadadhar Sahu. But this was decided against the defendants (vide para. 7 of the lower Court's judgment) and this decision was not challenged in appeal. It may therefore be taken as well-established that the lease-hold property and the house standing on the said plot were the joint property of Gadadhar Sahu and his three brothers who admittedly were members of a Hindu joint family at all relevant times. The plaintiff is a businessman and moneylender of Cuttack town. He instituted a suit (M.S No. 137 of 34) against Gadadhar Sahu and his three brothers for realisation of the price of the articles supplied on credit to them amounting to about Rs. 12,653-8-0. He also took out an order for attachment before judgment of some of the properties of the joint family including disputed house. But before the said order of attachment was actually served at the spot the parties came to a compromise in pursuance of which a compromise decree was passed on 30th July 1934. In the operative portion of the decree one of the terms which referred to a charge being created in favour of the plaintiff decree, holder in respect of the disputed house by way of security for payment of the compromise decretal amount was not embodied but it remained in the petition of compromise which was also attached to the decree. Subsequently, however, on 16th February 1939 the said petition appars to have been made part of the decree by an order of the Court and there is an endorsement at the end of Ex. 2 to that effect. But no evidence was led about the circumstances under which the Court passed the order on 16th February 1939 directing the compromise petition to be part of the decree and the order itself was not proved. The learned lower Court rightly refused to take the endorsement to be sufficient to show that the compromise petition also became part of the decree. The judgment-debtors failed to implement some of the terms of the compromise and thereupon the appellant decree-holder filed an execution (Execution case No. 352 of 34 renumbered as 17 of 36). It is unnecessary to describe in detail the various stages in the execution petition and it is sufficient to note that in execution of the said compromise decree the appellant purchased the disputed house on 16th September 1937 and also obtained delivery of symbolical possession on 29th April 1938. His title to the house is based on the court sale dated 16th September 1937 in execution of the compromise decree obtained against Gadadhar Sahu and his three brothers.

    3. Bespondent 1 is a prominent lawyer and money-lender of Puri town and he claims to have purchased the entire house in a certificate sale dated 13th February 1935 (certificate case No. 277 of 1933-1934). The certificate case arose in consequence of a certificate filed by the Income-tax authorities on 10th March 1934 against Gadadhar Sahu for realisation of income-tax dues with penalty. After the certificate sale dated 13th February 1935 and delivery of possession, the three brothers of Gadadhar Sahu filed an objection under Section 35 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act. But their objection was rejected on 15th November 1935. Respondent 2 is a subsequent purchaser of the disputed property from respondent 1.

    4. It will be noticed that the plaintiff's purchase at court auction in execution of his compromise decree was on 16th September 1937 whereas the purchase by defendant 1 in the certificate sale was more than two years before on 13th February 1935 in the certificate proceeding. The latter's purchase would obviously prevail. But with a view to get round this difficulty the plaintiff relied on the fact that a charge in respect of the disputed house was created at the time of the passing of the compromise decree in M.S No. 127 of 34 on 30th July 1934. He further relied on the fact that in the certificate proceeding Gadadhar Sahu alone was shown as the certificate debtor. He further argued that the right, title and interest of Gadadhar Sahu in the property amounting to one-fourth share alone passed by the certificate sale and that in any case the rights of the other three brothers were unaffected by the sale and that those rights were transferred to the plaintiff by the civil court sale dated 16th September 1937.

    5. In dismissing the plaintiff's suit the learned lower Court found that: (i) Gadadhar Sahu represented the joint family consisting of himself and his three brothers in the certificate proceeding and that consequently the entire interest of the family in the disputed house passed by the sale (ii) the charge created by the compromise between the plaintiff and Gadadhar Sahu and his brothers in M.S No. 127 of 34 was not a valid charge because it was not created by a registered instrument nor was it incorporated in the operative part of the compromise decree; and (iii) in any case the suit was barred by limitation by virtue of Article 12, Limitation Act inasmuch as it was not brought within one year from the date on which the Collector on appeal maintained the order of the certificate officer rejecting the claim of Gadadhar's three brothers Satyabadi Sahu, Madan Sahu and Shyamsundar Sahu under Section 85 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act.

    6. All these three findings of the learned Subordinate Judge have been challenged before us and it is necessary to discuss each of them at come length.

    7. (After discussion of the evidence the judgment proceeds as follows:) Judging from the admissions and circumstances mentioned above I would accept the evidence of defendant 1 on this point and in agreement with the learned lower Court hold that Gadadhar Sahu effectively represented the joint family firm in the certificate proceeding. As rightly pointed out by the lower Court it is now well-settled that a Karta of a Hindu family can effectively represent the family in the certificate proceedings even though not expressly named as such (see Lalchand v. Sheogobind, A.I.R(16) 1929 Pat. 741 : (8 Pat. 788); Hari Prasad v. Lal Behari, A.I.R(27) 1910 Pat. 328 : (19 Pat. 618 F.B) and Kameshwar Singh v. Ishwari Prasad, A.I.R(27) 1910 Pat. 692 : (189 I.C 111). Therefore it follows that the entire interest of the joint family in the disputed house passed to defendant 1 by virtue of the certificate sale dated 13th February 1935.

    8. Next I take up the question as to whether a valid charge was created in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of the compromise between him and the Sahu brothers in M.S No. 127 of 1934. The compromise decree (Ex. 2) dated 30th July 1931 does not say expressly that a charge was created in favour of the plaintiff-decree-holder in respect of the disputed house. Doubtless in the petition of compromise which was also attached to the decree there is a reference to such a charge in para. 3. But it has not been incorporated in the operative portion of the decree and such a charge cannot be created except by a registered instrument.

    9. To meet this difficulty, Mr. Dasgupta urged that the compromise was effected at a time when the proceeding of the plaintiff in respect of attachment before judgment of the disputed house was pending before the Court and that consequently the disputed house may be held to form the subject-matter of that proceeding. He relied on Govindaswami v. Basu, A.I.R(22) 1935 Mad. 232 : (58 Mad. 781), in support of the view that even though the main suit may be a money-suit, where the parties compromise in an interlocutory proceeding in that suit in respect of some property which was sought to be attached before judgment the provisions of cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act would be attracted and registration was not compulsory. The Madras decision referred to was that of a single Judge and it came up for consideration in a later decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Chhotibai v. Mansukhlal, A.I.R(28) 1911 Bom. 1 : (I.L.R (1911) Bom. 34), where a Division Bench expressly dissented from the Madras view. With respect I would agree with the later Bombay view and hold that if certain property is attached before judgment in a money-suit that property will not be the subject-matter of the suit or of a proceeding as contemplated in cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act. Registration is therefore compulsory for creating such a charge even in a compromise petition and in the absence of such registration the plaintiff cannot claim any preferential right.

    10. Moreover, in any case, the plaintiff's preferential claim in respect of the disputed house must fail because under Section 8(b) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act from the date the service of the notice under S. 7 of that Act a charge is created in respect of all the property of the certificate debtors and all other charges created subsequently are postponed to that charge. In the present case, the order-sheet of the certificate proceedings (Ex. 6) shows that the notice under S. 7 was served on 19th March 1934, nearly four months before the plaintiff's compromise in M.S No. 852 of 34. Therefore even if it be held that by virtue of that compromise a charge was created in favour of the plaintiff that charge must be postponed to the prior charge of the Crown over the same property brought about by the operation of law, namely, by Section 8(b) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act. An attempt was made on behalf of the plaintiff, at the time of argument before the lower Court, to show that the notice under S. 7 was not properly served as required by law on the certificate debtors on 19th March 1934. The lower Court rightly refused to entertain that plea at such a belated stage. The order-sheet in the certificate proceeding (Ex. 6) especially the order dated 2nd May 1935 shows clearly that the Certificate Officer held that the notice was properly served. The plaintiff did not lead any evidence to show that there was no proper service nor did he raise any issue on this point.

    11. Next I take up the question of limitation. On 15th November 1935, the Certificate Officer rejected an application under Section 35 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act filed by the three brothers of Gadadhar Sahu (Satyabadi Sahu, Madan Sahu and Shyamsundar Sahu). Section 37 of that Act says that a person against whom such an order is made

    “may institute a suit in a Civil Court to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property; but subject to the result of such suit (if any) the order shall be conclusive.”

    12. The order of the Certificate Officer was passed on 15th November 1935 and an appeal against his order was dismissed by the Collector on 25th January 1936. But the present suit was filed on 21st June 1943. The plaintiff claims to be the successor-in-interest of Satyabadi, Madan and Shyamsunder who were unsuccessful applicants in the petition under Section 85 of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act. The learned lower Court held that Article 12, Limitation Act would apply and that the present suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. I think the appropriate Article is Article 13 and not Article 12. Though that article in terms applies only to a “decision or order of a civil Court in any proceeding other than a suit” it must be deemed to apply to decisions or orders of a Certificate Officer also by virtue of Section 65(2) of the B. & O. Public Demands Recovery Act which says clearly that the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act shall apply to all proceedings under that Act as if a certificate were a decree of a civil Court. Limitation would therefore be one year from the date of the appellate order of the Collector (Ex. O) dated 25th January 1936 rejecting the appeal filed by the Sahu brothers against the order of the Certificate Officer dated 15th November 1935. Thus the plaintiff's suit must fail both on the ground of limitation and also because of the prior title acquired by defendant 1 by virtue of the certificate sale. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.

    Panigrahi, J.:— I agree.

    K.S

    13. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mani Sahoo v. Lokanath Misra
    (Jan 5, 1950)