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citation codes
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  • Order 6, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code for short)
  • Order 6, rule 5 of the Code
  • R.S.C, Order 19, rule 22A,
  • Order 82, rule 3(2),
  • rule 5 of Order 6,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 6, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code for short)
  • Order 6, rule 5 of the Code
  • R.S.C, Order 19, rule 22A,
  • Order 82, rule 3(2),
  • rule 5 of Order 6,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed two related cases under Order 6, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking damages for libellous publications in the Illustrated Weekly of India dated 18-24 May, 1986. The defendants pleaded justification and fair comment but failed to provide full particulars of the defamatory allegations, except in relation to four persons. The plaintiff sought directions requiring defendants to furnish better and further particulars of the allegations made against him to enable him to prepare a proper defense. The two miscellaneous cases (No. 47 of 1987 and No. 72 of 1987) concern these applications for particulars from different defendants regarding specific libellous statements in the publication.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled under Order 6, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure to obtain better and further particulars of the defamatory allegations from the defendants who have pleaded justification and fair comment.
  2. Whether defendants can refuse to furnish particulars on the basis that the plaintiff is seeking particulars of facts stated in the published article rather than in the pleadings.
  3. The extent to which a defendant pleading justification and fair comment must specify the facts and particulars relied upon to avoid unfair surprise at trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The defendants have pleaded truth, justification, and fair comment but have not provided full and detailed particulars of the defamatory allegations against the plaintiff's moral character.
  • Without such particulars, the plaintiff cannot adequately defend himself or prepare for trial, as many allegations remain vague or unsaid.
  • The defendants have effectively adopted the facts stated in the libellous articles as part of their pleadings and are thus obliged to furnish particulars of those facts.
  • The objection that furnishing particulars would disclose evidence or witnesses is not a valid defense in such libel actions.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The petitions under Order 6, rule 5 are not maintainable because the plaintiff seeks particulars of facts stated in the published articles, not in the pleadings.
  • The plaintiff is not entitled to a roving inquiry to ascertain evidence or particulars beyond the pleadings.
  • Where the defence is a general plea of fair comment made in good faith without malice, particulars of the underlying facts are not required.
  • The defendants should not be compelled to furnish particulars that would disclose the names of witnesses or their trial strategy before discovery.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thompson v. Birklay, 1883 31 W.R Eng. 230 Particulars prevent surprise and limit inquiry at trial. Supported the principle that particulars should be encouraged to narrow issues.
Zieranberg v. Laboouchere, 1891-4 All E.R Rep. 611 In libel actions with general plea of justification, defendant must give specific particulars. Reinforced that defendants cannot refuse particulars on grounds of disclosing witnesses or awaiting discovery.
Wootion v. Sievier, 1911-13 All E.R Rep. 1001 Defendant cannot refuse to give particulars merely to protect witness identities. Affirmed the duty to provide particulars despite potential disclosure of witnesses.
Goldschmidt v. Constable & Co., 1937 4 All E.R 293 Particulars of justification must be given before discovery. Emphasized that defendants must rely on information possessed at the time of pleading.
Marks v. Wilson-boyd, 1939 2 All E.R 605 Particulars must enable plaintiff to know the charge; specificity depends on case facts. Allowed that if libel is specific, further particulars may not be needed; otherwise, particulars are required.
The Aga Khan v. Times Publishing Company, 1924 1 K.B 675 Recognized the "rolled-up plea" combining justification and fair comment. Held that if plea admits facts, defendant is bound to those facts and particulars may not be required beyond them.
Cunningham-howie v. F.W Dimble by & Sons Ltd., 1950 2 All E.R 882 R.S.C Order 19, rule 22A requires particulars in rolled-up plea to specify facts and words relied upon. Resolved uncertainty by mandating particulars in rolled-up pleas to prevent anomaly.
Lord v. Sunday Telegraph Ltd., 1970 3 All E.R 504 General plea of fair comment requires particulars of basic facts but not specification of words as fact or comment. Distinguished between rolled-up plea and general fair comment plea regarding particulars required.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the defendants' pleadings and found that by pleading truth, justification, and fair comment, the defendants effectively adopted the facts stated in the libellous articles as part of their defence. Since the defendants did not provide full and detailed particulars of these facts, the plaintiff was left unable to prepare his defence adequately, facing vague and incomplete allegations. The court relied on established English precedents and legal principles emphasizing that particulars serve to prevent surprise at trial and enable parties to know the case they must meet. The court rejected the defendants' argument that particulars were unnecessary because the plaintiff sought particulars of facts stated in the publication rather than the pleadings, holding that the facts in the publication had merged into the pleadings by virtue of the defendants' defence. The court further held that objections based on potential disclosure of evidence or witnesses do not excuse the duty to furnish particulars. Accordingly, the court directed the defendants to provide better and further particulars within a stipulated time.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the Miscellaneous Cases and directed the defendants to furnish better and further particulars of the defamatory allegations as pleaded. This decision ensures that the plaintiff will have full knowledge of the facts and allegations he must meet at trial, thereby preventing unfair surprise and promoting a fair trial process. The ruling clarifies that defendants who plead truth, justification, and fair comment cannot avoid their obligation to provide particulars of the facts relied upon, especially when those facts are derived from libellous publications incorporated into their pleadings. No new precedent was established; rather, the court applied existing principles to the facts before it. Failure to comply with the order will result in legal consequences as per law.

    Shri J.B Patnaik Petitioner v. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd., And Others Opp. Parties

    K.P Mohapatra, J.:— These two cases under Order 6, rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘Code’ for short) involve common questions of fact and law. Therefore, they are disposed of by this common order.

    2. The plaintiff has stated that he has brought the action for damages against the defendants for the libellous publications in the Illustrated Weekly of India dated 18-24 May, 1986. The defendants in their written statements have taken the plea of justification and fair comment. While doing so they have not stated full particulars of the allegations illustrated in para 2 of the petition vis-a-vis the publications in the magazine except in respect of only four persons. In the absence of full particulars, it will not be possible on his part to enter into the contest, of the suit in order to protect himself from the defamatory allegations and imputations asssasinating his moral character. Therefore, in Misc. Case No. 47 of 1987 he has prayed for a direction to defendant nos. 1 to 3 to furnish better and further particulars as referred to in para 2(A) of the petitioner. Misc. Case No. 72 of 1987 is mostly directed against defendant No. 4 to furnish better and further particulars with regard to the libellous assertions published at page 10 of the magazine dated 18-24 May, 1986 within the bigger box of the article under the caption, “The Strange Escapades of J.B Patnaik”. It is stated by the plaintiff that defendant No. 4 in his written statement has also pleaded truth, justification and fair comment, but has not stated the full and detailed particulars of the defamatory allegations made by him against the plaintiff's moral character. The defamatory allegations have been stated in short in para 3 of the petition and a prayer has been made that defendant nos. 2 to 4 responsible for the publication of the article should furnish further and better particulars as stated in para 4 thereof.

    3. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and defendant No. 4 have filed separate counters and the sum and substance of their objection is that the petitions under Order 6, rule 5 of the Code are not maintainable, because the plaintiff is asking for better and further particulars of facts stated in the article published in the magazine and not of the facts stated in their pleadings. In the guise of asking for better particulars, the plaintiff is not entitled to make a roving inquiry to ascertain the evidence that the defendants are likely to offer during trial of the suit. The plaintiff cannot call for particulars of opinion and fair comment made in good faith without malice and in public interest.. In a case where the plaintiff has not been taken by surprise and the general defence is fair comment, he is not entiled to particulars of fact on which the comment is based. The petitions, therefore, being misconceived, the defendants should not be called upon to furnish better and further particulars.

    4. Mr. B.M Patnaik in support of the petitions and Mr. R. Mohanty, Mr. M.N Das and Mr. Raghumani Patnaik opposing the petitions referred to a large number of decisions with regard to the principle contained in Order 6, rule 5 of the Code. It is necessary to make a brief reference to the same. The object of particulars is to prevent surprise at the trial and to limit the inquiry at the trial to the materials set out in the particulars. So particulars are ought to be encouraged. They tend to narrow the issues. This was what, Watkin Williams, J. said in Thompson v. Birklay . 1883 31 W.R Eng. 230., In Zieranberg v. Laboouchere . 1891-4 All E.R Rep. 611., it was held that in an action for libel where the defamatory statement is of a general character and the defence is a plea of justification in general terms, particulars to support such a plea must be given stating specific instances with the same precision as in an indictment. The defendant cannot object to give such particulars on the ground that they will disclose the names of his witnesses, or on the ground that he should not be compelled to give particulars before getting discovery, since, ordinarily, a defendant cannot ask for discovery until there is a well-ple ded defence. In Wootion v. Sievier . 1911-13 All E.R Rep. 1001., Kennedy. L.J said

    “Further, as a general rule it is now, I think, established that if the particulars are such as the defendant ought to give, he cannot refuse to do so merely on the ground that his answer will disclose the names of persons whom he may intend to call as witnesses at the trial in Goldschmidt v. Constable & Co. . 19374 All E.R 293., Greer, L.J held

    “The only question of principle involved in this case is whether a judge is entitled to make an order in a libel action that an application for particulars of justification should stand over until after discovery. I am satisfied by the arguments Mr. Holmes that in a libel action the party who alleges that the defamatory statements are true must make out his case on the information which he had in his possession at the time when the defence was delivered. He is not entitled to wait for discovery in order to complete his attack, but must give full particulars before discovery.”

    5. In Marks v. Wilson-boyd . 1939 2 All E.R 605., Goddard, L.J observed

    “In the opinion of the court, there is not, nor ought there to be, an absolute rule of practice that, whenever a plea of justification is raised in the common form “that the words are true in substance and in fact,” an order for particulars must be made in this general form. A plaintiff is entitled to know with certainty on what the defendant intends to rely in support of his plea. Indeed, it has been said that the justification ought to state the facts with as much particularity as an indictment. No doubt in the great majority of cases a plea in this bald form ought to be supplemented by particulars from which the plaintiff can ascertain the precise nature of the charge which it is proposed to make against him, for he needs this information in order to prepare his evidence for the trial. Each case, however, must depend on its particular facts. If the words charged as a libel are themselves so specific—that is, precise—that the plaintiff must know from them what the charge is, no further particulars are required. Counsel for the respondents agreed' that, if for instance, the libel were (to take a clear case), “The plaintiff is a thief because he stole my watch from my house last Monday”, no further particulars would be required, and, if asked for, would be properly refused. On the other hand, were the charge merely, “The plaintiff is a thief,” he would be entitled to the facts and matters on which the defendant intended to rely in support of his plea that the plaintiff was a thief”

    6. The principle laid down by the old English decisions being the above, by the time The Aga Khan v. Times Publishing Company . 1924 1 K.B 675., came to be decided, a new ‘principle based on what was commonly known as the rolled-up plea” came to be recognised. A rolled-up plea in action of libel was a plea in defence said in words consisting of allegations of fact to be understood in their natural and ordinary meaning and true in substance and in fact, as well as expressions of opinion being fair comment made in good faith and without malice for the benefit of the public in the public interest. In other words, if the plea of the defendant is admission of facts consisting of allegations of libel, but at the same time pleading justification and fair comment in good faith and without malice for benefit of the public, the plea can be said to be a rolled-up plea. Bankes, L.J held:—

    “But here the plea itself states the matters upon which the comment is based, and the defendant ties himself down to the admission that it is the statements of facts contained in the libel and no others, on which he intends to rely. It cannot possibly assist the plaintiff that the defendants should be required to pick out the statements which they say are statements of facts and those which they say are matters of opinion, for the category to which the several statements belong is a question for the jury, subject to a direction from the judge.”

    7. Scrutton, L.J was of a different view. He said:—

    “…Personally, if I were not hampered by authority, I should be inclined to say in every case in which this rolled-up plea is pleaded that the plaintiff is entitled to ask the defendant to specify the statements of facts which he says are true, and the comments which he says are fair, But I cannot overlook the fact that there has been a series of cases in which it has been held that particulars ought not to be given of the rolled-up plea where the comment is alleged, as here, to be “on the said facts”

    xxx and I find that the general trend of the decisions in this Court is in the direction of not making the order where the facts, the comment on which is said to be fair, are defined as being the facts stated in the libel.” Sargant, L.J took the middle course and observed:—

    “…It is quite true that the plaintiff may find some difficulty in distinguishing between the parts of the articles which consist of facts, and those which consist of comments, but it may also be that difficulty is incapable of solution until the case has been tried by a judge and jury.”

    8. The uncertainty of the principle brought by the Aga Khan case, (supra) was finally settled by amendment of the Rules of the Supreme Court and in Cunningham-howie v. F.W Dimble by & Sons. Ltd. . 1950 2 All E.R 882., Denning, L.J said:—

    “For many years before 1949 it was the practice of the Bar, in an action for libel, to plead the defence of fair comment in the form commonly known as the “rolled-up plea”, because it gave to the pleader the benefit of not being ordered to give particulars of the facts on which he relied. That benefit was conferred by Aga Khan v. Times Publishing Co., Dawson v. Same (1) and many other case, but several judges, including Atkin, L.J, in Hobbs v. People Newspaper Publishing Co. Ltd. (2), and Scrutton, L.J, in the Aga Khan case (1), expressed their strong disapproval of it and in 1949 the practice was altered. By R.S.C, Order 19, rule 22A, it is laid down that, where the defence of fair comment is pleaded in the form known as the “rolled-up plea”, the defendant.

    E…shall give particulars stating which of the words complained of he alleges are statements of fact and of the facts and matters he relied on in support of the allegation that the words are true,”

    That new rule does away with an anomaly of the law.”

    9. His Lordships laid down the principles that in action for libel, the plaintiff is entitled to particulars of facts on which the comment alleged to be fair is based, not only where the defence of fair comment is pleaded in the form known as “rolled-up plea”, but also where the general plea of fair comment is pleaded. In Lord v. Sunday Telegraph Ltd. . 1970 3 All E.R 504., it was held that where a general plea of fair comment is raised the defendant must give particulars of the basic facts on which he relies in support of his plea but he is not required to give particulars stating which of the words complained of are statements of fact and which are expressions of comment for RSC Order 82, rule 3(2), applied only to the “rolled-up plea”, i.e to a plea appearing to roll up justification and fair comment together, and does not apply to a general plea of fair comment. The following quotation from 186 and 187 at pages 95-96 of “Halsbury's Laws of England”, Fourth Edition, is relevant:—

    “186 Particulars of justification:—Where a defendant raises an imputation of misconduct against the plaintiff, the plaintiff ought to be enabled to go to trial with knowledge of the acts which he is alleged to have committed and on which the defendant intends to rely as justifying the imputation. A plaintiff cannot be expected to come to trial prepared to justify his whole life.

    A defendant who pleads justification to a general charge must give full particulars of the facts he relies on as showing that the defamatory statement is true, to prevent the plaintiff from being taken by surprise.

    187. Fair comment:—Where a defendant pleads the general defence of fair comment the plaintiff is entitled to particulars of the facts on which the comment is based. The facts particularised must have existed at the time the comment was made. If there is a substratum of fact stated or indicated in the words complained of which is sufficient to form a basis for the comment, it is unnecessary for all the facts on which the comment is based to be stated in the alleged libel in order to admit the defence of fair comment.”

    10. The following quotation from “Gatley on Libel and Slander”, Eighth Edition, para 1152, page 481, is also relevant:

    “When the plaintiff's application for particulars of justification is otherwise proper it is no answer that in giving such particulars the defendant may be compelled to disclose the names of persons he intends to call as witnesses”.

    11. A few comments made in the A.I.R Manual (Vol. 4), Fourth Edition, page 345, below rule 5 of Order 6, may also be quoted:—

    “The object of obtaining particulars is to enable the opposite party to know what case he has to meet and to prevent a surprise at the trial so that he may not have to go to trial embarrassed by the obscruity or the incompleteness of the case which he has to meet.

    Furnishing particulars of what has been pleaded insufficiently or vaguely is not a discretionary matter at all. It is ordering one of the parties to give the other his due.

    It is the duty of the Court as well to see that parties plead their cases so plainly, fully and clearly that each side knows the nature of the case which has to be met.”

    12. Now coming to the cases at hand, it will appear from the instance given in para 2 of the petition in Misc. Case No. 47 of 1987 and para 3 of the petition in Misc. Case No. 72 of 1987 that the defendants have not given full particulars of facts stated by them. Many instances are as vague as they could be. For instances, in the earlier Misc. Case, para 2(c) is picked out at random and quoted below

    “In paragraph 12 of the written statement these defendants have stated that: “On hearing and receiving and reading numerous reports of facts contained in the impugned article from various quarters the defendant felt duty bound to make on the spot study and after lengthy and protracted investigation and interviews the defendants found the substance of the allegation against the plaintiff were justified.”

    13. From the above it would be clear that a lot of things have remained unsaid and material particulars remained unrevealed. In the latter case, para 3(a) is picked out and quoted below:—

    “One hears many strange stories about Orissa Chief Minister J.B Patnaik. Are these stories true ? He is portrayed as a pervert.

    “I submitted a memorandum to Mrs. Indira Gandhi about J.B Patnaik's sex life. I also gave her documentary evidence. He does not believe in conventional sex. He is a believer in orgies. This fact is not unknown to the people of Orissa. Unfortunately, his taste for women is rather poor. Firstly, his woman lack class. Secondly, he is also attracted to young boys. He loves both young boys and girls.”

    14. In the above passage, also many things have remained unsaid and many particulars have not been given. It is not understood how the plaintiff will clear himself of allegations said and unsaid and prove his case in the suit that the offending articles published in the magazine not only contained false and imaginary facts, but also they were highly libellous and defamatory in character, unless he knows the full particulars of all the allegations brought against him, particularly so when the defendants plead truth, justification and fair comment. If the defendants do not furnish all the particulars, the plaintiff cannot defend himself for his whole life. The objection that the defendants while being asked to furnish better and further particulars should not be called upon to reveal their evidence is no defence in a case of this nature, because the plaintiff in order to defend himself by meeting the allegations brought against him and in order to prove his own case has a right to know all the material facts before entering upon the trial of the suit. Law is not that the plaintiff or for that matter any of the parties in his position should be taken by surprise and to enter upon the trial of a suit without knowing full facts. The principle laid down in the decisions and the text books, therefore, support the plaintiff's case.

    15. Mr. Ranjit Mohanty contended that a party under Order 6, rule 5 of the Code is entitled to know further and better particulars of the pleadings of his opponent. According to him, however, the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to ask for further and better particulars of the articles published in the magazine. Mr. B.M Patnaik counted this argument by pointing out that the defendants have pleaded truth, justification and fair comment. Therefore, according to them, whatever allegations have been brought against the plaintiff in the articles are true, there was justification to make the allegations and the articles contained fair comment. So, the defendants have virtually adopted all the facts stated in the offending articles which have merged into their pleadings, because they are bound to prove that all the facts stated therein were true and justified. On consideration of the contentions of the learned counsel for both parties in this regard, I am of the view that since the defendants have pleaded truth, justification and fair comment, they have adopted the facts stated in the impugned articles and have raised the plea that all the facts stated therein were true and justified. Therefore, the facts stated in the impugned articles have completely merged into the pleadings of the defendants there is no escape for them, but to state further and better particulars, as they have not done so. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the objection raised by Mr. Ranjit Mahanty about the maintainability of the present cases.

    16. Parties to an action in the Court have to be treated evenly. One of them cannot be placed at an advantageous position. Both the parties should go up to the trial fully knowing the cases of each other. If one of them has not revealed full facts and his adversary is called upon to enter upon trial, the former must be said to be an advantageous position that the latter which is unjust. The situation in the present case is like the above. The plaintiff seems to be in a less advantageous position, because he has not been made aware of all facts which constitute allegations against him impeaching his moral character and he has a right to know them all. For the reasons stated above, the Misc. Cases are allowed. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are directed to furnish better and further particulars as stated in para 2(A) of the petition in Misc. Case No. 47 of 1987, and defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 shall furnish better and further particulars as stated in para 4 of the petition in Misc. Case No. 72 of 1987. The further and better particulars should be furnished within a fortnight hence, in default of which law will take its own course.

    17. Misc. Cases allowed.

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    Shri J.B Patnaik Petitioner v. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd., And Others Opp. Parties
    (Mar 9, 1988)