H.L Agrawal, C.J:— When this writ application was placed before a Division Bench of this Court, it referred the matter to a larger Bench to consider the following two questions:—

“(1) Whether the Co-operative Societies registered under a Co-operative Societies Act as such will come within the fold of Art. 12 of the Constitution and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?

(In case the answer is in the negative),

(2) Whether the Co-operative Society is borne (born?) under any Statute or is discharging any such functions which may make it an ‘instrumentality of the State’?

(Second question is recasted)

2. A few facts may also be noticed:

The petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the Khurda Central Co-operative Bank (for short ‘Bank’) in the year 1958 and in due course was promoted to the post of Accountant in the year 1966. While working as such in the Head Office at Khurda, he was suspended and reverted to the post of Branch Manager, thus imposing a ‘major penalty’, by the office order of the Bank dated 4-11-1966 (Annexure 2) pending the contemplated departmental enquiry, and in the departmental enquiry, his services were terminated by order dated 10-9-1980 (Annexure 24). The petitioner has accordingly filed the writ application for quashing the order of suspension as also the order of termination and for a direction to the Bank opposite party No. 2 to treat him in service all through.

3. When this application was placed for hearing, a question was raised on behalf of the Bank that no writ lay against the Bank as it was not ‘an authority’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. As already stated, this question is troubling the Courts since long. As there has been a continuous development of law and if I may say so, there is really a ‘plethora of decisions’ on this subject, and I will refer only to some of them which are more important.

Regarding the development of law on the subject, I may quote the Supreme Court itself. Mathew, J. in Sukhadev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331 made the following observation:—

“The concept of State has undergone drastic changes in recent years. Today State cannot be conceived of simply as a coercive machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority. It has to be viewed mainly as a service corporation.”

The following observation was made in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628:—

“Today the Government, in a welfare State is the regulator and dispenser of special services and provider of a large number of benefits, including jobs, contracts, licences, quotas, mineral rights etc. The Government pours forth wealth, money benefits, services, contracts, quotas and licences. The valuables dispensed by Government take many forms, but they all share one characteristic. They are steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth. These valuables which derive from relationships to Government are of many kinds. They comprise social security benefits, cash grants for political sufferers and the whole scheme of State and local welfare. Then again, thousands of people are employed in the State and the Central Government and local authorities. Licences are required before one can engage in many kinds of business or work. The power of giving licences means power to withhold them and this gives control to the Government on the lives of many people. Many individuals and many more businesses enjoy largesse in the form of Government contracts……………. All these mean growth in the Government largesse and with the increasing magnitude and range of governmental functions as we move closer to a welfare State, more and more of our wealth consists of these new forms……….”

In Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329 the Supreme Court ruled that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research registered under the Societies Registration Act was not an authority within the meaning of Art. 12 although the Prime Minister was the President or the Government appointed nominees to the Governing Body or the Government may terminate the membership.

4. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujid Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487 considered the matter in great detail and clarified that Sabhajit Tewary's case was not an authority for the proposition that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act could never be regarded as an authority within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. The Bench laid down various principles on which each individual case has to be tested. The principles which have been quoted from the Airport Authority's case (AIR 1979 SC 1628) by the Supreme Court with approval in Ajay Hasia's case are as follows:—

“1. ‘One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government’.

2. “Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Governmental character”.

3. ‘It may also be a relevant factor…………. Whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected’.

4. ‘Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality’.

5. ‘If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government’.

6. ‘Specifically, if a department of Govt. is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.’”

(Emphasis supplied)

The Supreme Court, after extracting the various indicia for determining whether the particular body was an agency or instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Art. 12, proceeded to examine as to whether the society which had established the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar and which was registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898, was an instrumentality or agency of the State and would be comprehended in the expression ‘other authority’ in Art. 12. The Court considered various circumstances in the light of the tests indicated, such as,—

“……….the monies required for running the college are provided entirely by the Central Government and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and even if any other monies are to be received by the Society, it can be done only with the approval of the State and the Central Governments. The Rules to be made by the Society are also required to have the prior approval of the State and the Central Governments and the accounts of the Society have also to be submitted to both the Governments for their scrutiny and satisfaction. The Society is also to comply with all such directions as may be issued by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government in respect of any matters dealt with in the report of the Reviewing Committee. The control of the State and the Central Governments is indeed so deep and pervasive that no immovable property of the Society can be disposed of in any manner without the approval of both the Governments. The State and the Central Governments have even the power to appoint any other person or persons to be members of the Society and any member of the Society other than a member representing the State or Central Govt. can be removed from the membership of the Society by the State Government with the approval of the Central Government. The Board of Governors, which is incharge of general superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of Society and of its income and property is also largely controlled by nominees of the State and the Central Governments. It will thus be seen that the State Government and by reason of the provision for approval, the Central Government also have full control of the working of the Society and it would not be incorrect to say that the Society is merely a projection of the State and the Central Governments and to use the words of Ray, C.J in Sukadev Singh's case (AIR 1975 SC 1331) (supra) the voice is that of the State and the Central Governments and the hands are also of the State and the Central Governments. We must, therefore, hold that the Society is an instrumentality or the agency of the State and the Central Governments and it is an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Art. 12.”

The Supreme Court again in the case of Som Prakash Rakhi v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212 was considering the same question with respect to the status of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and laid down the following principles:—

“………These characteristics convert a statutory corporation, a government company, a co-operative society and other registered society or body into a State and they are not confirmed to statutory corporations alone. We may decoct the test for ready reference:

1. ‘One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.’

2. ‘Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality.’

3. ‘It may also be a relevant factor……… whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected’.

4. ‘If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and, closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government.’

5. ‘Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.’”

The Supreme Court had to again consider this question in P.K Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 541 where the status of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and its affiliate Indian Veterinary Research Institute (IVRI) fell for consideration. On a reásumeá of the history of the ICAR, it was found that although it was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, yet when it was set up it was an adjunct of the Govt. of India and its present position was nothing different and therefore, it was an instrumentality of the State. After recording the aforesaid findings, the Court went on to consider the scope and ambit of Article 12 and discussed both the above cases namely, (i) Sabhajit Tewary (AIR 1975 SC 1329) and (ii) Ajay Hasia (AIR 1981 SC 487) (supra).

In P.K Ramachandra Iyer's case (supra), the Supreme Court examined the facts and the circumstances of the case in the light of the tests laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ajay Hasia's case and did not indicate any different indicia. The next case in point of time that was brought to our notice was Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 973 where reliance was placed on the following observation:

“………The very philosophy and concept of the co-operative movement is impregnated with the public interest….” in support of the submission that in the interest of the welfare State, the co-operative society was one of the functional wings of the State machinery.

Strong reliance was placed by Dr. Dash in support of the petitioner on a single Judge decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Ismail Khan v. State of Rajasthan (1985) 1 Serv LR 556, where the Court was examining the principle of Art. 12 in relation to the Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Bharatpur. This decision would not help the petitioner because, on reference to the authority of the Supreme Court, the conclusion was recorded on these materials noticed in para 19 of the judgment:

“The affidavit filed by the petitioner shows that from the Administrator up to the lowest cadre of the officers of the Bank are Government Officers who are administering the manning the affairs of the Bank. It further shows that the finance advanced or guaranteed are provided by the ‘State’ and the activities of the Bank are controlled by the bank and its officers. The officers of the State exercise statutory powers of the notification dated 8-12-1974 issued by the State Government in exercise of its powers under S. 3 read with S. 147 of the Act, 1965, gives these statutory powers to those officers. They have been given powers under different sections of the Act, 1965……..”

Dr. Dash also referred to the case of M.C Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086. This case was entirely of a different nature, namely, as to whether the principles of Art. 21 would apply to a private corporation engaged in industrial activities having potentials to affect the life and health of the people. In this case, though the court had posed a question in para 19 as to whether a private corporation, such as Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries, came within the ambit of Art. 12 so as to be amenable to the discipline of Art. 21, it did not decide this question finally. The decision, therefore, is of no help.

5. Mr. Jena appearing for the Bank referred to the decision in B. Suryanarayana v. No. 1453 the Kulluru Parvathi Co-operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1986 Andh Pra 244 to show that although a co-operative society might trench upon banking incidentally, yet it does not cease to be a society as it is one of the activities of the co-operative society. I do not think this decision has got much to help Mr. Jena.

6. Mr. Patra also cited before us the decision in Tekraj Vasandi v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 469 where the status of the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies (ICPS) registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 fell for consideration. It was held that it was not covered under Art. 12 of the Constitution. The following observation may be usefully quoted:—

“There are tests formulated by several cases of the Supreme Court to find out whether an institution is a ‘State’. There cannot indeed be straitjacket formula. It is not necessary that all the test should be satisfied for reaching the conclusion either for or against holding an institution to be ‘State’. In a given case some of the features may emerge so boldly and prominently that a second view may not be possible. There may be yet be other cases where the matter would be on the border lines and it would be difficult to take one view or the other outright.”

The Court then gave the following caution to decide such a question:—

“In a Welfare State, Governmental control is very pervasive and in fact touches all aspects of social existence. In the absence of a fair application of the tests to be made, there is possibility of turning every non-governmental society into an agency or instrumentality of the State. That obviously would not serve the purpose and may be far from reality. A broad picture of the matter has to be taken and a discerning mind has to be applied keeping the realities and human experiences in view so as to reach a reasonable conclusion. In the facts of the case, it cannot be held that ICPS is either an agency or instrumentality of the State so, as to come within the purview of ‘other authorities’ in Art. 12 of the Constitution. ICPS is a case of its type typical in many ways and the normal tests may perhaps not property apply to test its character.”

In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath, AIR 1986 SC 1571 a very apt observation (if I may say so with respect) was made that—

“….. For the purposes of Art. 12 one must necessarily see through the corporate veil to ascertain whether behind that veil is the face of an instrumentality or agency of the State.”

There the Supreme Court was considering the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, a Government Company, and held that it was the Government operating behind a corporate veil carrying out a governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance.

7. Mr. Patra also referred to the recent Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in P. Bhaskaran v. Addl. Socy., Agricultural (Co-operative) Department, Trivendrum, AIR 1988 Ker 75. The following observation made in this judgment is, in my view, most pertinent and relevant:—

“The Co-operative Societies are not created by the Co-operative Societies Act and they are not statutory bodies. They are only functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Act. These institutions would have legal existence even if the Co-operative Societies Act was not in force. Moreover, the Government have no shares in the Co-operative Societies. There is no deep and pervasive state control. The management of the Societies does not vest in the Government or in the representatives of the government Bank. The management is under the effective control of a committee elected by the members of the Societies. The statutory regulation or restriction in the functioning of the Societies is not “an imprint of State under Art. 12”. Hence no writ will lie against a Co-operative Society governed by the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act.”

8. Although very old, yet to the same effect is the decision in Pitambar Mohapatra v. Nilambar Sahu, (1970) 36 Cut LT 866 where our High Court had taken a similar view and held that “a co-operative society was not a quasi-judicial body in its dealings……. nor a statutory body discharging statutory or public duties and therefore no writ could issue”.

The same view was reiterated by this Court in the case of Narayan Rath v. Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. (1977) 43 LT Cut 119 : (1977 Lab IC 786) where the Court held that a “company incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act cannot be said to be a body created by the Companies Act. That being so, a co-operative Society, like the Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank in the present case, cannot beheld to be a statutory body”.

A similar view was taken with respect to the Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pritam Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 Punj and Har 228:—

“The Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank is not an instrumentality or agency of the State. Consequently, it cannot be deemed to be an “authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 and as such is not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Art. 226. In this connection it cannot be urged that it is such an instrumentality on the ground that the 4th, test of deep and pervasive state control laid down in AIR 1981 SC 487 for determining whether a co-operative society is an instrumentality of the State is satisfied in view of the provisions of Punjab Co-operative Societies Act read with Punjab Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act.”

Sri Patra also referred to the case of Harender Narain Banker v. State of Bihar, (1986) 2 Serv LR 256 : (1985 Lab IC 1807), a case decided by a Bench of the Patna High Court where the Court was considering the application of Art. 12 of the Constitution to the case of the Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd. (BISCOMAUN) a co-operative society registered under the Bihar Co-operative Societies Act. It was not disputed that it was not a creation of a Statute as in the case before us. The Court in para 6 of the report, on reference to the “unbroken line of precedents of the final court as also of the other High Courts on the point beginning with Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.V Immanual, AIR 1969 SC 1306; Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 245; Sabhajit Tewari, AIR 1975 SC 1329 and Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Narayan Rath, AIR 1977 SC 112, held that it came to be well settled that merely because a co-operative society is registered under the Act, it does not become amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 or come in the category of ‘other authorities’ under Art. 12.

9. I may not, however, be misunderstood to lean in favour of the conclusion as the Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 1571 (supra) has observed that the matter has to be examined on tearing the veil of a corporate society and, therefore, as a matter of principle it must be held that even a co-operative society which in essence is an instrumentality or agency of the State would come within the wide sweep of Art. 12 and would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The crux of the matter therefore is as to whether the institution successfully answers any of the indicia indicated by the apex court. If it answers the acid test, it may come under the umbrella of Art. 12, otherwise not.

10. The Patna High Court, therefore, referred to the model Bye-laws and the other provisions of the Companies Act and the Co-operative Societies Act and came to the conclusion that none of the six tests laid down in Ajay Hasia's case (AIR 1981 SC 487) (supra) was satisfied with regard to the Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd. I may also point out that the share of the State Government in BISCOMAUN was 99 per cent and the recommendation of the 4th Pay Revision Committee was also made applicable to its employees. The Managing Director of the BISCOMAUN was also appointed by the State Government. But these factors were held not to be sufficient ingredients to make the relevant criteria applicable.

11. Having realised that he has to bring his case within the ambit of the indicia pointed out repeatedly by the Supreme Court, Dr. Dash then referred to some provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act and the Regional Rural Banks Act to show that the provisions of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 also applied to co-operative societies like Banking Companies (vide S. 56) and contended that the Bank should be held to be borne under those Statutes. He also referred to some of the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act in his endeavour to show that the Executive authorities had extensive control over the management and affairs of the Bank. It is difficult to accept the contention of Dr. Dash that the supervisory powers or powers of superintendence will make the opposite party-Bank either a child of any statute or an authority under Art. 12.

12. In this connection I may refer to the case of Verendra Pal Singh v. District Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Etah (1980) 4 SCC 109 cited by the learned Additional Government Advocate in support of his contention that for co-operative societies registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, the supervisory powers given to the Registrar and the executive powers given to the Secretary etc. have a single object in view, namely, the better working of the co-operative societies. It is well known that many of the co-operative societies, “particularly in rural areas, need the guidance of well trained expert officers and it is the function of the Secretary and the other members of the centralised service to afford proper guidance to the ignorant and often illiterate members of the co-operative society. The supervisory powers enable the Registrar and the officials of his department to keep a vigilant and benevolent eye on the working of the society so that none may take advantage of the illiteracy and ignorance of the innocent rural folk and the co-operative movement may be a success and a real boon to the weaker sections of the people. The constitution of a centralised service is perhaps to see that the officials do not acquire any vested interest in the co-operative society of a locality.”

13. Dr. Dash then referred to the decision in A.M Ahamed and Co. v. Union of India AIR 1982 Mad 247 where the Court was considering the National Agricultural Co-operative Federation of India Ltd. (NAFED), a co-operative society registered under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, in relation to its activity as a canalising agency for export of onions outside India to show that the activity was a part of the welfare activities undertaken by the State and therefore it can be said to be an instrumentality of the State. On examining the scheme, particularly conferring monopoly on NAFED in respect of export of onions, it was held that it was really the Government which was acting through the canalising agency, and the juristic personality owned by the agency was only for the purpose of convenience which could not be allowed to obliterate the true nature of the reality behind which was the Government. I am afraid, in the absence of the relevant facts and the petitioners bringing home these compelling circumstances, this authority would be of any assistance to the petitioners.

14. In order to examine as to whether the indicia of “deep and pervasive State control” or the share capital of the Corporation or any other indicia indicated by the Supreme Court could be attracted to the case of the opposite party-Bank, we also examined the Bye-laws of the Bank, a copy of which was supplied by Mr. Jena. The relevant Bye-laws may be noticed. Bye-law No. 10 makes provisions for raising of funds which provides as follows:—

“10. FUNDS.

The Central Bank will ordinarily obtain funds from the following sources—

i. Subscription to shares,

ii. Deposits,

iii. Borrowings,

iv. Contributions from Government or any specified object.

v. Entrance fees and miscellaneous receipts,

vi. Contributions towards cost of supervision and Collection, and

vii. Donations,

viii. Cader Fund.”

Similarly, the provision for membership is contained in Bye-law No. 5 which is as follows:—

“5. MEMBERSHIP—

(i) The following may be admitted as members of the Central Bank—

a. every co-operative society within the area of operation of the Central Bank,

b. the State Government,

c. the Central Government,

d. the Orissa State Co-operative Bank Ltd.,

e. Panchayat Samity or Gram Sasan situated wholly or partly within the area of operation of the Central Bank.

f. Orissa Khadi & Village Industries Board, and

g. any other body corporate, with the prior permission of the Registrar,

(ii) h. No individual shall be eligible to be a member of the Central Bank.

(iii) Nominal members will be allowed, but they cannot avail voting right nor can claim dividends.”

The final authority of the Bank is the General Body and the management is vested in a Committee of 15 members under Bye-law No. 30(a) consisting of nine-member societies from among the share holding agricultural societies; (b) one-member societies of non-agricultural societies; and (c) five persons to be nominated by the State Government.

The main object of the Bank is to raise funds for financing co-operative societies and to develop, assist, co-ordinate their work, such as, for promotion of thrifts, self-help and mutual aid among agriculturists and other persons and for promotion of economic interest of its members in accordance with the co-operative principles.

Dr. Dash referred to S. 18, Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 which provides as to what could be the business of the Regional Rural Bank which inter alia includes the following types of business:—

(a) Granting of loans and advances, particularly to the small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers including agricultural marketing societies for agricultural operations or for other purposes connected therewith.

Dr. Dash in his last attempt to salvage his case referred to the provisions of the Regional Rural Banks Act to support his contention that the activities of the opposite party-Bank were similar to that of a Bank established under the Regional Rural Banks Act and therefore it can be covered within the expression ‘any other authority’ under Art. 12. This argument on the face of it is not tenable and must be rejected because in Tekraj Vasandi's case (AIR 1988 SC 469) (supra), the Supreme Court itself has given a caution to the effect that in a welfare State there is possibility of turning every non-governmental society into an agency or instrumentality of the State. In the ever expanding activity of the welfare State, there would hardly be a field where it may not exercise some modicum of control or interference. But this would not be the kind of control which would convert any and every legal person into a ‘State’ for the purpose of Art. 12.

The matter, therefore, has to be examined in the light of the tests indicated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Som Prakash Lakhi (AIR 1981 SC 212) and Ajay Hasia (AIR 1981 SC 487) which still hold the field.

Out of the several tests, the main tests on the anvil of which the case of the opposite party-Bank rests is to examine the formation of the share capital and the functions of the Bank. In this connection, I have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Bye-laws of the Bank to show how the capital of the Bank is to be raised and its functions and activities. The petitioner has singularly failed to establish that these tests were satisfied in this case. Then again there is no existence of any deep and pervasive State control over, the affairs of the opposite party-Bank. In any case, no material except the statutory and formal regulatory supervision was placed before us even in the course of the submissions made by Dr. Dash on which any finding on this ingredient can be recorded in favour of the petitioner. The relevant tests therefore stricto sensu are not satisfied here so as to bring the case of the opposite party-Bank within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution and thus make it amenable to the writ jurisdiction.

15. Although I have already answered the questions posed in the order of reference, for the sake of convenience, I may put the answers at one place.

Answer to question No. 1 — A co-operative society on merely getting registered under the Co-operative Societies Act does not acquire any status of becoming an authority to render it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The supervisory powers given to the Registrar is with the object of better working of the societies and to give them guidance of well trained and expert officers.

Answer to question No. 2 — If a co-operative Bank is borne under or created by statute, then it may acquire the status, then it may acquire the status of an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. Otherwise, it has to satisfy the essential tests formulated by the various decisions of the Supreme Court for which, however, there cannot be a strait jacket formula. However, it may not be necessary that the society must satisfy all the tests for qualifying to be an ‘authority’ and in a given case, only some of the prominent features may give it that status. But that must be so predominant that on tearing the veil, it may appear that the society is merely a projection of the State, the voice being that of the State and the hands also of the State.

16. As a result of the above discussion, I unhasitatingly come to the irresistible conclusion that this application is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner, however, will be at liberty to seek his remedy, if any, available under the general law.

In the circumstances, I shall make no order as to costs.

R.C Patnaik, J.:— 17. I agree.

P.C Misra, J.:— 18. I agree.

Application dismissed.