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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966,
  • Rule 10. Thereafter in sub rule 2 to 13
  • Rule 12, the provisions of Rule 13
  • Sub rule (1) of this rule
  • sub rule 2 of rule 1
  • sub rule (d) of Rule 2
  • Clause Rule 2(d),
  • Rule 13. Rule 13
  • Rule 14, 15
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966,
  • Rule 10. Thereafter in sub rule 2 to 13
  • Rule 12, the provisions of Rule 13
  • Sub rule (1) of this rule
  • sub rule 2 of rule 1
  • sub rule (d) of Rule 2
  • Clause Rule 2(d),
  • Rule 13. Rule 13
  • Rule 14, 15
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion dated 14/2/2012

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, who at the relevant time was posted as Sub Inspector at Police Station Kindrai, District Seoni, challenged two orders by way of a writ petition: Annexure P/12 dated 7.6.2003 (order by the Inspector General of Police imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement) and Annexure P/14 dated 11.12.2003 (order by the Director General of Police rejecting the petitioner's appeal).

A complaint from one Swarooplal alleged that the petitioner had demanded Rs.1000 to forward a claim for pension relating to Swarooplal's deceased father. The Superintendent of Police issued a show cause notice (Annexure P/1). After the petitioner's reply (Annexure P/2) was found unsatisfactory, a preliminary enquiry was ordered and conducted by the S.D.O.P., Seoni. Based on that report the Superintendent of Police issued a charge sheet (Annexure P/3) dated 21.11.2002 and appointed the Additional Superintendent of Police as the Enquiry Officer. Following an enquiry in which five witnesses were examined, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty (Annexure P/10). The Inspector General of Police passed the punitive order (Annexure P/12) and subsequent appeals including the mercy appeal were rejected (Annexure P/14), bringing the matter before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether initiation of departmental proceedings by the Superintendent of Police (a subordinate officer) without an express general or special order from the Governor under Rule 13(1) of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 — instead of initiation by the disciplinary authority (Deputy Inspector General of Police as per the Schedule) — vitiates the disciplinary proceedings.
  2. Whether the fact that the final punishment was imposed by an authority (Inspector General of Police) competent to impose punishment cures the alleged illegality in initiation of the proceedings by a subordinate authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments — as advanced by Shri A. M. Trivedi, Senior Counsel

  • The preliminary enquiry was conducted by the S.D.O.P. in an illegal manner and certain relevant documents were not supplied to the petitioner.
  • There were discrepancies in the enquiry, perversity in the findings of the Enquiry Officer, and the appellate authority did not decide the appeal in accordance with law.
  • The Superintendent of Police (who issued the charge sheet and received the reply) is not the disciplinary authority under the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966; the Schedule designates the Deputy Inspector General of Police as the appointing and disciplinary authority for a Sub Inspector.
  • Under Rule 13 the disciplinary authority alone (or the Governor by general/special order under Rule 13(1)) may institute proceedings; because no general or special order empowering the Superintendent was shown, initiation by the Superintendent vitiates the entire proceedings and consequent punishment.

Respondent's Arguments — as advanced by Shri Rajesh Tiwari

  • The final order imposing punishment was passed by a competent authority (the Inspector General of Police), and therefore the initiation by the Superintendent does not render the proceedings illegal.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the discrete legal question of whether the Superintendent of Police had power and jurisdiction to initiate the departmental enquiry. The Court accepted the uncontested factual record that the Superintendent issued the show cause (Annexure P/1), the charge sheet (Annexure P/3), and appointed the Enquiry Officer.

The Court examined the relevant provisions of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 as they were cited in argument: the definition of "disciplinary authority" in sub‑rule (d) of Rule 2; the list of punishments in Rule 10 (which includes compulsory retirement as a major penalty); Rule 12 (authority competent to impose punishment); Rule 13 (which governs who may institute departmental proceedings and contains two parts: Rule 13(1) permitting the Governor or an authority empowered by the Governor to institute proceedings or direct the disciplinary authority to do so, and Rule 13(2) permitting the disciplinary authority competent to impose a penalty to institute proceedings); and Rules 14–16 (procedure for imposing punishment).

Applying those rules to the admitted facts, the Court observed that for a Sub Inspector the Schedule identifies the Deputy Inspector General of Police as both the appointing and disciplinary authority. Therefore, the disciplinary authority competent to impose punishment and to institute proceedings in accordance with the rules would be the Deputy Inspector General. The Superintendent of Police is subordinate to that disciplinary authority and could only initiate proceedings if empowered to do so by a general or special order from the Governor under Rule 13(1).

The record contained no general or special order issued by the Governor authorizing the Superintendent to institute departmental proceedings. The Court therefore concluded that the Superintendent had not been authorized under Rule 13(1), and the disciplinary proceedings were not instituted by the disciplinary authority as required under Rule 13(2).

The Court reasoned that where a statute prescribes a particular process for initiating disciplinary action, that mandated procedure must be followed in its entirety, and initiation contrary to the statutory scheme renders the initiation illegal and the subsequent actions vitiated. On this basis the Court found the initiation of the departmental enquiry to be illegal and constitutionally infirm.

Holding and Implications

PETITION ALLOWED; Impugned orders quashed.

Holding (direct effect on the parties):

  • The impugned orders dated 7.6.2003 (Annexure P/12) and 11.12.2003 (Annexure P/14) are quashed.
  • Because the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation, the respondents are directed to treat the petitioner as having remained in service until the date of superannuation and as having retired on attaining that age.
  • The respondents are directed to pay consequential retirement benefits to the petitioner and to pay arrears after deducting any post-retiral benefits already granted.

Broader implications: The opinion rests on the application of the Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1966 and holds that initiation of departmental proceedings by an unauthorized person contravenes the statutory procedure and vitiates subsequent action. The opinion does not discuss or declare the establishment of a novel precedent beyond its application to the facts; its immediate consequence is the relief granted to the petitioner.

Disposition: Petition stands allowed and disposed of in accordance with the directions above.

Source: Opinion dated 14/2/2012 as provided. All statements in this summary are drawn exclusively from that opinion.

    Dal Chand Ahirwar v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh

    14/2/2012:

    Challenging the order Annexure P/14 dated 11.12.2003 passed by the Director General of Police rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner and the order dated 7.6.2003 Annexure P/12 passed by the Inspector General of Police, imposing penalty of compulsory retirement, petitioner has filed this writ petition.

    2. At the relevant time when the impugned action was taken, petitioner was posted as Sub Inspector in Police Station, Kindrai, District Seoni. A complaint was received in the office of Superintendent of Police to the effect from one Swarooplal that his father has died in the village about six months back and for forwarding his claim for grant of pension under a particular scheme, the petitioner has demanded a sum of Rs.1000/-.

    3. Record indicates that a show cause notice Annexure P/1 was issued to the petitioner. Petitioner's reply to the same Annexure P/2 being found to be not satisfactory, a preliminary enquiry was ordered which was conducted by the S.D.O.P. Police, Seoni and based on the report submitted by the said authority, a charge sheet Annexure P/3 was issued to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, Seoni on 21.11.2002. Petitioner denied the allegations leveled in the charge sheet, gave a detailed reply, however, finding the same to be unsatisfactory, the Additional Superintendent of Police was appointed as Enquiry Officer. Enquiry Officer conducted enquiry, five witnesses were examined and on the basis of evidence that came in the Enquiry, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding, forwarded to the petitioner vide Annexure P/10 holding the petitioner is guilty of charges leveled against him. Petitioner's reply to the show cause notice being found to be not satisfactory, impugned order Annexure P/12 has been passed by the Inspector General of Police, Jabalpur Range and appeal and mercy appeal having been rejected, petitioner is before this Court.

    4. During the course of hearing Shri Adarsh Muni Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel raised various contentions. The contentions put forth by him pertains to the conduct of the SDOP in conducting preliminary enquiry in an illegal manner, so also with regard to non supply of certain documents which were relevant and were with regard to illegal manner of conducting preliminary enquiry. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out various discrepancies in the enquiry, perversity in the findings of Enquiry Officer and also raised grounds with regard to non issuance of show cause notice before imposing the punishment by the Competent Authority, act of the Appellate Authority in not deciding the appeal in accordance with law. However, a question of legal ground raised by Shri A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel was to the effect that the charge sheet was issued to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police himself received the reply to the charge sheet and on being dis-satisfied with the reply appointed the Additional Superintendent of Police as Enquiry Officer, got the enquiry conducted and after receipt of enquiry report forwarded the entire matter to the Inspector General of Police for taking action. Taking me through the provisions of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, the definition of 'disciplinary authority' as contained in Clause Rule 2(d), the punishment envisaged under the rule as contained in Rule 10, the authority competent to impose the punishment as detailed in Rule 12, the provisions of Rule 13 with regard to initiation of departmental proceedings and the procedure for imposing penalty as contained in Rule 14, 15 and 16, submitted that as per the Schedule to the Discipline and Appeal Rules with regard to an employee holding the post of Sub Inspector, the Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority is the Deputy Inspector General of Police and accordingly, it is argued by him that initiation of departmental enquiry by the Superintendent of Police who is not the disciplinary authority vitiates the entire proceedings. Accordingly, Shri A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel submits that if the initiation of the enquiry itself is by an unauthorized person then the final punishment imposed are also stands vitiated. Accordingly, on these counts Shri A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel prays for interference into the matter.

    5. Shri Rajesh Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents refuted the aforesaid contentions and with regard to the legal objection submitted that as the final punishment order is passed by the competent authority, namely the Inspector General of Police, there is no illegality in the matter and therefore, the contentions of Shri A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior counsel needs to be rejected.

    6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and after due consideration of submissions made, I am of the considered view that before entering into the controversy on merit, the legal objection raised by Shri A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel, with regard to power and jurisdiction of Superintendent of Police to initiate departmental enquiry should be gone into.

    7. It is not in dispute that before initiating the proceedings against the petitioner, a show cause notice Annexure P/1 was issued by the Superintendent of Police and it was the Superintendent of Police who issued the charge sheet to the petitioner for initiating the disciplinary proceeding under Rule 14 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules vide Annexure P/3 dated 21.11.2002 and thereafter appointed the Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry. In the Discipline and Appeal Rules of 1966 a "disciplinary authority" is defined in sub rule (d) of Rule 2 to mean a authority competent under the rules to impose on the government servant any of the penalties specified in Rule

    10. In the schedule to this rule with regard to a Sub Inspector of Police the appointing authority is indicated to be the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the authority competent to impose penalty is also shown to be the Deputy Inspector General of Police. That being so, the disciplinary authority with regard to the petitioner who is holding the post of Sub Inspector would be the Deputy Inspector General of Police in accordance to these rules. Under Rule 10 various punishments have been indicated and compulsory retirement is a major punishment envisaged under this rule. The procedure for imposing major punishment or rather any punishment under the rule is contemplated under Rule 14 and 15 and the authority competent entitled to initiate or institute these proceedings is indicated in Rule 13. Rule 13 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules consisted of two parts. Sub rule (1) of this rule indicates that the Governor or any other authority empowered by the Governor by general or special order may institute the departmental proceedings against a government servant or such authority may direct the disciplinary authority to institute the departmental proceedings against a government servant and impose any of the penalty specified in Rule 10. Thereafter in sub rule 2 to 13 it is stipulated that the disciplinary authority who is competent under these rules to impose any of the penalty, may institute the departmental proceedings against the government servant. Admittedly, in this case the departmental proceeding is not initiated by the disciplinary authority in accordance to sub rule 2 of rule 1 but it is by an authority subordinate to the disciplinary authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police could initiate the departmental proceeding if the Governor exercising the powers under Rule 13(1) had empowered by general or special orders the Superintendent of Police to initiate departmental proceedings under this rule. Neither in the return nor during the course of hearing of this petition till date any such general or special order issued by the Governor authorizing the Superintendent of Police to institute or initiate a departmental enquiry is brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the Superintendent of Police is not authorized by the Governor through a general or special order issued under Rule 13(1) to institute disciplinary proceeding, it is also an admitted position that the same is not instituted by disciplinary authority as required under Rule 13(2). The proceeding initiated by an unauthorized person would be illegal and the entire subsequent action taken also vitiated, as it is contrary to procedure prescribed under the law.

    8. When the statute prescribe a process to be followed for taking disciplinary action and when the process so prescribed under the statutes contemplates as to how and in what manner the disciplinary proceeding is to be initiated, mandate of rule has to be followed in its totality and if the disciplinary proceeding is initiated contrary to the aforesaid statutory rules, the entire initiation of disciplinary proceeding stands vitiated. This itself is sufficient to hold the subsequent action to be illegal.

    9. When a law prescribes a procedure to be followed, then everything has to be done in accordance to the procedure prescribed under the law and anything contrary thereto being in contravention to the law stands vitiated being in nullity and therefore, cannot be given effect to. Under such circumstances this is a case where the initiation of departmental enquiry against the petitioner itself is found to be illegal being contrary to the statutory provisions and on that count this petition is liable to be allowed.

    10. In view of aforesaid finding recorded by this Court now, it is not necessary for this Court to go into various other questions raised by Shri A. M. Trivedi, learned Senior Counsel during the course of hearing. Finding the initiation of departmental enquiry against the petitioner which culminated in imposing of punishment to be initiated by an unauthorized person, contrary to the statutory rules, this petition is allowed.

    11. Orders impugned dated 7.6.2003 and the order dated 11.12.2003 passed by the appellate authority are quashed. As the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation, respondents are directed to treat the petitioner to have remained in service till the age of superannuation and treating him to have retired on attaining the age of superannuation, consequential benefits be paid to him. All arrears be paid to him after deducting post retiral benefits already granted to him.

    12. Petition stands allowed and disposed of with the aforesaid.

    c.c. as per rules.

    (Rajendra Menon) Judge Mrs. mishra

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    Dal Chand Ahirwar v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh
    (Feb 14, 2012)