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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • S.L Kochar
  • V.K Tankha, Advocate General
  • S.A Dharmadhikari
Judges
  • Dipak Misra, J.
Acts
  • SECTION 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act II of 1974).
  • provisions of the Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1985
  • Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861)
  • provisions of the Code. Section 154(1) of the Code
  • Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872)
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.
  • Section 41(1)(a) arid (g) of the Code
  • Sections 157 and 173 of the Code.
  • Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code
  • provisions of Sub-section s (2)
  • Section 154(1) of the Cr. P.C.
  • Section 154(1) of the Code,
  • Section 156(3) of the Code.
  • Section 154 of the Cr. P.C.
  • Section 2(c) of the Code)
  • Section 173 of the Code
  • Sub-section (2). 29.
  • Sub-section (5). (8)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • S.L Kochar
  • V.K Tankha, Advocate General
  • S.A Dharmadhikari
Judges
  • Dipak Misra, J.
Acts
  • SECTION 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act II of 1974).
  • provisions of the Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1985
  • Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861)
  • provisions of the Code. Section 154(1) of the Code
  • Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872)
  • Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.
  • Section 41(1)(a) arid (g) of the Code
  • Sections 157 and 173 of the Code.
  • Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code
  • provisions of Sub-section s (2)
  • Section 154(1) of the Cr. P.C.
  • Section 154(1) of the Code,
  • Section 156(3) of the Code.
  • Section 154 of the Cr. P.C.
  • Section 2(c) of the Code)
  • Section 173 of the Code
  • Sub-section (2). 29.
  • Sub-section (5). (8)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Vice President of Harizan Adivasi Bass Udyog Sahakari Samiti, Balaghat (a cooperative society registered as No. 44/449), alleges that respondent No. 5 (Chairman of the District Co-operative Central Bank) demanded Rs. 20,000 as a processing charge for sanctioning a credit facility to the Society. The petitioner states that he withdrew Rs. 20,000 from the Society's bank account on 22-9-1999 and delivered it to respondent No. 5, who allegedly gave a handwritten receipt (Annexure P/1). Despite this, the credit facility was not sanctioned, the Society's functioning suffered and the Society's President lodged complaints with various authorities (Annexure P/2) and the petitioner filed an affidavit (Annexure P/3).

The petitioner alleges that respondent No. 5 abused and threatened him on 6-12-1999, and that attempts to lodge an FIR at the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare Police Station in Hoshangabad were repeatedly refused or delayed; a written report dated 23-12-1999 is on record (Annexure P/4). The writ petition prays for a mandamus directing respondents Nos. 1–4 to take cognizance of the complaint, investigate and file a chargesheet against respondent No. 5, and to provide protection to the petitioner.

Respondents Nos. 1–4 filed a counter-affidavit denying that the petitioner delivered money to respondent No. 5 or that a handwritten receipt was issued. They stated that enquiries were entrusted to Sub-Inspector B.S. Parihar, who recorded statements and produced a report (Annexure R-II) concluding that respondent No. 5 was falsely implicated. The respondents relied inter alia on the need for preliminary enquiry before registration in some circumstances and cited precedent (P. Sirajuddin).

The petitioner filed a rejoinder disputing the veracity and the conduct of the enquiries and asserting non-cooperation by the respondents. Respondent No. 5 separately filed a return denying allegations and suggested the petitioner may file a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. instead of approaching the High Court.

The Court heard counsel for the petitioner, the Advocate General for respondents Nos. 1–4, and counsel for respondent No. 5. After considering statutory provisions and precedents, the Court issued directions regarding the registeration of FIRs and the procedure to be followed where information discloses a cognizable offence. The writ petition was allowed to the extent indicated in the order; no costs were charged in the peculiar facts of the case. The Court also directed that a copy of the order be sent to the State Home Secretary for circulation to Superintendents of Police.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence satisfying Section 154(1) Cr.P.C., the officer-in-charge of a police station is statutorily bound to record the information as a First Information Report and allot a crime number (i.e., whether refusal to register on the ground that a preliminary enquiry shows the information to be false is permissible).
  2. What is the scope and permissibility of conducting a preliminary enquiry prior to registration of an FIR, particularly where allegations are made against a public servant.
  3. What procedural steps must be followed by police after registration (interplay of Sections 154, 156, 157 and 173 Cr.P.C.) and whether registration necessarily triggers arrest or other immediate steps.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • When an FIR is lodged in respect of a cognizable offence, the officer-in-charge must register the case, give a prime/crime number and thereafter proceed with investigation; an enquiry and subsequent finding that no offence is made out cannot justify prior refusal to register.
  • The police cannot, prior to registration, embark on an enquiry and then refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable; Section 154(1) mandates registration where information discloses a cognizable offence.
  • Relied on several precedents (including State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal; Munna Lal; Tulsiram; Gurmito; Suresh Chand Jain) to support the proposition that refusal to register is impermissible when the statutory requirements are met.

Respondents' (State / Advocate General) Arguments

  • Registration of an FIR in all circumstances is not mandatory because that might give rise to chaos; an investigating agency may conduct a preliminary enquiry to test the truth of allegations and, if the enquiry shows allegations are false, decline to register an FIR.
  • As a matter of practice in the State, when an FIR is lodged no crime number is given immediately; a preliminary enquiry is often conducted and only after some investigation is a crime number assigned.
  • Relied on precedents (e.g., Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh; State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha; P. Sirajuddin; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj; Mrs. Vidya Stokes) to emphasize circumstances where preliminary enquiry is appropriate, particularly when accusations target public servants.

Respondent No. 5's Arguments

  • Denied the allegations and contended the present complaint was foisted following dismissal of an earlier writ (W.P. No. 4037/99).
  • Suggested that if dissatisfied with the preliminary report, the petitioner ought to file a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. rather than seek extraordinary writ relief from the High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cri LJ 527 Authority cited for principles concerning registration of FIRs and limitations on interference with police investigation; cited by both sides. The Court treated it as one of the leading authorities on the topic and relied upon it in concluding that once information discloses a cognizable offence, registration under Section 154(1) is required.
Munna Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1992 Cri LJ 1558 Held that when a petitioner approaches police with facts and prays for registration, the police must register and then investigate; refusal to register and instead to conclude after ex parte enquiry is impermissible. The Court relied on the decision to support the principle that refusal to register an FIR and then close the matter on the basis of a preliminary enquiry is not recognised by law.
Tulsiram s/o Purushottamji Malani v. State of M.P., 1993 Cri LJ 1165 Where a written report disclosing a cognizable offence with sufficient particulars is made, denial by the police to register after conducting ex parte preliminary enquiry is illegal and violative of natural justice. Cited as authority for the proposition that a report required to be registered in terms of Section 154(1) cannot be buried by an ex parte preliminary enquiry.
Smt. Gurmito v. State of Punjab, 1996 Cri LJ 1254 Held that any information disclosing a cognizable offence conveyed to officer-in-charge satisfying Section 154(1) cannot be refused registration on credibility grounds; registration is mandatory. Used by the Court to affirm that police cannot refuse registration where Section 154(1) requirements are met; registration precedes any decision under Section 157 whether to investigate.
Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P., AIR 2001 SC 571 : 2001 Cri LJ 954 Held that a Magistrate may order investigation under Section 156(3) and may direct registration of FIR; once ordered, officer-in-charge must register FIR. The Court cited it to emphasise the duty to register when a Magistrate directs investigation and that registration is part of enabling police to start investigation.
P. Sirajuddin v. The State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 520 : 1971 Cri LJ 523 Observes that before publicly charging a high-ranking public servant with serious misconduct, a suitable preliminary enquiry should ordinarily be conducted to avoid incalculable harm if allegations are baseless. The Court acknowledged this authority as cautioning preliminary enquiry in respect of allegations against high-ranking public servants but did not treat it as authorising police to refuse registration when statutory requisites for Section 154(1) are met.
Mohindro v. State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 2113 : 2001 Cri LJ 2587 Court directed registration where police failed to register a case; noted surprise that enquiry could be held without registering a criminal case. The Court relied on the decision to illustrate that enquiry without registration is anomalous and to support its direction that registration must follow where information discloses a cognizable offence.
State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 SC 949 : 1982 Cri LJ 819 Held that an FIR must prima facie disclose the essential ingredients of a cognizable offence before lawful investigation under Section 157 can commence; police's right to inquire is conditioned by reason to suspect. The Court cited it to explain that investigation under Section 157 requires that the FIR prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, and that police powers are not unfettered.
Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1087 : 1975 Cri LJ 928 Cited by the State to support the concept that registration need not automatically follow every allegation and that preliminary inquiry may be appropriate in some circumstances. The Court acknowledged the citation but interpreted the aggregate of authorities as not permitting police to refuse registration where Section 154(1) requirements are satisfied.
Mrs. Vidya Stokes v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1994 Cri LJ 1833 Held that before publicly charging a public servant with dishonesty, some preliminary enquiry must be held; such enquiry must be fair and reasonable to avoid harm. Relied on by the Advocate General; the Court accepted that preliminary enquiry may be appropriate in some departmental or sensitive contexts but did not accept that such enquiry can substitute mandatory registration when Section 154(1) is satisfied.
Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, AIR 1996 SC 309 : 1996 Cri LJ 381 Cited in support of submissions relating to preliminary enquiries and sensitive handling of allegations against public servants. The Court considered it among authorities emphasising caution but again held registration under Section 154(1) is mandatory where its requirements are met.
Smt. Bachani Devi v. State of Haryana, 1997 Cri LJ 2632 Held that police officials have a statutory duty to register and investigate the case and cannot refuse registration on the ground that they have conducted a preliminary enquiry. Used to reinforce the Court's view that a statutory duty to record information as FIR exists and preliminary enquiry cannot be used to avoid registration.
Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup, AIR 1974 SC 183 (1974) 2 SCR 12 Quoted passage warning against undue invasion of personal liberty and emphasizing observance of procedure established by law. The Court cited the passage to underline the procedural safeguards protecting personal liberty and the need for strict adherence to statutory procedure when depriving liberty or launching investigation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court engaged in a statutory and precedential analysis focused on Sections 154(1), 156, 157 and 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). It proceeded step-by-step as follows:

  1. Statutory foundation: The Court reproduced Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. (mandatory reduction of information about a cognizable offence into writing and signature of the informant) and canvassed Sections 156 and 157 (police power to investigate cognizable cases and procedures for investigation) and Section 173 (report on completion of investigation).
  2. Interpretation of "information": The Court emphasized the legislative choice of the unqualified term "information" in Section 154(1), contrasting it with other provisions (e.g., Section 41(1)(a) or (g)) that use qualifiers such as "reasonable complaint" or "credible information". The Court held that reasonableness or credibility of information is not a condition precedent to registration under Section 154(1).
  3. Mandatory nature of registration where requirements met: The Court concluded that where information discloses a cognizable offence and satisfies Section 154(1), the officer-in-charge has no option but to enter the substance in the prescribed form (i.e., register a case). A refusal by the officer-in-charge to register on the ground of lack of credibility was characterized as a violation of statutory duty.
  4. Role of preliminary enquiry considered: The Court examined precedents relied upon by both sides. It acknowledged authorities (notably P. Sirajuddin and Vidya Stokes) that caution a preliminary enquiry before publicly charging a high-ranking public servant to avoid injustice. However, the Court distinguished those authorities from the proposition that police may refuse registration where Section 154(1) requirements are satisfied. The Court observed that some decisions invoked by the State related to departmental or governmental enquiries and did not authorize the police to conduct a preliminary enquiry to avoid registration in the ordinary course.
  5. Interplay between registration and investigation: The Court clarified the distinction between registering an FIR (entry of information under Section 154(1) and allotment of a crime number) and commencing investigation under Sections 156 and 157. It observed that registration does not automatically mandate arrest; it merely triggers the procedural machinery that permits investigation subject to legal constraints.
  6. Practical objection to State practice: The Court noted a reported practice in Madhya Pradesh of not registering FIRs immediately but conducting preliminary enquiries first. The Court held that such a procedure is unknown to the Code and must be rectified.
  7. Reluctance to decide disputed facts: The Court did not delve into the merits of the factual dispute (e.g., whether the Rs. 20,000 was paid or whether the receipt was genuine) but confined itself to the legal question of the duty to register where information discloses a cognizable offence.
  8. Directions: The Court directed that if the FIR in question discloses a cognizable offence and meets Section 154 requirements, the concerned officer-in-charge shall register the FIR, allot a crime number and proceed in accordance with Sections 157 and 173. The Court also ordered that a copy of the order be sent to the State Home Secretary to circulate to Superintendents of Police so as to instruct officers-in-charge to comply with Section 154 requirements.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed to the extent that the Court held that when information disclosing a cognizable offence satisfying Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. is presented to an officer-in-charge of a police station, the officer is statutorily bound to record the information as an FIR and allot a crime number; registration cannot be refused merely because a preliminary enquiry purports to show the information false.

Immediate consequences for the parties and administrative directives:

  • If the FIR in the present matter discloses a cognizable offence and satisfies Section 154 Cr.P.C., the concerned officer-in-charge is directed to register the FIR, give a crime number and proceed in accordance with law (Sections 157 and 173 Cr.P.C.).
  • The Court clarified that registration and allotment of a crime number does not necessarily require immediate arrest; police must proceed in accordance with the Code and applicable law.
  • The Court directed the Registry to send a copy of the order to the Home Secretary of the State for circulation to Superintendents of Police, instructing officers-in-charge to register FIRs in compliance with Section 154 Cr.P.C., thereby addressing a State practice of conducting preliminary enquiries prior to registration.
  • In the peculiar facts of the case, there was no order as to costs.

Broader legal implication (as reflected in the order): the judgment reiterates and affirms the statutory duty to record information as FIR under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. where the information discloses a cognizable offence; administrative practices that delay or avoid registration by preliminary enquiry are to be corrected in conformity with the Code.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add any information beyond that opinion.

Show full summary ...

    Giridhari Lal Kanak v. State Of M.P And Others

    1. Invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court the petitioner has prayed for to call for the record and after examination of the same to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the petitioner and after due investigation file chargesheet against the respondent No. 5 for the offence committed by him. The further prayer in the writ petition is to issue appropriate direction to the respondents No. 1 to 4 to provide sufficient protection to the petitioner as there is threat to his life.

    2. The facts as have been undraped are that the petitioner is the Vice President of Harizan Adivasi Bass Udyog Sahakari Samiti Maryadit, Balaghat, having its registration No. 44/449. The said Co-operative Society is committed for the upliftment and development of downtrodden members of Scheduled Castes Community. It is entitled for financial assistance and running its affairs from the Zila Sahakari Kendra Bank, Hoshangabad to avail uninterrupted financial assistance. The petitioner has completed all the formalities and submitted necessary and relevant documents for sanction of credit limit as directed by the respondent No. 5 and the Chief Observor of the said Bank. It is setforth in the writ petition that despite completion of all formalities the respondent No. 5 acting illegally, deliberately delayed the grant of financial assistance on one pretext or the other. The petitioner contacted the respondent No. 5 time and again and the said respondent informed the petitioner that for the processing of the application of the Society an expense of Rs. 20,000/- would have to be incurred by the Society. Believing the aforesaid representation of the respondent No. 5 the petitioner withdrew a sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the Savings Bank Account of the aforesaid society on 22-9-1999 and delivered the amount to the respondent No. 5 who issued a receipt in his own handwriting as per Annexure P/1. Despite of payment of necessary processing charges, as represented by the respondent No. 5, the Society was not sanctioned the desired credit facility as a result of which the functioning of the Society was paralysed and the members virtually reached the stage of starvation. Perceiving the unjustified inordinate delay in sanctioning the credit facility the petitioner and the other office bearers of the Society enquired into the matter and to their shock and surprise they were informed that no processing charges as recovered by the respondent No. 5 was required to be paid and in fact, the said respondent misappropriated the amount. Realising this, the President of the Society lodged a complaint before the Lokayukt, Chief Secretary, Inspector General of Police Harijan Kalyan and the Collector, Hoshangabad, Copy of the said complaint has been brought on record as Annexure P/2. It is putforth in the writ petition that the society delegated the petitioner to file affidavit on oath regarding the incident and accordingly submitted the affidavit as per Annexure P/3.

    3. According to the petitioner the respondent No. 4, Station House Officer, having received the information/complaint called the petitioner on 6-12-1999 to meet him in the Guest House of the Bank. The respondent No. 5 seeing the petitioner started abusing and insulting him in extremely filthy language and threatened him with dire consequences. The petitioner felt humiliated because he is a member of the Scheduled Caste. The petitioner went to the Police Station, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare, Hoshangabad to lodge a report of the incident but the personnel present declined to register the FIR on the ground that the Town Inspector was not available. Thereafter the petitioner approached the authority of the police station but every time his FIR was not recorded on some flimsy execuses. Thereafter the petitioner, under compelling circumstances, submitted a report in writing on 23-12-1999 at the Police Station Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare, Hoshangabad, as per Annexure P/4. It is alleged in the petition that despite written report by the petitioner the Station House Officer has not taken cognizance of the matter and is avoiding to take action against the respondent No. 5 for his political influence in the area. It is putforth that as the Station House Officer has not taken any steps in the matter the petitioner submitted a written complaint to the Inspector General of Police. Bhopal, as per Annexure P/5 but no action has yet been taken and efforts are being made to hush-up the matter. It is averred in the writ petition that the respondent No. 5 being the Chairman of the District Co-operative Central Bank is a public servant and the aforesaid acts tantamount to cognizable offence under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1985 and hence, the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are duty bound to register the FIR against the respondent No. 5 on the basis of the complaint made against him and to take appropriate action in the matter, but the said action is not being taken up though mandated in law. With the aforesaid averments reliefs have been sought, as have been incdicated hereinabove.

    4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the answering respondents Nos. 1 to 4 contending, inter alia, that on enquiry it has been found out that the petitioner never delivered the sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the respondent No. 5 and the said respondent never issued a receipt in his own handwriting. It has been putforth that, the letter dated 22-11-1999 and the D.O. letter bearing No. PHQ/AJK/A-4/5233/99, Bhopal dated 14-12-1999 were sent to Shri Mool Chand Bajaj, Police Superintendent, Hoshangabad from Shri Ganesh Prasad Dubey, ADGP (AJK), Bhopal, regarding the complaint of the petitioner. On receipt of the complaint the Town Inspector of the concerned Police Station. Anusuchit Jati Kalyan, Hoshangabad entrusted the enquiry to Shri B.S. Parihar, Sub-Inspector, Hoshangabad who had conducted the enquiry and recorded the statement of the petitioner Girdharilal on 6-12-1999 the statement of compLalnant, Arjun on 18-1-2000 and the statement of the respondent No. 4, Lakhan Singh Mourya on 26-1-2000 and that of N.R. Mandloi on 29-1-2000. It is putforth that during the enquiry the petitioner even could not produce original receipt which reflects the conduct of the petitioner. Allegations have been made that there has been non-co-operation and inaction on the part of the petitioner. It Is also setforth that the report of the enquiry officer which has been marked as Annexure 1-4/R-ll is quite clear on each and every point and the said report clearly reveals that the respondent No. 5 has been falsely implicated. As the complaint of the petitioner was found false no offence could be registered against the respondent No. 5. It is putforth that the petitioner had filed a writ petition forming the subject-matter of W.P. No. 4037/99 which was dismissed on 8-9-1999 and thereafter, being aggrieved, he had filed this false complaint. It is also highlighted that enquiries have been made at various levels and the allegations have been found not to be correct. It is also putforth that before lodging of an FIR a preliminary inquiry is necessary as per the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of P. Sirajuddin etc. v. The State of Madras etc. AIR 1971 SC 520 : 1971 Cri LJ 523 :

    5. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed highlighting that the affidavit to the return has been filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Adim Jati Kalyan, Hoshangabad whereas the said authority had no occasion to have personal knowledge of the fact situation and, therefore, the denial made is apparently incorrect. The enquiry conducted by the various authorities have been disputed and it is also stated that the petitioner had never given any statement as contained in Annexure P/5. It is also putforth that no enquiry has been done but an adroit attempt has been made to show to this Court that enquiry has been conducted. Various discrepancies have been pointed out in the affidavit to show that no inquiry was ever conducted. It is also highlighted that the investigating agency could not have conducted detailed investigation/enquiry without registering the FIR when it disclosed a cognizable offence. Various other aspects have been highlighted in the rejoinder affidavit which need not be stated in detail as the same are not essential for disposal of this writ petition. However, it is worthnoting here, it has been stated in the affidavit that there is no connection between the dismissal of the W.P. No. 4037/99 and the present complaint filed by the petitioner. The concept of holding preliminary inquiry has been disputed in the affidavit. Serious criticism has been advanced the manner in which the enquiry has been made.

    6. A return has been filed by the respondent No. 5 contending, inter alia, that because of dismissal of the W.P. No. 4037/99 the present case has been foisted. The allegations made in the petition has been specifically denied. The allegations made in the complaint have been refuted. It is also putforth that if the petitioner is aggrieved/dissatisfied with the preliminary report of the Officer Incharge of the Anusuchit Jati Kalyan, Police Station, Hoshangabad, he can file criminal complaint under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') instead of approaching this Court.

    7. I have heard Mr. S.L. Kochar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. V.K. Tankha, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and Mr. S.A. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5.

    8. It is submitted by Mr. Kochar that when an FIR is lodged in respect of a cognizable offence it is the duty of the Officer Incharge of the Police Station concerned to register the case and give a prime number and thereafter proceed with investigation. It is putforth by him that without registering a crime number it is inconceivable that an enquiry can be conducted by the Officer Incharge of a police station or any other investigating agency and to arrive at a conclusion that no case has been made out against the respondent No. 5. The learned counsel has not argued and rightly with regard to the merits of the case, but confined his argument with regard to the aspect that it is obligatory on the part of the investigating agency to register an FIR if it reveals a cognizable offence and give a crime number and proceed with investigation and, thereafter do the needful as warranted in law. To substantiate the aforesaid submissions Mr. S. L. Kochar, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cri LJ 527; Munna Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1992 Cr LJ 1558 (Him Pra); Tulsiram s/o Purushottamji Malani v. State of M.P. 1993 Cri LJ 1165 (Madh Pra); Smt. Gurmito v. State of Punjab 1996 Cri LJ 1254 (Punj & Har); and Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 571 : 2001 Cri LJ 954.

    9. Mr. V.K. Tankha, learned Advocate General for the State, combating the aforesaid submissions has contended that registration of an FIR in all circumstances is not a must as that would give rise to chaos and anarchy. It is canvassed by him that an investigating agency has the duty to conduct a preliminary enquiry whether there has been any truth in the allegations made in the FIR and if it found on the preliminary enquiry that there is no truth and it is founded on falsehood, no FIR should be registered and no number should be allotted. Learned Advocate General has submitted that as a practice here when an FIR is lodged no crime number is given and after the matter is investigated then only a crime number is assigned. Learned Advocate General gave immense emphasis on the concept of preliminary enquiry to highlight that if such a safeguard is not there any person can be booked on frivolous allegations and investigation would be warranted. To support his submissions he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Hazara Singh AIR 1975 SC 1087 : 1975 Cri LJ 928; State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha AIR 1982 SC 949 : 1982 Cri LJ 819; State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal 1992 Cri LJ 527 (SC), Mrs. Vidya Stokes v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1994 Cri LJ 1833 (Him Pra); Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill AIR 1996 SC 309 : 1996 Cri LJ 381.

    10. Before I advert to the rival submissions raised at the Bar, it is apposite to refer to certain provisions of the Code. Section 154(1) of the Code provides for recording of registration of cognizable offences. The said provision reads as under :

    154(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.

    11. In this context I may also profitably refer to sections 156 and 157 of the code. They read as under :

    156. Police-officer's power to investigate cognizable case. (1) Any officer in charge of a public station may, without the order of a Magistrate investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

    (2) No proceeding of a police-officer in any such case shall be at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this Section to investigate.

    (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.

    157. Procedure for investigation- (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measure for the discovery and arrest of the offender :

    Provided that -

    (a) when information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;

    (b) if it appear to the officer-in-charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.

    (2) In each of the cases mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), the officer-in-charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that Sub-section and in the case mentioned in Clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated.

    12. In this context it is also apposite to refer to Section 173 of the Code which deals with filing of chargesheet and section 190 of the code which lays down the postulate for taking cognizance. The aforesaid provisions read as under :

    173. Report of police officer on completion of investigation.

    (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay.

    (2)(i) As soon as it is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating -

    (a) the names of the parties :

    (b) the nature of the information;

    (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;

    (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;

    (e) whether the accused has been arrested;

    (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties;

    (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under Section 170.

    (ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.

    (3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under Section 158, the report shall, in any case in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer-in-charge of the police station to make further investigation.

    (4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.

    (5) When such report is in respect of a case to which Section 170 applies the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report-

    (a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation;

    (b) the Statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.

    (6) If the police officer is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the proceedings or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interest of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, he shall indicate that part of the statement and append a note requesting the Magistrate to exclude that part from the copies to be granted to the accused and stating his reasons for making such request.

    (7) Where the police officer investigating the case finds it convenient so to do, he may furnish to the accused copies of all or any of the documents referred to in Sub-section (5).

    (8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under Sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer -in-charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of Sub-section s (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under Sub-section (2).

    29. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1) is that every informantion relating to the commission of a "cognizable offence" (as defined under Section 2(c) of the Code) if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into writing) or in writing to "an officer incharge of a police station" (within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Code) and signed by the informant should be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe which form is commonly called as "First Information Report" and which act of entering the information in the said form is known as registration of a crime or a case.

    30. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of a Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, Lald by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer incharge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 of the code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of sections 156 and 157 of the code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to deal with those sections in extenso in the present context.) In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested on him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence, reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concernad who is satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.

    31. Be it noted that Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the expression "information"' without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word "information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) arid (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, "reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information" without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872) which thereafter read that 'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station shall be reduced into writing. The word 'complaint', which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word 'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1955 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act II of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for recording a First Information Report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.

    32. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is Lald before an officer in charge of a poilice station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.

    14. Relying on the decision it is canvassed by Mr. Kochar that once an FIR is lodged it has to be registered and a crime number has to be given. Learned counsel has also drawn inspiration from the decision rendered in the case of Munna Lal 1992 Cri LJ 1558 (supra), wherein paragraph No, 4 two Judge Bench of the Apex Court held as under :

    4. We are not satisfied at all about the manner in which this case is sought to be closed. The provisions of law about the registration of FIR are very clear. When the petitioner approached the police on February 9 1991 and brought the facts which are given in this petition to their notice and prayed for the registration of FIR the police had no option but to register it and thereafter start investigation. It is another thing that after making investigations as a result where of the police may come to the conclusion that no offence is made out in which eventuality it has to submit a report to the Court for cancellation of the FIR. Making an investigation and thereafter forming an opinion about the non-commission of an offence followed by refusal to register FIR is a procedure not known to law....

    15. The learned counsel has also referred to the Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in the case of Tulsiram s/o Purushottamji 1993 Cri LJ 1165 (supra), wherein the Bench after referring to sections 154 and 157 of the code held as under :

    Where a written report disclosing cognizable offence with sufficient particulars and identity was made before the police, the denial by the police to register the case on the ground of false allegations. After conducting ex parte preliminary enquiry, would be illegal as despite the alleged enquiry, the report is required to be registered in terms of Section 154(1). The prejudicial decision to bury the case without participation of the maker of the report in the enquiry was also violative of the principles of natural justice.

    16. Mr. Kochar has also commended me to a decision of a learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in the case of Smt. Gurmito 1996 Cri LJ 1254 (supra). While referring Police Rules of 1938 providing that a Police Officer is not bound to record an FIR, in paragraph 20 held as under :

    20. The legal position as emerges from the above discussion is that any information disclosing a cognizable offence if conveyed to officer "in-charge of a police station satisfying the requirement of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer cannot refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, he is bound to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, i.e. to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. It is only after the registration of a case as envisaged by section 154 of the code that the said police officer has been given the option by section 157 of the code to make up his mind as to whether he would or would not enter on an investigation.

    17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Smt. Bachani Devi v. State of Haryana through its Secretary to the Home Department and others. 1997 Cri LJ 2632 (Punjab & Hary) wherein it has been held that a statutory duty is cast upon police officials to register and investigate the case and they cannot refuse to register the case on the ground that they have conducted a preliminary enquiry.

    18. Mr. S.L. Kochar has also commended me to the recent decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Suresh Chand Jain (2001 Cri LJ 954) (supra) wherein two Judge Bench held as under (para 10) :

    Any judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the compLalnant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station as indicated in section 154 of the code. Even if a Magistrate does not say so in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed....

    19. In this context I may profitably refer to another two Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Mohindro v. State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC2113 : 2001 Cri LJ 2587 wherein their Lordships expressed thus :

    1. The grievance of the appellant is that though she has approached the authority for registering a case against the alleged accused persons but the police never registered a case and never put the law in motion, and, therefore, having failed in an attempt in the High Court to get a case registered she has approached this Court. Pursuant to the notice issued the respondents have entered appearance. Though the learned counsel appearing for the State of Punjab stated that there had been an enquiry, we fail to understand as to how there can be an enquiry without regestering a criminal case. On the facts alleged, it transpires that the appellant approached the police for registering a case and get the allegation investigated into and yet for no reasons whatsoever the police failed to register the case, in the aforesaid premises, we allow this appeal and direct that a case be registered on the basis of the report to be lodged by the appellant at the Police Station within a week from today and thereafter the matter will be duly investigated into and appropriate action be taken accordingly.

    20. Presently I shall proceed to deal with the contentions raised by Mr. V.K. Tankha, learned Advocate General for the State. Learned Advocate General has shown concern that there might be frivolous lodging of FIR. He has referred to certain decisions to all of which I need not advert in detail. His main plank of argument is that before an FIR is lodged a preliminary enquiry can be held. To substantiate the aforesaid submission the learned Advocate General has placed heavy reliance on the decision rendered in the case of P,. Sirajuddin 1971 Cri LJ 523 (supra) in the aforesaid case their Lordships of the Apex Court expressed the view as under :

    17. In our view the procedure adopted against the appellant before the laying of the first information report though not in terms forbidden by law, was so unprecedented and outrageous as to shock one's sense of justice and fairplay. No doubt when allegations about dishonesty of a person of the appellant's rank were brought to the notice of the Chief Minister it was his duty to direct an enquiry into the matter. The Chief Minister in our view pursued the right course. The High Court was not impressed by the allegation of the appellant that the Chief Minister was moved to take an initiative at the instance of a person who was going to benefit by the retirement of the appellant and who was saif to be a relation of the Chief Minister. The High Court rightly held that the relationship between the said person and the Chief Minister, if any, was so distant that it could not possibly have influenced him and we are of the same view. Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report against a person, specially one who like the appellant occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the department he belonged to, in general. If the Government had set up a Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department as was done in the State of Madras and the said department was entrusted with enquiries of this kind, no exception can be taken to an enquiry by officers of this department but any such enquiry must proceed in a fair and reasonable manner. The enquiring officer must not act under any preconceived idea of guilt of the person whose conduct was being enquired into or pursue the enquiry in such manner as to lead to an inference that he was bent upon securing the conviction of the said person by adopting measures which are of doubtful validity or sanction. The means adopted no less than the end to be achieved must be impeccable. In ordinary departmental proceedings against a Government servant charged with delinquency, the normal practice before the issue of a charge-sheet is for someone in authority to take down statements to examine documents which have a bearing on the issue involved. It is only thereafter that a charge-sheet is submitted and a full-scale enquiry be held for the purpose of finding out whether criminal proceedings are to be restored to the scope thereof must be limited to the examination of persons who have knowledge of the documents bearing on the same to find out whether there is prima facie evidence of guilt of the officer. Thereafter the ordinary law of the land must take its course and further inquiry be proceeded with in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure by lodging a first information report.

    21. Mr. Tankha has also commended me to the decision rendered in the case of Swapan Kumar Guha 1982 Cri LJ 819 (supra) wherein three Judge Bench of the Apex Court expressed their view that an FIR which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirement of the penal provision and prima facie, satisfy, cannot form that foundation or constitute the starting point of lawful investigation. The learned counsel has drawn attention to the paragraphs Nos. 21 and 22 of the aforesaid case, which are reproduced :

    21. The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A. N. Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under section 157 of the code is that the FIR must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under section 157 of the code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and the rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. On the other hand, if the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as Lald or rceived.

    22. There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to Investigate Into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code, I may, in this behalf, usefully draw attention to the warning uttered by Mathew J. in his majority judgment in Prabhu "Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup (1974) 2 SCR 12 at pp 22-23 : AIR 1974 SC 183 at p. 199, to the following effect :

    We say and we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty or a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law.

    The learned Advocate General has also drawn transpiration from the Division Bench decision rendered in the case of Mrs. Vidya Stokes 1994 Cri LJ 1833 (Him Pra) (supra), wherein the Court while dealing with the matter relating to quashment of an FIR held as under (para 50) :

    Before a public servant is publicly charged with acts of dis-honesty, which amounts to serious misdemeanour some preliminary enquiry must be held into the allegations prior to lodging of FIR. Such preliminary enquiry must proceed in a fair and reasonable manner and the object of holding such enquiry is to avoid causing incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but to the Department to which he belongs.

    23. From the decisions cited by the learned Advocate General it is deducible that a preliminary enquiry has to be made before an FIR is lodged making allegations against a respectful public servant. The said decisions in no way, create an embargo for registration of an FIR when an FIR is filed. Submission of Mr. Tankha is that before the FIR is registered a preliminary enquiry is warranted by the investigating agencies, namely, Police Department or Criminal Investigation Department or Central Bureau of Investigation is not acceptable. In the case of P. Shirajuddin 1971 Cri LJ 523 (supra) the Apex Court sounded a note of caution for lodging of an FIR before a preliminary enquiry into the allegations made against a responsible officer in the case. Their Lordships were dwelling upon lodging of an FIR by the concerned Department and the ratio Lald down in the said case was followed in other cases cited by Mr. Tankha, learned Advocate General of the State. From the aforesaid decision it is difficult to infer that the Police has Jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary enquiry. On the contrary, the decisions which have been cited by Mr. Kochar. learned counsel for the petitioner, go a long way to show that once an FIR has been lodged as contemplated under Section 154(1) of the Cr. P.C. in respect of cognizable offences the Police is obligated under law to register the same. Mr. Tankha expressed his apprehension that once an FIR is registered the Criminal Law has to be set in motion and the person concerned would be arrested. In my considered opinion, the aforesaid apprehension is not well founded. The Police has to satisfy itself with regard to certain conditions precedent before proceeding with the investigation. In certain cases the Police may refuse to investigate. Investigation into an allegation and registration of an FIR by giving a crime number are two different compartments. In fact, for that reason their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohindro 2001 Cri LJ 2587 (supra), expressed their surprise, how there would be an enquiry without registering a criminal case.

    24. Ex consequent!, I am inclined to hold that once an FIR is lodged meeting the requirements as enjoined under section 154 of the code, the same has to be registered by the Officer Incharge of the Police Station or any other person in his charge and thereafter, the investigating agency, if an offence is disclosed, investigate into the offence and may take such appropriate steps as per law enshrined under Sections 157 and 173 of the Code. It is further clarified that when an FIR is lodged and the conditions precedent are satisfied, the same has to be registered and a crime number has to be allotted. It does not necessarily follow that the Police is duty bound to arrest the persons named in an FIR, for the FIR has been registered. The police is required to act in accordance with law and the provisions of the Code. It has been brought to the notice of this Court in course of hearing that in the State of Madhya Pradesh when an FIR is lodged, it is not registered and no crime number is given but a preliminary enquiry is carried on. This procedure is totally unknown to the Code. It has to be rectified as per the directions given and sooner it is done, better it is.

    25. Accordingly, it is directed that a copy of this order be sent to the Home Secretary of the State by the Registry of this Court so that, the said Secretary shall circulate it amongst the Superintendents of Police of the State, who shall in their turn, inform the Officers Incharge of the Police Stations to register the FIR, give a crime number, subject to of course, meeting the requirements as enjoined under Section 154 of the Cr. P.C. and proceed thereafter in accordance with the law.

    26. As far as the case at hand is concerned, it is directed that if the FIR in question is disclosing a cognizable offence, concerned Officer Incharge shall register the FIR giving a crime number and proceed to deal with the same in accordance with the procedure Lald down in the Code.

    27. In the result, the writ petition is al lowed to the extent indicated herein above. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    Giridhari Lal Kanak v. State Of M.P And Others
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