1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge whereunder allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1, the order passed by the State Appellate Tribunal seeking setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Auihority granting the stage carriage permit to the said respondent has been quashed, the objec-tor/respondents in the writ petition have now come up in Letters Palent Appeal seeking redress praying for the selling aside of the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondent, and have carefully perused the record.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass. The respondent No. I had moved an application praying for the grant of a permit on 28-10-1996 for service of a stage carriage of two return trips daily on the route Ashoknagar to Kadwaya via Saraskhcdi, Issagarh, Gahora and Manethi and for a single return trip daily between Ashoknagar to Isagarh via Saraskhedi.
4. The Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior vide its order dated 27-8-1997, granted a single permit for plying the stage carriage authorising two return trips daily between Ashoknagar and Kadwaya and a single return trip daily between Ashoknagar and-Isagarh, as prayed for.
5. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the present appellants challenged the same in revision before the Madhya Pradesh State Appel late Tribunal. The State Appellate Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 3-10-1997, allowed the revision and set aside the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority granting permit to the respondent No. 1.
6. Before the revising authority it had been urged by the present appellants that a single permit for routes having more than two terminals could not be granted. It had further been urged that the contesting respondent was required to pay Rs. 500/- for the grant of permit according to Rule 145 of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, and as Prem Narain, the said respondent had paid only a sum of Rs. 500/- his application for the grant of permit to ply his siage carriage on a route with more than two terminals signifying two different routes could not be entertained. The appellants had also challenged the lime schedule fixed by the Regional Transport Authority on the ground that it was wholly unjust.
7. The revising authority came to the conclusion that in his application for the grant of a permit, Prem Narain, the contesting respondent had in fad sought for permit to ply his stage carriage between the routes having more than two terminals and consequently, the pcrmil issued by the Regional Transport Auihority could not be held to be in accordance with the provisions contained in Scclion 2(38) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, holding that a single permit for a roule having more than two terminals could not be granted.
8. The objection in regard to the payment of an additional sum of Rs. 500/- in order to comply with the requirements contained in rule 145 of the rules referred to hereinabove, was however, rejected.
9. So far as the objection in regard to the time schedule was concerned, although the Slate Appellate Tribunal had expressed the opinion that it appeared to be unjust but it did not go into merits of this conlroversy as the application for permit filed by the contesting respondent was found to be not enterlainable and the revision was allowed on that short ground.
10. The order passed by the revising authority was challenged by Prem Narain, the contesting respondent in the writ petition which has given rise to the present Letters Patent Appeal.
11. A learned single Judge of this Court vide the impugned order dated 11 -3-1998 (reported in AIR 1998 Madh Pra 229), allowed the writ petition and quashed the order passed by the revising authority holding it to be against the provisions of the law.
12. Under the impugned order the learned single Judge reversed the finding of the revising authority on the question relating to the entertainability of the application filed by Prem Narain, the contesting respondent No. 1, being of the view that on a correct interpretation of the provisions contained in Sections 2(38) and 70 ol the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as well as the rule 145 of the rules referred to hcreinabove, any other interpretation except that one application could be moved for a permit with respect to a single route or more routes or the area or areas to which the application related was not possible.
13. The learned single Judge rejected the contention that separate applications ought to have been given for permits for operating the stage carriages over separate routes.
14. So far as the deposit of an additional sum of Rs. 500/- is concerned, the learned single Judge was of the view that the fee prescribed was for an application for grant or renewal of stage carriage permit, and therefore, the fee required to be paid under the rule had to be taken as the fee required to be paid for a single application irrespective of the fact that the application was for permit to ply stage carriage on separate routes.
15. In the aforesaid view of the mattter, the contention that separate fee ought to have been paid for permits to operate the stage carriages on the routes in question was found to be wholly misconceived.
16. It may be noticed that before the learned single Judge, in support of their submission, the contesting respondent the present appellants had placed reliance upon a decision of this Court rendered by a Division Bench in the case of M/s. Shiv Chand Amolak Chand v. Stale Transport Appellate Authority reported in 1964 MPLJ 754.
17. The learned single Judge while expressing the opinion that there was no question of any disagreement or difference of opinion in respect of the law laid down by the Division Bench in its aforesaid decision holding that the aforesaid case was distinguishable on facts, upheld the contention of the petitioner that he was not obliged to move separate applications and pay separate fee for permits with respect to separate routes.
18. The learned single Judge reversed the finding of the revising authority on the question relating to the implications arising under the provisions contained in Section 2(38) of the Act. It was held that in fact the petitioner had complied with the requirement of Section 2(38) of the Act, as the only requirement so far as the said respondent was concerned was that the route should be clearly mentioned in the application. According to the learned single Judge since the routes had been clearly mentioned in the single application, this amounted to sufficient compliance.
19. So far as the contention in regard to the time schedule is concerned, the learned single Judge repelled the contention of the appellants on the ground that the revising authority had discussed the argument'relating to the frequency, and therefore, the submission had no substance.
20. The learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously urged that the finding of the learned single Judge that a single application seeking permit to ply stage carriages on a route having more than two terminals was cntcrtainable is patently erroneous and is based on a misconstruction of the provisions contained in Sections 2(38) and 70 of the Act, read with rule 145 of the rules referred to hercinabove. It has been urged that in fact the application filed by Prcm Narain had to be treated to be an application for two different routes and was not cntertainable especially in the absence of payment of the additional amount of Rs. 500/- prescribed under rule 145 of the rules, which condition had to be treated as a condition precedent in view of the provisions contained in Section 70(1)(f) of the Act.
21. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has heavily relied upon a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Shiv Chand Amolak Chand v. State Transport Appellate Authority reported in 1964 MPLJ 754, urging that the ratio of the aforesaid decision was binding on the learned single Judge but it has been erroneously ignored on the ground that the decision was distinguishable on facts.
22. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has however tried to support the findings returned against the appellants by the learned single Judge.
23. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the application filed by Prem Narain had to be treated to be an application for the grant of permits for two different routes or a single route and as to whether a single application seeking grant of a single permit for different routes was entertainable.
24. At this stage, it will be useful to notice the provision contained in Section 2(38) of the Act, which is to the following effect:
" 'route' meansa line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another."
25. The route is an essential ingredient of a permit authorising the plying of motor vehicles on a public highway It is an-abstract concept of line of travel between one terminus and another and is not the same thing as a physical tract between two termii. It is of the essence of a route in respect of which a permit is granted, that it should run from one terminus to another so as to ensure a service between the two terminii.
26. There can be no manner of doubt that a route has two terminals and further as required under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the route must be set out not only in the application form but also in the permit itself. If one of the two terminals is different, it will constitute a different route although the line of travel and the highway traversed might be common to both the routes.
27. In the present case, Prem Narain, the contesting respondent, hud sought for the permit for plying his stage carriage between Ashoknagar and Kadwaya via Saraskhedi, Isagarh, Gahora and Manethi and for plying his stage carriage between Ashoknagar and Isagarh via Saraskhedi. The mere fact that the highway to be traversed was common and the terminals fell on the same highway therefore was wholly immaterial. In the circumstances there being more than two terminals there could be no escape from the conclusion that the application was for permit to operate the state carriage service on two different routes:,
28. We are of the considered opinion that in the circumstances of the case, the application filed by the contesting respondent had to be taken to be an application for permits for plying his stage carriage on two separate route's as envjs,-
agcd under Section 2(38) of the Act.
29. It may be noticed at this stage that a Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of M/s. Shiv Chand Amolak Chand (1964 MPLJ 754) (supra), had clearly observed that it was obvious, and was not disputed either that a separate application had to be made for each permit and a separate fee as prescribed had to be paid therefor. It was, however, indicated that it was open to the transport authorities to allow the applicant to make amendment in the application for permit so as to make it an application for one of the two routes, and notwithstanding the ab sence of a formal order to that effect, they could be regarded as having the application substan tially made for one of the two permits. The submission that since the prescribed fee had to be paid with the application and that, since the fee required for two permits had not been paid, there was no valid application at all, was however, rejected; observing that such an objection was technical one and without any substance as the fee required for one of the two permits for which the application was treated as valid had actually beer paid in the manner required.
30. We are of the clear opinion that the ratio of the decision in the aforesaid case rendered by a Division Bench is squarely attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
31. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has vehemently urged that the provisions contained in Section 70 of the Act. clearly stipulate and permit the moving of a single application for one or more permits in respect of a stage carriage for a route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates indicating, that a single application could be entertained for the grant of permit for more than one route.
32. The relevant portion of Section 70 of the Act is to the following effect. "7,0. Application for stage carriage permit.-
(1) An application for a permit in respect of a stage carriage (in this Chapter referred to as a Stage carriage permit) or as a reserve stage carriage shall, as far as may be, contain the following particulars, namely :-
(a) the route or routes or the area or areas to which application relates;
(b) to (e)..................................
. (f) such other matter as may be prescribed.
(2) An application referred to in sub-section (I) shall be accompanied by such document as may be prescribed."
33. Much emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent on the use of the expression "An application for a permit" occurring in Section 70(1) of the Act. and on the expression "the route of routes" as contained in Section 70(1)(a) of the Act.
34. On the strength of the aforesaid expressions, it has been urged that a single application lor different permits for different routes could be entertained.
35. We have given our anxious consideration to the above submission;
36. The provisions contained ih Section 70 of the Act, in our opinion, have to be interpreted not in a pedantic manner but taking into consideration the provisions contained in Section 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that in all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa.
37. It has been pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Administrator', Mu nicipal Corporation, Bilaspur v. Dattatraya Dahankar, Advocate reported in (1991) 4 JT (SC) 500: (AIR 1992 SC 1846) that a mechanical approach to construction is altogether out of step with the modern positive approach. The modern positive approach is to have a purposeful con struction that is to effectuate the object and the purpose of the Act.
38. Ordinarily, when the language used in the statute is Unambiguous and on a plain grammati-
cal meaning the end result is neither arbitrary.
irrational or contrary to the object of the statute then it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the words used in the statute as the words declare the intention of the law making authority. :
It should however not be forgotten that the statutes arc not to be construed as theorems of Euclid but with some imagination of the pur poses which lie behind them, that is the general legislative purpose and one should not go by the letter of the statute but by the spirit of it. A purposive approach ought to be adopted in such matters.
39. We are of the considered opinion that the expression 'an application" as used in Section 70 of the Act, includes the expression "applica tions" especially taking into account the provi sion contained in Section 13 of the General Clauses Act. Similarly, the expression 'the per mit' as used in the aforesaid provision has to be taken to have within its ambit "permits." Any other interpretation is bound to lead to wholly unwarranted results which could never have been intended.
40. There may be a situation where several routes may be available in a single area requiring service of stage carriages. There may be a single highway and there may be different highways' falling in different areas where such routes may be available.
41. The legislative intent underlying the provisions of the Act, does not indicate that a single application is enteftainable tor different routes as indicated above as different consideration have to be taken into account while granting the permits for different routes. Further the routes may relate to different areas having no connection with each other. Entertaining of a single application for routes covering different areas or different routes in the same area seeking permits for plying stage carriages providing service on the different routes does not appear to have been contemplated under the provisions of the Act. However, as pointed out by the Division Bench in the case of M/s. Shiv Chand Amolak (1964 MPLJ 754) (supra), it is open to the applicant for a permit to amend his application so as to confine it to a single route.
42. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are not inclined to uphold the finding of the learned single Judge to the effect that a single application for different permits or different routes falling in the same area or a single application for permits for routes tailing in different areas is maintainable and entertainable.
43. Taking into consideration the various aspects referred to hereinabove, there can be no escape from the conclusion that a single application for the grant of a single permit for two different routes is not permissible or contemplated under the Act.
44. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the application filed by Prem Narain the contesting respondent had to be treated as an application for the grant of two permits for different routes and a single permit, for both the routes could not have been granted by the Regional Transport Author-ity.
45. the provisions contained in the rule 145 of the rules referred to hereinabove, by virtue of Section 70(1)(f) of the Act, have to be regarded as a condition precedent for the grant of the permit. An application seeking a permit must substantially conform to the requirements envisaged under the provisions contained in S. 70 of the Act. The tee prescribed under the rule 145 of the rules referred to hereinabove, it seems to. us is a fee prescribed for a single application for the grant or renewal of a stage carriage permit for one route.
46. In the present case, since Prem Narain, the contesting respondent had sought for permits in respect of two different routes but had paid the fee envisaged under rule 145 of the rules for only a single application, there could be no occasion for the grant of a single permit for two routes, on the payment of fee prescribed for one application for the grant of a single permit,
47. However, this Court in its decision in the case of M/s. Shiv Chand Amolak Chand (1964 MPU 754) (supra) has already clarified that it was permissible to maintain the application so as to make it an application for one of the two permits only. Indeed value his application being I.A. No. 6822/98, moped in this appeal Prem Narain, the contesting respondent has confined his application for the permit for the route Ashok Nagar to Kadwaya via Saraskhedi, Isagarh, Gahera and Manethi, for two return trips only. His application dated 28-10-1996, for grant of permit therefore, has to be treated as confined for the permit for the aforesaid route only.
48. In the aforesaid view of the matter; the grant of permit so far as the aforesaid route is concerned, does not require any interference but so far as the grant of the permit for the other route, Ashok Nagar to Isagar via Saraskhedi with a single return trip, the order of the Regional Trans-port Authority cannot be sustained.
49. The learned counsel for the appellants has next contended that the revising authority had in fact left the question undecided on merits, in regard to the time schedule fix'ed by the Regional Transport Authority which was found by it to be unjust only on the ground that it was wholly unnecessary as the entire order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the permit was being set aside. It is urged that while quashing the order of the revising authority, the learned single Judge has failed to consider the aforesaid question on the assumption that it had no substance.
50. We have carefully perused the order passed by the revising authority. The said authority had clearly expressed the opinion that the timings fixed by the Regional Transport Authority appeared to be unjust. However, since in the view no ground for interference while exercising the revisionary jurisdiction in the said matter could be said to have been made out, the said authority had refused to interfere on that count but had quashed the order of the Regional Transport Authority only on the ground that the application for the grant of permit was not maintainable and en tertainable.
51. It must be emphasised that when a permit for a direct stage carriage service from one termi-nus to another is asked for, the transport authority has to consider the need having regard to they passenger traffic between the two places. The adequate transport facilities, if any, between the intermediate stations should not be regarded as conclusive of the matter. ' 52. It is, therefore, obvious that the time schedule regulating the running of the stage carriage for which purpose the permit is granted assumes considerable importance and the Regional Transport Authority has to consider at thy time of fixing the time schedule the interests of the travelling public in relation to the entire route between the two terminii. The timings are given to facilitate the travellers and not for favouring one operator at the expense of the other. Speed limit is only one pf the factors for fixing the time table and the Regional Transport Authority must consider the time table filed by all the affected operators,
53. It must be emphasized here that the timings for operating the stage carriages or the time table has to be fixed with reference to the object of seeing the interestsof the general public and cannot be treated as confined to the competing interests of the permit holders authorised to operate the stage carriage on the same route. The timings have to be determined therefore accordingly and not on the basis of agreements between the permit holders or their consent.
54. Considering the facts and circumstances noticed here inabove; the position which emerges is that now the application filed by Prem Narain, the contesting respondent stands confined to only one permit for a single route with two return trips daily. The time schedule which has been fixed by the Regional Transport Authority is with reference to an additional permit for plying on the second route which had been asked for by the Contesting respondent, the relief in respect whereof stands given up. The fixation of time schedule, therefore, requires reconsideration in the light of the observations made here in above.
55. In view of our conclusions referred to hereinabove, this appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside. The order passed by the revising authority is quashed in its entirety and modifying the order of the Regional Transport Authority, the matter is sent back to him with a direction to puss fresh order in regard to the grant of permit to the respondent No. 1 confined to a single route refixing the time schedule in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove.
56. It is further directed that the Regional Transport Authority shall ensure that this exercise is completed within a month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him during which period the respondent No. I shall be allowed to continue to operate his stage carriage only for two return trips daily on the route Ashok Nagar to Kadwaya via Saraskhedi, Isagarh, Gahora and Manethi, on the time schedule already fixed except to the extent it relates to the plying of the stage carriage for the second route i.e., Ashoknagar to Isagar via Saraskhedi.
57. There shall however be no order as to costs.
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