JUDGMENT T.N. Singh, J.

1. The appeal and the cross-appeal are preferred under Section 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (for short 'the Act'). In their appeal (M.A. No. 48 of 1986), the claimants have prayed for enhancement of the compensation, while in the other appeal (M.A. No. 29 of 1986), the prayer is for setting aside the award in toto.

2. Deceased Rameshwardayal Bajpai, a daftary in the office of the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, at Gwalior, was admittedly hit by jeep No. CPC 13, belonging to the Border Security Force, Tekanpur. The accident book place on 3.10.1983 at around 1.30 p.m. and in an unconscious state, the deceased was removed from place of occurrence to the hospital where, on the same date, in the night, he breathed his last. He was carried to the hospital in the same vehicle which had caused the accident and the defence is that the vehicle was not driven rashly and negligently.

3. Two questions mainly, evidently, arise for decision in these two appeals. We would examine first, therefore, the defence and evidence that has come on record in that regard. It appears that on three main props, the defence was erected, but in our view, claimants' case is proved aliunde to sustain the finding and conclusion of the Tribunal that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently at the time of the accident. False defence results evidently in dilution of the onus of the claimants. Indeed, when the case pleaded is that the driver was not guilty of rash and negligent driving and interposition of human agency resulted in the inevitable accident, onus would lie on the driver to establish the stand taken. Because, when due to an active God, any inevitable happens, the position is different. When it is not possible for a driver to prevent the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill, it may be a case of an inevitable accident and it shall be open to him to plead that the cause of the accident was not absence of those, but of external human factor such as the negligence of the victim.

4. In the instant case, the defence alleged three specific facts as constituting the external human factor which resulted in the accident: that the deceased was hit not by the front part of the vehicle, but by its rear part; that the deceased was negligent because he was running across the road to board a bus and he did not care to look around; and that there was a speed-breaker little ahead of the place of occurrence and, therefore; it had to be presumed that the vehicle was driven slowly. However, in evidence those facts are not established and it can be justifiably held that false plea of the occurrence being an 'inevitable accident' was set up. In the joint written statement filed, it was specifically pleaded that there was a bus standing in from to of A.G.'s Office and embarkation and disembarkation of passengers from that vehicle was going on. At that time, the deceased, it is alleged, was running hurriedly across the road to board the bus and he did not look to his right to the oncoming jeep and dashed against the middle portion of the jeep, being unable to stop himself. The driver immediately applied brakes and stopped the jeep. This plea, in evidence, was embellished and bolstered. Order 8, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code contemplates that in regard to any 'ground of defence', the defendant must state the necessary facts and Section 103, Evidence Act rests burden of proof of the facts so alleged on the defendant. Indeed, principles underlying these statutory provisions are of universal application to all civil litigations.

5. The driver examined himself as DW 2 besides the Deputy Commandant of BSF, who deposed as DW 1 and stated that he was one of the occupants of the jeep at the time of accident. While DW 1 deposed that the deceased dashed against one side of the bonnet (front portion) of the jeep in the middle DW 2 admitted in his cross-examination that he could not see when the deceased dashed against his vehicle. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that he saw on man dashing against the right side of the vehicle and when he stopped the vehicle, he saw a man lying on the road on the backside. PWs 5, 6 and 7 had witnessed the occurrence and they have been believed by the Tribunal. Exh. P-4, the F.I.R., which PW 5 lodged immediately after the occurrence, contains a clear statement that the jeep was driven negligently by DW 2. It came at a high speed and hit daftary Ramesh-wardayal Bajpai at his backside who sustained serious injuries on his head and leg. This statement is corroborated by Autopsy Surgeon, PW 2, who deposed to fractures of bones of the left leg and arm of the deceased and also of parietal bone of his head. Several and serious injuries to which PW 2 deposed, indubitably suggest that the impact on the person of the deceased, during the accident, was serious. Although they have belied the version of DWs 1 and 2, we have seen no reason to disbelieve them and we agree with the Tribunal that they were natural witnesses and were disinterested persons, unlike the two DWs.

6. PW 5 stated that the jeep hit the deceased on his back and in the same vein, more categorically, PW 6 deposed that the jeep came from the backside and hit the deceased. Defence suggested categorically to PW 7 that the deceased had dashed against the jeep at the backside, which the witness denied. He also stated clearly that the jeep had dashed the deceased on his back. PW 7 was a Senior Auditor in the A.G. 's Office who naturally knew the deceased and his version is that it was lunch-break when the accident took place. He was in the roadside tea stall, adjacent to the gate of A.G. 's Office where he was taking tea when deceased Bajpai had also come there and had told him that he was going to buy banana from the vendor, who was standing on the other side of the road. Although DWs 1 and 2 both deposed that horn was blown, but the defence did not have the courage to put that question to any of the PWs. Indeed, driver, DW 2, discredited himself by stating, as noted earlier, that he had not seen the deceased dashing against the vehicle. All the three PWs deposed corroboratively, clearly and categorically that the jeep was driven rashly and indeed, the defence did not care to put to them that there being a speed-breaker ahead, the vehicle could not have been driven at high speed. The only reasonable conclusion on evidence to be reached is that the driver was negligent and he did not care to look around and follow the rule of the road in that regard in order to discharge his duty to the predestrains. He was driving unmindful of the fact that there was a bus standing ahead and that there was pedestrian traffic on the road which, as PWs have deposed, was natural in lunch-time in front of a Government office with huge establishment.

7. For reasons aforesaid, we find that there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Mittal that it was a case of 'inevitable accident' and not one of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. We affirm the finding and conclusion of the Tribunal that the vehicle was driven rashly and negligently and for the death of deceased Rameshwardayal Bajpai, the claimants were entitled to compensation as contemplated under Section 110-A of the Act, and therefore, the award passed by the Tribunal in that regard under Section 110-B is not without jurisdiction.

8. Now, the question of enhancement. On that, we cannot have another option today as we find that our decision in Prabhavati Sharma v. Brijmohan Parihar , is clearly applicable to the facts of the instant case. True, Tribunal followed a different method and applied the multiplier of 15 in assessing the compensation. Claimants counsel, Mr. Jain, was contended that even that is not done properly. PW 3, Section Officer in A.G.'s Office, proved income certificate, Exh. P-3, and the pay and allowances statement, Exh. P-6, but he wrongly deposed that at his death, the deceased was drawing gross salary of Rs. 665.70. That figures the Tribunal accepted in computing the compensation. As per Exh. P-3, the figure is Rs. 693.80 and according to Exh. P-6, in October 1983, the deceased was entitled to gross salary of Rs. 712.50. The fact also is that in applying the multiplier and reckoning the annual loss of the claimants at Rs. 3,600/-, the Tribunal took into consideration the factor that deceased's widow was receiving family pension of Rs. 150/- per month. It is rightly contended, therefore, that this Court's decision in Kashiram Mathur v. Rajendra Singh 1983 ACJ 152 (MP), rendered by the Full Bench and our decision in Prabhavati Sharma's case, (supra), do not permit that, counsel is very correct because we had observed, deduction on account of family pension is not permissible if that is not "proved as a benefit accruing to the claimants in the form of advantage resulting from the death". In the instant case, PW 3' s evidence gave no scope to the Tribunal to regard family pension as a valid deduction because he clearly and categorically deposed that if the deceased was alive, he could have received salary, allowances etc. payable therewith besides pension, which was now being given to his family.

9. Following supreme guidelines Laid down in Summit Court's decision in Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupta 1977 ACJ 134 (SC), we took the view in Prabhavati Sharma's case, (supra), that the proper method of computation of compensation in case of death of a Government servant is one that their Lordships indicated because "Government servants enjoy security of tenure, earning and health-care for longevity besides retirement benefits" mat, therefore, "in their case compensation has to be assessed differently to the best advantage of the claimants". There was striking resemblance, which we noticed, Prabhavati Sharma's case, (supra), with that of Manjushri Raha's case, (supra) and surprisingly, that we notice here also. Not only in all three cases, the deceased was a Government servant, but all the three persons were in the age group of 37 years at the time of their death. Taking into consideration the salary statement in Manjushri Raha's case (supra), their Lordships held that a fair estimate of loss of dependency and loss of company which she and her children suffered could not be less than half the amount disclosed in the statement after taking into consideration all expenses. That statement disclosed emoluments, which the deceased would have received till his superannuation reckoning promotions and increments in salary etc. during the course of his service. In the instant case, according to Exh. P-6, we find that till his superannuation, the deceased, if alive, would have received Rs. 2,29,492.80. We would, therefore, hold that the reasonable compensation to which the claimants are entitled on account of death of Rameshwardayal Bajpai is Rs. 1,15.000/-. In the impugned award, for loss of dependency Rs. 54,000/- and for loss of company and mental suffering, Rs. 7,000/- is specified as compensation payable to the claimants together with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the date of application. On the other hand, claimants have put their entitlement at Rs. 5,36,832/- on the basis of pleading and evidence that the deceased had extra income of Rs. 600/- per month, derived from priestly chores and preparing horoscopes. We do not think if we would be justified in entertaining that Claim ignoring the supreme mandate and the proper guideline applicable to the case of claimants as deceased was a Government servant who is not expected to carry on other profession or vocation.

10. Some case law. Mr. Mittal cited, to which attention must be paid. In Ramesh Chandra v. Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans. Corporation 1983 ACJ 221 (MP), compensation was Claimed for an unemployed boy aged 19 years who was undergoing training as a fitter. Reliance on that is evidently misconceived. C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair 1970 ACJ 110 (SC). Is an Apex Court's decision. Parents had claimed compensation for the death of 8 years old son. Construing the provisions of Sections 1A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, their Lordships observed that damages thereunder are not to be given as a solatium and actual pecuniary loss had to be assessed. That decision certainly does not advance counsel's contention. The short noted decision in Subhan Ali 1984 MPWN 434, is also distinguishable on facts.

11. Although Mr. Mittal also relied on State of M.P. v. Ashadevi 1988 ACJ 846 (MP), to submit that correct multiplier of 15 was applied by the Tribunal, the contention of Mr. Jain, as noticed earlier, was that annual loss of dependency was wrongly fixed by the Tribunal at Rs. 3,600/-. It is necessary, however, to point out that even when multiplier method is used in computing compensation, deceased's age is not the sole factor and we have failed to appreciate Mr. Mittal s contention that Ashadevi's case (supra) lays down the law that when deceased is in the age group of thirties and forties, the multiplier to be selected must in variably be 15. The court, in Ashadevi's case (supra), relied on another D.B. decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Davi Rawat 1986 MPLJ 534, for following the multiplier method and as such reference to Davi Rawat's case (supra), is imperative. G.P. Singh, C.J., speaking for the court in Davi Rawat' s case (supra), recognised the position that the two methods of assessing damages could be applied and referred in that connection to Majushri Raha's case 1977 ACJ 134 (SC). However, he preferred to follow another decision of the Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans. Corporation v. Sudhakar 1977 ACJ 290 (SC), without stating reasons for doing so. The fact that deceased in Manjushri Raha,s case (supra) was a Government servant while in Sudhakar's case (supra), she was not so and Claim was not preferred on that basis, escaped the notice of the court in Davi Rawat's case (supra). Otherwise, perhaps, multiplier method would not have been followed as deceased in David Rawat' s case (supra) was a Government servant. In any case, the court observed in Davi Rawat's case (supra) that in choosing the multiplier, such other factors also are taken into consideration, namely, the size and circumstances of deceased's family dependent on him at the time of his death, besides his retirement age and longevity.

12. In the premises aforesaid, we are of the view that the claimants are entitled to enhanced compensation and award has to be modified in that regard. Indeed, they are also entitled to higher rate of interest because his court's Full Bench, recently in Prakashchand v. Chhuttan M.A. No. 73 of 1982; decided on 30.11.1990, has decided that interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the date of application till the date of realisation is die interest which is to be specified in terms of section 110-cc of me act. The impugned award is accordingly modified. Claimants are held entitled to Rs. 1,15,000/- as compensation and interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application till payment. However, in regard to interest and also payment made pursuant to the award, due credit shall be given. Mr. Mittal submitted that in the first instance, Rs. 15,000/- was paid and then full payment due under the award has been deposited with the Tribunal. Accordingly, liability of interest to be suffered by the respondents shall be on Pro rota basis till the date of payment made under the award, from the date of application. Within three months, the payment due under the award, as modified herein, shall be deposited with the Tribunal. Steps shall be taken for disbursing that amount keeping in view the needs of the different dependants/claimants. Besides a widow, the deceased left surviving him a daughter, aged 12 years and two minor sons and an adult son. In disbursing the amount, distribution shall be made to suit the needs and circumstances of the different claimants/ dependants.

13. In the result, M.A. No. 29 of 1986 fails and is dismissed. The connected M.A. No. 48 of 1986 succeeds and is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, parties are left to bear their own costs in this Court