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Case Number

Misc. Petn. No. 222 of 1985

Attorney(S)

R.D. Jain
for Petitioner; R.S. Verma
for Respondents.

Judges

R.C Shrivastava
K.M Agrawal
Rampal Singh, JJ.

Acts

SECTION 51 STATES REORGANISATION ACT 1956
provisions of Section 88(b), States Reorganisation Act, 1956,
provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution.
Section 51(2), States Reorganisation Act, 1956,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Full Bench Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is an Assistant Professor at the Agriculture College, Gwalior, which is run by Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur ("the University"). He challenged the fixation of his pay and sought a direction to the University to fix his pay "in the scale of Rs. 700-1600 by giving him five increments over the pay which he was drawing in his earlier place of posting." The respondents filed a preliminary objection (I.A. No. 2484/86) contending that the petition was not maintainable before the Gwalior Bench because, under the Presidential Order dated 28-11-1968 (issued under Section 51(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956), the Gwalior Bench's jurisdiction extends only to cases arising in specified revenue districts and that neither the impugned University order nor any part of the cause of action arose in those districts. The objection relied principally on the earlier decision in Kanti Prasad v. J.N.K.V. Vidyalaya (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15).

The preliminary objection was initially heard by a Division Bench, which considered it significant enough to refer to a larger Bench. Accordingly, a Full Bench was constituted to examine the correctness of Kanti Prasad and the jurisdictional question. After hearing arguments for both sides and considering precedent and constitutional provisions, the Full Bench rendered the opinion summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, under the Presidential Order dated 28-11-1968 (issued under Section 51(2), States Reorganisation Act, 1956), the expression "in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Gwalior, Shivpuri, Datia, Guna, Vidisha (Bhilsa), Bhind and Morena" must be understood to mean the place or places where the whole or part of the cause of action arises, thereby attracting the jurisdiction of the Gwalior Bench.
Whether, in the circumstances of this petition (an impugned order of pay fixation made at Jabalpur but affecting the petitioner posted at Gwalior), a part of the cause of action arose within the territory of the Gwalior Bench so as to make the petition maintainable at Gwalior under Article 226 (and Article 226(2)) of the Constitution.
Whether the decision in Kanti Prasad (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15), which held that the petition was not maintainable at Gwalior because "nothing happened within the Gwalior District," remains good law and should be followed or whether it should be overruled in light of subsequent authorities and reasoning about where a cause of action arises.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on authorities (including Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh and other cases) to explain the meaning of "cause of action," and argued that the wrong fixation of pay by the impugned order adversely affected the petitioner while he was posted at Gwalior, so a part of the cause of action arose at Gwalior.
It was contended that because adverse consequences of the impugned order operated at Gwalior, the Gwalior Bench has jurisdiction to hear the petition under Article 226(2) of the Constitution.
Senior counsel and several intervening advocates (named in the text) supported the contention that the Gwalior Bench had jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition.

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents raised a preliminary objection about maintainability at Gwalior, relying on Kanti Prasad v. J.N.K.V. Vidyalaya (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15), and argued that the Presidential Order (28-11-1968) restricted the Gwalior Bench's jurisdiction to cases arising in the listed revenue districts and that neither the impugned University order nor any part of the cause of action arose within those districts because the University and the impugned order originated at Jabalpur.
The respondents' submission was that mere posting of the petitioner at Gwalior did not suffice to attract jurisdiction unless something forming part of the cause of action had occurred within the specified districts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kanti Prasad v. J.N.K.V. Vidyalaya, AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15	Held that nothing happened within Gwalior District to furnish a cause of action; therefore petition was not maintainable at Gwalior under the Presidential Order.	The Full Bench examined Kanti Prasad closely, concluded it failed to consider that consequences of an order (where the petitioner was affected) can form part of the cause of action, and held that Kanti Prasad was not good law and deserved to be overruled.
Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 791 : AIR 1977 SC 640	Cited to show the meaning of the term "cause of action" and its scope.	The petitioner's reliance on Gurdit Singh supported the proposition that a cause of action may include the adverse consequences of an order where those consequences fall on the petitioner; the Court considered this in its analysis of jurisdiction under Article 226(2).
Nasiruddin v. S.T.A. Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331	Interpreted a similar expression about areas where courts may sit and held that if a cause of action arises wholly or in part within specified areas, the Bench sitting in those areas will have jurisdiction; the "cause of action" should be understood in its ordinary sense.	The Full Bench relied on Nasiruddin to construe the Presidential Order's phrase "in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts..." and adopted the view that jurisdiction attaches where the whole or part of the cause of action arises.
W.W. Joshi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 Bom 363	Explained that where an order is made, that fact forms part of a cause of action and that consequences of that order falling on a person at another place also form part of the cause of action; thus cause of action may arise where order is made and where its consequences fall.	The Court applied this principle to hold that consequences of the impugned order could be said to have fallen on the petitioner at Gwalior (where he was posted), thereby attracting jurisdiction of the Gwalior Bench in part.
Damomal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 355	Followed the principle that the place where the order is made and the place where its consequences fall may both form part of the cause of action (applied in a related context).	The Full Bench noted that Damomal followed W.W. Joshi's principle and treated it as supporting the proposition that part of the cause of action can arise where consequences fall on the affected person.
P.S. Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1974 Mys 39	Held the petition maintainable in Mysore because the fact that the petitioner held a post at Bangalore was an essential fact to be proved for relief; therefore a part of the cause of action arose within the Mysore High Court's territorial jurisdiction.	The Full Bench found P.S. Rao more reasonable on the point (even if it did not adopt the exact reasoning) and used its conclusion to support overruling Kanti Prasad, observing that Kanti Prasad failed to consider the place where the adverse consequences fell.
D.L. Suresh v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, AIR 1983 Kant 43	Held that when petitioners (residents of Bangalore) sent nominations to Delhi and received rejection orders at Bangalore, a part (if not whole) of the cause of action arose within Bangalore, giving that Court jurisdiction.	The Full Bench noted this authority but observed it did not materially advance the current controversy because in the Karnataka case the papers and orders passed through Bangalore, whereas in the present case the impugned order was served at Indore and made effective by joining at Gwalior.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded in a stepwise manner:

Constitutional and statutory framework: It accepted that the Gwalior Bench's jurisdiction is determined by the Presidential Order dated 28-11-1968 issued under Section 51(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, which grants the Bench jurisdiction "in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts" specifically listed in the Order.
Meaning of the phrase "in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts...": The Court examined the phrase in light of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Nasiruddin, concluding that the phrase should be understood to mean the place or places within the specified revenue districts where the whole or part of the cause of action arises. Thus, if a cause of action arises wholly or partly within those districts, the Gwalior Bench has jurisdiction.
Interpretation of "cause of action": Relying on authorities and textual definitions, the Bench accepted that "cause of action" can be understood in the ordinary sense (the bundle of facts giving rise to the claim) and that it may include both the act that produced the grievance (for example, an order made at a seat beyond the Bench's territorial limits) and the consequences of that act where they affect the aggrieved person.
Application of the "where consequences fall" principle: The Bench considered precedents (notably W.W. Joshi and its successors) that held that an impugned order forms part of a cause of action at the place where it is made and also at the place where its consequences fall on the person affected. The Court applied this principle to the present facts: although the impugned pay fixation order was made at Jabalpur, the order was to be effective when the petitioner took charge at Gwalior, and therefore implementation (and the adverse effect) occurred at Gwalior.
Assessment of Kanti Prasad: The Court analysed the earlier decision in Kanti Prasad (which had held a similar petition not maintainable at Gwalior because nothing happened there) and concluded that Kanti Prasad failed to take notice that the adverse consequences of the order (the place where the petitioner was superseded or affected) can form part of the cause of action. As a result, Kanti Prasad's reasoning was found to be unsound in this respect.
Conclusion on jurisdiction and maintainability: Because a part of the cause of action arose at Gwalior (where the consequences of the appointment/pay fixation would fall and where the petitioner was posted), the Gwalior Bench has jurisdiction to entertain the petition under the Presidential Order and Article 226(2). The preliminary objection to maintainability at Gwalior accordingly failed.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Full Bench held that a part of the cause of action in the present matter arose within the territory of the Gwalior Bench (because the consequences of the impugned order fell on the petitioner at Gwalior), and therefore the objection to maintainability of the petition at Gwalior fails and is rejected. The Full Bench further held that the decision in Kanti Prasad (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15) is not good law on this point and is overruled.

Implications and direct effects:

The immediate practical consequence is that the petition challenging pay fixation is maintainable before the Gwalior Bench and the preliminary jurisdictional objection is dismissed.
The Full Bench overruled Kanti Prasad insofar as it held that nothing happening at the place of posting could not constitute part of the cause of action; this alters the application of the Presidential Order's territorial limitation by recognizing that causes of action may arise partly where adverse consequences fall.
The record of the case is to be placed before the regular Division Bench for further hearing on admission of the petition.

The opinion's holding is limited to the issues addressed in the judgment: interpretation of the Presidential Order's reference to cases "arising in" specified revenue districts and the question whether a part of the cause of action arose within those districts. The Court expressly overruled Kanti Prasad on that point and rejected the preliminary objection; further merits of the petition remain for the Division Bench to decide.

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K.P Govil v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur And Another

1. In pursuance of a show cause notice against admission, the respondents put in appearance and on the authority of Kanti Prasad v. J.N.K.V.

Vidyalaya., AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15, raised a preliminary objection (I.A. No. 2484/86) about maintainability of the petition at Gwalior. The objection was first heard by me and brother Rampal Singh, J. in a Division Bench, but instead of deciding it ourselves in a Division Bench, we considered it proper to have the objection decided by a larger Bench in view of its importance and far reaching effect. Accordingly we made a recommendation to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for resolving the objection. This is how this Full Bench has been constituted.

2. The petitioner is an Assistant Professor in the Agriculture College, Gwalior run by the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur, (for short, "the University"). He is aggrieved by his pay fixation and seeks a direction to the University for fixation of his pay "in the scale of Rs. 700-1600 by giving him five increments over the pay which he was drawing in his earlier place of posting."

3. The respondents say that the petition is not maintainable at Gwalior, because as per the Presidential Order dated 28-11-1968 issued under Section 51(2), States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the Gwalior Bench has jurisdiction and power only in respect of the cases arising in the Revenue Districts of Gwalior, Shivpuri, Datia, Guna, Vidisha, Bhind and Morena and because neither the impugned order of the University was passed at Gwalior, nor any part of the cause of action could be said to have arisen in any of the Revenue Districts falling within the jurisdiction of Gwalior Bench of the High Court. Reliance is placed in Kanti Prasad, (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15) (supra).

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 791 : (AIR 1977 SC 640) in order to show what the term 'cause of action' means and submitted that the wrong fixation of his pay by the impugned order (Annexure P-2) adversely affected the petitioner while posted at Gwalior and, therefore, a part of cause of action arose at Gwalior and the Gwalior Bench, as such, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition. He placed reliance in W.W. Joshi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 Bom 363; Damomal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bom 355; P.S. Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1974 Mys 39; D.L. Suresh v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, AIR 1983 Kanti 43 and Nasiruddin v. S.T.A. Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 besides relying on the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution.

5. Shri P.L. Dubey, a senior Advocate sought permission of the Court and made his submissions, supporting the contention of Shri R.D. Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Gwalior Bench had jurisdiction to hear and decide the present petition. Sarvashri P.N. Gupta, C.P. Singh, Madhukar Rao and Arun Mishra, Advocates also intervened in support of the contentions of Shri R.D. Jain.

6. In Kanti Prasad, (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15) (supra), the petitioner was an employee of the University posted at Gwalior. His grievance was about non-consideration of his case for promotion by the University. On a similar objection about maintainability of the petition at Gwalior, it was held :

"From the petition it is clear that nothing happened within the Gwalior District which could be said to have furnished a cause of action to the petitioner. The University is located at Jabalpur and the actions of the University by which the petitioner is aggrieved including the interview held at Jabalpur. The mere fact that the petitioner happens to be posted at Gwalior is of no consequence. Thus this case cannot be said to have arisen in the Revenue District of Gwalior, within the meaning of the aforesaid order of the President." (Para 4) The petitioner in the present petition is also an employee of the University posted at Gwalior. His grievance is about non-fixation of his pay "in the scale of Rs. 700-1600 by giving him five increments over the pay which he was drawing in his earlier place of posting." From the petition it is clear that nothing happened within the Gwalior District. The University is located at Jabalpur and the alleged wrong fixation of pay, giving cause for filing the petition, was made at Jabalpur.

It would, thus, appear that Kanti Prasad's case is not distinguishable from the present case and as held in that case, this petition would not be maintainable at Gwalior. It was, therefore, argued that Kanti Prasad (supra) required reconsideration.

7. In the order of reference, it has been mentioned that

"the decision in Kanti Prasad (supra) has a far reaching effect, which has hitherto been lost sight of Say for instance, a transfer order or an order of supersession emanating from Bhopal, but affecting an employee at Gwalior would also be beyond challenge in Gwalior Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, because a case arising out of such an order cannot be said to be a case arising in the Revenue District of Gwalior. Yet we have been entertaining and deciding such petitions at Gwalior."

We therefore, proceed to examine the correctness of the decision in Kanti Prasad in the light of the order of reference and the various decisions cited at the Bar.

8. The Presidential Order dated 28-11-1968 reads as follows :--

"In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956), I, Zakir Husain, President of India, after consultation with the Governor of Madhya Pradesh and the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, hereby establish a permanent Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior and further direct that such Judges of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, being not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice may from tune to time nominate shall sit at Gwalior in order to exercise the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising In the revenue districts of Gwalior, Shivpuri, Datia, Guna, Vidisha (Bhitsa), Bhind and Morena :

Provided that the Chief Justice may, for special reasons, order that any case or class of eases arising in any such district shall be heard at Jabalpur."

It is not disputed that the jurisdiction of this Bench to hear cases is regulated by the said order of the President.

9. The first thing that is to be determined is the meaning of the expression

"in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Gwalior, Shivpuri, Datia, Guna, Vidisha (Bhilsa), Bhind and Morena"

used in the Presidential Order dated 28-11-1968. In Nasiruddin, ( AIR 1976 SC 331) (supra), the Supreme Court considered the meaning of a similar expression used in first proviso to Para 14 of the High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948, which was to the following effect :--

"14. The new High Court, and the judges and division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint:

"Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice, may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court:

Provided further that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad."

After holding the conclusion and the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court to be incorrect, the Supreme Court concluded :

.............the expression 'cause of action' in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be ' passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order was passed at a place outside the area in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression 'cause of action' is well known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter, If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas, in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum convenient. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action.

Similarly in Kanti Prasad, (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15) (supra) this Court held :

"The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word 'case' is a thing that has happened. In its technical legal sense it means a cause or a state of facts which furnishes an occasion for exercise of the jurisdiction by a Court of justice, vide 14 C J.S.I. In the present context the word 'case' means the facts or events which furnish a cause of action to a party." (Para 4) It must, therefore, follow and we hold that the expression "in respect of cases arising in the revenue districts of Gwalior, Shivpuri, Datia, Gun a, Vidisha (Bhilsa), Bhind and Morena" means the place or places within the specified revenue districts where the whole or a part of cause of action arises. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place or places within the specified revenue districts, the Gwalior Bench will have jurisdiction.

10. The next question that crops up for decision is whether the cause of action wholly or in part arose at a place within the specified revenue districts, so as to give jurisdiction to this Bench of the High Court to entertain the petition. Article 226(2) of the Constitution provides that, "the power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. In Nasiruddin, (AIR 1976 SC 331) (supra), it has been seen that the Supreme Court held "the expression 'cause of action' in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood." In Gurdit Singh, (AIR 1977 SC 640) (supra), M.H. Beg, J. observed in his dissenting judgment that: --

"The expression 'cause of action' has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or of the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit."

ln W.W. Joshi, (AIR 1959 Bom 363) (supra), the Bombay High Court considered the maintainability of three petitions filed by the persons, who were in the service of the former State of Madhya Pradesh and whose services were terminated by the then Government of Madhya Pradesh, in the light of the provisions of Section 88(b), States Reorganisation Act, 1956, which read as follows : --

"88. Where, immediately before the appointed day, an existing State is subject to any liability in respect of an actionable wrong other than breach of contract, that liability shall :-

"(a)

(b) If there be two or more successor States and the cause of action arose wholly within the territories which as from that day are the territories of one of them, be a liability of that successor State."

After explaining the meaning of the term 'cause of action', it was held that:

................the fact that the order for termination of service was made would form part of a cause of action, and it would arise at the place the order is made.......... That fact by itself alone cannot afford to him a ground to claim relief at the hands of this Court. He must further prove that the consequences of that order fell on him i.e. as a consequence pf that order he, in fact, was removed from service. In our opinion, therefore, for a claim of this kind the cause of action would arise at a place where the order of termination of service was made and also at a place where its consequences fell on the servant; If this cause of action has in its entirety arisen within the former territories of the State of Madhya Pradesh which now form part of the State of Bombay, then the liability referred to in Section 88 of the Act of the former State of Madhya Pradesh would fall on the present State of Bombay under Clause (b) thereof.

(Para 18) The decision was followed in Damomal, (AIR 1967 Bom 355) (supra), though in a different context and under a different provision of law. The principle deducible is that in cases of orders impugned, the cause of action would arise at a place where the order is made and also at a place where its consequences fall on the person concerned. This principle appears to be sound, but the question remains, whether in the present case, the consequences of the impugned order (Annexure P-2) could be said to have fallen on the petitioner at Gwalior or at any other place within the specified revenue districts, because it was admittedly made at Jabalpur, which is a place beyond the jurisdiction of this Bench. We are of the view that it is possible to say that the consequences flowing from the impugned order fell on the petitioner at Gwalior, where he is posted. The reason is that the impugned order was an order of fresh appointment served on the petitioner at Indore, where he was in service of Krishi Vigyan Kendra Trainers' Training Centre, run by the Kasturba Gandhi National Memorial Trust and not by the University. The order was to be effective from the date he took over charge of the post at Gwalior. In other words, in order to succeed in his petition, it would not only be necessary for the petitioner to prove that an order of appointment in his favour was made by the University, but also that the made the order effective by joining the post at Gwalior. If he fails to prove that the Appointment order has taken effect and that he has become an employee of the University, he would not be entitled to any relief against the University. That being the position, the fact that the order of appointment was made and the further fact that the appointment was accepted by joining the post would form part of a cause of action and it would arise at the place the order is made, as also at the place the order is implemented by joining the post. We accordingly hold that a part of cause of action having arisen at Gwalior, this Bench has jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

11. We now come to consider the correctness of the decision in Kanti Prasad, (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15) (supra). Kanti Prasad was a servant of the University posted at Gwalior. His grievance was that "although he is senior to Shri Solanki his claims for the post of Associate Professor in the Department of Agronomy were not duly considered and that he was not even interviewed for the said post along with Shri Solanki." The petition was held to be not maintainable at Gwalior, because nothing was found to have "happened within the Gwalior District which could be said to have furnished a cause of action to the petitioner." In P.S. Rao, (AIR 1974 Mys 39) (supra), the Mysore High Court had to face a similar objection about maintainability of the petition in relation to a similar grievance of an employee of the Central Government posted at Bangalore. The petition was held maintainable after . giving reasons as follows : --

The case of the petitioner is that the Union Government was not competent to promote respondent 2 without considering the case of the petitioner who holds the post of Head of Utilisation Research at the Forest Research Laboratory, Bangalore. The very basis for claiming relief in the writ petition is that the petitioner is the holder of the aforesaid post in Bangalore. If this fact was controverted by the respondents, the petitioner would have been required to prove that fact in order to secure the relief prayed for. If the petitioner fails to establish the fact that at the relevant time he was holding the above mentioned post at Bangalore, he will not be entitled to any relief in this writ petition. It is, therefore, clear that the holding of the post of Head of Utilisation Research at the Forest Research Laboratory, Bangalore is an essential fact which the petitioner is required to prove in order to secure relief in the writ petition. It is clear that the cause of action has partly arisen within the territory in respect of which this High Court exercises jurisdiction.

(Para 9) The conclusion arrived at by the Mysore High Court in P.S. Rao is apparently in conflict with the conclusion arrived at by this Court in Kanti Prasad (supra), but we find it to be more reasonable and just, without subscribing to the reasons given for the conclusion. We do not subscribe to the reasons, because according to us, the petitioner in P.S. Rao (supra) could have succeeded in his petition by showing that he held a post under the Union of India and that overlooking his claim for promotion, a junior person in his cadre was promoted to the higher post, without further proof of his place of posting. We hold the conclusion to be right, because the employee was adversely affected while posted at Bangalore, or because the consequences of the promotion order in favour of a junior person fell on him at Bangalore, which was the place where a part of cause of action arose and which was within the jurisdiction of Mysore High Court. In Kanti Prasad (supra), this Court failed to take notice of the fact that the evil consequences of the promotion order in favour of Solanki also formed part of a cause of action and that it arose at a place where the consequences fell on the petitioner, besides the place where the order was made. To put it differently, it was not noticed in Kanti Prasad that the petitioner could not have succeeded in his petition only by showing that the order was passed and the interview held at Jabalpur. He was further required to prove that the order had the effect of superseding him in disregard of his claim for promotion. The place where he was superseded would be the place for accrual of his cause of action. Kanti Prasad (supra) does not, therefore, lay down--good law and deserves to be overruled. - -.

12. In D.L. Suresh, (AIR 1983 Kant 43) (supra), the petitioners were chartered accountants having residence in Bangalore. They filed their nominations to the Central and Regional Councils of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India which had its office at Delhi. The petitioners sent their nomination papers by registered post as required by the regulations to Delhi and the respondent Institute despatched the orders rejecting the nomination papers to the petitioners at Bangalore. The rejection orders were challenged in petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. On preliminary objections about maintainability of the petitions, the Karnataka High Court held :

"When the petitioners, who are residents of Bangalore, sent their nomination papers by Registered post as required by the Regulations to Delhi and the Institute despatched its orders to Bangalore a part of cause of action, if not whole, without any doubt has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. If that is so this Court has jurisdiction to entertain these petitions, notwithstanding the Institute and the Panel have their offices at Delhi."

(Para 18) This decision does not throw any light on the matter in controversy, because in Karnataka case, the nominations were sent from Bangalore and orders rejecting them were despatched to Bangalore, but in the present case, it appears that the petitioner applied for the post from Indore and received the impugned order of appointment at Indore. The decision, therefore, does not require any further discussion.

13. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the decision of this Court in Kanti Prasad, (AIR 1971 Madh Pra 15) (supra) deserves to be overruled and is hereby overruled, Accordingly the objection about maintainability of the petition before this Bench of the High Court fails and is rejected.

14. The record of the case shall now be placed before the regular Division Bench for the purpose of further hearing on admission of the petition.

K.P Govil v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur And Another

Structured Summary of the Full Bench Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Respondents' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

K.P Govil v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur And Another

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