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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • provisions of the Accommodation Control Act.
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act.
  • Clauses (f) and (m) of Section 12 (1).
  • Section 12 (1) (m)
  • Section 12 (1) (f)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • provisions of the Accommodation Control Act.
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act.
  • Clauses (f) and (m) of Section 12 (1).
  • Section 12 (1) (m)
  • Section 12 (1) (f)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is by the defendant (appellant) against the judgment dated 31 October 1980 of the Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad, which decreed a suit for ejectment and mesne profits in respect of a cinema hall situated at Itarsi and dismissed the appellant's counter-claim.

The original plaintiff, Maoji, instituted the suit on 27 January 1975. Maoji died on 16 January 1978 during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives (respondents in the appeal) were substituted. The suit was based on an oral lease of the cinema hall given by Maoji to the appellant, terminated by notice effective 1 February 1975. The premises had first been leased to the appellant in 1958 and again in 1968 for a monthly rent of Rs. 900. Because there was no writing evidencing the lease, the tenancy was treated as month-to-month; the parties do not dispute that treatment.

At trial, the court held that the lease was a lease of the cinema business and therefore not governed by the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961; nevertheless the trial court found the plaintiff had established need under Section 12(1)(f) and also decided an issue relating to Section 12(1)(m) in the plaintiff's favour. The trial court awarded mesne profits at Rs. 900 per month from the date of termination and directed that if the appellant did not vacate within two months of decree, mesne profits at Rs. 1500 per month would be payable from the date of the suit. The appellant counter-claimed for Rs. 31,954.18 as the value of constructions allegedly made with the plaintiff's consent; the counter-claim was dismissed on the finding that the constructions were not made with the plaintiff's consent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lease was a lease of the cinema business (thus outside the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961) or a lease of accommodation (the cinema building with furniture and fittings) governed by the Act.
  2. If the lease is governed by the Accommodation Control Act, whether the plaintiff had proved any of the statutory grounds in Section 12(1) (specifically clauses (f) and (m)) entitling him to ejectment.
  3. Whether the appellant was entitled in his counter-claim to the value of constructions allegedly made with the plaintiff's consent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted a counter-claim that he had made constructions with the plaintiff's consent and had expended Rs. 31,954.18, and therefore was entitled to recover that amount from the plaintiff.
  • Implicit in the appellant's case was that the nature of the lease and the investments made entitled him to compensation (as reflected by the counter-claim seeking value of constructions).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (legal representatives of Maoji) maintained that the lease was a lease of the cinema business and thus not covered by the Accommodation Control Act (a position the trial court initially accepted).
  • Respondents' counsel relied on authorities (e.g., Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani) regarding the character of leases where machinery/fixtures are involved and argued facts supported the trial court's view (as referenced in the opinion).
  • Respondents also argued need for the premises by the plaintiff or his legal representatives, and later sought to plead that the cinema hall was needed by the plaintiff and his major sons for carrying on cinema business (an amendment application which was rejected at trial but later considered wrongly rejected by the appellate court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 Principles to determine whether a lease is of a business (including machinery/fixtures) or of accommodation; test of dominant intention. Used to frame the dominant intention test and to contrast facts where fixed, serviceable machinery existed with the present case where necessary machinery (projector) was absent and installed later by lessee, supporting conclusion that lease was of the building and fittings, not the business.
Dwarka Pd. v. Dwarka Das, AIR 1975 SC 1753 Authority for the proposition that when what is leased is a running business with necessary fittings and machinery, the lease may be of the business and not merely accommodation. Relied upon for comparison: in that case the cinema was fitted with projector and accessories (a running business), unlike the present case; this contrast supported the court's conclusion that the present lease was of accommodation.
Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 Established principle that the need relied on for ejectment must exist until the end of proceedings. Applied to hold that the original plaintiff's (Maoji's) personal need ended on his death and could not support ejectment; therefore the trial court's reliance on that need could not be supported.
Harisingh v. Ratanlal, 1969 MPLJ 622 Case dealing with lease of a running cinema business where projector and accessories were present. Used by the court as an example of facts where lease was of a running cinema business (contrasting those facts with the present case where the projector was absent at lease inception).
S. G. Film Exchange v. H. H. Tej Kunwar, 1978 MPLJ 302 Another decision with similar facts involving a running cinema business fitted with necessary machinery and accessories. Compared with the instant facts to show that prior cases finding a lease to be of a business involved premises already equipped for exhibition (again, unlike the present case).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court proceeded in distinct analytical steps:

  1. Character of the lease — dominant intention test:
    • The court framed the question as whether the dominant intention was to lease the cinema business or to lease the cinema building with furniture and fittings.
    • Relevant facts considered: the plaintiff never carried on exhibition of films; the cinema hall lacked machinery installed by the plaintiff (no projector or projection machinery); the projector was installed by the appellant and only thereafter did film exhibition commence.
    • Evidence (Ex. P-9) showed the appellant's paid amounts distinguished between rent for the cinema premises (Rs. 800) and rent for furniture (Rs. 100), indicating payment for building and furniture rather than for a business.
    • Because the premises were not equipped with the essential machinery for exhibition at lease inception, the court concluded that the dominant intention was to lease the building with fittings (accommodation), not the business.
  2. Consequence of characterisation — applicability of the Accommodation Control Act:
    • Having held the lease to be of accommodation, the court found the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act applicable, making it necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove grounds in Section 12(1) to obtain ejectment.
  3. Analysis of the trial court's findings on Section 12(1)(f) (need):
    • The trial court had found need under Section 12(1)(f) in favour of the plaintiff, but the appellate court observed that the original plaintiff's need ended with his death, and the law requires the need to exist until the end of the proceedings (citing Hasmat Rai).
    • The appellate court held that the trial court could not support ejectment on the basis of the deceased plaintiff's need.
    • The appellate court noted an amendment application filed on 11 December 1976 by the plaintiff seeking to plead need by the plaintiff and his major sons (Visram Bhai and Purushottam Bhai). That application was wrongly rejected at trial and should have been allowed; however, since Visram (Vishram) Bhai also died, only the pleading of Purushottam Bhai's need could now be permitted by amendment.
  4. Analysis of the trial court's findings on Section 12(1)(m) (unauthorized constructions/damage):
    • The trial court decided an issue covering the ground under Section 12(1)(m) in favour of the plaintiff, but did not give specific findings that constructions materially altered accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest or substantially diminished its value.
    • In the absence of such specific findings, the appellate court concluded that Section 12(1)(m) was not established by the trial court's reasoning.
    • Because there was some pleading and an issue on the point, the appellate court permitted respondents to apply to amend the plaint to plead clearly the ground under Section 12(1)(m).
  5. Other possible grounds:
    • The respondents' counsel submitted that the appellant had sublet the cinema hall during pendency; the court observed that if true, subletting could be pleaded by amendment as an additional ground.
  6. Counter-claim:
    • The appellate court found that the appellant failed to show any substantive legal basis entitling him to the value of constructions if they were not made with the plaintiff's consent.
    • There was no evidence apart from the appellant's own testimony that the constructions were made with the plaintiff's consent or at his request; therefore, the counter-claim was not maintainable and the trial court's dismissal of the counter-claim was upheld.
    • The factual questions about whether constructions enhanced value or were detrimental were left open for the trial court to decide if the plaint is amended to include Section 12(1)(m) grounds.
  7. Relief and procedural directions:
    • The appeal was allowed insofar as the ejectment and mesne profits decree was set aside and the suit remanded to the trial court for trial according to law.
    • The respondents were permitted to file an application to amend the plaint on the date fixed for appearance; the trial court should decide that application in light of the appellate court's observations.
    • The appellant may amend the written statement in response; both parties may lead evidence on new points raised by any amendment.
    • The decree dismissing the counter-claim was upheld. No order as to costs. Parties to appear before the trial court on 2 December 1981.

Holding and Implications

Primary Holding: The appellate court allowed the appeal in part, set aside the trial court's judgment and decree pertaining to ejectment and mesne profits, and remanded the suit to the trial court for fresh trial in accordance with law.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The lease was held to be a lease of the cinema building with furniture and fittings and therefore governed by the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961; accordingly, ejectment requires proof of one or more grounds under Section 12(1).
  • The trial court's finding of need under Section 12(1)(f) based on the original plaintiff Maoji could not be sustained because that need did not continue to the end of proceedings; respondents may apply to amend the plaint to plead need of Purushottam Bhai (the remaining legal representative) where appropriate.
  • The trial court's finding under Section 12(1)(m) was inadequate because it lacked specific findings that constructions materially altered the accommodation or diminished its value; respondents may apply to amend the plaint to plead this ground clearly.
  • The appellant's counter-claim for the value of constructions was not supported by evidence of consent and its dismissal by the trial court was upheld.
  • Procedurally, the suit is remanded; the respondents may file an amendment application, the appellant may amend his written statement, both parties may lead evidence on new issues, and the parties are to appear before the trial court on 2 December 1981. There is no order as to costs of the appeal.

No broader precedent was announced by this decision beyond its application to the facts; the court applied established principles (as cited) to characterise the lease and to determine the sufficiency of findings on statutory grounds.

    Anant Narayanrao Gadre v. Gomtibai

    1. This is an appeal by the defendant against the judgment dated 31st October 1980 passed by the Additional District Judge, Hoshanga-bad, decreeing the suit for ejectment and mesne profits in respect of a cinema hall situated at Itarsi and dismissing the appellant's counter-claim.

    2. The suit was instituted by the original plaintiff Maoji on 27th January 1975. Maoji died during the pendency of the suit on 16th January 1978 and his legal representatives who are respondents in this appeal were substituted in his place.

    3. The suit is based on an oral lease of the cinema hall given by Maoji in favour of the appellant which was terminated by notice with effect from 1st February 1975. The cinema hall was first leased out in 1958 to the appellant. Thereafter, it was again leased out in 1968. The monthly rent agreed was Rs. 900/-. As there is no writing evidencing the lease, the tenancy has been treated to be from month to month, and there is no dispute between the parties on that point. The trial Court held that the lease was really a lease of cinema business and was not covered by the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and, therefore, it was not necessary to plead and prove any of the grounds mentioned in Section 12 of the Act. Even so, the trial Court held the need of the plaintiff under Section 12 (1) (f) to be established. The trial Court also decided an issue having reference to Section 12 (1) (m) in favour of the plaintiff. The trial Court allowed the mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 900/- per month from the date of termination of tenancy. It further directed that in case the appellant did not vacate within two months from the date of the decree, the plaintiff would be entitled to get mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month from the date of the suit. There was a counter-claim by the appellant. The appellant's case was that he made certain constructions with the consent of the plaintiff in which he spent Rs. 31,954.18 and that he was entitled to get this amount from the plaintiff. The counterclaim was dismissed on the finding that the constructions were not made with the consent of the plaintiff.

    4. The first question that arises in this appeal is whether the trial Court was right in holding that the lease was really a lease of cinema business and that it was not governed by the provisions of the Accommodation Control Act. It is only a lease of an accommodation as defined in Section 2 (a) of the Act which is governed by the provisions of the Act. Therefore, if in a given case what is leased out is a business carried on in a building, the lease will be out side the provisions of the Act. The principles bearing upon this question have been decided by the Supreme Court in Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 and Dwarka Pd. v. Dwarka Das. AIR 1975 SC 1753. The test to be applied is of dominant intention and the question to be decided by us is whether the dominant intention was to let out the cinema business or, whether, it was a lease of the cinema building with furniture and fittings. The facts relevant on this point are that the plaintiff Maoji never carried on the business of exhibition of films in the cinema hall. The cinema hall is equipped with fans, furniture and some fittings. It, however, contains no machinery installed by the plaintiff for exhibition of films. The projector was installed by the appellant and it was thereafter that the exhibition of films started in the cinema hall.

    In deciding the question of dominant intention, one has to see whether the cinema hall is so equipped that the business of exhibition of films could be started by the lessee without incurring any substantial expenditure in making it reasonably fit for carrying on the business. Now when the projector or the machinery itself was not installed in the cinema hall, it cannot be said that it was equipped up to that standard. In such a situation, in our opinion, it can not be held that the dominant intention was to let out the cinema business. The dominant intention here was to lease out the building with furniture and fit tings. We may also refer to Ex. P-9 which is a certificate for purposes of assessment of property tax given by the appellant to the plaintiff stating that he paid Rs. 800/- for cinema premises and Rs. 100/- towards the rent of furniture in the cinema house. This certificate also shows that the rent was paid for the building and furniture and not for any business.

    5. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to us a passage from the case of Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani (supra) in which it is stated that tha fact that the machinery of a Dal Mill which was transferred to lessee under the lease was found to be not very serviceable and the lessee had to bring in his own machinery, would not alter the character of the transaction. These observations have to be appreciated in the light of the facts of that case. In that case, Dal Mill building with fixed machinery in working order and accessories was leased out on an annual rent. The machinery installed was serviceable, although it may not have been very serviceable in the sense that the lessee had to bring in new machinery also. It was held that the lease was a lease of the Dal Mill located in the building and not a lease of a building where the fixture of the machinery incidentally passes with the lease and in this context it was said that the fact that the lessee had to bring in his own machinery also did not alter the character of the lease. In the instant case, the machinery for exhibition of films was not at all fitted in the cinema hall when it was leased out to the appellant and, therefore, the inference that arises is that it was not a lease of cinema business although the lessee took the lease of the cinema hall for carrying on that business by installing his own machinery. In the case of Dwarka Pd. v. Dwarka Das (supra), also what was leased out was a running cinema business i. e. a cinema hall fitted with a projector and other accessories for running cinema business. Similar were the facts in Harisingh v. Ratanlal, 1969 MPLJ 622 and S. G. Film Exchange v. H. H. Tej Kunwar, 1978 MPLJ 302. No case has been pointed out to us where a lease of a cinema hall without machinery for exhibition of films may have been held to be lease of cinema business. For these reasons, we hold that the lease in the instant case was a lease of the cinema building with furniture and other fixtures, governed by the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act.

    6. On the finding reached by us, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 12 of the Act for obtaining a decree for ejectment. We have earlier stated that the Court below has found in favour of the plaintiff existence of grounds under Clauses (f) and (m) of Section 12 (1). As regards the ground under Section 12 (1) (f), we notice that initially what was pleaded was the need of the original plaintiff Maoji. The need of Maoji came to an end on his death and, therefore, the suit could not be decreed on the basis of that need. It is now well settled that the need on the basis of which ejectment is sought must exist till the end; (see Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711). The finding on the question of need, therefore, cannot be supported. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, pointed out that an application was made on 11th December 1976 in the trial Court to plead that the cinema hall was needed by the plaintiff and his major sons Visram Bhai and Purushottam Bhai for carrying on cinema business, Vishram Bhai and Purushottam Bhai are amongst the legal representatives who were joined after the death of Maoji. Vishram Bhai also died during the pendency of the suit. This application, filed by the plaintiff, was rejected by an order passed on llth December 1976 itself on the plea that according to the plaintiff the cinema building was not covered by the Accommodation Control Act. The rejection of this application was clearly wrong. It is true that the plaintiff's case was that the cinema building was not covered by the Accommodation Control Act, but he could plead in the alternative requirements of Section 12 for claiming ejectment. In our opinion, the amendment application made on 11th December 1976 ought to have been allowed by the trial Court. Had that application been allowed, the issue whether Vishram Bhai and Purushottam Bhai who were later on joined as legal representatives, needed the cinema hall for running cinema business could have been tried. Now that Vishram Bhai also died during the pendency of the suit, the only amendment that can be permitted is about the need of Purushottam Bhai for carrying on cinema business in the cinema hall.

    7. As regards the question as to the existence of the ground under Section 12 (1) (m), we find that there is an issue (Issue No. 4) framed by the trial Court which substantially cover the ground under that section, but there is no clear pleading to that effect. Although that issue has been decided in favour of the plaintiff by the trial Court, the rinding is not very happy. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the constructions made by the appellant were not made with the consent of the plaintiff. The trial Court did not give any specific finding that these constructions materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest or that they were likely to diminish its value substantially. In the absence of any such finding, it could not be said that the ground under Section 12 (1) (m) was made out. The trial Court's decree, therefore, cannot be supported even on this ground. However, as the issue was there and there is also some pleading that the constructions were made without the consent of the plaintiff and they damaged the building, we permit the respondents to apply for amending the plaint for pleading clearly the ground mentioned in Section 12 (1) (m).

    8. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the cinema hall has been let out by the appellant during the pendency of the suit. If that be so, a ground of subletting can also be added by amending the plaint.

    9. Coming to the counter-claim, learned counsel for the appellant has failed to show any substantive law under which he could be entitled to the value of the constructions made by him, in case they were not made with the con-sent of the plaintiff. Except for the word of the appellant, there is no evidence whatsoever that the constructions were made with the consent of the plaintiff or at his request. In theses circumstances, the appellant was not entitled to counter-claim for the value of the constructions. The question whether these constructions enhanced the value of the cinema hall or whether they were detrimental to it or whether they materially altered the building, is left open to be decided by the trial Court, if the plaint is amended to bring in the ground under Section 12 (1) (m).

    10. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court pertaining to ejectment and mesne profits are set aside and the suit is remanded to it for trial in accordance with law. The respondents will file an application for amendment of the plaint on the date of appearance fixed by us which will be decided by the trial Court in the light of the observations made above, The appellant will have a right to amend the written statement in answer to the amendment of the plaint. Both parties will be allowed to lead evidence on the new points arising out of the amendment. The decree dismissing the counter-claim is upheld- There will be no order as to costs of this appeal. Parties will appear before the trial Court on 2nd December 1981.

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    Comments

    Anant Narayanrao Gadre v. Gomtibai
    (Nov 3, 1981)