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Case Number

Misc. Petns. Nos. 1123 and 1169 of 1974

Attorney(S)

S.L. Jain and A.K. Jain
for Petitioner; S.K. Dixit
Dy. Govt. Advocate
for Respondents.

Judges

R.J Bhave
J.P Bajpai, JJ.

Acts

provisions of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Shri S.
Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (M.P. Nos. 1123/74 & 1169/74)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions (M. P. No. 1123/74 and M. P. No. 1169/74) were heard together because they rested on similar facts, common grounds and challenged the same notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Agricultural lands belonging to the petitioners were acquired by the State of Madhya Pradesh for the purpose of "establishing industry" in Sagar district. Notifications under Section 4 were issued on 7-9-1974 and under Section 6 on 17-9-1974, published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 13-9-1974 and 27-9-1974 respectively.

The petitioners challenged the notifications as mala fide and colourable, alleging the acquisition was effectively for a private company (M/s. Central India Paper and Board Mills (Pvt.) Limited) and that mandatory procedures applicable to acquisitions for companies (Chapter VII of the Act) and statutory enquiry under Section 5A were not followed. They also alleged non-publication of the Section 4 notification in the locality and disputed the applicability of Section 17(1) to lands already under cultivation.

The State filed returns asserting a public-purpose acquisition to promote industry and employment in a backward area of Sagar tahsil; a survey had indicated suitability for a straw-board mill and roughly 20 acres were proposed to be acquired, including petitioners' lands. The State asserted that responsibility for payment of compensation rested with the State Government out of consolidated State funds.

The writ petitions were dismissed by the court with costs; counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 100. The court ordered that any security amount due, after deduction of costs and expenses, may be refunded to the petitioners. The court also noted that claims for compensation already made by petitioners would be dealt with according to law under the Land Acquisition Act.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring petitioners' lands were mala fide or colourable and therefore invalid.
Whether the acquisition was effectively for a private company (M/s. Central India Paper and Board Mills (Pvt.) Limited) such that the special procedure in Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act (acquisition for companies) and its mandatory requirements were applicable.
Whether the State was obliged to conduct an enquiry under Section 5A prior to issuing the Section 6 notification (i.e., whether provisions of Section 17(1) rendering urgency applicable were properly invoked).
Whether the notification under Section 4 was properly published in the locality and, if not, whether subsequent proceedings were vitiated.
Whether Section 17(1) (reference to "waste and arable lands") applies to agricultural lands already under cultivation, or whether such lands were excluded from that term.
Whether the notifications were sufficiently certain (not vague) in specifying the public purpose and particulars required under Sections 4 and 6.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

The acquisition was mala fide and a colourable exercise of powers under the Land Acquisition Act because it was essentially for a private company (M/s. Central India Paper and Board Mills (Pvt.) Limited).
Because the acquisition was for a company, the mandatory provisions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act (relating to acquisition for companies) were not complied with, rendering the proceedings vitiated.
The enquiry under Section 5A and giving opportunity to hear objections were avoided mala fide; no material justified invoking Section 17(1) and forgoing a Section 5A enquiry as emergent.
Section 17(1) could not apply to agricultural lands already under cultivation—the term "waste and arable lands" was said to exclude lands already in cultivation.
The Section 4 notification was not properly published in the locality (by affixing copies and promulgation in the neighbouring area), and therefore subsequent proceedings in pursuance of it were illegal and vitiated.
Because more than 30 days elapsed between Section 4 notification and taking possession and petitioners were allowed to cut and remove standing crops, there was no urgency to justify invoking Section 17(1).
The notifications were vague for not specifying details such as the name of the industry or specific purpose, prejudicing the petitioners.

Respondents' (State and Land Acquisition Officer) Arguments

The acquisition was for the public purpose of establishing industry in a backward area to promote economic development and employment; the State had carried out surveys identifying suitability for a straw-board mill in the area.
The State's decision to develop and provide land (and other facilities) to attract industry was within the State's discretion; lands would be owned by the State with compensation payable out of consolidated funds, and any industrialist would occupy as a lessee.
Because responsibility for payment of compensation rested on the State Government, the acquisition could not be treated as one governed by Chapter VII for companies; Chapter VII procedure was therefore unnecessary.
Publication of the Section 4 notification in the locality was duly carried out by affixing copies at conspicuous places (Gram Panchayat, tahsil notice board, near fields and railway station); official certificates and office endorsements supported the presumption of proper publication.
Possession having been taken, allowing petitioners to cut and remove crops was a humanitarian and practical measure and did not negate urgency or render the notification mala fide.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033	If the responsibility for payment of compensation is shown to be on the State Government, acquisition cannot be treated as one governed by Chapter VII (acquisitions for companies); compliance with that part is not necessary.	The court relied on this decision to hold that Chapter VII procedures were unnecessary because the State expressly bore responsibility for compensation and would own the land; this defeated petitioners' contention that the acquisition was for a company requiring Chapter VII compliance.
Ratilal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 SC 984	Similar observation to Jage Ram regarding non-applicability of Chapter VII where State bears compensation responsibility.	Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that Chapter VII need not be complied with in such circumstances; used to reinforce the court's conclusion on procedure for acquisitions purportedly for companies.
K. M. Chinni v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 SC 1188	Similar observation to Jage Ram and Ratilal on Chapter VII non-applicability.	Used as supporting precedent together with Ratilal and Jage Ram to reject the petitioners' Chapter VII argument.
Inderjit C. Parekh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 SC 1182	Adopted the same view as earlier Supreme Court decisions regarding Chapter VII non-applicability where State bears compensation responsibility.	Relied on to show continued Supreme Court authority for the rule that Chapter VII procedures are not required when the State pays compensation and retains ownership.
Raja Anand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1081	Authority referred to in argumentation; it was noted that this case had been considered in Jage Ram.	The court observed that Raja Anand was already considered in Jage Ram and did not require separate treatment; it did not alter the court's conclusion on Chapter VII applicability.
Narinderjit Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 552	Held that if a notification was not published in the locality, all further proceedings in pursuance of that notification could be vitiated.	The petitioners relied on this case, but the court found on the record (office endorsements, annexures and certificate of publication) that proper publication had been made and the presumption of official acts being duly performed stood; Narinderjit Singh therefore did not assist the petitioners.
Sadruddin Suleman v. J. H. Patwardhan, AIR 1965 Bom 224	Earlier High Court decision interpreted "waste and arable lands" in a manner relied upon by petitioners (to exclude lands already under cultivation).	The court noted that subsequent Supreme Court authority (Ishwarlal) had impliedly overruled earlier High Court views; thus Sadruddin Suleman could not prevail against later Supreme Court pronouncements.
Ishwarlal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870	Held that "arable lands" include lands already under cultivation; High Court decisions to the contrary were impliedly overruled.	The court applied Ishwarlal to reject the petitioners' contention that Section 17(1) could not apply to agricultural lands already under cultivation; this ground failed accordingly.
Jagram v. State of Haryana (referred to as "Jage Ram" / "Jagram" in the opinion)	Authoritative observations (in the same line as Jage Ram) regarding urgency and delay—used to answer arguments that delay or allowing crops to be cut negated urgency.	The court relied on the Supreme Court's observations to hold that a delay or humanitarian allowance to cut crops did not establish absence of urgency or mala fide notification.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a stepwise analysis addressing the petitioners' principal contentions, applying the factual record and cited Supreme Court authority:

On mala fide/colourable exercise: The court found no specific pleaded or substantiated material to show mala fides. The State had carried out surveys indicating the area was suitable for a straw-board mill; the area chosen was adjacent to transport links and had adequate water and power. Selection of area was within State discretion and nothing in the record supported an ulterior purpose.
On Chapter VII applicability (acquisition for companies): The State's return specifically averred that compensation payment responsibility rested with the State Government out of consolidated funds, and that the industrialist would occupy the land as a lessee. The court applied Supreme Court authority (notably Jage Ram and other decisions) to hold that where the State bears compensation responsibility, Chapter VII procedures for company acquisitions are not applicable. Consequently, the petitioners' challenge based on non-compliance with Chapter VII failed.
On publication of the Section 4 notification: The court applied the presumption that official acts are carried out according to rules. It examined record material (Annexures R-IV and R-V, order-sheet signed by petitioners' counsel, certificates of publication in the Collectorate file) and found adequate publication at conspicuous local places (Gram Panchayat, tahsil notice board, near the fields and railway station). The Land Acquisition Officer's dealing with and disposal of objections supported sufficient compliance. Thus, Narinderjit Singh's principle did not invalidate proceedings here.
On urgency and Section 17(1): The petitioners argued that elapsed time and permission to cut standing crops showed lack of urgency. The court accepted the State's explanation that possession had been taken and cutting of crops was permitted on humanitarian and practical grounds. It relied on Supreme Court observations (Jage Ram/Jagram) to conclude that delay or such permissions did not prove absence of urgency or mala fides.
On applicability of Section 17(1) to cultivated lands: The petitioners relied on a Bomaby High Court decision (Sadruddin Suleman), but the court followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Ishwarlal that "arable lands" include lands already under cultivation. Therefore the petitioners' contention that Section 17(1) did not apply to already cultivated agricultural lands failed.
On vagueness of notifications: The court inspected the original notifications and found the public purpose expressly stated ("for establishing industries"), the village name and area specified, and a statement that more precise map and khasra numbers were available for inspection at the Assistant Director of Industries' office. The court held that further industry-specific details were unnecessary to indicate public purpose under Sections 4 and 6 and found no prejudice to petitioners.
On compensation claims and further procedure: The court noted that petitioners had already claimed compensation (Re. 1 per sq. ft.) but held that compensation would be determined and disposed of according to law and procedure under the Land Acquisition Act.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The petitions (No. 1123/74 and No. 1169/74) were dismissed with costs.

Direct effects and orders stated in the opinion:

The petitions are dismissed with costs; counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 100.
Any security amount due, after necessary deductions for costs and expenses, may be refunded to the petitioners.
Claims for compensation already lodged by the petitioners will be dealt with and disposed of according to the law and procedures prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act.

The court's decision applied existing Supreme Court authorities and did not announce a new legal precedent; the opinion does not describe broader legal policy implications beyond the direct effect on the parties.

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Prem Bai v. The State Of M.P And Others

1. This petition has been heard along with M. P. No. 1169 of 1974 (Sardar Bahu and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and 2 others), since both the petitions are based on similar facts and common grounds and are against the common notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Shri S. L. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in both the cases, had also made the statement that the arguments put forth in this petition will also be adopted for the other petition, i.e. M. P. No. 1169/ 74. Under these circumstances, the order passed in this case will also govern the disposal of M. P. No, 1169/74.

2. Certain agricultural lands belonging to the petitioners in both the cases have been acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the purposes of establishing industry in Sagar district and the said purpose has been declared as public purpose for which acquisition has been made by the State Government Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 have been issued on 7-9-1974 and 17-9-1974 respectively and they were published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 13-9-74 and 27-9-1974 accordingly.

3. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid notifications on the ground that the proceedings taken for acquiring their lands are mala fide and have been taken in colourable exercise of powers under the Land Acquisition Act. According to the petitioners, the acquisition of lands is for the purpose of a company, i.e. M/s. Central India Paper and Board Mills (Pvt.) Limited, in which one Rajkumar Jain is interested. According to them, the purpose of establishing the industry is not a public purpose.

The petitioners urged that since the acquisition is for the company, the proceedings are vitiated for want of non-compliance of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act, which is mandatory in cases of acquisition for companies. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also urged that the course of holding enquiry under Section 5A and the opportunity of hearing objections has been avoided mala fide. There was no material before the State Government for forming an opinion that the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act were applicable and as such, due to emergent requirements, there was no necessity for applying the provisions of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act regarding enquiry before issuing the notification under Section 6 of the Act.

The learned counsel for the petitioners also stated that since the lands, already under cultivation, cannot be treated as arable lands, Section 17(1) of the Act could not be applied to the present case concerning agricultural lands already under cultivation. It was also urged that since the notification under Section 4 of the Act has not been published in the locality by affixing a copy of the same and promulgating, in the neighbouring area, subsequent proceedings in pursuance of the said notification under Section 4 of the Act are illegal and vitiated.

4. The respondents, State of Madhya Pradesh and the Land Acquisition Officer filed a return. It has been stated that after formation of the new State of Madhya Pradesh on 1-11-1956, several backward areas in the State were to be given proper opportunity for economic development and it was necessary to solve the burning problem of unemployment in such areas. It has been shown that the area comprised in tahsil Sagar in the central region has been declared as backward area by the Government of India. The State Government took a decision to see that industries and other projects are established in such area so that there may be industrial development resulting in opportunities of employment and financial improvements of the inhabitants in that area. The State Government, for this purpose, decided to provide facilities regarding land, electricity and other issues so as to attract the industrialists for establishing the requisite industries in particular areas.

A survey was carried out to ascertain the type of industries which could be established and developed in particular areas according to the availability of raw materials and other facilities. According to the survey report, it was found that there was sufficient scope for establishing a mill for manufacture of straw-board in Sagar tahsil and accordingly the State Government proposed to acquire about 20 acres of land in village Kishanpura, tahsil and district Sagar. The lands belonging to the petitioners, in both the cases, are included in the proposed acquisition. Under these circumstances and in the absence of any specific allegation or material, either pleaded in the petition or substantiated before this Court, it is not possible to hold that the proposed acquisition was mala fide in any manner. The selection of the suitable area is within the discretion of the State Government, The area in question is adjacent to railway station Ishra-wara on Bina-Katni main line and Sagar-Bina main road. There is adequate supply of water and power in the vicinity of the area. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to hold that the proposal for acquiring the lands was in any manner motivated with any ulterior purpose.

5. The contention of the petitioners that the acquisition was for the company and, therefore, compliance of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act was necessary is also without any basis. It has been stated in the return filed by the State that the area was acquired for the purposes of establishing industries. The State Government was free to establish industries by developing the area and allowing even & private industrialist to use and occupy the same on lease. In view of the specific averment made in the return in paragraphs 1 and 6, that the responsibility of making payment of compensation is on "the State Government out of the consolidated funds of the State, it is clear that the ownership of lands so acquired rests with the Government and the industrialist-company, i.e. M/s. Central India Paper and Board Mills (Pvt.) Limited, has been allowed to occupy the said land only as a lessee for the purposes of establishing the industry for manufacture of straw-board etc. Now, there is no doubt regarding the legal position in this respect.

Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held in Jage Ram v State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 that if the responsibility for payment of compensation is shown to be on the State Government, the acquisition cannot be treated as one governed by Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act concerning the acquisition for the companies. It has been also held that in such cases, it is not necessary to comply with the provisions of the said part. Similar observations have been made in Ratilal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 SC 984 and K. M. Chinni v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1970 SC 1188. Recently, in Inderjit C. Parekh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 SC 1182, the same view has been adopted.

6. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it is not possible for the petitioner to challenge the notifications on the ground that the procedure prescribed for being followed in cases of acquisition of lands for companies was not complied with. Under the circumstances, it is also not necessary to refer in detail to various cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners during the course of arguments. The other case of the Supreme Court referred to by the petitioner, i.e Raja Anand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1081 has already been considered in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 (supra).

7. The petitioners have relied on Narinderjit Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 552 for contending that because the notification was not published in the locality, all further proceedings in pursuance of the said notification were vitiated. However, in the present case, we are satisfied that the notification was duly published in the locality by affixing the copies of the same on important conspicuous places including the Gram Panchayat and notice board of the tahsil building etc. Necessary directions were issued for making the proper publication and the official acts are presumed to have been carried out according to the rules. The petitioners have not been able to substantiate and place cogent materials to rebut the aforesaid presumption or the truth of the contention of the respondents that such publication was done.

On the contrary, it is found from Annexures R-IV and R.V that specific objection in this respect was also dealt with and disposed of by the Land Acquisition Officer and there is a specific mention that sufficient compliance regarding the publication of the notices was done. The aforesaid order-sheet is also signed by the counsel appearing for the petitioners. We have perused1 the certificates of publication endorsed by the process-server on the notifications, from the office-file of the Collectorate. The notification under Section 4 was duly published at conspicuous places in the neighbourhood of the fields in question apart from the village and" railway station. The endorsement reads as below:--

श्रीमान् जी सहायक संचालक उद्योग विभाग सागर के आदेशानुसार इस नोटिस की तामीली नीचे लिखे स्थानों पर की गई। ः- जमीन के पास सडक स लगे हुये टपरे पर 2ः- खेत के पास लगे हुये कैथ के पेडपर। ः- गांव बिशनपुरा में। ः- रेलवे स्टेशन इसरवारा पर। दः- हरीशंकर मृत्य उद्योग कायर्ालय सागर तारीख 22--ष्

8. The learned counsel for the petitioners then contended that in view of the fact that more than 30 days' time had elapsed between the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act and taking possession, it should be held that there was no urgency for applying the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners contended that they were given time to cut and remove the standing crops and this fact shows that it was not a case of urgency.

The learned counsel, Shri Dixit, Dy. Govt. Advocate appearing for the State made a statement that possession had already been taken and on humanitarian grounds, the petitioners were permitted to cut and remove their standing crops. This was done for convenience of the petitioners and to avoid complications regarding unnecessary claims for damages etc. The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jagram v. State of Haryana (supra) are complete answer to such contentions as raised by the petitioners. Even if there might have been some delay or the authorities had been lethargic, it cannot be said that on the date of the notification, there was no urgency and that the notification is mala fide.

9. Lastly, it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied to agricultural lands already under cultivation. According to the petitioners, the term 'waste and arable lands' could include either waste lands or lands only fit for cultivation, but not lands already under cultivation. Reliance was placed on Sadruddin Suleman v. J. H. Patwardhan, AIR 1965 Bom 224. In view of the decision of their Lordships in Ishwarlal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870, the earlier decisions of all other High Courts in this respect have been impliedly overruled. It has been held by the Supreme Court that arable lands also include such land which is already under cultivation. Thus, this ground also fails.

10. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the petitions are absolutely misconceived and no case is made out for interference. There was no vagueness in the notifications. We have seen the original notifications. The public purpose has been specifically stated as "for establishing industries". The name of the village and the acrage have also been stated with the remark that further details in respect of the map showing actual location of the khasra numbers were available in the office of the Assistant Director of Industries, Sagar, for inspection. The challenge regarding vagueness was, however, only confined to the absence of the details of the name of the industry and purpose. We think that further details of the industry are not necessary for showing the public purpose in the notifications, under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The public purpose has been sufficiently indicated and there is no case of prejudice to the petitioners on this count.

11. The petitioners have already made a claim for compensation at the rate of Re. 1 per square foot. However, this will be dealt with and disposed of according to law and procedure prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act.

12. The petitions (No. 1123/74 and No. 1169/74) therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee in this case at Rs 100. The amount of security, if any due, after necessary deductions of the costs and expenses, may be refunded to the petitioner.

Prem Bai v. The State Of M.P And Others

Structured Summary of the Opinion (M.P. Nos. 1123/74 & 1169/74)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Respondents' (State and Land Acquisition Officer) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Prem Bai v. The State Of M.P And Others

Comments