Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Attorney(S)

.S. Awasthy and R.K. Verma A.P. Sen. R.J. Bhare

Judges

Chief Justice Mr. P.V. Dixit
Mr. Justice K.L. Pandey

Acts

Section 55 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960,
Sub-sectiontion (2) of Section 55,
provision in Section 55 (2)
Sections 55 and 77 (1)(b).
Section 77(1)(b),

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed temporarily as a Tad-Gud guide by the Madhya Pradesh State Tad-Gud Co-operative Federation, Ltd., posted at Kareli. By an order dated 25 March 1963 the federation terminated the petitioner's services with effect from 10 May 1962. The stated reasons in the federation's order were that the petitioner previously attended a conference in Mysore State without permission or leave, was warned that repetition would lead to discharge, and was thereafter found to be visiting Ujjain and other places without intimating or obtaining permission from the federation.

The petitioner complained to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Section 55(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The Joint Registrar, after notice to parties, concluded that the termination was proper and dismissed the petitioner's complaint. The petitioner then appealed to the State Government under Section 77(1) of the Act. The State Government dismissed the appeal on the ground that, in its view, Section 55(2) made the Registrar's decision final and no appeal lay against it.

The petitioner filed the present application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the federation's order of termination (and effectively challenging the State Government's refusal to entertain his appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether an appeal lies to the State Government under Section 77(1) against a decision of the Registrar or an officer appointed by him deciding a dispute under Section 55(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960.
Whether the expression in Section 55(2) that the Registrar's decision "shall be binding on the society and its employees" operates as an "otherwise provision" within the meaning of Section 77(1) and thereby bars appeals.
Whether the federation's termination order was illegal for being passed without framing charges, without holding an inquiry, without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard, and for terminating services retrospectively (these points were raised by the petitioner but were not decided by the court in this opinion).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The federation's termination order was illegal because it was passed without framing any charges, without holding any inquiry, and without giving the petitioner an opportunity to defend himself against charges.
The termination was unlawful insofar as it purported to take effect from a date anterior to the passing of the impugned order.
When the petitioner moved the Registrar under Section 55(2), the Registrar had to function as a quasi-judicial authority; consequently the Registrar (or Joint Registrar) should have held an inquiry, framed charges, and given the petitioner an opportunity to show cause—i.e., acted in accordance with principles of natural justice.
The appeal preferred under Section 77(1) to the State Government was competent and should not have been rejected on the ground that Section 55(2) made the Registrar's decision final and non-appealable.

State's Arguments (as presented by the Government Advocate)

The opening words of Section 77(1)—"Save where it has been otherwise provided"—mean that appeals are barred where the statute otherwise provides.
The provision in Section 55(2) that the decision of the Registrar or any officer appointed by him "shall be binding on the society and its employees" constitutes such an "otherwise provision" and therefore makes the Registrar's decision final and not subject to appeal under Section 77(1).
Consequently, the State Government's dismissal of the petitioner's appeal on the stated ground (that no appeal lay) was justified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Shell Co. of Australia, Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 1931 A.C. 275 (Privy Council)	Approval of the definition of "judicial power" (Griffith C.J. in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead) that judicial power is the power to decide controversies between subjects or between the sovereign and subjects; and that such power may produce binding and authoritative decisions "whether subject to appeal or not."	The court relied on Lord Sankey L.C.'s approval to support the proposition that a decision being "binding" does not necessarily mean it is final and immune from appeal; thus Section 55(2)'s statement that decisions "shall be binding" does not, by itself, preclude an appeal under Section 77(1).
Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead, 8 C.L.R. 330 (definition cited by Griffith C.J.)	Definition of "judicial power" as the sovereign authority to decide controversies, and the clarification that such decisions may be authoritative irrespective of whether they are subject to appeal.	The court cited Griffith C.J.'s definition (as approved in Shell) to distinguish between the binding nature of a decision and the concept of finality; used to interpret Section 55(2) and to conclude that "binding" does not necessarily mean "final and conclusive."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the material statutory provisions: Sections 55 (particularly sub-section (2)) and 77(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. It observed that Section 55(1) allows the Registrar to frame rules governing terms of employment and working conditions; where such rules exist employees are governed by them, and where no such rules exist the general law of master and servant applies.

Turning to Section 55(2), the court noted that it provides that disputes (including those about terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action) between a society and its employees are to be decided by the Registrar or an officer appointed by him and that "his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees." The court interpreted this language to mean that the Registrar's decision is compulsory in the sense that it prescribes a rule to be obeyed and that in subsequent proceedings the matter so determined cannot be openly re-agitated by the parties.

The State's argument that the phrase "decision shall be binding" should be read as an "otherwise provision" in Section 77(1) (thus rendering Registrar's decisions final and non-appealable) was rejected. The court explained that Section 55(2) does not confer judicial power on the Registrar or his officers; rather the decision-making function under that provision is arbitral/consensual. Although the Registrar and officers must act judicially (i.e., in a quasi-judicial manner) when deciding disputes, they do not exercise the judicial power of a court that can finally and authoritatively determine rights without provision for appeal.

To support this distinction between a binding decision and a finally conclusive decision, the court relied on the Privy Council's exposition in Shell Co. of Australia (which approved Griffith C.J.'s definition in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead) that a determination can be binding and authoritative "whether subject to appeal or not." Using these authorities, the court concluded that "binding" in Section 55(2) denotes compulsion or effect on the parties but does not necessarily negate the possibility of an appeal provided for elsewhere in the statute.

Consequently, the court held that Section 55(2) cannot be treated as an "otherwise provision" that bars appeals under Section 77(1). Therefore, the State Government erred in rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground that the Registrar's decision was final and non-appealable.

The court expressly refrained from deciding the substantive issues raised by the petitioner concerning retrospective termination, the need for framing charges and holding an inquiry, or whether a temporary employee's services could be terminated without notice. It directed that such questions are to be decided by the authority that will hear the petitioner's appeal, with assistance from relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed in part. The court quashed the State Government's order refusing to entertain the petitioner's appeal on the ground that the Registrar's decision under Section 55(2) was final and non-appealable. The State Government is directed to entertain the petitioner's appeal and dispose of it in accordance with law. The parties are to bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of the petitioner's security deposit is to be refunded to him.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The State Government must entertain and decide the petitioner's appeal on its merits; the petitioner's security deposit is to be refunded; no party costs awarded against either side.
On the legal question addressed, the court's interpretation clarifies that the wording in Section 55(2) that a Registrar's decision "shall be binding" does not, by itself, operate as an "otherwise provision" barring appeals under Section 77(1). The decision instructs the State Government to hear appeals arising from decisions under Section 55(2).
The court did not resolve the other substantive issues raised by the petitioner (e.g., procedural fairness, retrospective termination) and directed that those questions be considered by the authority hearing the appeal with the aid of relevant case law.
No new substantive factual findings were made about the validity of the termination itself; the outcome is procedural—restoring the petitioner's right to have his appeal heard on the merits.

Show full summary ...

Ramcharan Bille v. Madhya Pradesh State Tad-Gud Co-Operative Federation Ltd. And Ors.

1. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari for quashing an order passed by respondent 1, the Madhya Pradesh State Tad-Gud Co-operative Federation, Ltd., Ujjain, on 25 March 1963 terminating his services with effect from 10 May 1962.

2. The petitioner was employed by the federation in a temporary capacity as Tad-Gud guide. He was posted at Kareli. On 25 March 1963, the federation passed an order terminating the petitioner's services as from 10 May 1962. The order stated that on a previous occasion the petitioner had attended a conference In the Mysore State without permission and without obtaining any leave, that for this unauthorized absence and attendance at the conference he was warned that In the event of repetition of such a conduct, his service would be discharged, and that despite this warning the applicant was again found to be visiting Ujjain and other places without intimating the federation and obtaining Its permission for the visits. The applicant then moved the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies under Section 55 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, complaining that the federation had illegally terminated his services. The Joint Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, who heard the petitioner's complaint after giving notice to the parties, came to the conclusion that the applicant's services were properly terminated, and accordingly dismissed the complaint made to him by the petitioner. The applicant then filed an appeal before the State Government against the decision of the Joint Registrar, The appeal was under Section 77(1) of the Act, That appeal was dismissed by the Government taking the view that under Section 55 (2) the decision of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies was final and no appeal lay against that decision.

3. The petitioner contends that the order terminating his services was Illegal inasmuch as it was passed by the federation without framing any charges or holding any enquiry and without giving him an opportunity of defending himself against the charges, and that the action of the federation In terminating his services from a date anterior to the passing of the Impugned order was wholly illegal. His further contention Is that In discharging his functions under Section 55 (2), the Registrar has to function as a quasi-judicial authority and, therefore, when he approached the Registrar under Section 56 (2) an inquiry should have been held by the Registrar into the charges on the basis of which the federation dispensed with his services; that he should have been given an opportunity to show cause against those charges; that in deciding his complaint about the illegal termination of his services, the Joint Registrar should have acted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and that the appeal, which he had preferred under Section 77 (1) of the Act to the State Government, was competent and it was wrongly rejected by the State Government on the ground that the decision of the Registrar under Section 55 (2) was final and no appeal lay against it.

4. It will be proper to deal first with the petitioner's contention that the appeal, which he had filed before the State Government against the decision of the Joint Registrar, was competent and the State Government should have decided it on merits. If this contention is upheld, then it would not be necessary for us to express any opinion on other contentions raised by the applicant. The material provisions to consider are Sections 55 and 77 (1)(b). They are as follows:

55. (1) the Registrar may from time to time frame rules governing the terms of employment and working conditions In a society or a class of societies and the society or the class of societies to which such terms of employment and of working conditions are applicable shall comply with the order that may be Issued by the Registrar in this behalf.

(2) Where a dispute Including a dispute regarding terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society, arises between, a society, and its employees, the Registrar or any officer appointed by him, not below the rank of Assistant Registrar, shall decide the dispute and his decision shall be binding on the society and its employees.

77. (1) Save where it has been otherwise provided, an appeal shall lie from every original order under this Act or the rules thereunder--

It is obvious from the provisions contained In Section 55 that if the Registrar has framed any rules governing the terms of employment and working conditions in a co-operative society, then the employees of the society would be governed by those rules. If no such rules have been framed, then the general law governing master and servant will apply to the employees. Sub-sectiontion (2) of Section 55, when it speaks of a dispute, including a dispute regarding terms of employment, work-ing conditions and disciplinary action taken by a society, arising between a society and its employees being determined by the Registrar or any officer appointed by him, does not restrict its operation only to disputes arising under the rules framed by the Registrar in the exercise of his powers under Section 55 (1). That Sub-sectiontion, as it is worded, means that any dispute between a society and its employees, whether arising under the rules framed under Section 55 (1) or otherwise, shall be determined by the Registrar or any officer appointed by him. Sub-sectiontion (2) further Bays that the decision of the Registrar or any officer appointed by him in any such dispute " shall be binding on the society and its employees."

5. Now, under Section 77(1)(b), an appeal lies from every original order passed under the Act or the rules thereunder by the Registrar, Additional Registrar or Joint Registrar, to the State Government. The decision, therefore, of the Registrar, Additional Registrar or Joint Registrar determining a dispute under Section 65 (2) would be appealable. But Sri Bhave, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State, argued that an appeal under 8.77(1) was subject to the condition embodied in the opening words, namely, " Save where it has been otherwise provided " ; that the provision in Section 55 (2) that the decision of the Registrar or any officer appointed by him "shall be binding on the society and its employees " was an " otherwise provision "; and that consequently there was no right of appeal under Section 77 (1) from a decision of the Registrar or any officer appointed by him deciding a dispute under Section 55 (2) of the Act. Learned Government Advocate suggested that the expression " decision shall be binding" meant that the decision shall be final and conclusive.

6. We are unable to accept this contention. It is no doubt true that Section 77 (1) precludes an appeal in cases where there is an "otherwise " provision. But the provision contained in Section 55 (2) that the decision of the Registrar or any officer appointed by him " shall be binding on the society and its employees " is not an " otherwise provision " taking away the right of appeal in cases determined under Section 55 (2). The expression " decision shall be binding on the society and its employees," as used in Section 55 (2), does not mean that the decision of the Registrar or any officer appointed by him determining a dispute shall be final and conclusive and not subject to appeal. The expression " decision shall be binding" only denotes that the decision shall affect the society and the employee concerned in a constraining or compulsory manner. The necessity for providing that the decision of the Registrar or any officer appointed by him in a dispute under Section 55 (2) shall be binding arises because of the fact that Section 55 (2) does not confer any judicial power upon the Registrar or any officer appointed by him, and the function these officers discharge while determining a dispute are not judicial but are arbitral. Under Section 55 (2), the Registrar or any officer appointed by him can decide a dispute only when a party raises a dispute and desires to have it determined.' Thus the Registrar, or the officer appointed by him, in deciding a dispute under Section 55 (2), exercises a consensual jurisdiction. These executive authorities are no doubt required to act judicially while deciding a dispute under Section 55 (2), and. their decision is a quasi judicial act. But their decision is not a decision of a Court having the power by its decision to Impose a liability on, or affect the rights of, the parties to the dispute. The purpose of the expression " decision shall be binding " is not to grant judicial power to these authorities. But it is to make their decision binding in the sense of prescribing a rule which must be obeyed. The use of the expression " decision shall be binding on the society and its employees" means no more than this that the decision shall be binding on the society and its employees so that in any subsequent proceedings, as for example, proceedings for recovery of salary, it would not be open to the society or the employee concerned to agitate again any matter determined by the competent officer is a dispute under Section 55 and which was actually within his power to decide. It does not mean that the decision shall be final in the sense of not being open to appeal. In this connexion, it would be pertinent to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Shell Co. of Australia, ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation 1931 A.C. 275 where Lord Sankey, L.C., approved, at pp. 295-296, the definition given by Griffith, C.J., in Huddart, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead 8 C.L.R. 330 of "judicial power" as meaning--

...the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.

[Italics ours.] This observation of Griffith, C.J., approved by the Privy Council, and the use therein of the words " whether subject to appeal or not" make it abundantly clear that to say that a determination of a Court or an award of an arbitrator shall be binding and authoritative Is not the same thing as saying that the decision shall be final and conclusive and not open to any appeal. A decision may be made binding and authoritative by a statutory provision, and yet it may or may not be subject to any appeal according to the provision contained In the statute dealing with appeals against that decision.

7. In our judgment, the expression decision shall be binding on the society and its employees" occurring in Section 55(2) cannot, therefore be treated as an "otherwise provision" prohibiting an appeal under Section 77(1) against a decision of the Registrar, or any officer appointed by him deciding the dispute under that provision. It follows, therefore, that the State Government was not right in rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the decision of the Joint Registrar on the ground that it was final and no appeal lay against the decision. The petitioner desires that the appeal preferred by him should be entertained and disposed of by the State Government on merits. That being so, it is not necessary for us to deal with the petitioner's contention whether, when the applicant was a temporary employee, his services could be terminated without notice or framing of any charges against him; whether the order passed by the federation terminating his services was altogether Invalid inasmuch as by that order his Services were terminated retrospectively as from a date in the past, or whether while determining the complaint of the petitioner that his services had been illegally terminated, the Joint Registrar was required to frame charges and hold an enquiry against him. These are all questions, which must be decided by the authority hearing the petitioner's appeal with the help of cases decided by the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts.

8. For these reasons, this petition is allowed in part, and the order passed by the State Government, refusing to entertain the petitioner's appeal against the decision of the Joint Registrar is quashed. The State Government is directed to entertain the appeal and dispose it of in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner

Ramcharan Bille v. Madhya Pradesh State Tad-Gud Co-Operative Federation Ltd. And Ors.

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

State's Arguments (as presented by the Government Advocate)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ramcharan Bille v. Madhya Pradesh State Tad-Gud Co-Operative Federation Ltd. And Ors.

Comments