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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners filed this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari to quash an order made by the Income-tax Officer (C‑Ward, Jabalpur) dated 28 March 1962 under Section 35 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922, which rectified an earlier assessment for the assessment year 1956–1957.

In the assessment proceedings for 1956–1957 the Income‑tax Officer noticed a cash credit entry of Rs. 44,659 in the petitioners' capital account. The assessee explained the entry as sale proceeds of 508 tolas of gold and gold ornaments; the Officer was not satisfied. He concluded that, given the assessee's financial position, accumulation of such gold was unlikely and thus treated Rs. 40,000 as income from undisclosed sources. That figure was added to other incomes and the business loss carried forward from the assessment year 1955–1956 was set off in the assessment. An assessment order was passed on 20 February 1961 (the opinion also quotes from a passage referencing an assessment order dated 20 February 1962).

The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax, who affirmed the Income‑tax Officer's view that the cash credit was income from undisclosed sources but reduced the amount to Rs. 30,000. An appeal from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, remained pending.

On 19 March 1962 the successor Income‑tax Officer issued a notice under Section 35 stating that a mistake apparent from the record had occurred in the assessment: the business loss of 1955–1956 had been set off against income from undisclosed sources (and other heads), contrary to the provisions of the Act, and that rectification would increase the assessment by Rs. 7,866.80 nP. The petitioner did not object to the notice insofar as it sought to correct set off against income from a registered firm and house property, but contended that the Rs. 30,000 treated as income from undisclosed sources was actually business income and hence eligible for set‑off under Section 24(2). The successor Income‑tax Officer ultimately rectified the assessment by an order dated 28 March 1962; the petition challenges that rectification.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Income‑tax Officer could rectify the earlier assessment under Section 35 by treating the prior set off of a business loss (1955–1956) against income treated as from undisclosed sources as a mistake apparent from the record.
  2. Whether the amount of Rs. 30,000, reduced in appeal from Rs. 40,000, was income from business (against which a business loss could be set off under Section 24(2)) or income from undisclosed sources (against which such set‑off was not permitted).
  3. Whether a successor Income‑tax Officer's differing view from his predecessor amounts to a mere change of opinion (which would not justify rectification) or whether the original assessment contained a mistake apparent from the record.
  4. Whether the Income‑tax Officer's jurisdiction to rectify under Section 35 is ousted or affected by appeals pending before appellate authorities.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Shri Sen, counsel for the assessee)

  • The predecessor Income‑tax Officer had in fact treated the originally assessed Rs. 40,000 (subsequently reduced to Rs. 30,000) as business income and had rightly set off, under Section 24(2), the business loss of the previous year against that income.
  • There was no mistake apparent from the record to justify rectification under Section 35; at most the successor had a different opinion from his predecessor about the source of the income.
  • Because the cash credit entry appeared in the business account, that entry should have been treated as a business receipt.
  • Counsel relied on Lakhmichand Baijnath v. Commissioner of Income‑tax and other authorities for the proposition that a mistake rectified under Section 35 must be patent on the record and not one discoverable only by argument or investigation.

Revenue's Position / Income‑tax Officer's View (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Income‑tax Officer (original) was not satisfied by the assessee's explanation for the cash credit and treated Rs. 40,000 (later reduced to Rs. 30,000 on appeal) as income from undisclosed sources rather than business income.
  • The original assessment order itself identified the addition as "income from undisclosed sources." The set off of the business loss against such income was therefore contrary to the statutory limits of Section 24(2).
  • The successor Income‑tax Officer regarded the earlier set off as a mistake apparent from the record and issued a notice under Section 35 to rectify the assessment; he maintained that his jurisdiction to rectify was not affected by pending appeals because the particular question of set‑off against undisclosed income was not the subject‑matter of the pending appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lakhmichand Baijnath v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, (1959) 35 ITR 416 : AIR 1959 SC 341 Authority relied upon by petitioner for the proposition that rectification under Section 35 is limited to mistakes apparent on the face of the record and does not extend to matters discoverable by argument or investigation. The court considered the precedent but held it does not establish an absolute rule that a credit entry in business accounts must always be treated as business income; the decision was distinguished and it did not prevent rectification here.
Sidhramappa v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, (1952) 21 ITR 333 : AIR 1952 Bom 287 Authority cited for the limitation that rectification power is confined to mistakes apparent from the record and not those discoverable only by elucidation or argument. Referenced by petitioner; the court noted the principle but applied later Supreme Court decisions that clarified the scope of rectification under Section 35.
K. Parameswaran Pillai v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, (1955) 28 ITR 885 : AIR 1957 Trav. Co. 217 Similar authority cited to stress that Section 35 is limited to patent mistakes on the record. Not treated as decisive; the court relied on Supreme Court authority to explain a broader understanding of rectification powers.
Maharana Mills (Private) Ltd. v. Income‑tax Officer, (1959) 36 ITR 850 : AIR 1959 SC 881 Supreme Court authority that an Income‑tax Officer can examine the record and, if he discovers a mistake (of fact or law), rectify it under Section 35; mistake need not be discoverable only by argument. The court treated this as authoritative support for the proposition that Section 35 permits examination of the record, including evidence, and correction of errors of fact or law.
Income Tax Officer, Alwaye v. Asok Textiles Ltd., Alwaye, (1961) 41 ITR 732 : AIR 1961 SC 699 Supreme Court held that overlooking statutory provisions could constitute a mistake apparent from the record, justifying rectification under Section 35. The court cited this decision as supporting the view that a mistake consisting of omission to apply clear and mandatory statutory provisions (analogous to omission to apply S.24(2)) can be rectified under Section 35.
Kalekhan v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, (1958) 34 ITR 669 : AIR 1958 Madh Pra 271 Held that where evidence tendered is worthless or absent, cash credits in account books may be treated as indicating income from undisclosed sources; the Income‑tax Officer may rely on the books when no explanation exists. The court relied on this Division Bench authority to support the proposition that cash credits need not always be treated as business receipts if evidence is absent or worthless, and that ITO may treat such credits as undisclosed income without indicating the particular source.
Ratanchand Dipchand v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, (1960) 38 ITR 188 : AIR 1961 MP 9 Followed Kalekhan: upholds treating cash credits as evidence of income from undisclosed sources when no explanation or worthless evidence exists. Used by the court as supporting precedent for treating unexplained cash credits as undisclosed income in appropriate circumstances.
Mansfield and Sons v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, (1963) 48 ITR 254 (Cal) Held that where credit entry is in business account and explanation is rejected and if the assessee has no other source, the amount may be treated as business income (for excess profits tax purposes in that case). The court distinguished this decision on facts, noting it records a distinct finding of undisclosed business profit and does not establish a rule that credit entries must always be treated as business income.
Central India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Income‑tax Officer, (1963) 47 ITR 895 : AIR 1962 Madh Pra 386 Authority relied on to support the proposition that the Income‑tax Officer's jurisdiction to rectify under Section 35 is not necessarily ousted by the existence of appeals in respect of related matters. The court relied on this decision to hold that pending appeals did not deprive the Income‑tax Officer of power to rectify the mistake here because the set‑off issue was not in fact the subject‑matter of the appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court summarized and applied relevant statutory provisions and authoritative precedents to reach its conclusion. The reasoning proceeded in the following principal steps, as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Scope of Section 35: The court accepted the Supreme Court authorities (Maharana Mills and Asok Textiles) as settling that an Income‑tax Officer may examine the record (including evidence) and rectify a mistake under Section 35; the mistake may be of fact or law, and need not be limited to matters discoverable only by argument. The court noted that an oversight of clear mandatory statutory provisions may amount to a mistake apparent from the record (illustrated by Asok Textiles).
  2. Statutory constraint under Section 24(2): The court analyzed Clause (ii) of Section 24(2), observing that carried‑forward business loss may be set off only against profits or gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on in the year in which the set‑off is sought; the loss must have arisen from a business, profession or vocation and that business must be continued. Thus a loss from 1955–1956 could be set off in 1956–1957 only against business profits of a business still carried on.
  3. Character of the Rs. 40,000/30,000 addition: The court examined the assessment order and found it plainly showed the Income‑tax Officer had treated the original addition of Rs. 40,000 (reduced to Rs. 30,000 on appeal) as income from undisclosed sources (the court quotes the assessment order stating an addition "as income, from undisclosed sources"). Although the Income‑tax Officer later described aggregate total income as business income, that did not convert the separately recorded undisclosed income into business income; such an overarching description was an error.
  4. No inflexible rule from account placement: The court rejected the submission that a credit entry in business accounts must automatically be treated as business income. Whether a cash entry represents undisclosed income or a business receipt depends on evidence and explanations. The court relied on Kalekhan and Ratanchand to show that where evidence is worthless or absent the books' cash credits may be treated as indicating undisclosed income without needing to specify the precise source.
  5. Application of precedents relied upon by the petitioner: The court held that Lakhmichand Baijnath (and the other older authorities cited by petitioner) do not establish an absolute rule requiring classification as business income merely because the entry appeared in business books; those authorities do not prevent rectification in circumstances where the mistake amounts to omission to apply a clear statutory provision.
  6. Conclusion on mistake apparent from record: Because the earlier set off of the business loss against income the Income‑tax Officer consistently treated as "income from undisclosed sources" was contrary to the clear provisions of Section 24(2)(ii), that set off was a mistake apparent from the record. The successor Income‑tax Officer was therefore justified in issuing notice under Section 35 and rectifying the assessment.
  7. Rectification despite pending appeals: The court found the Income‑tax Officer's power to rectify under Section 35 was not taken away by the fact that appeals were pending, since the precise question of entitlement to set off the business loss against undisclosed income was not actually the subject of the appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal. The court cited Central India Insurance Co. Ltd. to support this conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court held that the Income‑tax Officer acted within his powers in passing the rectification order dated 28 March 1962 and that the rectification was in conformity with Sections 24(2) and 35 of the Income‑tax Act.

Implications and consequences:

  • The rectification under Section 35 that removed the improper set‑off of the business loss of 1955–1956 against income treated as income from undisclosed sources was upheld.
  • The court reaffirmed that an Income‑tax Officer may examine the record (including evidence) and rectify mistakes of law or fact apparent from the record under Section 35; such mistakes are not limited to those discoverable only by argument.
  • The decision clarifies that a cash credit entry in business accounts is not, as a matter of law, automatically and inflexibly to be construed as business income; the character depends on the evidence and explanation before the tax authority. In appropriate circumstances (where evidence is absent or worthless), the Income‑tax Officer may treat unexplained cash credits as income from undisclosed sources.
  • Pending appeals do not automatically oust the Income‑tax Officer's jurisdiction to rectify an assessment under Section 35 where the rectification concerns a matter not properly before the appellate forum.
  • Direct application to parties: The petition is dismissed with costs; the court fixed counsel's fee at Rs. 200 and ordered that any outstanding security deposit, after deduction of costs, be refunded to the petitioner.

Note: This summary is confined to and derived solely from the content of the provided opinion. No information outside the opinion has been added or inferred.

    M/S. Kalooram Tirasilal v. The Income-Tax Officer, C Ward, Jabalpur .

    Dixit, C.J:— By this application under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners seek, a writ of certiorari for quashing an order made by the Income-tax Officer, C-Ward, Jabalpur, on 28th March, 1962, under Section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, rectifying an error in the assessment made against the petitioners for the assessment year 1956–1957.

    2. The matter arises thus: In the course of assessment proceedings with respect to the assessment year 1956–1957, the Income-tax Officer noticed an item of Rs. 44,659 as cash credit in the capital account of the petitioner-assessed. When asked to explain this item, the assessee said that they were sale proceeds of 508 tolas of gold and gold-ornaments belonging to the family. The Income-tax Officer was not satisfied with this explanation. He took the view that having regard to the financial condition of the assessee, the accumulation or possession of so much gold as to yield Rs. 44,659 as sale proceeds was not possible. Having regard to the circumstances of the assessee, he came to the conclusion that the assessee had derived Rs. 40,000 as income from undisclosed sources. To this income, the Income-tax Officer added the income of the assessee from a registered firm, income from house-properly and income which the assessee earned from business in the material year, and then set oft against this total income the business loss carried forward from the assessment year 1955–1956. On this basis an assessment order was passed against the petitioner on 20th February, 1961. The petitioner then preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax who, while affirming the decision of the Income-tax Officer that the cash credit discovered was ‘income from undisclosed sources’ reduced that income to Rs. 30,000. An appeal preferred by the petitioner against the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is still pending before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay.

    3. On 19th March, 1962 a notice under S. 35 of the Act was issued to the petitioner saying that in the assessment for the year 1956–1957 made on 20th February, 1961 there was a mistake apparent from the record in that the business loss of the year 1955–1956 had been set off against income from undisclosed sources, registered firm and house property for the assessment year 1956–1957, and that as a result of the intended rectification the assessment would be enhanced by Rs. 7,866.80 nP. The petitioner was intimated of the date of hearing and asked to appear in person, or by a representative, or to send his reply in time if he did not wish to be heard in person. In reply to this notice under S. 35, the petitioner raised no objection in regard to the error of setting off the business loss of the year 1955–1956 against income from registered firm and house property.

    4. He, however, urged that the income of Rs. 30,000 from undisclosed sources was really business income and that he was entitled to have the loss of the previous year, namely, 1955–1956, set off against this income. This contention was negatived by the Income-tax Officer who held that in the assessment proceedings for the year 1956–1957 his predecessor-in-office treated the income of Rs. 40,000, reduced to Rs. 30,000, as income from undisclosed sources and not as income from business and consequently the assessee was not entitled to set off the business loss for the assessment year 1955–1956 against this income. The set off given by the then Income-tax Officer in the assessment concluded on 20th February, 1961 was regarded by the Income-tax Officer in proceedings under S. 35 as a mistake apparent from the record. He accordingly rectified the mistake and modified the assessment.

    5. Shri Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-assessee, argued that previously the Income-tax Officer had in fact treated the income of Rs. 40,000, reduced to Rs. 30,000, as income from business and had rightly set off under S. 24(2) the business loss of the previous year against this income; that there was no error apparent from the record justifying rectification of the assessment under S. 35; that the successor Income-tax Officer issued the notice he did under S. 35 merely because he happened to hold an opinion different from that of his predecessor with regard to the source of Rs. 30,000; and that when the entry of Rs. 44,659 appeared as cash credit in the account books, then the Income-tax Officer was bound to treat the credit, ultimately determined by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as Rs. 30,000, as business receipts.

    6. Learned counsel relied on Lakhmichand Baijnath v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1959) 35 ITR 416 : (AIR 1959 SC 341). It was said that the mistake which the Income-tax Officer rectified was not any mistake apparent from the record but was one which could at the most be discovered by investigation or a process of elucidation or argument, and that such a mistake could not be rectified under S. 35 of the Act. Learned counsel referred us to Sidhramappa v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1952) 21 ITR 333 : (AIR 1952 Bom 287) and K. Parameswaran Pillai v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1955) 28 ITR 885 : (AIR 1957 Trav. Co. 217), for the proposition that the power of rectification under S. 35 is limited to correcting only those mistakes which are apparent from the record and that the mistake must be patent on the record and not one which could be discovered by a process of elucidation, argument or debate.

    7. In our judgment, this petition must be dismissed. It is now authoritatively settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maharana Mills (Private) Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, (1959) 36 ITR 850 : (AIR 1959 SC 881) and Income Tax Officer, Alwaye v. Asok Textiles Ltd., Alwaye, (1961) 41 ITR 732 : (AIR 1961 SC 699), that Income-tax Officer can under S. 35 of the Act examine the record and if he discovers that he has made a mistake he can rectify the error and the error which can be corrected may be an error of fact or of law, and that the mistake contemplated by this section is not one which is to be discovered as a result of an argument but it is open to the Income-tax Officer to examine the record including the evidence and if he discovers any mistake he is entitled to rectify the error. In (1961) 41 ITR 732 : (AIR 1961 SC 699) the Supreme Court regarded the overlooking by the Income-tax Officer of the provisions of Section 2 of the Finance Act, 1952, and of Section 18A(8) of the Income-tax Act as a mistake apparent from the record justifying rectification under S. 35. As will be shown presently, the mistake which the Income-tax Officer rectified here did not constitute any change of opinion with regard to the source of the income of Rs. 30,000. The mistake lay in the omission to apply the clear and mandatory provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act. The mistake was apparent from the record and did not require any debate or argument for being brought to the surface.

    8. Now, under S. 24(2) of the Act the right to carry forward a loss is subject to certain restrictions and the two restrictions, which are material here, are that the loss must be in a business, profession or vocation, and the business, profession or vocation in which the loss was originally sustained must be continued to be carried on by the assessee in the year in which the carried forward lefts is sought to be set off. Clause (ii) of S. 24(2) plainly lays down that the loss sustained by the assessee in any business, profession or vocation shall be set off against the profits or gains, if any, of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him in that year, provided that the business, profession or vocation in which the loss was originally sustained is continued to be carried on by the assessee in the year in which, the carried forward loss is intended to be set off.

    9. It is, therefore, clear the business loss of the year 1988–1956 could be set off in the assessment for the year 1986–1957 only against the profits and gains of any business if the business in which the loss was originally sustained was carried on by the assessee in that year. If, therefore, the unexplained income of Rs. 30,000 was not a business income, then the loss of the previous year, namely, the year 1955–1956, could not be set off against that income. That the Income-tax Officer never treated the income of Rs. 40,000 which he originally determined and which was reduced in appeal to Rs. 30,000 as business income but treated as income from undisclosed sources is abundantly plain from the assessment order itself which was passed on 20th February, 1962. In that order, he observed—

    “Taking into consideration all these facts, I give an allowance of Rs. 4,458 and make an addition of Rs. 40,000 ‘as income, from undisclosed sources’” (underlining (here into ‘’) ours.

    10. Again, while giving the details of the income, the Income-tax Officer described Rs. 40,000 as income from undisclosed sources. No doubt, after adding Rs. 40,000 to the business income of the assessee, the Income-tax Officer described the total income of Rs. 66,140 as business income. But when he described the whole of the income including the income from undisclosed sources, as business income he was clearly in error.

    11. Learned counsel for the assessee said that as the credit entry was found in the business account of the assessee, the inference was inevitable that it was a receipt from business and that the amount of Rs. 30,000 was not an income from undisclosed sources but from business. We do not agree. There is no inflexible rule that when an amount is credited in business accounts it must be taken as a receipt from business. The answer to the question whether the amount represented by the cash entry in the account books is income from an undisclosed source, that is to say, some profit arising out of some unknown activity of the assessee, or is an undisclosed profit of the business activity of the assessee depends on the evidence tendered before the Income-tax Officer and the explanation offered by the assessee. As stated earlier, here on the explanation given by the assessee the Income-tax Officer held the amount of Rs. 40,000, reduced to Rs. 30,000 as income from undisclosed sources and not as undisclosed profit from the assessee's business. After having found that the income was from an undisclosed source, the Income-tax Officer was not bound to indicate what that source was.

    12. In Kalekhan v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1958) 34 ITR 669 : (AIR 1958 Madh Pra 271), the Income-tax Officer brought to tax the amount represented by certain cash credit entries in the account books of the assessee treating it as income from undisclosed sources in circumstances somewhat similar to those in the present case. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in that case that the Income-tax Officer could only act upon the evidence tendered before him and where the evidence tendered was worthless or no evidence was tendered, all that remained was the fact of cash credits for which no explanation existed and in such circumstances he was justified in taking the evidence of the books showing the cash deposits as conclusive of the fact that some income was made and related to an undisclosed source and he was not bound to indicate what that source was. This decision was followed by this Court in Ratanchand Dipchand v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1960) 38 ITR 188 : (AIR 1961 MP 9).

    13. The decision of the Supreme Court in (1959) 35 ITR 416 : (AIR 1959 SC 341), relied on by the petitioner, does not lay down that when a credit entry is found in the business account of the assessee, then the amount represented by the entry must always be taken as a receipt from business. What has been held in that case is that if the credits are found in the business accounts of the assessee and the explanation as to how the amounts came to be received is rejected by the income-tax authorities, then they are entitled to treat the credits as business receipts chargeable to tax. If the income-tax authorities are entitled to treat a credit entry as representing a receipt from business, that does not mean that they must do so in each and every case irrespective of the facts and circumstances of it. The other decision cited on behalf of the petitioner, namely, Mansfield and Sons v. Commr. of Income-tax, (1963) 48 ITR 254 (Cal), also does not lay down that where a credit entry is found in the business account of an assessee, then it must in all cases be treated as business income of the assessee.

    14. In that case, a credit entry was found in the business account of an assessee and the explanation offend by him as to how he came to receive the amount was rejected by the income-tax authorities. It was held that the income can be treated as business income if the assessee has no other source of income and taken into account as business income for the purposes of the excess profits tax. In that case, the Calcutta High Court has not held that when a credit entry is found in the business accounts of an assessee and his explanation as to its receipt is rejected, then the amount can never be treated as income from an undisclosed source. In Mansfield's case, (1963) 48 ITR 254 (Cal) (supra), the income-tax authorities had recorded a distinct finding that the amount represented by the cash entry was an undisclosed profit from business and thus his (assessee's) undisclosed business income. That case is, therefore, distinguishable on facts.

    15. In our opinion, it is clear from the record that the income of Rs. 30,000 was never held by the income-tax authorities in the present case as undisclosed profits of any business of the petitioner. It was treated as income from an undisclosed source. That being so, in the face of the clear provisions of S. 24(2)(ii) of the Act the business loss of the previous year, namely, the year 1955–1956, could not clearly be set off against that income. When, therefore, in the assessment order, dated 20th February, 1961 the Income-tax Officer set off the business loss of the assessment year 1955–1956 against the income from undisclosed sources contrary to S. 24(2), he committed a mistake and that mistake was apparent from the record. The successor Income-tax Officer was, therefore, justified in issuing to the petitioner a notice under S. 35 of the Act for rectifying the assessment in the manner he did by his impugned order, dated 28th March, 1962.

    16. He was competent to do so notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner had appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the assessment order, dated the 20th February, 1961 and in that appeal the petitioner's income from undisclosed source was determined at Rs. 30,000 and the fact that an appeal against the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is pending before the Tribunal. The Income-tax Officer's jurisdiction to rectify the mistake under S. 35 is not taken away because of these appeals for the reason that the question whether the business loss of the earlier year could or could not be set off against income from an undisclosed source was not in fact the subject-matter of the appeal preferred before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. So as this Court is concerned, this point is concluded by the decision in Central India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, (1963) 47 ITR 895 : (AIR 1962 Madh Pra 386). For all these reasons, our conclusion is that the Income-tax Officer acted within his powers and jurisdiction in passing the order of rectification, dated 28th March, 1962, and that order is in conformity with S. 24(2) and 35 of the Act. The result is that this petition it dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee it fixed at Rs. 200. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner.

    CI/SC/DVC.

    17. Petition dismissed.

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    M/S. Kalooram Tirasilal v. The Income-Tax Officer, C Ward, Jabalpur .
    (Aug 9, 1963)