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citation codes
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  • Order 43, Rule 1 (m) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 104 or in Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code.
  • Clause (m) of Order 43, Rule 1
  • Section 96(3) of the Code
  • Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C.
  • Order 23, Rule 3. C.P.C.
  • Rule 3 of Order XXIII
  • Order 43, Rule 1 (m)
  • Order 23, Rule 3
  • Order 43, Rule 1
  • Order 23, Rule
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 43, Rule 1 (m) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 104 or in Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code.
  • Clause (m) of Order 43, Rule 1
  • Section 96(3) of the Code
  • Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C.
  • Order 23, Rule 3. C.P.C.
  • Rule 3 of Order XXIII
  • Order 43, Rule 1 (m)
  • Order 23, Rule 3
  • Order 43, Rule 1
  • Order 23, Rule
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises under Order 43, Rule 1(m) of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order recording a compromise which the appellant challenged as fraudulent, unauthorized and illegal.

The appellant instituted a suit on 20-9-1955 in the Court of the District Judge for sale of mortgage property for recovery of Rs. 22,871-11-0 and consequential reliefs. The defendants Parma, Tulsiram, Ballabh Das and Smt. Narayani were mortgagors and Badrilal (defendant No. 5) was a subsequent mortgagee. Written statements by the first four defendants were filed on 28-12-1955 and by Badrilal on 30-12-1955; 27-1-1956 was fixed for the framing of issues.

On 4-1-1956 a compromise petition was filed stating that the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1–4 had privately settled and that the plaintiffs had received the amount of their claim; it prayed that the suit be dismissed in full satisfaction. The petition was signed by Raghunath Das Goel, Mnkhtar Am of the plaintiffs, by the first four defendants and by counsel for those defendants. The Additional District Judge recorded the compromise and, by a separate judgment the same day, dismissed the suit on its basis.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies under Order 43, Rule 1(m) against an order recording a compromise even where the compromise was recorded without contest (i.e., whether such an order is appealable notwithstanding that a consent decree may have been passed).
  2. Whether the order recording the compromise is merged in the subsequent decree so as to preclude an appeal against the recording of the compromise.
  3. Whether the order recording the compromise complied with the requirements of Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. (i.e., whether the compromise petition contained sufficient terms to be recorded as a compromise).
  4. Whether a compromise petition can be recorded although not all parties to the suit subscribed to it (specifically whether the omission of subsequent mortgagee Badrilal invalidated recording).
  5. On the merits: whether the compromise was void or voidable because (a) the agent who signed (Raghunathdas Goel) lacked authority to compromise immovable property; (b) his power of attorney had been revoked on 27-12-1955 before the 4-1-1956 compromise; and (c) no payment had been made and the compromise was fraudulent.
  6. Whether the appellate court should exercise powers under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. (or direct inquiry) to examine allegations of fraud when those allegations are supported only by the appellant's affidavit in the appellate court and when other procedural remedies at trial were available or a separate suit has been instituted to set aside the decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Opposing Counsel's (Preliminary) Arguments (Shri Shejwalkar)

  • The order recording the compromise was a consent order; where there has been no contest and a decree is passed in the terms of a recorded compromise, no appeal lies (relying on Onkar Bhagwan v. Gamna Lakhaji, AIR 1933 Bom 205 and Amarnath Radharam v. Smt. Malan, AIR 1954 Punj 259).
  • Because there is no appeal from a consent decree under Section 96(3), the order recording the compromise merged in the decree and therefore this appeal cannot be heard.

Appellants' Arguments (Shri Gupta)

  • The order recording the compromise was made without jurisdiction and was in disregard of Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C.; in particular, a compromise must contain its terms and the petition in this case did not state when, how, by whom or to whom payment was made.
  • The compromise petition could not be treated as one under Order 23, Rule 3 because all parties to the suit did not subscribe to it (Badrilal, defendant No. 5, did not sign).
  • The compromise was invalid because (a) the attorney who signed the petition (Raghunathdas Goel) was not authorized to deal with immovable property; (b) his power of attorney had been revoked on 27-12-1955, prior to the 4-1-1956 compromise; and (c) no money had in fact been paid to the plaintiffs, so the compromise was actuated by fraud.
  • The affidavit filed in this Court by the appellant should be accepted unless controverted and the court should either itself inquire under Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. or direct the trial judge to inquire.
  • Reliance was placed on international/English authority (William v. Preston (1882) 20 Ch D 672) and on Yeshwant Govardhan v. Totaram Avasu, AIR 1958 Bom 28 (for the proposition that a plaintiff can withdraw before withdrawal becomes effective).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Onkar Bhagwan v. Gamna Lakhaji and Co., AIR 1933 Bom 205 Held that where there has been no contest and a compromise is recorded and decree passed in its terms, no appeal lies (relying on Section 96(3) reasoning). Relied on by opposing counsel to argue appeal was barred; the Court rejected this reliance and disagreed with that view for the purpose of Order 43, Rule 1(m), distinguishing consent decree from an order recording compromise.
Amarnath Radharam v. Smt. Malan, AIR 1954 Punj 259 Followed the view that an appeal does not lie against a recorded compromise where there was no contest. Relied on by opposing counsel; the Court rejected the view for purposes of Order 43, Rule 1(m).
Ramanarayana v. Rama Krishnarao, AIR 1936 Mad 385 Authority supporting the proposition that an appeal lies against an order recording compromise. Used by the Court to support its view that Order 43, Rule 1(m) provides a right of appeal irrespective of whether the compromise was recorded after contest or without contest.
Jialal Raina v. Prithvi Nath Raina, AIR 1954 J and K 54 Authority supporting appellate jurisdiction over orders recording compromise. Cited by the Court in support of its interpretation that Clause (m) is unqualified and appealable.
Jagdish Narain v. Rasul Ahmad, AIR 1952 All 29 Principle that a consent decree challenged on ground that the consenting agent lacked authority cannot be assumed valid and the question must be decided in appeal. Quoted and relied upon by the Court to show that an appeal can be entertained where the validity of the consent (or authority to consent) is contested.
Damodar Saha v. Aswin Kumar Saha, AIR 1934 Cal 846 Support for the proposition that an appeal against the order recording compromise is maintainable despite a decree subsequently being passed on the compromise. Cited by the Court to reject the objection that the order merged in the decree and so the appeal could not be heard.
Satyanarayanamurthi v. Jayanti Butchayya, AIR 1925 Mad 606 Authority indicating distinction between appeal against order recording compromise and appeal against the decree passed on its basis. Relied upon by the Court to support the proposition that a right of appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(m) is not lost by reason of a decree having been prepared.
Mahomed Idris v. Mohammad Habibur Rahman, AIR 1948 Pat 97 Held that Section 96(3) bars appeal from consent decree but an appeal against the order recording the compromise is distinct and maintainable. Quoted and applied by the Court to show that the right of appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(m) is not lost by passing a decree; used to overrule the merger argument.
Sabitri Thakurain v. F.A. Savi, AIR 1929 Pat 318; AIR 1933 Pat 306 Authorities cited in support of the distinctness of an appeal against recording of compromise from an appeal against a consent decree. Referred to by the Court in confirming that recording of a compromise and a subsequent decree do not extinguish the statutory right of appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(m).
Pannalal v. Molilal, (M.B. High Court) First Appeal No. 32 of 1951 (Gwalior Bench) An interlocutory order where a compromise petition was found insufficient because it did not state the terms of compromise or that the claim had been satisfied; the bench refused to record the compromise. Distinguished by the Court: the present compromise petition explicitly stated that plaintiffs had received the amount and prayed for dismissal in full satisfaction, so the present case differed from Pannalal.
Sachidanand v. Vidya Narasingha, 54 Ind App 111; AIR 1927 PC 57 Authority that a compromise may be recorded even if not all parties subscribe to it, provided it does not adversely affect the interests of the omitted party. Applied by the Court to hold that omission of Badrilal (defendant No. 5) did not preclude recording of the compromise because it did not adversely affect his interest where the prayer was for dismissal as the claim had been fully satisfied.
William v. Preston, (1882) 20 Ch D 672 English authority where a solicitor had put in a fraudulent defence without client's knowledge and the court set aside judgment and permitted rehearing in the same court. Relied on by appellants, but the Court held it did not help them because that case concerned rehearing in the same court, not proceedings in an appellate court; the appellate court here was not being asked to rehear evidence in the same way.
Yeshwant Govardhan v. Totaram Avasu, AIR 1958 Bom 28 Proposition that a plaintiff may withdraw his application for withdrawal of his suit so long as the withdrawal has not become effective by an order of the Court. Relied upon by appellants for leave to withdraw the compromise petition; the Court held it did not help because in the present case the compromise had been recorded and a decree had been passed on its basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages. First, it addressed the preliminary objections that the order recording the compromise was not appealable:

  1. Statutory interpretation of Order 43, Rule 1(m): The Court observed that sub-clause (m) specifically grants a right of appeal against an order recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction and is unqualified by restrictions as to the nature of the order (e.g., whether passed after contest or without contest). The Court emphasized the distinction between a consent decree and an order recording a compromise, noting that Section 96(3) bars appeal against a consent decree but no equivalent bars appear in Section 104 or in Order 43, Rule 1. Therefore, an order recording a compromise is appealable irrespective of whether a consent decree followed it.
  2. Reliance on authority: The Court cited and relied on several precedents (e.g., Ramanarayana v. Rama Krishnarao; Jialal Raina; Jagdish Narain) to support the proposition that appeals against orders recording compromise are maintainable. The Court also quoted Jagdish Narain to illustrate that where the validity of the consent (or the agent's authority to consent) is contested, the appellate court must decide the question and cannot simply assume a consent decree is valid.
  3. Merger argument rejected: The Court rejected the contention that the recorded compromise merged in the decree and thus precluded an appeal, holding that the statutory right under Order 43, Rule 1(m) cannot be frustrated by passing a decree forthwith. Several cases were cited to support this conclusion (Damodar Saha; Satyanarayanamurthi; Mahomed Idris; Sabitri Thakurain).

Having overruled the preliminary objections, the Court turned to the substantive objections raised by the appellants:

  • Compliance with Order 23, Rule 3: The Court distinguished an interlocutory decision (Pannalal v. Molilal) where a compromise petition failed because it did not state the terms or that the claim had been satisfied. In the present case, the compromise petition expressly stated that the plaintiffs had received the amount of the claim and prayed for dismissal in full satisfaction. The Court held it was not necessary that the petition narrate the manner of payment (when, how, by whom to whom) to be recorded under Order 23, Rule 3.
  • Omission of a party's subscription: The Court accepted authority (Sachidanand v. Vidya Narasingha) that a compromise may be recorded even if not all parties subscribe to it, where recording does not adversely affect the omitted party's interest. Applying that principle, the Court held that omission of Badrilal (defendant No. 5) did not invalidate recording because the prayer was for dismissal as the claim had been fully satisfied and the compromise did not adversely affect his interest.
  • Allegations regarding the attorney's authority, revocation and fraud: On a perusal of the power of attorney on record, the Court found that the objection that Raghunathdas Goel had no authority to deal with immovable property did not prima facie succeed. There was no material before the Court to uphold the other allegations (revocation of power on 27-12-1955 and no payment / fraud).
  • Appropriate forum and remedies: The Court stressed that the appellant had available remedies at trial — a petition for review or invocation of the trial court's inherent powers — which could have produced an inquiry; the appellant did not pursue those remedies. The Court declined to exercise discretionary powers under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. to undertake the inquiry in the appellate forum, particularly because the appellant had already instituted a separate suit to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud and the issues of fact and law would be fully determined in that suit.
  • Authorities relied upon by the appellant (William v. Preston; Yeshwant Govardhan): The Court explained that William v. Preston was not helpful because it involved rehearing in the same court (and the appellate court had not been the forum for rehearing there). Yeshwant Govardhan confirmed withdrawal is possible until it becomes effective, but was inapposite because here the compromise had already been recorded and decree passed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The appeal is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Court ruled that an order recording a compromise is appealable under Order 43, Rule 1(m) irrespective of whether a consent decree followed or whether the compromise was recorded without contest; the right of appeal is not extinguished merely because a decree is subsequently drawn up in accordance with the compromise.
  • The Court held that the particular compromise petition in this case met the requirements for recording under Order 23, Rule 3 as it explicitly stated that the plaintiffs had received the amount and prayed for dismissal in full satisfaction; the omission of defendant No. 5 from subscription did not vitiate recording as it did not adversely affect his interest.
  • The Court found no prima facie material on the record to uphold allegations that the attorney lacked authority to deal with immovable property, that his power of attorney was revoked before the compromise, or that the compromise was fraudulent. The Court declined to conduct or order an inquiry under Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. in the appellate forum, noting available trial remedies and the existence of a separate suit to set aside the decree on the ground of fraud.
  • The direct, immediate effect: the appeal is dismissed and the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new broad precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the facts of this case; the Court applied existing authorities to resolve the legal questions presented.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed; parties to bear their own costs. (A. H. Khan, J. concurred.)

    Mathura Prasad Phool Chand And Others v. Parmanand Thakur Das And Others

    1. This is an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (m) of the Code of Civil Procedure from an order recording a compromise which is challenged as fraudulent, unauthorized and illegal.

    2. The material facts arc that on 20-9-1955, the appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the District Judge for sale of mortgage property for the recovery of Rs. 22,871-11-0 and consequential reliefs. The defendants Parma, Tulsiram, Ballabh Das and Smt. Narayani were the mortgagors while Badrilal defendant No. 5 was the subsequent mortgagee. On 28-12-1955, the first four defendants filed their written statement and on 30-12-1955, Badri Lal filed his written statement. 27-1-1956 was then fixed for the framing of issues.

    3. However, on 4-1-1956 a compromise petition was made wherein it was stated that the plaintiffs and the defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 had arrived at a private settlement, that the plaintiffs had received from the defendants the amount of the claim and it was prayed that the suit be dismissed in full satisfaction. This was signed my Raghunath Das Goel, Mnkhtar Am of the plaintiffs by the first four defendants and by the counsel for those defendants. The additional District Judge recorded the compromise and by a separate judgment dismissed the suit on its basis that very day.

    4. To this appeal, against the order recording the compromise, two preliminary objections are raised by Shri Shejwalkar. It is first contended that the order recording the compromise was a consent order and as such no appeal lay. Learned counsel relies on the decision in Onkar Bhagwan v. Gamna Lakhaji and Co., AIR 1933 Bom 205, where it is held that where there has been no contest in the court below, but an application for compromise has been put in and is recorded and a decree is passed in its terms no appeal lies cither against the decree itself, an appeal there from being barred under Section 96(3), or against the order under Order 43, Rule 1 (m), since there are no materials for adjudication. This was followed in Amarnath Radharam v. Smt. Malan, AIR 1954 Punj 259. In these cases, the proper remedies open to the aggrieved party were suggested. With great respect I cannot agree with that view. The question whether an appeal is patent or not does not depend upon the availability of other remedies. I shall therefore, proceed to examine whether this appeal falls within the purview of Order 43, Rule 1 (m) or not. The sub-clause runs thus :

    (m) an order under Rule 3 of Order XXIII recording or refusing to record an agreement compromise or satisfaction
    .

    5. This sub-clause specifically centers a right of appeal against an order recording a compromise or satisfaction and does not qualify it by any restrictions or conditions as to the nature of that order

    --it may have been passed after contest or without contest. In my view the order is appealable irrespective of whether a consent decree followed it or not. It is obvious enough from the scheme of the Cods that there is a distinction between a consent decree arid a consent order. Whereas Section 96(3) of the Code bars an appeal against a consent decree, no such provision is found in Section 104 or in Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code.

    The framers of the law had in their mind the distinction between an order recording a compromise and a final decree passed in accordance therewith. Clause (m) of Order 43, Rule 1 being unqualified, the right of appeal cannot be denied on the ground that there was no contest in the Court below. It will be different matter altogether whether in the absence of adequate material on record the appellants will be entitled to a substantial relief in the appellate Court. In the view, that I am taking I am supported by the decisions in Ramanarayana v. Rama Krishnarao AIR 1936 Mad 385 and Jialal Raina v. Prithvi Nath Raina, AIR 1954 J and K 54. In Jagdish Narain v. Rasul Ahmad, AIR 1952 All 29 it was held :

    "When the consent upon the basis of which a decree has been passed by the Court is itself challenged in the Court of appeal it cannot be taken for granted that the decree was a consent decree. A consent decree must mean a decree validly consented to either by the party himself or by his duly authorized agent. If the question raised is that the agent who consented to the decree was not duly authorized, the question has to be decided and it cannot be prejudged by holding that because on the fact of it there was a consent decree, no appeal lies to the appellate Court."

    6. The argument remains that if a compromise as recorded without any dispute and an appeal is preferred, on extraneous grounds, the appellate Court will in the absence of necessary materials, find itself unable to decide the controversy. But that does not mean that the appeal can be dismissed as incompetent. Whether an appeal lies or not is quite independent of whether it can be allowed or not.

    7. The second preliminary objection is that since there is no appeal from the decree, this appeal cannot be heard because the order recording the compromise merged in the decree. In my opinion this objection too has no force. Just because the Court passes a decree in terms of the compromise the right to prefer an appeal against the order recording it cannot be taken away. To hold otherwise will mean that the statutory right of a party under Order 43, Rule 1 (m) can be frustrated by passing a decree forthwith. Here again I am supported by several decisions, for instance, Damodar Saha v. Aswin Kumar Saha, AIR 1934 Cal 846; Satyanarayanamurthi v. Jayanti Butchayya, AIR 1925 Mad 606; and Mahomed Idris v. Mohammad Habibur Rahman, AIR 1948 Pat 97. In the last mention case it was held:

    "Section 96(3) clearly bars any appeal from a decree passed on consent. There is a difference between an appeal against an order recording a compromise and an appeal against the decree passed thereon. The right of appeal provided by Order 43, Rule 1 (m) is not lost by reason of a decree having been prepared; Sabitri Thakurain v. F.A. Savi, AIR 1929 Pat 318 and Sabitri Thakurain v. F.A. Savi, AIR 1933 Pat 306, Rel. on."

    8. Both the preliminary objections are therefore ruled out.

    9. Shri Gupta for the appellants first of all assails the order under appeal as one made without jurisdiction, being in disregard to Order 23, Rule 3. C.P.C.

    It is urged that in order to call it a compromise it must contain its terms. In support of his argument he relies on an interlocutory order passed by the M. B. High Court in First Appeal No. 32 of 1951 (Gwalior Bench) Pannalal v. Molilal. In my opinion that case is clearly distinguishable, because there although a compromise petition had been filed, it was subsequently withdrawn by others except one who insisted on its being recorded. The learned Judges of the Division Bench refused to record the compromise and in that order they observed :

    "In my opinion the application made by the respondent Battelal cannot be taken as one under Order 23, Rule 3. That application merely states that the appellant in pursuance of a compromise has agreed to have the appeal dismissed. It dues not narrate the terms of the compromise and does not even say that the only term of the compromise was that the appellant should get the appeal dismissed with certain directions as to costs is this Court and in the Court below. It only prays for the dismissal of the appeal without any further relief. The mere fact that the respondent has stated in the application dated 3-1-1958 that the compromise be recorded and the appeal be dismissed cannot make the application one under Order 23, Rule 3 when it does not state that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part or that the appellant's claim has been wholly or partly satisfied and when the term or the compromise according to which the decree is to be passed have not been stated."

    In this case the position is quite different because here it was clearly stated in the compromise petition that the plaintiffs had received from the defendants the amount of the claim and that the suit be dismissed in full satisfaction. In my opinion it is not correct to say that a compromise cannot be recorded under Order 23, Rule 3 unless the manner in which the compromise is arrived is also stated. The argument of Shri Gupta that because in the compromise petition in the present case, it was not stated when and how and by whom and to whom the money was paid, it could not be treated as a compromise, is not supported by any authority or any provision of law.

    10. Next it is maintained that the compromise petition could not be treated as one under Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. because all the parties to the suit did not subscribe to it. It is true that Badrilal defendant No. 5, the subsequent mortgagee, was left out but it must be taken into account that the prayer in the petition was for dismissal of the suit as the claim had been fully satisfied. In my opinion since the compromise did not adversely affect Badrilal's interest, in spite of him the compromise could be recorded, Sachidanand v. Vidya Narasingha, 54 Ind App 111: (AIR 1927 PC 57), may be referred to.

    11. This brings me to the main contentions in this appeal. It is alleged that since in the power of attorney Raghunathdas Goel was not authorized to deal with immovable properties of the principal and this suit was one For sale of immovable property he could not file the compromise petition; secondly, since his power of attorney was revoked on 27-12-1955, he could not file the compromise petition on 4-1-1956; and thirdly not a single pie had been paid to the plaintiffs and the whole thing was actuated by fraud. On a perusal of the power of attorney, a printed copy whereof is on the record, the first point does not prima facie appear to be correct. And there is no material before us to uphold the other allegations.

    The learned counsel urges that the affidavit filed by the appellant in this Court together with appeal should be treated as correct unless it is controverted by the opposite side and, further, that this Court should under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. enter into an inquiry or direct the trial Judge to do it. I find myself quite unable to accept any of these courses. It was open to the appellant to move the trial Judge by a petition for review or to invoke his inherent powers. An inquiry was then possible. He did not take recourse to either of those remedies. Nor do I see any case for exercising the discretionary power under Order 41, Rule 27. C.P.C. It is all the more so, because admittedly the appellant has already instituted a regular suit for setting aside the decree on the ground of fraud. All the questions in controversy between the parties both of fact and law will be fully determined there.

    12. Shri Gupta relies on William v. Preston, (1882) 20 Ch D 672. I do not see how that decision helps the appellants. In that case, a solicitor had put in a fraudulent defence for his client without the knowledge of the client, making admissions, on which judgment was obtained against the client. It was held that the Court had jurisdiction to set aside the judgment and permit the client to withdraw his defence. From the report it appears that an appeal was taken against that judgment by Mrs. Elliott,

    "and at the same time moved that the action might be reheard and that she might be at liberty to withdraw her defence and to deliver fresh defence and to adduce fresh evidence"
    , (See page 673). The ground for the 'application' was that -- Preston had no authority to borrow any money from the plaintiff on her behalf and that he had acted fraudulently and without authority in putting in statement of defence and suffering judgment. It was observed :

    "We are all satisfied that this being a case of rehearing we have jurisdiction to grant this application and that if the allegations of fraud should be established we ought to exercise it."

    (Page 674) A date was fixed for further hearing of the case and evidence of fraud was allowed to be produced. On the date so fixed, after hearing the witnesses the Court came to the conclusion that the defence had been put in fraudulently. Leave was, therefore, given to have a rehearing of the action and for Mrs. Elliott to put in a new statement of defence. At the request of both parties the Court reheard the action at once and a fresh judgment was given for Mrs. Elliott and the action was dismissed with costs. From all this it is very clear that it was not the appellate Court which reheard or recorded evidence in that case, the proceedings were for rehearing that is, in the same Court, and not in the appellate Court. It is not clear from the report what the result of the appeal was; presumably it must have become infructuous.

    13. At the time of the hearing of this appeal an application is made before us on behalf of the appellants for leave to withdraw the compromise petition dated 4-1-1950, filed before the Additional District Judge. It is not known under what provision of law that application is made, but the learned counsel relies on Yeshwant Govardhan v. Totaram Avasu, AIR 1958 Bom 28, where it is held:

    It is open to a plaintiff to withdraw his application for withdrawal of his suit so long as the withdrawal his not become effective by an order of the Court.

    There can be no quarrel with this proposition but it does not help the appellants because in this case the compromise was in fact recorded and a decree was passed on its basis.

    14. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

    15 A. H. KHAN, J. : I agree.

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    Mathura Prasad Phool Chand And Others v. Parmanand Thakur Das And Others
    (Dec 4, 1959)