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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Acts
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Second Amendment) Act, 1926 (22 of 1926). Sub-rule (5) of the rule
  • provisions of Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) of the Code of Civil Procedure.4.
  • Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 2(15) of the Code.
  • Rule 4 of Order 3
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Second Amendment) Act, 1926 (22 of 1926). Sub-rule (5) of the rule
  • provisions of Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) of the Code of Civil Procedure.4.
  • Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 2(15) of the Code.
  • Rule 4 of Order 3
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion by Agarwala, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for ejectment and damages instituted on 30 January 1948 against four defendants: Rasool Ahmad (defendant No. 1), Abdul Hasan and Wasir (defendants Nos. 2 and 3), and Abbas Ali (defendant No. 4). Defendant No. 4 was the previous owner of the shop in dispute and had transferred it to the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 was the tenant; defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were alleged sub-tenants. Defendants Nos. 1–3 filed a joint written statement and defendant No. 4 filed a separate written statement; defendant No. 4 admitted the plaintiff's claim while defendants Nos. 1–3 contested it, principally on the grounds that the plaintiff had no right to eject them and that, if he did, they were entitled to sufficient time to vacate.

On 6 May 1948 the parties present (including Mr. Saddiqui, pleader for defendants Nos. 1–3, and defendants Nos. 2 and 4) recorded a compromise agreeing that the suit be decreed with costs and that defendants vacate the shop by 6 September 1948, failing which the plaintiff could execute his decree. The compromise statement was signed by Mr. Saddiqui, defendants Nos. 2 and 4, and the plaintiff; defendants Nos. 1 and 3 were absent. The trial court adjourned to 13 May 1948 to obtain the missing signatures; on that date defendants Nos. 1 and 3 again were absent, and Mr. Saddiqui represented that he had verified the agreement on their behalf and prayed for decree in terms of the recorded compromise. The trial court accordingly passed a decree in terms of the compromise.

Rasool Ahmad (defendant No. 1) appealed to the lower appellate court challenging the compromise on the ground that his counsel, Mr. Saddiqui, had no authority to enter into the compromise. The lower appellate court interpreted the relevant power of attorney as not authorising Mr. Saddiqui to enter into the compromise but only to file a petition of compromise signed by the clients, set aside the trial court's decree and remanded the case for trial according to law. The plaintiff appealed to this Court against that remand order. A preliminary objection was raised that no further appeal lay because the appeal below had been against an order recording a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure; the Court rejected that objection.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a second appeal to this Court lies against the lower court's order remanding the case when the lower court set aside a trial court decree that had been passed upon a recorded compromise (i.e., whether the appeal below was against the decree so as to permit a second appeal under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) of the Code of Civil Procedure).
  2. Whether a decree passed upon a recorded compromise is necessarily a consent decree barring appeal, when the validity of the consent (on the basis that the advocate/pleader lacked authority) is challenged.
  3. Whether the pleader (Mr. Saddiqui) had either (a) an implied/general authority as counsel to enter into a compromise on behalf of defendants Nos. 1–3, or (b) specific authority under the written power-of-attorney to enter into and file a compromise on behalf of those defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments

  • No appeal lay to the lower appellate court because the decree was a consent decree (i.e., passed on compromise) and hence not appealable in the manner taken.
  • Mr. Saddiqui, the pleader who entered into the compromise, had authority to do so either because: (a) he had a general implied power as an advocate/pleader to compromise suits; or (b) he had specific authority under the power-of-attorney executed in his favour by the defendants.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (defendant who appealed below) contended that Mr. Saddiqui lacked authority to enter into the compromise and relied upon jurisprudence indicating that a pleader or counsel who has not filed or does not hold a general power of attorney authorising him generally to compromise cannot be recognised by the court as having authority to compromise the suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sourendranath Mitra v. Tarabala Das, I.L.R. 57 Cal. 1311 (Privy Council) Established that the power to compromise a suit is an inherent/implied power of an Advocate in India; such implied power can be restricted or countermanded by the client; where authority derives from an express written vakalatnama different considerations may arise. Used as the leading authority supporting that advocates/pleaders possess an implied power to compromise; the Court relied on it to justify recognizing an implied or inherent power and to reject narrower interpretations in some precedents decided before it.
Sourindra Nath Mittra v. Heramba Nath Bandopadhaya, A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 98 Stated that a pleader who does not hold a client's general power of attorney authorising him generally to compromise cannot be recognised by a court as having authority to compromise the suit. Referred to by respondent's counsel; discussed as part of the jurisprudential background on the limits of a pleader's authority and the need to examine the precise terms of any written authority.
Jiwibai v. Kamkumar Shriniwas Murarka Agarwala, A.I.R. 1947 Nag. 17 F.B. Held that counsel/pleaders in India have inherent powers to compromise claims and refer disputes to arbitration without authority of the client unless expressly countermanded; this applies even where law requires written authority to "act" or "plead". Relied upon to support the proposition that a pleader engaged for pleading has similar powers to an advocate engaged for pleading and therefore may have power to compromise unless expressly countermanded.
Mt. Akbari Begam v. Rahmat Husain, A.I.R. 1933 All. 861 Interpreted general words in a vakalatnama (e.g., "Whatever is done by the counsel shall be acceptable to us") as conferring a power to enter into a compromise, not merely to file a deed already executed by the parties. Used as supporting authority for reading certain general phrases in a power-of-attorney as including power to compromise.
Sat Deo Prasad v. Debi Badal, 1940 A.L.J. 18 Similar interpretation to Mt. Akbari Begam: certain terms in a vakalatnama include power to compromise the suit. Relied upon as further support that language in a vakalatnama can be interpreted to include authority to compromise.
Mt. Govindi v. Ganga Prasad, A.I.R. 1933 All. 955 Held that similar expressions in a vakalatnama included the power of entering into a compromise and filing it in court. Referred to as another decision that interprets analogous wording to include power to compromise; supports Court's interpretation of the present power-of-attorney.
Mt. Hubraji v. Chandra Bali, A.I.R. 1928 Oudh 386 In a vakalatnama executed by an illiterate pardanashin lady, the phrase authorising the agent "to file compromise" was held ambiguous and construed narrowly as possibly referring only to filing a compromise already executed by the principal. Distinguished by the Court: held not to be authority for the proposition that the phrase at issue must always be read narrowly to mean only physical filing of an already-executed compromise.
Ram Kirat v. Gajadhar Shukla, A.I.R. 1930 Oudh 112 Single-judge decision that extended the narrow interpretation of the phrase empowering an agent to file compromise. Noted by the Court and its interpretation criticized as too narrow in light of later authorities and the present facts.
Kalpi Singh v. Bachchu Singh, A.I.R. 1934 Oudh 417 Another single-judge decision applying a narrow construction of vakalatnama language regarding compromise. Distinguished and criticized by the Court for being too narrow.
Thenal Ammal v. Sokkamal, I.L.R. 41 Mad. 233 Held that words authorising a vakil "to present petitions for razinama for withdrawal ... and to sign the razinama etc. petitions" did not give authority to enter into a compromise without referring to the client; interpreted as only authorising presentation. The Court observed that the Madras decision's general observations are undermined by the Privy Council's decision in Sourendra Nath Mitra's case and accordingly treated that decision as distinguishable or of limited application to the present case.
Mehra v. Ahmad, A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 746 The Lahore High Court followed the Madras approach (Thenal Ammal) and reached a similar conclusion before the Privy Council's decision. Noted as a pre-Privy Council decision and therefore not controlling for the present interpretation; distinguished by the Court.
Keshav Ram Krishna Bhatt Phadke v. Subba Manga Naik, A.I.R. 1939 Bom. 490 Interpreted vakalatnama language similar to Thenal Ammal restrictively. Distinguished by the Court on the ground that the present vakalatnama used different language; therefore it affords no guidance here.
Ramappayya v. Subbamma, A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 98 Where the vakalatnama was silent about power to compromise and contained only general powers to conduct and defend, it was held counsel had no power to compromise. The Court observed that the factual circumstances of that case differ from the present case and therefore it is not applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in stages corresponding to the issues raised:

  1. Appealability: The Court rejected the preliminary objection that no further appeal lay to this Court. It reasoned that the appeal in the lower court was directed against the decree passed by the trial court (the decree given in terms of the recorded compromise) and not merely against the order recording the compromise. Because the decree itself was challenged and set aside by the lower court, a second appeal to this Court lay under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Nature of a "consent decree": The Court rejected the appellant's submission that no appeal lay because the decree was a consent decree. The Court explained that although the decree was on its face a consent decree, the basis of that consent was itself challenged before the appellate court (the respondent asserted that Mr. Saddiqui lacked authority to consent). A consent decree must be a decree validly consented to by the party or by a duly authorised agent. If the authority of the agent is in question, that question cannot be pre-emptively resolved by treating the decree as an unassailable consent decree; it must be adjudicated in the appeal process.
  3. Authority to compromise—legal framework and precedents: The Court examined authorities on the implied power of advocates and on interpretation of powers-of-attorney. It identified the Privy Council decision in Sourendra Nath Mitra's case as the leading authority recognizing the general principle that advocates in India have an inherent power to compromise suits, subject to limitation or countermanding by the client. The Court observed that where the representative's authority is derived from an express written authority (a vakalatnama or power-of-attorney), different considerations arise and the terms of that written instrument must be examined.
  4. Pleader vs. advocate and statutory context: The Court considered statutory changes to Order 3, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Second Amendment) Act, 1926), noting that a pleader engaged only for pleading is in the same position as an advocate engaged for the same purpose (and that the definition of "pleader" includes "advocate" under Section 2(15)). The Court relied on a Nagpur High Court decision (Jiwibai v. Kamkumar...) holding that counsel in India (broadly defined) have inherent powers to compromise unless such powers are expressly countermanded.
  5. Interpretation of the specific power-of-attorney: The Court closely read the terms of the power-of-attorney executed by the defendants. The instrument expressly authorised the pleader to "conduct and defend the case or to examine or cross-examine (witnesses) or to file documents or sanads etc. or to withdraw them or on our behalf to take out execution of the decree and to realise money or to file compromise or admission claims on our behalf or withdraw moneys deposited by us or by the opposite party by granting a receipt executed by us or executed by himself, or to appoint arbitrators or another vakil. All this done by him shall be acceptable to us as if it was done by ourselves."
  6. Construction of the power-of-attorney: The Court rejected a narrow reading that confined the words referring to "compromise" to merely presenting a deed of compromise already executed by the parties. It reasoned that the clause specifically mentioning the filing of compromise or admission claims would be purposeless if limited only to physically presenting an already-executed deed (since earlier phrases such as "file documents" would already cover that). The Court therefore held that the words are wide enough to include the power to enter into a compromise and to file the petition of compromise in court.
  7. Distinguishing contrary authorities: The Court reviewed decisions that had taken a narrower view (for example, Thenal Ammal; certain Oudh decisions) and explained why those decisions either pre-dated the Privy Council's ruling or were factually distinguishable (e.g., due to differences in the exact language of the vakalatnama or the circumstances of the principal). Where factual differences existed, the Court declined to follow the narrow construction.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: Applying these principles to the facts and to the explicit wording of the present power-of-attorney, the Court concluded that the pleader (Mr. Saddiqui) had authority to enter into the compromise on behalf of the defendants-respondents. Accordingly, the Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, set aside the lower court's order remanding the case, and restored the decree passed by the Munsif (trial court).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Appeal allowed. The Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court that had set aside the trial court's decree, and restored the decree passed by the Munsif (trial court).

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The decree passed by the Munsif in terms of the recorded compromise is restored.
  • The appellant (plaintiff) shall have his costs in all courts.
  • The stay order dated 11 August 1949 is discharged.

Broader implications: The Court's reasoning reaffirmed and applied the principle that whether a pleader or advocate has authority to compromise depends on the combination of (a) the general law recognizing an advocate's implied power to compromise (subject to countermand) and (b) the specific terms of any written power-of-attorney or vakalatnama. The opinion distinguishes prior authorities that took a narrower approach where the facts or language differed. The opinion itself does not state that it establishes a new broad precedent beyond its application to the facts and the interpretation of the particular power-of-attorney before the Court.

End of summary.

    Jagdish Narain v. Rasul Ahmad And Others

    Agarwala, J.:— This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and damages. The suit was instituted on January 30, 1948 against four persons, Rasool Ahmad, Abdul Hasan and Wasir, defendants Nos. 1 to 3, and Abbas Ali, defendant No. 4. Defendant No. 4 was the previous owner of the shop which was the subject-matter of the suit and had transferred it to the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 was a tenant of the shop. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were alleged to be his sub-tenants. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 filed one written statement and defendant No. 4 filed another. Defendant No. 4 admitted plaintiff's claim while defendants Nos. 1 to 3 contested it mainly on two grounds, firstly, that the plaintiff had no right of ejecting them and secondly that even if he had such a right, they were entitled to sufficient time to vacate the shop.

    2. On May 6, 1948 Mr. Saddiqui, pleader for defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and defendants Nos. 2 and 4 were present. They made a statement to the following effect:

    The parties agree today that plaintiff's suit be decreed with costs against defendants and that defendants vacate the shop in dispute by or on 6th September, 1948 failing which plaintiff will be entitled to immediately execute his decree.

    3. The statement was signed by Mr. Saddiqi and defendants Nos. 2 and 4 and the plaintiff. As defendants Nos. 1 and 3 were absent, the court took the precaution of adjourning the case to May 13, 1948 for the purpose of obtaining their signatures. On May 13, 1948 the defendants Nos. 1 and 3 were again absent. Mr. Saddiqi stated that defendants Nos. 1 and 3 were absent due to illness and that he had verified the agreement on their behalf on May 6, 1948 and prayed that a decree be prepared in terms thereof. On this statement being made the Court passed a decree in terms of the compromise recorded on May 6, 1948. Against this decree Rasool Ahmad, defendant No. 1, appealed to the lower appellate court, challenging the compromise on the ground that Mr. Siddiqi his counsel, had no authority to enter into it. The learned Judge of the Court below construed the terms of the power of attorney in favour of Mr. Siddiqi and came to the conclusion that it did not authorise Mr. Siddiqi to enter into the compromise—it merely authorrised him to file a petition of compromise which had been signed by his clients. In the result the decree of the trial court was set aside and the case was remanded for being tried according to law. Against this order of remand the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court. A preliminary objection has been raised to the hearing of this appeal. It is urged that the appeal in the court below was against an order recording a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such no further appeal lay to this Court. This contention, in our opinion, has no force. The appeal in the lower court was directed against the decree passed by the trial court and not against the order recording the compromise. Where the decree itself is challenged in the court a second appeal to this Court would lie against the order of remand under the provisions of Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (u) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    4. On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant two points have been urged before us. It has been urged that no appeal lay to the lower appellate court since the decree against which the appeal was preferred was a consent decree. In our opinion this contention also is not sound. No doubt the decree was passed upon a compromise and as such was on the face of it a consent decree. But the very basis of the decree was challenged by the respondent in the court below. According to him Mr. Saddiqi who entered into the compromise on his behalf had no power to do so and therefore it could not be said that he (the respondent) had consented to the decree being passed against him. When the consent upon the basis of which a decree has been passed by the court is itself challenged in the court of appeal, it cannot be taken for granted that the decree was a consent decree. A consent decree must mean a decree validly consented to either by the party himself or by his duly authorised agent. If the question raised is that the agent who consented to the decree was not duly authorised, the question has to be decided and it cannot be prejudged by holding that because on the face of it there was a consent decree, no appeal lies to the appellate court.

    5. The second ground urged on behalf of the appellant is that Mr. Siddiqi had a general implied power to enter into a compromise on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and that in any case even if he had no such general implied power, he had specific authority under the power of attorney which was executed in his favour by the defendants. The leading authority on the implied power of an Advocate is the decision of the Privy Council in Sourendranath Mitra v. Tarabala Das I.L.R 57 Cal. 1311. where it was held that the power to compromise a suit is inherent in the position of an Advocate in India, because the considerations which had led to this implied power being established in the advocates of England, Scotland and Ireland, applied in equal measure to India. Their Lordships, however, added that this implied power can be restricted or countermanded by the client and that

    Where the legal representative in court of a client derives his authority from an express written authority, such as a vakalatnama, different considerations may well arise, and in such cases their Lordships express no opinion as to the existence of any implied authority of the kind under discussion.

    6. On behalf of the respondent, our attention was drawn to Sourindra Nath Mittra v. Heramba Nath Bandopadhaya A.I.R 1923 P.C 98. where their Lordships observed:

    A pleader who does not hold and has filed in the suit before the Court his client's general power of attorney authorising him generally to compromise suits on behalf of his clients, cannot be recognised by a Court as having any authority to compromise the suit his client's vakalatnama giving his authority to compromise the suit before the Court.

    7. In this case the Privy Council had apparently Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in mind which requires that no pleader shall act for any person in any court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. Rule 4 of Order 3 was subsequently amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Second Amendment) Act, 1926 (22 of 1926). Sub-rule (5) of the rule as amended empowers a pleader to plead (but not to act) upon filing a memorandum of appearance signed by himself. He need not file a vakalatnama. The position, therefore, as the Civil Procedure Code now stands is that a pleader who is engaged only for the purpose of pleading is in the same position as an advocate who is engaged for the same purpose. It would, therefore, appear that where a pleader is engaged for the purpose of pleading merely, he has the same power with regard to compromising a suit as an Advocate possesses. The word ‘pleader’ under the Civil Procedure Code includes an Advocate, vide Section 2(15) of the Code. The point has been considered by the Nagpur High Court in Jiwibai v. Kamkumar Shriniwas Murarka Agarwala A.I.R 1947 Nag. 17 F.B. where it was decided that counsel in India, whether Barristers, Advocates, or pleaders have inherent powers, both to compromise claims, and also to refer disputes in Court to arbitration, without the authority or consent of the client, unless their powers in this behalf have been expressly countermanded and this whether the law requires a written authority to “act” or “plead” or not. It is not necessary for us to express an opinion upon the proposition whether the power of an advocate or pleader in India to compromise a suit even though he is authorised to act under a written power-of-attorney can be referred to his implied authority or it should be found within the four corners of his power of attorney, because, in our opinion, in the present case upon the interpretation of the written power-of-attorney there was an express power of compromising the suit conferred upon the pleader concerned.

    8. The power of attorney in the present case was in the following terms:

    The pleader shall have the power to conduct and defend the case or to examine or cross-examine (witnesses) or to file documents or sanads etc. or to withdraw them or on our behalf to take out execution of the decree and to realise money or to file compromise or admission claims on our behalf or withdraw moneys deposited by us or by the opposite party by granting a receipt executed by us or executed by himself, or to appoint arbitrators or another vakil. All this done by him shall be acceptable to us as if it was done by ourselves.

    9. The words referring to compromise are,

    Razinama ya iqbal dawa minjanib hamare dakhil karen.” In some cases where there were general words empowering counsel to act on behalf of a client, for instance words like this:

    Whatever is done by the counsel shall be acceptable to us as if done by ourselves,

    it was held that these general words conferred a power upon the counsel to enter into a compromise: See Mt. Akbari Begam v. Rahmat main A.I.R 1933 All. 861. and Sat Deo Prasad v. Debi Badal 1940 A.L.J 18.. We think that there are no such general words in the power of attorney in the present case. The words at the end of the power-of-attorney “All this done by him shall be acceptable to us as if it was done by ourselves” refer to the powers previously specified and not to certain undefined general powers. We are there fore confined to the language of the power-of-attorney itself. In our opinion the words used in the power-of-attorney are wide enough to include the power not only of presenting a petition of compromise signed by the parties themselves but also to enter into a compromise and to file the petition of compromise in court. There would be no point in mentioning this power if it were merely confined to presenting a deed of compromise already executed by the parties. That power would be covered by the expression “conduct and defend the case and file documents” which had been mentioned earlier. In Mt. Govindi v. Ganga Prasad A.I.R 1933 All. 955. a similar expression was used and it was held that the words included the power of entering into a compromise and filing the same in court. In Mt. Akbari Begam v. Rahmat Husain the terms of the vakalatnama were also similar. The terms mentioned in the judgment of Sir Shah Sulaiman at page 881 were:

    The said Vakil may take back court-fee appoint arbitrators, file a deed of compromise……….

    10. This was interpreted as meaning not merely the filing of a deed of compromise duly executed by the parties but also as including the power to compromise the suit. In Sat Deo Prasad v. Debi Badal 1940 A.L.J 18. also the words were similar and they were interpreted in the way indicated above.

    11. On the other hand our attention has been drawn to three cases decided by the late Chief Court of Oudh in which a contrary view appears to have been taken. In Mt. Hubraji v. Chandra Bali A.I.R 1928 Oudh 386. a vakalatnama was executed by an illiterate pardanashin lady. The vakalatnama authorised the agent “to file compromise” on behalf of the party. There was evidence before the Court to show that the plaintiff was told at the time the power-of-attorney was read out by the scribe that the power to compromise given by the deed was with respect to disputes between tenants and not with respect to suits. It was held that the power-of-attorney must be strictly construed and the expression in question was ambiguous and could be construed as referring merely to the power of filing a compromise already executed by the pardanashin lady. This case, therefore, is no authority for the proposition that the words “minjanib hamare dakhil karen” refer merely to the physical act of presenting a petition of compromise already entered into between the parties.

    12. The observations made in this case were extended to cases of powers-of-attorney executed by persons other than pardanashin ladies in two single Judge decisions in Ram Kirat v. Gajadhar Shukla A.I.R 1930 Oudh 112. and Kalpi Singh v. Bachchu Singh A.I.R 1934 Oudh 417.. With all respect we think that the interpretation given to the phrase in question in these two cases was too narrow.

    13. Our attention has also been drawn to Thenal Ammal v. Sokkamal I.L.R 41 Mad. 233.. In that case the vakalatnama contained a provision authorising a Vakil “to present, if necessary, petitions for razinama for withdrawal and for referring to arbitration and to sign the razinama etc. petitions.” It was held that this did not give authority to the vakil to enter into a compromise without referring to his clients. As the language of the vakalatnama referred merely to presentation of petitions of compromise the interpretation put by the Madras High Court may be taken as correct, but certain general observations made by that Court do not seem to hold good now after the decision of the Privy Council in Sourendra Nath Mitra's case I.L.R 57 Cal. 1311.. It as observed by the Court in that case that the practice prevailing in England by which Counsel and Solicitors are clothed with extensive powers to agree to terms on behalf of the client should not be imported into this Country and that it is not the ordinary duty of an advocate to negotiate terms, without reference to his client, with the opposite party, as such an action is calculated to place the practitioner in a false position. The Privy Council in the aforementioned case has pointed out that there is no reason to make a distinction between the powers of Advocates in England, and those in India. The Lahore High Court followed the Madras decision, vide Mehra v. Ahmad A.I.R 1929 Lah. 746.. This case was also decided before the Privy Council decision in Sourendra Nath Mitra's case. In Keshav Ram Krishna Bhatt Phadke v. Subba Manga Naik A.I.R 1939 Bom. 490. the terms of the vakalatnama were similar to those in Thenal Ammal's case and were interpreted in the same manner. As the terms in the present vakalatnama are different these authorities can afford us no guidance. In Ramappayya v. Subbamma A.I.R 1949 Mad. 98. the vakalatnama was silent as regards the power to compromise and no general powers beyond the power to compromise and no general powers beyond the power of conducting and defending the suit were mentioned. In those circumstances it was held that counsel had no power to compromise the suit. The facts of that case were, therefore, different from the facts of the case before us.

    14. In our opinion the pleader in the present case had power to enter into the compromise on behalf of the defendants-respondents. We therefore, allow this appeal set aside the order of the court below and restore the decree passed by the Munsif. The appellant shall have his costs in all the courts. The stay order dated August 11, 1949 is discharged.

    15. Appeal allowed.

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    Jagdish Narain v. Rasul Ahmad And Others
    (Sep 12, 1951)