1. The appellant instituted a suit against the respondent for his ejectment from a house situated in Ujjain and for recovery of arrears of rent. The learned civil judge, First Class, Ujjain,
who tried the suit, dismissed the plaintiff's claim for ejectment. The claim for arrears of rent was, however partially decreed. The decision of the trial court was upheld by the District Judge of Ujjain, The plaintiff has, therefore, filed this second appeal.
2. One of the grounds on which the plaintiff
sought to evict the defendant Abdul Rehman was that the defendant fell in arrears of rent and did not pay them despite repeated notices asking him to pay the arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notices. In reply, the defendant pleaded that he Lever made a default in the payment of rent and that the last notice to quit which the plaintiff gave on 13th February 1952 was waived by the plaintiff by accepting rent for a period after the expiry of the notice.
Both the courts below have found that the plaintiff first gave a notice to quit on 3rd September 1951 stating that the defendant was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 250/-; that the second notice was given on 29th January 1953 and on the expiry of the period of the notice the defendant had to pay to the plaintiff Rs. 400/- as rent up to 29th February 1952; that the third notice which the plaintiff gave on 30th January 1952 merely corrected a statement in the second notice as regards the period during which, according to the plaintiff, the defendant had made a default in the payment
of rent; that the plaintiff gave the fourth notice on 13th February 1952; that on 14th June 1932 the defendant sent to the plaintiff a cheque for Rs. 150/- which the plaintiff retained ; and that by retaining the cheque the plaintiff received not
only the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 400/- up to 29th February 1952 but also the rent for the months of March and April 1952, that is to say for a period after the expiry of the notice on 13th February 1952.
This acceptance of the rent by the plaintiff was regarded by the courts below as tantamount to a waiver by the plaintiff of the notice to quit which he gave on 13th February 1952. The plaintiff's claim for ejectment was, therefore, rejected by the lower courts.
3. The only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the acceptance by the plaintiff of a cheque for Rs. 150/- which the defendant sent to him on 14th June 1952 can be regarded as a waiver of the notice to quit which the plaintiff eave to the defendant on 13th February 1952. There can be no doubt that by retaining this cheque the plaintiff received payment of rent for the months of March and April 1952, that is for some period after the expiry of the notice dated 13th February 1952.
The question is whether this acceptance of rent by itself is sufficient to hold that the plaintiff waived the notice to quit which he served on the defendant on 13th February 1952. Under Section 113, Transfer of Property Act, a notice given under Section 111(h) is waived, with the express or implied consent of the person to whom it is given, by any act on the part of the person giving it showing an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. It will be seen from the wording of Section 113 that in order to constitute waiver, there must be an intention not only on the part of the lessor but also on the part of the lessee to treat the lease as subsisting.
What has to be proved is whether the landlord accepted the amount of rent for a period after the expiry of the notice to quit from the tenant as rent and with an intention to treat the tenancy as subsisting. It is manifest that when the question of waiver is one of intention, mere payment and acceptance of rent by the landlord after the notice to quit cannot by itself necessarily constitute waiver. As has been pointed out by the Federal Court in Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai, AIR 1949 FC 124, the assent of a landlord for the continuance of a tenancy which is founded on the acceptance of rent must be acceptance of rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy rights asserted by the person who pays it. It has been observed by Woodfall in Law of Landlord and Tenant (page 1052-53, 25th Edn.)
"A demand of rent accruing subsequently to the expiration of a notice to quit is not necessarily a waiver of the notice, but is a question of intention which ought to be left to the jury."
4. Here, except the fact that the plaintiff accepted the cheque, and thus accepted rent for some two months that is for a period after the expiry of the notice, there is nothing to show the intention of the landlord to treat the tenancy as subsisting. It must be remembered that the notices to quit were given and the suit was filed when the accommodation control act was in force. The accommodation control act precluded a landlord from evicting a tenant except on any of the grounds mentioned in the Act.
Even after a notice is given by the landlord terminating the contractual tenancy, the tenant has a statutory right under the accommodation control act to remain on the demised premises. That being so the payment and acceptance of rent after the determination of the contractual tenancy can be attributed either to the contractual tenancy or to the statutory tenancy created by the relevant provisions of the Accommodation Control Act. It follows, therefore, that the payment and accept met of rent for a period after the expiry of the notice terminating the contractual tenancy so long as the accommodation control act is in force cannot necessarily be taken as a waiver of notice terminate the contractual tenancy and showing an intention on the part of the landlord to treat the contractual tenancy as subsisting. This view is supported by the decisions in Pulin Behary Shaw v. Miss Lila Dey, (S) AIR 1957 Cal 627 and Panchanan v. Haridas AIR 1954 Cal 460.
5. In the instant case, there is no evidence to indicate that by receiving the cheque the plaintiff landlord accepted rent for any period after the termination of the contractual tenancy. The courts below were in error in treating the acceptance of the cheque itself as an act of the landlord showing his intention to treat the contractual tenancy as subsisting. If, as I think, the notice dated 13th February 1952 cannot be deemed to have been waived by the plaintiff, then he is clearly entitled to a decree for possession of the premises in the occupation of the defendant.
6. For these reasons, this appeal is accepted,
the judgment and decree of the lower court are
modified and a decree directing the defendant respondent to deliver possession of the tenanted premises to the plaintiff on or before 31st August 1955
is passed. The appellant shall have his costs through
out