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Case Number

C.O No. 1093 of 2002

Attorney(S)

Jyotirmoy Bhattacharya and Ms. Sabnam Dey
S. P. Roy Chowdhury
Dipak Kumar Ash and S. K. Dasgupta

Judges

Arun Kumar Mitra, J.

Acts

Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with S. 151
provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Order 6, Rule 17 and expression of O. 9, R. 7, C.P.C
Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure
6 Rule 17 in the Code of Civil Procedure
S. 276 of Indian Succession Act,
Order 20, Rule 5, CPC.
Order 6 Rule 17 CPC

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revisional Application)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opposite parties/applicants filed an application under S. 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1975 for grant of probate of the last Will and testament of the deceased Sudhir Chandra Saha. The probate application was registered as Probate Case No. 73/1998 before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta. Upon learning of the probate proceeding the petitioner (objector) raised objections; the probate matter was then dropped and transferred as O.C. No. 5/1999.

The petitioner filed a written objection on 21 May 1999, alleging that the applicants suppressed material facts and acted mala fide to grab property; the objection also alleged the existence of two earlier Wills executed in 1990 and on 30 July 1994 which were not disclosed. The petitioner alleged that the testator was about 87 years old and, from December 1999 until his death, was under the control or influence of the opposite parties; the petitioner also alleged hospitalisation (December 1993), and that the petitioner bore medical and funeral (shradha) expenses and performed funeral rites.

The petitioner then filed an application to amend the original objection under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC read with Section 151. The trial Court (learned Chief Judge) dismissed the amendment application by Order No. 38 dated 6 March 2002 in O.C. No. 5/1999. The petitioner challenged that dismissal by filing the revisional application which is the subject of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the learned trial Judge erred in dismissing the application to amend the objection under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (read with Section 151), particularly at a belated stage of the probate proceeding.
Whether an amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC can be allowed at any stage even if the proposed amendment introduces inconsistent or alternative pleas.
Whether allowance of the proposed amendment would cause prejudice or dislodge accrued rights of the opposite parties, thereby justifying refusal of the amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Objector's) Arguments

The impugned order dismissing the amendment application is bad in law; the trial Judge failed to appreciate and apply the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.
An amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings and the trial court should permit amendments that help resolve the controversy; the observation by the trial Judge that the petitioner "want to add dimension which would change the character of this original case" was incorrect.
The amendment sought would conclusively settle the dispute in the probate proceeding.
Relied on a number of precedents (including decisions of the Supreme Court and this High Court) supporting a liberal approach to amendments even when pleas are inconsistent.

Opposite Parties / Executors' Arguments

The amendment application was belated and should be rejected because some right had accrued to the opposite parties as the trial had progressed.
The amendment sought is inconsistent and was made with mala fide intention to defeat the beneficiaries' claim under the Will.
By the time the amendment application was verified and filed (6-12-2001), material steps in trial had already been taken: P.W.1 was examined on 8-8-2001 and P.W.2 (the petitioner/executor) had been examined in chief and partially cross-examined on 29-8-2001.
Relied on the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 680 (Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills v. Ladha Ram & Company) for the proposition that amendments introducing an entirely different/new case prejudicial to the other side should not be permitted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills v. Ladha Ram & Co., AIR 1977 SC 680	The proposition that an amendment which effectively introduces an entirely different/new case and displaces admissions may not be permitted because it can prejudice the other side.	The Court acknowledged the decision and its observation that inconsistent pleas are possible but that substitution which displaces an admission may not be permissible; the Court examined whether the present amendment would dislodge the petitioner/executor from his case and concluded it would not.
Narendra Singh Sengar v. Smt. Malti Devi, AIR 1993 (Madhya Pradesh) 248	Interpretation that Order 6 Rule 17's phrase "at any stage of the proceedings" gives wide power to amend even after close of evidence and that the trial court remains seised until judgment is pronounced.	The Court relied on this view to hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider amendment applications at late stages and that dismissal on ground of lack of jurisdiction after close of evidence was not appropriate; this supported allowing the amendment here despite belatedness.
Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177	The principle that parties may raise mutually inconsistent pleas and relief may be founded on an alternative plea.	The Court cited this principle to support the proposition that inconsistent or alternative pleas in written statements/pleadings may be permitted and should not be a rigid bar to amendment.
Arundhati Mishra v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey, (1994) 2 SCC 29	The settled law that amendments of pleadings can be made at any stage, inconsistent pleas are permissible, and essential considerations include delay, reasons for delay and prejudice to the other side.	The Court applied these guidelines (considering delay, reason and prejudice) and concluded that despite belatedness the amendment could be allowed because it would assist in determining the real controversy and did not cause prejudice.
B.K. Narayanan Pillai v. Parameshwar Pillai, AIR 2000 SC 614	Order 6 Rule 17 CPC confers wide power to allow amendments at any stage in the interests of justice; courts should adopt a liberal approach and avoid hyper-technicality.	The Court used this principle to adopt a liberal approach in favour of allowing the amendment, subject to protective measures (costs) to compensate any potential prejudice.
Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 3295	Amendment may be allowed where proposed change does not cause irretrievable prejudice, delay alone is not sufficient ground for rejection, and amendments that aid proper adjudication and avoid multiplicity should be allowed.	The Court relied on this holding to conclude that in absence of shown prejudice and given the need for conclusive adjudication of the probate dispute, the amendment should be permitted.
Khanta Bala Biswas v. Abinash Chandra Biswas, 1998 (2) Cal WN 418	High Court single-judge view that courts should be lenient in granting amendment of written statement and that inconsistent or contradictory pleas are permissible in a written statement.	The Court referred to this local authority to support the proposition that a liberal approach is appropriate in this jurisdiction and applied that approach in allowing the amendment.
Badri Prasad (AIR 1981 Madh Pra 228) and Arjun Singh (AIR 1964 SC 993)	Referenced in the context of interpretation of "at any stage of the proceedings" vis-à-vis other procedural provisions; used historically in discussion of jurisdiction to permit amendments.	The Court discussed them as part of the chain of reasoning in Narendra Singh Sengar and concluded the trial court retains jurisdiction to consider amendments until judgment is pronounced; applied that understanding here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis based on the text of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and the authorities cited by the parties.

The Court quoted Order 6 Rule 17 CPC ("The court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings... and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.") and identified two key phrases: "at any stage of the proceedings" and "for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy".
The Court explained the object and purpose of Order 6 Rule 17 — to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and shorten litigation by settling disputes conclusively — but cautioned that amendments should not so jeopardize the other side's case as to non-suit them.
The Court considered the respondent's reliance on AIR 1977 SC 680 and acknowledged that while inconsistent pleas may be permissible, an amendment that displaces an admission or otherwise dislodges the other side from a core stance may not be allowed. The Court stated it would examine whether the present amendment would have such an effect.
The Court examined authorities (including the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Narendra Singh Sengar and subsequent Supreme Court decisions) establishing that the power to allow amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 is wide, can be exercised at any stage (even after close of evidence while the court remains seised until judgment), and that inconsistent pleas in pleadings may be permitted. It also noted relevant considerations: delay in making the application, reasons for delay, and whether prejudice would be caused to the other side.
The Court analysed the facts of the probate proceeding: the central dispute is whether the Will was executed voluntarily or under coercion/undue influence. The Court considered the alleged belatedness of the amendment application but concluded that because the controversy as to the Will's validity must be finally and conclusively decided, and because the authorities permit amendments when no prejudice to the other side is established, the amendment should not be refused merely on account of delay.
Applying the precedents emphasizing a liberal approach to amendments (especially where amendments aid adjudication and avoid multiplicity of proceedings) and noting absence of demonstrated irretrievable prejudice to the opposite parties, the Court found it appropriate to allow the amendment. To protect any countervailing interest, the Court conditioned allowance of the amendment on payment of costs (assessed at Rs. 1080) by the objector/petitioner to the executors/opposite parties.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court set aside the impugned order (Order No. 38 dated 6-3-2002 in O.C. No. 5/1999), allowed the amendment sought by the objector/petitioner under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, and assessed costs of Rs. 1080 to be paid by the objector/petitioner to the executors/opposite parties. The revisional application was disposed of.

Direct consequences and implications:

The amendment to the objection in the probate proceeding is permitted to be made, subject to the payment of the specified costs.
The impugned dismissal by the trial Judge is set aside and the trial court will have the amended pleadings before it for adjudication of the probate dispute.
The decision applies established principles (as discussed in cited authorities) favouring a liberal approach to amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC where no irretrievable prejudice to the other side is shown and where amendments assist in resolving the real controversy and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.
The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent; it applies and reconciles existing authority to the facts of this case. The immediate effect is the allowance of amendment and the imposition of costs; no broader novel rule was announced in the text of the opinion.

Order accordingly. The revisional application was disposed of.

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Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha

1. This revisional application has been preferred challenging Order No. 38 dated 6-3-2002 passed by the learned Chief Judge in the City Civil Court at Calcutta in O.C No. 5/1999. The basis of or the background on which this revisional application has been preferred is inter alia as follows:—

The opposite party herein filed an application under S. 276 of Indian Succession Act, 1975 for grant of probate of the last Will and testament to the deceased Sudhir Chandra Saha, son of Late Nandalal Saha of 16A, Mondal Street, P.S Jorabagan, Calcutta — 700006. The said application for probate has been registered as Probate Case No. 73/1998 before the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta.

2. Coming to know about the said probate proceeding, the petitioner herein raised an objection in the said proceeding for which the said case No. 73/1998 was dropped and was transferred as O.C No. 5/1999 that is the instant case.

3. The petitioner filed written objection on 21st May, 1999. According to the petitioner, the applicants of the Will suppressed all material fact and filed this application for the grant of probate with a mala fide intention to grab the property at the back of the petitioner. In the objection it was also stated that the deceased Sudhir Chandra Saha prior to the execution of the alleged Will executed earlier two Wills in the year 1990 and 30th July, 1994 which the opposite parties did not disclose in the said application.

4. According to the petitioner, the testator (presently deceased) was aged about 87 years and since December, 1999 till his death he was fully under the control or influence of the opposite parties who were the applicants in the probate proceedings. According to the petitioner prior to his death. Sudhir Chandra Saha was admitted in Marowari Relief Society Hospital in December, 1993 and all the medical expenses and shradha ceremony expenditure was borne by the petitioner. The petitioner performed the shradha ceremony function by giving fire to the deceased Sudhir Chandra Saha as per rites and customs of the Hindu Law.

5. Subsequently, the petitioner filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with S. 151 to amend the original objection of the application for grant of probate of the Will. That the opposite parties, however, did not file any objection to the said application for amendment of the objection and, according to the petitioner, the opposite parties have not raised any objection to the said application also as and when the learned Court allowed time for filing the same.

6. That the learned Chief Judge by order dated 6th March, 2002 dismissed the said application for amendment. Challenging the said order of dismissal of the application for amendment passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Calcutta by his order dated 6th March, 2002 in O.C No. 5/1999, the petitioner has come up to this Court.

7. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the order impugned is bad in law and the learned trial Judge passed the order without appreciating the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The impugned order suffers from material irregularity and the learned trial Judge failed to exercise his jurisdiction by not allowing the application for amendment. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned trial Judge went on wrong when making observation “want to add dimension which would change the character of this original case”. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that amendment can be allowed by the Court at any stage of the proceeding and this amendment was necessary to resolve the controversy in the probate proceeding.

8. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite parties/executors submits that the learned trial Judge rightly rejected the amendment application at this belated stage when some right has accrued to the petitioner/executor by virtue of initiation of the trial and/or progress of the trial to a certain stage. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further submits that the plea taken out in the amendment application is inconsistent and the amendment has been sought to be made with a mala fide intention to defeat the claim of the beneficiaries of the Will. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that the proceeding was initiated in 1999 P.W 1 Shri Prabir Bose was the identifier witness of the Will who was examined on 8-8-2001 P.W 2 Ashit Kumar Saha the petitioner/executor No. 1 was examined as also cross-examined (in part) on 29-8-2001 and the amendment application was verified on 6-12-2001 and filed. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, when the P.W 1 was examined and the examination-in-chief of the P.W 2 was completed the objector/petitioner herein to improve their case changed the stand and submitted this amendment application. Mr. Roy Chowdhury submits that at such a belated stage, after progress of the proceeding to some extent the amendment taking a contrary stand should not be allowed in the trial court and the learned trial Judge rightly rejected the amendment application. In support of his contentions, Mr. Roy Chowdhury relies on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1977 SC 680 (Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills v. Ladha Ram & Company) and submits that the Hon'ble Apex Court observed in this decision that amendment introducing entirely different and new case which goes to prejudice the other side should not be permitted. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury if such amendment is allowed the petitioner/executor of the probate proceeding will be highly prejudiced and the instant revisional application should be rejected.

9. In turn in his reply, Mr. Bhattacharya submits that amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceeding and even if the stand is contradictory or inconsistent then also the amendment can be permitted if the purpose of the amendment is to settle the dispute or issue in question and to set the dispute at rest for ever. Mr. Bhattacharya relies on the decisions reported in AIR 1993 Madh Pra 248 (Narendra Singh Sengar v. Smt. Malti Devi), (1994) 2 SCC 29 (Arundhati Mishra v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey), (2000) 1 SCC 712 : (AIR 2000 SC 614) (B.K Narayanan Pillai v. Parameshwar Pillai), 2001 (3) Cal HN (SC) 81 : (AIR 2001 SC 3295) (Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd..) and also on a decision of a learned single Judge of this court reported in 1998 (2) Cal WN 418 (Khanta Bala Biswas v. Abinash Chandra Biswas).

10. Mr. Bhattacharya relying on the aforesaid decisions emphatically submitted that though the amendment sought for by his clients do not bring about contradictory stand but assumingly that is so and the pleas are inconsistent still then amendment can be or should be permitted inasmuch as in the instant case, the amendment which has been sought for if allowed would conclusively settle the dispute. The amendment application (copy) and the objection of the objectors have been annexed to this petition.

11. Heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties considered the averments made in the revisional application, the objection and the amendment application.

12. For the sake of convenience Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quoted herein below:—

“Amendment of Pleadings”

“The court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such a manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.”

13. Before coming to the discussions regarding the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties as well as the decisions cited and/or relied on by them, let us see what the plain reading of the provision says. The terms of this provision “at any stage of the proceedings”, and “for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy” are important. The whole object and purpose of introduction of order 6 Rule 17 in the Code of Civil Procedure is to avoid multiplicity of proceeding and or to shorten the litigation and to settle the entire dispute at rest, though, however, any amendment should not or must not jeopardize the case of the other side in such a manner which goes to non-suit the other side.

14. Now let us start from the decision cited by Mr. Roy Chowdhury reported in AIR 1977 SC 680 (supra). In paragraph 10 of this decision in the perspective of that case it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

“It is true that inconsistent pleas can be made in pleadings but the effect of substitution of paragraphs 25 and 26 is not making inconsistent and alternative pleadings but it is seeking to displace the plaintiff completely from the admission made by the defendant in the written statement.”

15. The Hon'ble Apex Court, therefore, in this decision also observed and/or admitted that inconsistent pleas can also be made. Now whether this amendment intends to dislodge the petitioner/executor from his case or the amendment if allowed goes to non-suit the petitioner/executor or not is being discussed later on.

16. The decision of Hon'ble High Court at Madhya Pradesh in the case of Narendra Singh Sengar (AIR 1993 Madh Pra 248) (supra) in paragraph 10 and 11 observes in the manner as follows:—

“This Court in Badri Prasad's case (AIR 1981 Madh Pra 228) (supra) while considering case of rejection of an application for amendment by the trial Court, which placed reliance on Arjun Singh's case (AIR 1964 SC 993) (supra) as the case was fixed for pronouncement of the judgment has taken the view that the expression “at any stage of the proceedings” employed in O. 6, R. 17 was not for interpretation before the Supreme Court, but the expression employed in O. 9, R. 7 was considered, and as the two expression i.e, expression “at any state of the proceedings” used in Order 6, Rule 17 and expression of O. 9, R. 7, C.P.C “the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte and the defendant at or before such hearing appears and assigns good cause”, are distinct expressions and no analogy can be drawn from the interpretation of one for the interpretation of the other. The net of the power of the court so far as amendment is concerned is wider in view of the expression “at any stage of proceedings” and not “hearing”. Therefore, as the suit commences by presentation of the plaint under O. 4, R. 1, CPC and it stands disposed of by the trial court on the pronouncement of judgment under O. 20, R. 3, CPC, the irresistible conclusion can safely be drawn, that delivery of judgement by the trial court is a stage in the proceeding, and, therefore, because of the expression “at any stage of the proceedings” employed in O. 6, R. 17, CPC, the court is competent to deal with the application for amendment as it keeps seisin over the case till judgment is pronounced, and does not become functus officio.

Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the upshot of the above discussion is that the trial court was not right in holding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the application for amendment after the close of the case when it was reserved for judgment besides, the judgment so recorded violates Order 20, Rule 5, CPC. As a result of above now the case shall go back to the trial court the trial court shall consider the two applications u/O. 6, R. 17, CPC and pass appropriate orders thereon and then decide the sum afresh in accordance with law.”

17. In the decision reported in (1994) 2 SCC 29 (supra) in paragraph 3 Hon'ble Apex Court observes in the manner as follows:—

“It is settled law as laid down by this Court in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad (AIR 1951 SC 177) that it is open to the parties to raise even mutually inconsistent pleas and if the relief could be founded on the alternative plea it could be granted. If the facts are admitted in the written statement, the relief could be granted to the plaintiff on the basis of the evidence though inconsistent pleas were raised. Amendment to written statement cannot be considered on the same principle as an amendment to the plaint. The pleas in the written statement may be alternative or on additional ground or to substitute the original plea. It is equally settled law that amendment of the pleadings could be made at any stage of the proceedings. Instances are not wanting that pleadings are permitted to be amended even when second appeal is pending. Equally it was refused. It is not necessary to burden the judgment by copious references thereof. But each case depends upon its own facts. The essential requisites are that the delay in making the application; the reason therefore should be given and considered; and there should be no prejudice caused to the other side. Bar of limitation which is available to the parties cannot be permitted to be defeated. It is also settled law that if the relief is found on the same cause of action, though different sets of facts are sought to be brought on record by appropriate pleadings, it cannot be refused. In those circumstances, permission to amend the pleadings could be granted.”

18. In the case of B.K Narayana Pillai (AIR 2000 SC 614) (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court again observes:—

“The purpose and object of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. The power to allow the amendment is wide and can be exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various High Courts and this Court. It is true that the amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and under all circumstances. But it is equally true that the courts while deciding such prayers should not adopt a hypertechnical approach. Liberal approach should be the general rule particularly in cases where the other side can be compensated with the costs. Technicalities of law should not be permitted to hamper the courts in the administration of justice between the parties. Amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid uncalled-for multiplicity of litigation.”

19. In the later decision in the case of Estralla Rubber (AIR 2001 SC 3295) (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court observes:

“We have considered the submissions' made on behalf of either side. The High Court set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge stating that the proposed amendment will have the effect of displacing the plaintiff from admission made by the defendant in its petition filed under S. 17(2) and 17(2A) of the Act and that such admission could not be permitted to be withdrawn. We have perused the relevant records including the original application and the proposed amendments. We are not able to see any admission made by the defendant as such, which was sought to be withdrawn. By the proposed amendment the defendant wanted to say that Ala Mohan Das was permissive occupier instead of owner. The further amendment sought was based on the entries made in the revenue records. It is not shown how the proposed amendment prejudiced the case of the plaintiff. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that any accrued right to it was tried to be taken away by the proposed amendment. The proposed amendment is to elaborate the defence and to take additional plea in support of its case. Assuming that there was some admission indirectly, it is open to the defendant to explain the same. Looking to the proposed amendments it is clear that they are required for proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceedings. The High Court also found fault with the defendant on the ground that there was delay of three years in seeking amendment to introduce new defence. From the records it cannot be said that any new defence was sought to be introduced. Even otherwise, it was open for the defendant to take alternate or additional defence. Merely because there was delay in making the amendment application when no such serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the plaintiff so as to take away any accrued right, the application could not be rejected. At any rate, it cannot be said that allowing amendment caused irretrievable prejudice to the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff can file his reply to the amended written statement and fight the case on merits. The impugned order passed by the High court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution to set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge in revision under S. 115A of the CPC allowing the amendment application filed by the defendant, is patently erroneous and unsustainable. In the impugned order the High Court observed that the order of the learned District Judge was apparently wrong but in our view it is otherwise.”

20. In case of Khanta Bala Biswas (1998 (2) Cal WN 418) (supra) one Hon'ble single Judge of this court also adopted the same view and observed:—

“The law relating to the amendment on pleadings is now well settled. It is a well settled that the court should be more lenient in the matter of granting an application for amendment of written statement. It is equally settled that in the written statement defendant is entitled to take inconsistent or contradictory plea.”

21. In the probate proceeding pending before the learned Court below it is necessarily and conclusively to be concluded as to whether the Will in question was executed under coercion or undue influence or the same was executed voluntarily and at the free Will of the testator at his good and proper sense or not. In such a situation, I must respectfully disagree with the submissions of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the intention of the amendment as it appears is mala fide or it totally extinguishes the case of the petitioner/executor. I, however, agree with the submissions made by Mr. Roy chowdhury that the application for amendment has been made at a belated stage. But as discussed earlier from various decisions or from plain reading of the S. it comes out that the Court may allow an amendment at any stage of the procedure and even if on inconsistent or contradictory plea if no prejudice is caused to the other side. As observed earlier since the fate of the Will is to be conclusively decided no question of prejudice by the amendment does not arise.

22. In view of the discussions made above I, therefore, set aside the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge being Order No. 38 dated 6-3-2002 in O.C No. 5/1999 and allow the amendment sought for herein to be made subject to however payment of cost assessed at Rs. 1080/- to be paid by the objector/petitioner herein to the executor/opposite parties (Petitioner in the probate proceeding).

23. This revisional application, is, thus, disposed of.

Order accordingly.

Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revisional Application)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Objector's) Arguments

Opposite Parties / Executors' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ajit Kumar Saha v. Ashit Kumar Saha

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