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  • Code of 1898. Section 386 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of Rule 11 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Rule 17(1) of Order 41
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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  • Code of 1898. Section 386 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of Rule 11 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Rule 17(1) of Order 41
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arose from a revisional application challenging an order of the Court of Appeal which had dismissed a criminal appeal for default of appearance by the appellants or their counsel. The judgment examines the statutory framework (including Rule 11 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Rule 17(1) of Order 41 as amended in 1976, and sections 423 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure and 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) and an authoritative line of Supreme Court decisions to determine whether a criminal appeal may be dismissed for default of appearance by the appellant or counsel, and whether appellate courts subordinate to the High Court possess inherent powers to dismiss and subsequently restore such appeals. The Court set aside the order of dismissal by the Court of Appeal and remitted the case for rehearing in accordance with s. 386.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to s. 423 of the earlier Code), a criminal appeal can be dismissed for default of appearance of the appellant or his counsel, or whether the appellate court must peruse the record and dispose of the appeal on merits notwithstanding non‑appearance.
  2. Whether decisions of the Supreme Court that appear to conflict (notably Ram Naresh Yadav vis-à-vis earlier decisions such as Sankatha Singh) bind the High Court, and how such conflicts should be resolved.
  3. Whether appellate courts subordinate to the High Court possess inherent powers (e.g., under the equivalent of s. 482 for High Courts) to dismiss an appeal for default and subsequently restore it, or whether they are exclusively governed by s. 386 and devoid of inherent powers to do so.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Mr. Roy, counsel for the petitioner-accused, argued that the dictum in Ram Naresh Yadav (AIR 1987 SC 1500) was patently against the plain statutory provisions of s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore would not bind the High Court as a precedent.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of arguments advanced by the other parties in the proceeding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sankatha Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1208 (three-Judge Bench) Stated that "a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for the default of appearance of the appellants or their Counsel" and that the Court must either adjourn to enable appearance or consider the appeal on merits after perusing the record. The Court regarded this larger Bench decision as binding and decisive: it governed the Court's conclusion that under s. 386 a criminal appeal must be disposed of on merits after perusal of the record, and cannot be dismissed for default of appearance.
Shyam Deo Pandey, AIR 1971 SC 1606 Reiterated that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance and that the Court must either adjourn or consider the appeal on merits. Used to support the settled position that perusal of the record and disposal on merits is mandatory under the criminal procedure provisions.
Ram Naresh Yadav, AIR 1987 SC 1500 (also referenced AIR 1987 SC 1503 in the opinion) Included dicta suggesting that "the Court can dismiss the appeal for non‑prosecution" and may enforce discipline or refer matters to the Bar Council; also noted that the Court might appoint counsel at State cost to argue for appellants. The opinion treated this decision as apparently contrary to the earlier line of Supreme Court decisions but nonetheless binding on the High Court. The Court distinguished its application: where the High Court (which has inherent powers) is dealing with appeals, it may exercise such powers; whereas subordinate appellate courts governed solely by s. 386 may not.
Bholanath v. Madanmohan, AIR 1988 Cat 1 Advised that when faced with contrary Supreme Court decisions the High Court should first ascertain which decision was rendered by a larger Bench and govern itself accordingly. The Court relied on this Special Bench guidance to prioritize the three‑Judge Bench decision in Sankatha Singh over the contrary solitary or smaller‑bench dicta in Ram Naresh Yadav.
Union of India v. K.S. Subramaniam, AIR 1976 SC 2433 Authority for the proposition that when Supreme Court decisions conflict the decision of the larger Bench governs. Cited to reinforce the approach of following a larger Bench decision when there are conflicting precedents.
Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1985 SC 231 at 236 Observation that it may be inappropriate for a Division Bench of three Judges to purport to overrule the decision of a Division Bench of two Judges. Referred to illustrate the approach courts should adopt when dealing with decisions of different bench strengths and to justify caution in claiming to overrule co‑equal or larger bench decisions.
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2432 Held that courts subordinate to the High Court have no inherent powers. Applied to conclude that subordinate criminal appellate courts, lacking inherent powers, cannot dismiss an appeal for default and later restore it; they are bound to follow s. 386 and dispose of appeals on merits after perusal of record.
A. S. Gaurava, 1986 2 SCC 709 Also relied upon for the principle that subordinate courts have no inherent powers. Used alongside Bindeshwari Prasad Singh to support the conclusion that subordinate appellate courts must adhere to s. 386 and cannot exercise inherent powers to dismiss and restore criminal appeals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in several interconnected steps, grounded in statutory text and appellate precedent:

  1. Distinction between civil and criminal appeals:
    • The Court explains that civil procedure (Order 41 Rule 11 and the Explanation to Rule 17(1) of Order 41 as amended in 1976) precludes dismissal on merits for non‑appearance in many cases; civil appeals may be dismissed if the appellant does not appear, but the Explanation to Rule 17(1) was intended to prevent a dismissal on merits arising purely from non‑appearance.
    • By contrast, the criminal provisions (s. 423 of the old Code and s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) require that where a criminal appeal is not summarily dismissed, it be heard after sending for and perusing the record; after perusal and hearing (if any), the court "may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal" or may allow it by appropriate orders.
  2. Mandatory nature of "perusing the record":
    • The Court emphasizes that the words "after perusing such record" in s. 386 are a categorical mandate. It refers to the Supreme Court decision in Sankatha Singh and similar authorities to assert that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance and that disposal on merits after record perusal is required even when the appellant or his counsel does not appear.
    • The Court states that perusal of the record and indication of such perusal in the order is "a must" before dismissing the appeal.
  3. Treatment of apparently conflicting Supreme Court dictum (Ram Naresh Yadav):
    • The opinion recognizes that Ram Naresh Yadav contains dicta suggesting dismissal for non‑prosecution and disciplinary measures against counsel. At first glance, that may appear inconsistent with the earlier line of decisions (Sankatha Singh, Shyam Deo Pandey).
    • However, the Court affirms that Supreme Court precedent, even if the High Court regards it as erroneous, is binding by virtue of Article 141. The High Court must follow Supreme Court decisions.
    • Where conflicting Supreme Court decisions exist, the High Court must ascertain which decision emanated from a larger Bench and follow it; here Sankatha Singh is a three‑Judge Bench decision and thus governs.
  4. Distinction drawn on availability of inherent powers:
    • The Court notes that High Courts possess inherent powers (s. 482) to make orders for ends of justice or prevent abuse of process; consequently, where an appeal is before the High Court, the High Court may dismiss an appeal for default and restore it on sufficient grounds, following Ram Naresh Yadav's observations in that context.
    • By contrast, subordinate appellate courts do not have inherent powers. Citing Bindeshwari Prasad Singh and A.S. Gaurava, the Court concludes that such subordinate courts are exclusively governed by s. 386 and cannot dismiss appeals for default of appearance; they must peruse the record and decide on merits.
  5. Application to the present case:
    • The appellate court below dismissed the criminal appeal for default of appearance. The High Court found that to be contrary to the mandate of s. 386 and the controlling three‑Judge Bench decision in Sankatha Singh.
    • The revisional application succeeded: the High Court set aside the order of dismissal and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal for disposal on merits after perusal of the record and in accordance with s. 386.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court's principal rulings are as follows:

  • The order of dismissal passed by the Court of Appeal for default of appearance is set aside.
  • The case is sent back to the Court of Appeal for re‑hearing and disposal on the merits after perusal of the record and in accordance with s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • The petitioners will continue on the same bail as now until the disposal of the appeal by the Court of Appeal below.
  • The records, along with a copy of the judgment, are to go down to the Court of Appeal forthwith.

Implications

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The specific dismissal for default in the appealed matter has been annulled and the appeal must be re‑heard on its merits by the Court of Appeal after perusal of the record.
  • The appellants remain on the same bail pending that rehearing.
  • The appellate court below must comply with the mandate of s. 386 and the controlling precedents when disposing of the appeal, even if the appellant or counsel does not appear to prosecute the appeal.

Broader legal implications addressed in the opinion:

  • The opinion clarifies that subordinate criminal appellate courts, being without inherent powers, cannot dismiss appeals for default of appearance and then restore them; they must peruse the record and dispose of the appeal on merits under s. 386.
  • The opinion also explains that High Courts, by contrast, possess inherent powers and, in appropriate circumstances, may dismiss and later restore appeals for default of appearance; Ram Naresh Yadav's observations are read in that contextual light.

The opinion does not state that it is creating a novel precedent; rather it applies existing statutory text and Supreme Court authorities (giving primacy to the larger Bench decision in Sankatha Singh) to the facts before it.

Impugned order set aside; case sent back for re‑hearing.

    Radheshyam Soni & Anr. v. The State & Anr.

    A.M Bhattacharjee, J.:—A Civil Appeal, if not dismissed summarily under the provisions of Rule 11 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is to be listed for hearing with notice to the respondent and if the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed. The cleavage of opinion as to whether such dismissal can be for default of appearance only, or on the merits also, has now been sealed by the Explanation added to Rule 17(1) of Order 41 by the Amendment of 1976, providing categorically that “nothing” in this Sub rule shall be construed as empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on the merits”.

    2. The law in the Criminal Jurisdiction is however different, as would appear from the provisions of s. 423 of the preceding Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, now replaced by s. 386 of the new Code of 1973, which is in pari materia with its predecessor in the old Code of 1898. Section 386 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if a criminal appeal is not dismissed summarily under s. 384, the same is to be heard under s. 385, with notice to the parties and after sending for the record of the case, unless the same is already there and then the appellate court, “after perusing such record, and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears ……… may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal” or may allow the same by passing appropriate orders.

    3. The words “after perusing the record” etc. in s. 386 have all the weight of a categorical mandate and while construing those words in the corresponding s. 423 in the preceding Code, the Supreme Court was never in doubt that, to quote from the three-judge Bench decision of Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh (AIR 1962 SC 1208 at 1209), “a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for the default of appearance of the appellants or their Counsel “and” the Court has either to adjourn the heating of the appeal to enable them to appear, or should consider the appeal on merits and pass the final order”. To the same effect is the decision of a later two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Shyam Deo Pandey (AIR 1971 SC 1606 at 1610), where it has been similarly ruled that a reading of s. 423 makes it clear that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance of the appellants or their counsel”, and “the Court has either to adjourn the appeal in order to enable them to appear or it should consider the appeal on merits and pass final orders”. The requirement regarding the perusal of record before disposing of the appeal, even where the appellant does not appear, cannot be treated as an empty formality. Perusal of the record of the particular case and giving indication of such perusal in the order is a must before dismissing the appeal, even though the appellant or his counsel does not appear to press the appeal.

    4. The position in law is so well-settled because of the clear letters of the law in s. 423 of the old Code and s. 386 of the new Code, and also the gloss put on the former by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions that any further citation would be a mere useless idle parade. But a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Naresh Yadav (AIR 1987 SC 1500) may ex facie appear to strike a different note and to have ruled that “the Court can dismiss the appeal for nun-prosecution, and enforce discipline or refer the matter to the Bar Council with this end view”, “but the matter can be disposed of on merits only after hearing the appellant or his Counsel and “the Court might as well appoint a Counsel at State cost to argue on behalf of the appellants”.

    5. The reason behind the law providing for different courses to be adopted in appeals by the Civil Courts and the Criminal Courts is not far to seek. Criminal appeals are, more often than not, preferred by convicted persons, whose lives or personal liberties have been put in peril by the sentence of imprisonment or even of fine, if not paid. And what is more, the society as a whole is, as it ought to be, vitally interested in the prevention of improper convictions as also unmerited acquittals. The Legislature, therefore, in enacting the provisions relating to disposal of criminal appeals, has taken care to provide that once a criminal appeal is admitted for hearing, implying thereby that the order of, say, conviction and sentence, warrants reconsideration, the Court cannot and shall not dispose of the same except on the merits and after examining the record on its own, whether or not the appellant appears to prosecute the appeal. As already noted, the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh (supra) and in Shyam Deo Pandey (supra) and in various other earlier and later decisions, has ruled out dismissal of criminal appeals for default and mandated disposal, including dismissal, on the merits only after examination of the records. The dictum in Ram Narayan Yadav (supra), therefore, to the effect that “the Court can dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution” may appear at first blush to be contrary to the long catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to hereinabove.

    6. Mr. Roy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-accused, whose appeal before the Court of appeal below has been dismissed for default has, at one stage, argued that the dictum in Ram Naresh Yadav (supra, AIR 1987 SC 1500) being patently against the plain statutory provisions in s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would not bind us as a precedent. I am afraid that even if, and this I say with respect, a decision of the Supreme Court appears to the High Court to be erroneous, it is nonetheless binding on the High Court. There should be no doubt that between a legislation and a precedent of the Supreme Court on such legislation, what binds the High Court more is the precedent. Whatever a legislation might have meant, it must be taken to mean what the Supreme Court says it means. With Article 141 enthralled in its majestic magnitude in the Constitution, it would not be permissible for the High Court to pass over a decision of the Supreme Court, whether against the Statute or in ignorance of the Statute.

    7. As has been pointed out by a Special Bench of this Court in Bholanath v. Madanmohan (AIR 1988 Cat 1 at 5), when faced with contrary decisions of the Supreme Court, the first course to be adopted by the High Court is to ascertain which one of them is decided by a larger Bench and to govern itself by such larger Bench decision, if any. This has been laid down by the Supreme Court itself in a series of decisions and must be taken to be the settled law and reference may be made, among others, to Union of India v. K.S Subramaniam (AIR 1976 SC 2433 at 24371. It may, however, be noted that a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Javed Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala v. State Of Maharashtra (AIR 1985 SC 231 at 236) has observed that ‘it may be inappropriate for a Division Bench of three Judges to purport to overrule the decision of a Division Bench of two Judges”.

    8. Be that as it may, the wave of consistent earlier decisions, even if emanating from co-equal Benches, would have been good enough to relieve us from the obligation to follow a solitary contrary decision if Ram Naresh Yadav (supra), is such a one, particularly when the latter has not, even remotely, taken note of the earlier decisions. But since one such earlier decision in Sankatha Singh (AIR 1962 SC 1208) has emanated from a larger three-Judge Bench, we, as already noted, cannot but govern ourselves by the same and hold that under s. 386 of the Code, corresponding to s. 423 of the earlier Code which contained the law at the relevant time, a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for the default of appearance of the appellant, but has got to be disposed of on the merits on perusal of the record, whether or not the appellant of this Counsel appears to pursue the appeal. The present revisional application must, therefore, succeed, and the order of dismissal passed by the Court of appeal must be set aside and the case sent back to the Court of appeal for disposal on merits, on perusal of the record and in accordance with the provisions of s. 386.

    9. But some more words about Ram Naresh Yadav (supra, AIR 1987 SC 1503) which may apparently appear to lay down something contrary to the earlier decisions. The Special Bench of this Court in Bholanath (supra) was no doubt concerned with contrary decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by Benches of co-equal strength and it has ruled that in such a case, endeavours should be made, wherever possible, to reconcile those decisions. We are inclined to think that such a course should also be adopted, even when apparently contrary decisions emanate from Benches of unequal strength, before resorting to the easy course of holding that the smaller Bench decision has stood out-weighed by the larger Bench. We think that as a matter of judicial propriety, decency and decorum, the decisions of the apex tribunal of the land, even though appearing to be contrary to or inconsistent with each other or one another, must be sought to be reconciled and explained by assuming, wherever possible, that they applied to different sets of circumstances. This, as pointed out by the Special Bench, is the course which was recommended by our ancient Jurists — “SRUTIRDWAIDHE SMRITIRDWAIDHE STHALAVEDA PRAKALPATE” — i.e in case there be two contrary precepts of the Sruties or the Smrities, different cases or sets of circumstances are to be assumed for their application. As Jurist Jaimini said, contradictions or inconsistencies ate not to be reality assumed, as they very often be not real, but only apparent, resulting from the application of the same or similar principle to different sets of facts—“PRAYOGE HI VIRODHA SYAT”. We would proceed accordingly.

    10. If a criminal appeal is dismissed, though for default of appearance only, the order of dismissal cannot be set aside and the appeal restored to file by any appellate court subordinate to the High Court, even on proof of sufficient and satisfactory grounds for non-appearance. The reason is that the Code of Criminal Procedure, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure, does not expressly provide for such a course and, as now ruled by the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh (AIR 1977 SC 2432) and in (A.S Gaurava, (1986 2 Supreme Court Cases 709), the Courts subordinate to the High Court have no inherent powers. Since the appellant in such a case would be without any remedy against the ex-parte dismissal by way of restoration and may thus have to submit to an order of conviction without any opportunity of having the same re-examined by the appellate court, such appellate court must not and cannot be allowed to go outside the provisions of s. 386 and to dismiss an appeal for default of appearance, but must examine the correctness, propriety or legally of the impugned order on perusal of the records on its own, even though none has appeared to press the appeal. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh (supra, AIR 1962 SC 1208) and in Shyam Deo Pandey (supra, AIR 1971 SC 1606) and other decisions holding the same view would govern such appeal, which cannot be dismissed for default of appearance, but must be ??? of on the merits of examination of the record under the mandate of s. 386.

    11. But when a criminal appeal is pending before the High Court, which notwithstanding s. 386, has all the inherent powers to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of other indiscipline, as expressly provided in s. 482, the provisions of s. 386 do not and cannot have any exclusive application to the exclusion of those inherent powers. The appeal in Ram Naresh Yadav (supra) was pending before the High Court having the entire gamut of inherent powers available to if. The Supreme Court has expressly demonstrated its awareness of the enormity of the problem resulting in dislocation and hampering of the working of the High Court, “if Counsel do not appear when criminal appeals are called out” and has then observed in that context that “the Court can dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution and enforce discipline or refer the matter to the Bar Council with this end in view”. The reaction of the Supreme Court to the unfortunate state of affair resulting from the Advocates not appealing when criminal appeals are called out generated the above-quoted observations and with s. 482 staring at the face, no one would doubt the powers of the High Court to pass such orders of dismissal for default. And such dismissal for default under the inherent powers, instead of dismissal on merits on perusal of the records only without hearing the appellant, would also secure to the appellant the opportunity to have the ex parte dismissal set aside by the High Court, obviously in the exercise of inherent powers, on proof sufficient grounds for non-appearance. But, to repeat, the right to dismiss criminal appeal for default for appearance and then to restore the same, are not at all available to the criminal appellate courts subordinate to the High Court, which are solely governed by s. 386 and are devoid of all inherent powers.

    12. We are thus inclined to hold that while a High Court may dismiss a criminal appeal for default of appearance, as held in Ram Naresh Yadav (supra) and may also restore the same to file on sufficient grounds, the criminal appellate courts subordinate to the High Court, exclusively governed by s. 386 and having no inherent powers, cannot, in view of the mandate in that Section, do so, but must dispose of the appeal on the merits on perusal of the records, even when the appellant or his Counsel does not appear to press or prosecute the appeal.

    13. In the case at hand, therefore, as already indicated, the appellate court was clearly wrong in dismissing the appeal for default of appearance of the appellants or their Counsel and we accordingly set aside the order dismissal and send the case back to the Court below for re-hearing on perusal of the records and in accordance with the provisions of s. 386, on hearing the parties or their Counsel, if they appear.

    14. The petitioners will continue on the same bail as now till the disposal of the appeal by the court of appeal below.

    15. The records, along with a copy of our judgement, to go down to the court of appeal forthwith.

    Impugned order set aside; case sent back for re-hearing.

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    Radheshyam Soni & Anr. v. The State & Anr.
    (May 3, 1991)