In this application the petitioner is challenging an order dated December 23, 1980 passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 246 of 1980 by the District Judge, Burdwan. By the said order the learned District Judge allowed the appeal filed by the opposite party No. 1 against an order dated Dec. 22, 1980 passed by the learned Munsif, Second Court, Burdwan in Title Suit No. 313 of 1980 refusing to grant an ad interim injunction as prayed for by the opposite party No. 1. The said suit was filed by the opposite party No. 1 for certain declarations and also for an injunction restraining the governing body of the Burdwan Raj College from giving effect to its resolution dated Dec. 22, 1980 terminating the services of the opposite party No. 1 as Principal of the said College. The prayer for ad interim injunction was disallowed by the trial court and the trial court directed notices to be issued to the defendants and fixed the hearing of the injunction after one week. Against the Said order the opposite party No. 1 preferred the miscellaneous appeal to the Court of the District Judge who allowed the appeal and granted an ad interim injunction. Against this appellate order the petitioner has filed this application.
2. Elaborate arguments were advanced by the learned Advocates for the parties in support of their respective contentions on the merits of the case. It is not necessary nor is it desirable to enter into the merits of the case and express any opinion at this stage, as that may prejudice either of the parties at the final hearing of the suit.
3. Mr. Chatterjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that the order of ad interim injunction granted by the lower appellate court cannot be sustained inasmuch as the opposite party No. 1 in his plaint as well as in the application for injunction did not truly and faithfully state all the relevant facts. He therefore contended that the opposite party No. 1 being guilty of suppression of material facts, his application was liable to be dismissed in limine. It was contended that the opposite party No. 1 had earlier moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and obtained a Rule and a limited order of injunction. By that order of injunction this Court directed that the opposite party No. 1 would be entitled to get his remunerations as previously drawn by him, but he would not act as the Principal of the College. The opposite party No. 1 mentioned about the Rule which was obtained by him from this Court, but he did not mention the limited order of injunction which was granted by this Court. It was further contended that the letter of the opposite party No. 1 dated 22/24 Nov. 1978 addressed to the Secretary, Education Department, Government of West Bengal, was also not disclosed by the opposite party No. 1. The statement made by the opposite party No. 1 in paragraph 6 of his petition for temporary injunction was not consistent with this letter. Other instances of suppression of material facts were also urged by Mr. Chatterjee in support of his contention that the application for temporary injunction was liable to be dismissed in limine. In support of his contention Mr. Chatterjee has relied upon the leading decision on this point in The King v. The General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Kensington reported in (1917) 1 KB 486 which has been followed by subsequent decisions by this Court as well as by other High Courts and the Supreme Court (See Ratan Chandra Nayak v. Adhar Biswas reported in (1952) 56 Cal WN 302 : (AIR 1952 Cal 72); Mishri Debi Agarwal v. Asstt. Collector of Central Excise reported in (1967) 71 Cal WN 385 and Bimal Kumar Sur v. State of West Bengal reported in (1976 Lab IC 796) (Cal). It has been observed in Rex v. Kensington Income-tax Commissioners ((1917) 1 KB 486), the decision of the King's Bench Division referred to above that “it is perfectly well settled that a person who makes an ex parte application to Court………is under an obligation to the Court to make the fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge and if he does not make that fullest possible disclosure, then he cannot obtain any advantage which he may have already obtained by means of the order which has thus wrongly been obtained by him. That is perfectly plain and requires no authority to justify it.”
4. In the present case it is quite clear from the plaint as well as the application for injunction that the opposite party No. 1 did not disclose the various correspondence and orders which were made from time to time as contained in the annexures to the present revisional application. That being the position in view of the principle of law laid down as stated above, an order for an ad interim injunction cannot be made in favour of the opposite party No. 1. The order passed by the lower appellate court cannot therefore be sustained.
5. This application is accordingly allowed, the order passed by the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the learned Munsif is restored. The learned Munsif is directed to hear out the application for temporary injunction within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order after giving the parties an opportunity to file their respective affidavits.
6. There will be no order as to costs in this application.
Application allowed.
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