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Citation Codes
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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Manindra Nath Ghosh
  • Hazari Prosad Roy Choudhury
  • Ranadeb Chaudhuri
  • A.N. Bose and Parimal Kr. Patari
Judges
  • B.N Maitra, J.
Acts
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Manindra Nath Ghosh
  • Hazari Prosad Roy Choudhury
  • Ranadeb Chaudhuri
  • A.N. Bose and Parimal Kr. Patari
Judges
  • B.N Maitra, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 2 September 1963 Tapan Kumar Banerjee purchased at auction the disputed property identified as R.S. Plot No. 574/650 for Rs. 27,100. One Ram Chandra Singh, predecessor of the petitioners, challenged that auction sale by filing Misc. Case No. 33 of 1966; that Misc. Case was eventually compromised and Tapan Kumar's title was admitted, with an agreement recording that Tapan Kumar would purchase the property for Rs. 32,000. Ram Chandra, however, remained in unauthorised occupation.

On 17 January 1975 a plaintiff purchased the property for Rs. 25,000 and shortly thereafter filed a title suit against Ram Chandra for recovery of possession, describing him as a trespasser and valuing the relief sought at Rs. 1,300. The defendant objected that this valuation exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court seized of the suit.

The learned Munsif heard the parties and decided against the defendant's objection. The defendant filed the present revisional application challenging that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision lies against the learned Munsif's order declining to question the plaint's valuation.
  2. Whether Section 7(vi)(a) of the West Bengal Court-fees Act (or paragraph (v)) governs valuation in a suit for recovery of possession from a trespasser where no declaration of title is claimed or necessary.
  3. Whether the plaintiff's valuation of the "relief sought" at Rs. 1,300 can be accepted as determinative of the court's pecuniary jurisdiction, or whether the court must form an opinion under Section 11 (and the corresponding earlier Section 8C) that the subject-matter has been wrongly valued.
  4. Whether the learned Munsif had pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit as valued in the plaint.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Defendant / Applicant for Revision)

  • Contended that the case is not covered by clause (a) of paragraph (vi) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Court-fees Act; rather paragraph (v) governs and the value of the subject-matter should determine jurisdiction.
  • Asserted that even if Section 7(vi)(a) applied, a declaration of title would be necessary for disposal and thus the suit had not been properly valued.
  • Raised that questions of jurisdiction and classification are involved: if the plaint is wrongly valued the suit should be tried by the Subordinate Judge (with first appeal to the High Court) rather than by the Munsif (with first appeal to the District Judge).

Opposite Party's Arguments (Plaintiff / Respondent)

  • Relied on Amrit Lal v. Hiralal ((1966) 70 Cal WN 857) to argue that after amendment the Act speaks of valuation of the "relief sought" and not of the property or subject-matter, and that the plaintiff may put his own valuation.
  • Argued that the proviso of Section 7(vi)(a) applies because no declaration of title was prayed for or necessary.
  • Cited Rathnayamaraja v. Vimla (AIR 1961 SC 1299) and Amal v. Bhagwan (1981) 85 Cal WN 42 to suggest that where the court decides valuation, it is a matter between plaintiff and government and not revisable.
  • Pointed to an estoppel by a solenama filed by Ram Chandra in the earlier Misc. Case; invoked Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and argued that the court is to go by the statements in the plaint in determining valuation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amrit Lal v. Hiralal ((1966) 70 Cal WN 857) After amendment the Act refers to valuation of the "relief sought" rather than valuation of the property/subject-matter; in that case it was said no order for ascertaining the value of the property could be passed. The plaintiff relied on it to support the proposition that the plaintiff's valuation should govern; the Court examined and concluded that the amendment does not eliminate the court's power (under corresponding provisions) to enquire and correct wrongful valuation.
Rathnayamaraja v. Vimla (AIR 1961 SC 1299) That decision was taken to indicate that no revision lies on a question of court-fee when no question of jurisdiction is involved. The Court applied and interpreted it: distinguished it because here a question of jurisdiction does arise, and therefore Rathnayamaraja does not preclude revision in the present case.
Amal v. Bhagwan ((1981) 85 Cal WN 42) Held that an order as to valuation was not revisable in the particular facts (plaintiff in possession and small valuation). Used to show limits of revisability. The Court found Amal distinguishable on facts and noted that Shamsher Singh v. R. Prasad (AIR 1973 SC 2384) was not considered in Amal; therefore Amal did not control the present question.
Shamsher Singh v. R. Prasad (AIR 1973 SC 2384) Explained the decision in Rathnayamaraja; treated substantive character of suit and jurisdictional consequences relevant to ad valorem fee liability. The Court relied on its explanation to show that where court-fee and jurisdiction are interlinked, revision may lie; used to support tenability of revision here.
Case law on Section 8C / Section 11 (Bengal / West Bengal Court-fees Acts) Section 8C (old Bengal Court-fees Act) / Section 11 (West Bengal Court-fees Act of 1970) empower the court to form an opinion that subject-matter has been wrongly valued, to revise valuation, determine correct valuation and hold enquiry. The Court held these provisions remain operative in effect and permit enquiry; the amendment’s omission of the word "subject-matter" does not oust this power.
Taramoni v. Mohammad Ali ((1976) 80 Cal WN 1082 : AIR 1977 NOC 202) Where suit concerns recovery of wakf property, the court can enquire into whether the valuation given is proper; refusal to enquire is liable to be set aside by the High Court. The Court cited this to support that trial courts must enquire into inadequate valuations and that refusal to do so can be set aside.
Hind-wire v. U.P. State Electricity Board ((1977) 4 Cal HN 829) Illustrated an objective standard of valuation where the relief (bank guarantee for Rs. 91,900) had an objective monetary figure; Section 7(iv)(b) applied. The Bench's reasoning was used to show that an objective standard of valuation can exist and be applied by the court in determining whether valuation is proper.
Tarai Tea Co. v. L.I.C. (AIR 1979 Cal 84) Where the value of relief claimed (shares above Rs. 22 lakhs) was objectively ascertainable, the court could direct the plaintiff to pay the balance of court-fee. Referred to as another instance where objective valuation of the relief justified the court directing payment of additional fee; used to support the proposition that objective standards can control valuation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal stages: first, whether revision lies against the order of the learned Munsif declining to question the plaint's valuation; and second, whether the plaintiff's valuation could be accepted.

On the question of revisability, the Court observed that some precedents (for example Rathnayamaraja and Amal) indicate that revision does not lie where no jurisdictional question is involved. However, the Court found that here a clear question of jurisdiction arises because if the plaint's valuation exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsif, the proper forum for trial would be the Subordinate Judge (with consequent appeal procedure) rather than the Munsif. The Court noted that the learned Munsif had not expressly found the plaint's valuation to be adequate and had assumed that the plaintiff can put his own valuation "irrespective of the actual value of the property." If revision were not allowed in such circumstances, certain statutory provisions (for example Section 10 and Order 7, Rule 10(1) Explanation) would be rendered purposeless. For these reasons the Court held that the revisional application was tenable.

Turning to valuation, the Court examined Section 7(vi)(a) of the West Bengal Court-fees Act together with Section 11 (and the corresponding earlier Section 8C) which empower a court to enquire and determine if the subject-matter has been wrongly valued. Although earlier decisions had emphasized that the amended statute speaks of valuation of the "relief sought" rather than of the "subject-matter", the Court held that the amendment did not eliminate the power to enquire into and correct wrongful valuation under the corresponding provision (Section 8C / Section 11).

The Court found that an objective standard of valuation did exist in this case. It relied on facts pleaded in the plaint and earlier transactions: (a) an auction purchase on 2-9-1963 for Rs. 27,100 by Tapan Kumar Banerjee; (b) an agreed purchase price of Rs. 32,000 recorded in the compromise of Misc. Case No. 33 of 1966; and (c) the plaintiff's purchase on 17-1-1975 for Rs. 25,000. The plaintiff gave no data explaining the Rs. 1,300 valuation, and had not pleaded mesne profits. The Court held that Section 11 permitted enquiry and that, on an objective standard, the valuation of the relief sought could not be less than Rs. 27,100.

Concluding its analysis, the Court held that the plaint had been arbitrarily and patently absurdly valued at Rs. 1,300, that the trial court (learned Munsif) had acted with material irregularity in accepting that valuation, and that the Munsif lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court made the Rule absolute and set aside the impugned order of the learned Munsif. The plaint must be returned to the plaintiff's advocate for presentation to the proper court.

Implications:

  • The immediate, direct consequence is that the plaint will be returned for presentation before the forum having proper pecuniary jurisdiction (the learned Munsif was held to lack jurisdiction on the valuation as found by the Court).
  • The trial court's order accepting the plaint's valuation and proceeding to try the suit was set aside as a material irregularity.
  • The Court directed that an intimation of this decision be sent to the trial court and ordered that there be no order as to costs.
  • The opinion does not state that it sets any novel legal precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities and statutory provisions (Section 7(vi)(a) read with Section 11); the decision's effect is the resolution of the parties' rights as set out above.

Order accordingly.

Show full summary ...

    Sambhu Nath Singh And Others v. Sankarananda Banerjee Opposite Party.

    On the 2nd September, 1963, one Tapan Kumar Banerjee auction purchased the disputed property appertaining to the R.S Plot No. 574/650 for Rs. 27,100/-. One Ram Chandra Singh, predecessor of the petitioners, challenged that auction sale and filed Misc. Case No. 33 of 1966. Eventually that Misc. Case was compromised and Tapan Kumar's title admitted. The latter agreed to purchase the property for Rupees 32,000/-. Instead of acting up to his agreement, Ram Chandra remained in unauthorised occupation of the property. On the 17th January, 1975, the plaintiff purchased that property for Rupees 25,000/-. Shortly after that date he filed this title suit against Ram Chandra for recovery of possession describing him as a trespasser and valuing his relief at Rs. 1,300/- only. The defendant's objection is that the valuation of the disputed property exceeded the pecuniary, jurisdiction of the court.

    2. The learned Munsif heard the parties and decided against the defendant. Hence this revisional application by the defendant.

    3. Mr. Manindra Nath Ghosh has contended for the petitioner that the case is not covered by clause (a) of paragraph (vi) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Court-fees Act. In fact the provision of paragraph (v) of Section 7 of the Act governs the case and the value of the subject-matter will determine that issue. Even if the paragraph (vi)(a) of Sec. 7 of the Court-fees Act is applicable, declaration of title is absolutely necessary for the disposal of the suit. In any view of the matter, the suit has not been properly valued. The questions of jurisdiction and classification are also involved. If such decision is allowed to stand, then the suit will be tried by the learned Munsif and there will be a first appeal to the District Judge. If the objection is accepted, then the suit will be tried by the learned Subordinate Judge and there will be a first appeal to this Court.

    4. Mr. Ranadeb Choudhury has urged on behalf of the plaintiff opposite party that the case is on all fours with that of Amrit Lal v. Hiralal in (1966) 70 Cal WN 857. That was a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property from a licensee and no license fee was paid. The plaintiff put his own valuation. A Bench of our Court has stated that no order for ascertaining the value of the property could be passed because the Amending Court-fees Act no longer speaks about valuation of the property or the subject-matter. The amendment uses a significant expression “relief sought is valued”. Valuation of the “relief sought” is not the same thing as valuation of the “property” itself or the “subject-matter” of the suit, vide the page 860 of the report. Reference has also been made to the cases of Rathnayamaraja v. Vimla, AIR 1961 SC 1299 and Amal v. Bhagwan, (1981) 85 Cal WN 42. It has been stated that those two cases clearly show that where the court decides a question regarding the valuation, that is a matter between the plaintiff and the Government and a revision does not lie against such order. Since the plaintiff is not enjoined to ask for a declaration of title, the case is covered by the provision of Section 7(vi)(a) of the Court-fees Act. A solenama was filed by Ram Chandra in Misc. Case No. 33 of 1966 and so there will be an estoppel. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation-Act has been referred to. The court is to go by the statements in the plaint to determine the present controversy. Hence the plaintiff can put his own valuation. The relief claimed is the valuation of the mesne profits and not the subject-matter of the suit, which is the actual valuation of the disputed property.

    5. So the first question is whether a revision lies. The case of Amal v. Bhagwan (supra), cited on behalf of the opposite party, is clearly distinguishable because in this case the plaintiff is not in possession of the disputed property. But in that case the plaintiff stated that he was in possession of the disputed property. He asked for an injunction on declaration of his title to the disputed land and put the valuation at Rs. 100/-. On the footing of the decision of the case of Rathnayamaraja v. Vimla (supra), it was held that such order was not revisable. But the case of Shamsher Singh v. R. Prasad, AIR 1973 SC 2384 at p. 2386, which explained that decision of Rathnayamaraja v. Vimla, was not considered in that case of Amal v. Bhagwan (supra). It has been stated that the ratio of the decision in Rathnayamaraja v. Vimla's case is that no revision lies on a question of court-fee when no question of jurisdiction is involved. In this case, the question of jurisdiction clearly arises because if the valuation exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Munsif, then the suit will be tried by the learned Subordinate Judge. There will be a first appeal to the High Court. Again the learned Munsif does not arrive at any finding that the valuation given by the plaintiff is adequate and the valuation does not exceed his pecuniary jurisdiction. He has assumed that the plaintiff can put his own valuation “irrespective of the actual value of the property”. If no revision lies against this decision, then the provisions of Sec. 10, which enjoin that even the appellate court can dismiss the suit after recording a finding that insufficient court-fee was paid, and of Order 7, Rule 10(1) Explanation of the Code, empowering the Court of Revision to direct a return of plaint, become purposeless enactments. Since the question of court-fee involves also the point of jurisdiction of the court to try the suit, it must be held that the application for revision is tenable.

    6. The only other point is if the plaintiff's valuation can be accepted. The learned Munsif has not given any reasons why and how the plaintiff can put his own valuation. Section 7(vi)(a) of the Court-fees Act says that in a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property from a trespasser, where no declaration of title is either prayed for or necessary for disposal of the suit — according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, subject to the provisions of Section 11 of the Act. Before the repeal of the Court-fees Act, 1870, similar provision appeared in Section 8C of that Act.

    7. In the case of Amrit Lal v. Hiralal ((1966) 70 Cal WN 857) (supra), it has been stated that after the amendment of the Court-fees Act, 1870, there is no longer any reference to property or subject-matter of the suit. But in that case it has been noticed that in a fit case the court earn exercise its power under Section 8C of the Bengal Court Fees. Act. Now, Section 8C of the Bengal Court-fees Act, which corresponds to Sec. 11 of the West Bengal Court Fees Act of 1970, says that if the court is of opinion that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongfully valued, it may revise the valuation, determine the correct valuation and may hold such enquiry as it thinks fit for such purpose. The position therefore is that even after the amendment of the old Court Fees Act, 1870, according to the provisions of Section 8C of the then Act, the court could form an opinion that the subject-matter of the suit had been wrongly valued. The contention put forward on behalf of the opposite party, that such amendment no longer spoke about “subject-matter”, is not acceptable.

    8. In the case of Taramoni v. Mohammad Ali in (1976) 80 Cal WN 1082 : (AIR 1977 NOC 202) it has been stated that where the suit is for recovery of wakf property, the court can make as enquiry, if the valuation given is proper. If the court refuses to make an enquiry, its decision is liable to be set aside by the High Court. In the Bench case of Hind-wire v. U.P State Electricity Board reported in (1977) 4 Cal HN 829 the suit was for declaration that a bank guarantee for Rs. 91,900/- was not enforceable. A Bench of our Court has stated that there is an objective standard because the bank guarantee is for Rupees 91,900/- and so Section 7(iv) cl. (b) of the Court Fees Act applies. The Bench referred to the well-known decision of Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prasad (AIR 1973 SC 2384) (supra). In that Supreme Court case father had mortgaged the property of a Hindu joint family and a decree was passed against him. His sons filed a suit for declaration that the decree was void and for an injunction so that the decree could not be executed. Alagiriswami, J., has stated that the suit is in substance one for setting aside the decree or for consequential relief for injunction and so ads valorem court-fee is payable. In the Bench case of Tarai Tea Co. v. L.I.C reported in AIR 1979 Cal 84, the plaintiff asked for a declaration that the property in shares above 22 lakhs passed to it and for a mandatory injunction on the defendant to redeliver those shares to the plaintiff. A Bench of our Court has stated that the value of relief is above 22 lakhs and so the court could direct the plaintiff to pay the balance of the Court-fee.

    9. Sections 7(vi)(a) and 11 of the West Bengal Court. Fees Act of 1970 have to be read together. Section 11 empowers the court to make an enquiry as to the valuation of any suit if it is of opinion that the subject-matter of the suit has been wrongly valued.

    10. The plaintiff has not asked for declaration of title. No declaration of title to property has either been prayed for or is necessary for the disposal of the suit. It is therefore held that Section 7(vi)(a) of the Act and not paragraph (v)(a) thereof applies.

    11. The contention put forward on behalf of the opposite party, that there is no objective standard of valuation, cannot be accepted. There is an objective standard of valuation. Even para 4 of the plaint shows that there was an agreement with the auction purchaser, Tapan Kumar Banerjee, for purchasing the suit property for Rs. 32,000/-. The plaintiff did not supply any data why he valued the relief claimed at Rs. 1,300/-. The broad fact is that on the 2nd September, 1963, Tapan Kumar Banerjee made an auction purchase of the disputed R.S Plot No. 574/650 for Rs. 27,100/-. Even on 7-1-1975 the plaintiff purchased the property for Rs. 25,000/- and filed the suit shortly thereafter. The provisions of Section 11 of the Act come info play and it is a fit case for exercising that power. The “relief sought”, within the meaning of Section 7(vi)(a), is recovery of possession of the disputed property together the structures from the defendant regarding the disputed property. The plaintiff artfully avoided putting the figure of the mesne profits in the plaint. The valuation of such relief sought cannot be the paltry sum of Rupees 1,300/- or the value of the mesne profits. The objective standard of valuation cannot be less than Rs. 27,100/-. It is trite knowledge that auction purchase does not fetch the real price of the property sold and the price of property has been steadily increasing. The submissions made for the opposite party cannot be accepted. It is held that the subject-matter of the suit has been wrongly valued, that the valuation of the relief sought is not less than Rs. 27,100/- and that the suit has been arbitrarily valued at the patently absurd figure of Rupees 1,300/-. The trial court acted with material irregularity in passing such order.

    12. Since the learned Munsif had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, the plaint must be returned.

    13. The Rule is therefore made absolute and the impugned order set aside. The plaint be returned to the learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff for presenting it to the proper court.

    14. Send this intimation to the trial court.

    15. There will be no order as to costs.

    Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Sambhu Nath Singh And Others v. Sankarananda Banerjee Opposite Party.
    (Feb 6, 1981)