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  • SECTION 13 WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT 1956
  • Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • Order 42, Rule 1 says that rules of Order 41
  • provisions of Order 41 including Rule 33
  • provision in Order 41, R. 33 of the CPC
  • Rule 33 of Order 41 of the CPC
  • Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code
  • Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC
  • Rule 33 of Order 41
  • Order 42, Rule 1.24.
  • Order 41, Rule 10
  • Order 41, Rule 33
  • Order 41, Rule 27
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 13 WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT 1956
  • Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • Order 42, Rule 1 says that rules of Order 41
  • provisions of Order 41 including Rule 33
  • provision in Order 41, R. 33 of the CPC
  • Rule 33 of Order 41 of the CPC
  • Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code
  • Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC
  • Rule 33 of Order 41
  • Order 42, Rule 1.24.
  • Order 41, Rule 10
  • Order 41, Rule 33
  • Order 41, Rule 27
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion (A.K. Janah, J., Letters Patent Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (landlord) instituted a suit for ejectment against the defendants (tenants) claiming reasonable requirement of a portion of premises No. 198, Upper Circular Road for his own use and for members of his family. The disputed portion comprised the north and western portion of that premises. Originally the defendants' father, Bipin Krishan Banerjee, was the tenant under the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest. The plaintiff produced a registered sale deed dated 14 December 1949 in respect of premises No. 198.

The plaint averred that the plaintiff required the premises because his existing joint family dwelling at 195 Upper Circular Road (in front of the disputed premises) could not accommodate his large family, and that he was compelled to live permissively at his wife's brother's house. The defendants denied the reasonable requirement and alleged that the plaintiff owned other properties (Nos. 8A and 8C Rashbehari Avenue) standing in his sons' names.

The trial court, after evidence, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed (F.A. No. 665 of 1972). The first appellate court (Chittatosh Mookerjee, J.) affirmed the finding of reasonable requirement but remanded the suit to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff was the owner of the disputed premises; if the plaintiff were found to be owner a decree for eviction was to be granted, otherwise the suit was to be dismissed. The defendants then filed this Letters Patent Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff satisfied the requirement under clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (i.e., that he reasonably requires the premises for his own use and occupation and for members of his family).
  2. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed premises (i.e., whether he is the sole owner and entitled to sue), including whether any benami or co-owner case was made out.
  3. Whether the first appellate court was right to remand the case to the trial court on the limited question of ownership (and whether the appellate court should itself dispose of the whole suit under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC).
  4. Whether the defendants could challenge the date/commencement of the tenancy (English calendar month contention) despite lack of pleading or issue on that point.
  5. Whether an earlier ejectment notice (16 February 1957) affected the validity of the subsequent notice dated 19 December 1966 and therefore vitiated the present suit.
  6. Whether a decree for partial eviction could be passed based on a local inspection and the Advocate-Commissioner's report.
  7. Whether Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC is applicable to Letters Patent Appeals (and, relatedly, whether the appellate court could set aside the remand and dispose of the matter).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Clause (ff) of Section 13(1) requires lack of any "reasonably suitable accommodation"; the plaint's averment that the plaintiff had "no other house of his own in Calcutta" was insufficient — the plaintiff required to allege and prove absence of any reasonably suitable accommodation (not merely ownership).
  • An additional issue (No. 7) framed on 8 December 1970 — whether the plaintiff reasonably required the premises for his two sons and the wife of one son — was omitted from the trial court's issues in judgment, thereby leaving that aspect unconsidered.
  • The trial court wrongly rejected applications for local investigation and appointment of a Commissioner (or otherwise mishandled local inspection procedures), and the appellate court erred in treating the defendants as having waived their rights.
  • The respondents' purchase produced a new tenancy not in accordance with the English calendar; relying on Bimalendu Bhusan Das v. Firm Mitra and Ghosh (AIR 1973 Cal 515) the appellants argued this point should be entertained.
  • The prior ejectment notice of 16 February 1957 (and consequent litigation) rendered the subsequent 19 December 1966 notice invalid; reliance was placed on Tayebali Jefarbhai Tankiwala v. Ahsan and Co. ((1970) 1 SCC 46 : AIR 1971 SC 102).
  • If the appeal were dismissed, the appellants expressed willingness to accept a decree for partial eviction.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position as Presented in the Opinion

  • The plaintiff contended he purchased the disputed premises by registered sale deed dated 14 December 1949 for his own use and the use of his family and had no other suitable accommodation to meet that need.
  • The plaintiff relied on the pleadings (paragraph 11 of the plaint and paragraph 1 asserting ownership) and produced a registered sale deed in his name.
  • The plaintiff denied that he was merely a benamdar for his wife and there was no pleading by the defendants to that effect; hence the defendants cannot raise benami now without proper pleading and evidence.
  • The plaintiff relied upon the Advocate-Commissioner's local inspection report and map (appointed by the court by consent) which showed many ground-floor rooms were dilapidated and not fit for habitation; on that basis the plaintiff opposed partial eviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bimalendu Bhusan Das v. Firm Mitra and Ghosh, AIR 1973 Cal 515 Authority on commencement/date of tenancy and effect of mutual agreement altering tenancy commencement (English calendar question). The court distinguished this case: there was no pleading or issue in the present case of any fresh agreement creating a new tenancy; Bimalendu Bhusan was factually distinguishable because there the mutual agreement established a new tenancy date.
Tayebali Jefarbhai Tankiwala v. Ahsan and Co., (1970) 1 SCC 46 : AIR 1971 SC 102 Principle that a landlord's conduct (serving a second notice and claiming post-second-notice damages) can amount to waiver of an earlier notice, treating tenancy as subsisting. The court observed this authority was of little assistance to appellants in the present circumstances and did not accept the appellants' reliance on it to invalidate the 19 December 1966 notice.
Pannalal v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516 Support for an appellate court's power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC to dispose of matters and to set aside orders of remand in appropriate circumstances. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to support its exercise of appellate power under Order 41, Rule 33 to set aside the remand order and to decree the suit itself.
Sabitri Thakurain v. Savi, (1921) 25 Cal WN 557 : AIR 1921 PC 80 (Privy Council) Holds that Orders and Rules made under the CPC are given effect and apply to High Court appeals, and thus provisions like Order 41 rules apply to Letters Patent appeals unless excluded. The court cited the Privy Council to support the proposition that the Orders and Rules under the CPC (including Order 41 provisions) are applicable to Letters Patent appeals and therefore Order 41, Rule 33 can be applied in this appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step review of procedural history, pleadings, evidence and the questions raised on appeal. The main strands of analysis in the opinion are:

  • Clause (ff), Section 13(1) issue: The court held the plaint's averment (paragraph 11) that the plaintiff had "no other house of his own in Calcutta" was sufficient for the purposes of clause (ff). Given the concurrent findings of both courts below affirming reasonable requirement, the appellate court declined to re-open that factual question.
  • Additional issue No. 7 (requirement for two sons and wife): Although the trial court's judgment did not explicitly list that additional issue, the trial judge had in substance considered accommodation questions (including premises Nos. 8A/8C Rashbehari Avenue). The lower courts' findings that 8A belonged to the son and ownership of 8C was not proved were affirmed; the appellate court observed that even if a son owned a house, that fact would not automatically disentitle the plaintiff from claiming for himself and family members. There was no evidence that the sons would not come to live with the father; mere suggestion from the Bar was insufficient to defeat the requirement.
  • Local inspection / Commissioner application: The court reviewed the chronology. A Commissioner had been appointed earlier and had begun work, but the defendants themselves had applied to withdraw that application and the writ was recalled; a later fresh application for local inspection was rejected. The appellate court accepted Chittatosh Mookerjee, J.'s conclusion that the defendants could not later complain that the trial court wrongly refused local investigation, because the defendants had effectively caused withdrawal of the earlier inspection. The court also rejected a further extraordinary defendants' demand (production of original map of premises that did not belong to plaintiff and compelling occupiers not party to suit to produce rent receipts) as rightly refused by the trial court.
  • Tenancy commencement / English calendar point: The court refused to entertain the appellants' new point (that a new tenancy arose not in accordance with the English calendar) because there was no such averment in the written statement and no issue was framed. Bimalendu Bhusan's case was distinguished on facts; raising this point in appeal without prior pleading and evidence was inappropriate.
  • Validity of earlier notice (16 February 1957) and effect on present notice (19 December 1966): The court recounted the earlier litigation — the 1957 notice and suit, appeal, and eventual dismissal of that suit by this Court on the ground that the 1957 notice did not comply with Section 13(6) of the Act. The earlier notice thus became ineffective; after dismissal of the earlier suit the tenancy continued such that a fresh notice and fresh suit based on the 1966 notice was permissible. The court declined appellants' reliance on Tayebali as inapposite.
  • Partial eviction: By consent the court appointed an Advocate-Commissioner for local inspection to ascertain whether partial eviction could be ordered. The Commissioner's report and sketch showed many ground-floor rooms were dilapidated and unfit for habitation; after careful consideration the court concluded that a decree for partial eviction could not be passed.
  • Whether to allow remand (Order 41, Rule 33 CPC): The pivotal question was whether to allow the first appellate court's limited remand to stand or to set it aside and dispose of the suit in the present appeal. The court examined pleadings and evidence on the ownership point: the plaint averred the plaintiff purchased the premises (sale deed dated 14-12-49), the written statement merely denied sole ownership without specifying other owners, and the defendants produced no material to show co-ownership or a benami relationship. There was a registered sale deed in the plaintiff's name and admissions in evidence (including the defendant Biva Banerji's answers) that supported the plaintiff's sole ownership. The court concluded that the remand to investigate a benami allegation (not pleaded and not suggested in cross-examination) was unnecessary and caused injustice. Exercising its power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC (as read with Order 42, Rule 1 for Letters Patent appeals) the court set aside the remand and decreed the suit.
  • Concurrence (R. Bhattacharya, J.): The separate concurring reasoning elaborated that Order 41 Rule 33 should be applied sparingly but is available in Letters Patent appeals (citing Privy Council authority). The concurrence emphasised pleadings and the absence of any properly pleaded benami case; the remand was improper and caused failure of justice.
  • Practical directions: The court granted the defendants time to vacate subject to conditions: initial time up to 15 November 1976 to file an undertaking to vacate; if the undertaking was filed and defendants deposited current mesne profits month by month, time extended to 31 March 1977; in default the decree would be executable forthwith. No order as to costs was made in the appeal. The application under Order 41, Rule 27 stood disposed of as unnecessary in view of the main order.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Letters Patent Appeal is DISMISSED. The order of remand passed by the first appellate court (Chittatosh Mookerjee, J.) is set aside and the decree of the trial court restoring eviction in favour of the plaintiff is restored.

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  • The plaintiff's decree for ejectment is restored and the defendants are required to vacate the disputed premises in accordance with the timetable and conditions ordered by the Court:
    • Initial period allowed until 15 November 1976 to file a written undertaking to vacate; if done, time extended to 31 March 1977 provided defendants deposit current damages/mesne profits month by month (at the rent rate) within the 15th of the next succeeding month in the trial court.
    • In default of such deposits the decree will become executable immediately; if deposits are made the plaintiff may withdraw them without security.
  • No order as to costs was made in the appeal.

Broader Legal Implications Noted in the Opinion

  • The appellate court applied Order 41, Rule 33 CPC to set aside a remand and dispose of the suit in a Letters Patent appeal — holding that Order 41 (including Rule 33) applies to appeals from appellate decrees by virtue of Order 42, Rule 1 and that the court may, in appropriate exceptional circumstances, invoke Rule 33 to do complete justice and set aside a remand. The court cited Privy Council authority (Sabitri Thakurain v. Savi) and Pannalal (AIR 1963 SC 1516) in support.
  • The court emphasised adherence to pleaded issues: matters not pleaded (e.g., benami or commencement of a new tenancy) cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal absent supporting pleadings and evidence; the court treated the defendants' attempt to raise such points as impermissible.

Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No extraneous facts or inferences beyond the text have been introduced. Where the opinion itself described statutory provisions or prior decisions, the table and analysis reflect the manner and purpose for which those authorities were cited in the opinion.

    Sm. Biva Banerjee And Another v. Manmatha Nath Banerjee .

    A.K Janah, J.:— This appeal is on behalf of the tenants-defendants and it arises out of a suit for ejectment instituted by the landlord-respondent on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation and also for the use and occupation of the members of his family. The suit premises consists of the north and western portion of premises No. 198. Upper Circular Road, Originally the defendants' father Bipin Krishan Banerjee was a tenant in respect of the disputed premises under the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff purchased premises No. 198, Upper Circular Road by a registered sale deed dated December 14, 1949 and became the owner of the said premises. The father of the defendant held the disputed premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 57.50 payable according to English Calendar month.

    2. The plaintiff's case is that he purchased the disputed premises for his own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of the members of his family, it is alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff has a joint family dwelling house at 195, Upper Circular Road which is just in front of the disputed premises. It is stated that the plaintiff has six brothers and each brother has a large family. The total number of rooms in the said joint family dwelling house is not sufficient to accommodate the families of the plaintiff and his brothers. It is alleged that for want of accommodation the plaintiff is compelled to live in the house of his wife's brother at 271, Kalighat Road. His possession in the said house is merely permissive. The plaintiff has two sons, one of whom is married and the other is of marriageable age. The plaintiff's son's wife is compelled to live at her father's house since her marriage on account of want of accommodation. The family of the plaintiff consists of himself his wife, two sons, wife of the eldest son and one unmarried deformed daughter and one married daughter. The defence of the defendants is a denial of the plaintiff's reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation and for the use and occupation for the members of his family. The defendants allege that the plaintiff is the owner of premises Nos. 8A and 8C, Rashbehari Avenue which stand in the names of his sons.

    3. The learned Judge in the trial court upon a consideration of the evidence adduced in the case decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Against the said decision the defendants preferred an appeal, being F.A No. 665 of 1972, to this Court. The appeal came up for hearing before Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. who affirmed the finding of the trial court with regard to plaintiff's reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for the plaintiff's own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of the members of his family, but remanded the suit to the trial court for a consideration of the question as to whether the plaintiff is the owner of the premises in question. His Lordship directed that in case the answer is in the affirmative, the trial court will grant a decree for eviction. On the other hand if the answer be in the negative the plaintiff's suit shall be dismissed. Against this decision of Chittatosh Mookherjee, J., the defendants have filed this Letters Patent Appeal.

    4. Mr. Bhose, learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal has argued in the first place, that the requirement of clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was not satisfied in the present case and as such the finding of the appellate court that the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation cannot be sustained. Mr. Bhose drew, our attention to the statements made in paragraph 11 of the plaint to the effect that the plaintiff has no other house of his own in Calcutta, and contended that this averment is not sufficient for the purpose of clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act, inasmuch as, the said clause contemplates ‘any reasonably suitable accommodation’. According to Mr. Bhose what the plaintiff is required to allege and to prove is that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation Such accommodation need not necessarily be in a house exclusively owned by the plaintiff, Mr. Bhose wanted to contend that since the plaintiff, according to his own case, had been living in his brother-in-law's house at Kalighat Road and since his son's wife was living in her father's house since her marriage, such accommodation was reasonably suitable accommodation within the meaning of clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. We are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Bhose. In our view the averment made in paragraph 11 of the plaint is quite sufficient for the purpose of clause (ff). Moreover, in view of the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the two courts below we do not think that we would be justified in this appeal to go into the question as to whether the plaintiff was in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation.

    5. The next contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that on the application filed off behalf of the defendants on 7th December, 1970 an additional issue, being issue No. 7, was framed on the 8th December, 1970. The said additional issue is as follows:

    “Additional Issue No. 7:

    Does the plaintiff reasonably require the premises for the use and occupation of his two sons and wife of one of the sons?”

    6. It was pointed out that in the judgment of the trial court the issues which have been set out do not contain the aforesaid additional issue No. 7. It was argued that this omission on the part of the learned Judge in the trial court has resulted in one of the important aspects of the case being left out of consideration altogether. From the judgment of the trial court it appears, however, bhat although this issue was not specifically mentioned, the learned Judge considered the question of accommodation of the plaintiff and the members of his family or his two sons for the matter of that, at premises No. 8.A and 8.C, Rashbehari Avenue. The learned Judge has considered the evidence adduced in the suit in so far as the accommodation in the said premises is concerned, and has come to the conclusion that in so far as premises No. 8.C, Rashbehari Avenue is concerned there is no evidence as to who is the owner of the same. In so far as premises No. 8.A, Rashbehari Avenue is concerned the finding is that the said house does not belong to the plaintiff but it belongs to his son. These findings of the trial court have been affirmed by the first appellate court and we find not to accept the said findings. If the plaintiff's son owns a house of his own that will not disentitle the plaintiff from claiming a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for himself and the members of his family, including such a son. It was also argued on behalf of the appellants that the requirement of the two sons of the plaintiff and the wife of one of the sons is not the plaintiff's requirement in the present case in view of the fact that the sons have a separate house of their own and they are not going to come back and live with the plaintiff as members of his family. There is no evidence in the case that the sons are not coming to live with the father in the father's house. It cannot, therefore, be held merely on the basis of this suggestion made from the Bar that the son's requirement in the present case will not amount to the plaintiff's requirement.

    7. Mr. Bhose made a grievance that Mookerjee J. was not right in his view that because the defendants did not follow up their prayer for appointment of a Commissioner for local inspection to ascertain the accommodation available at premises No. 8.A, Rashbehari Avenue it was no longer open to them to agitate that point in the appeal before his Lordship. He contended that the trial court wrongly rejected his client's prayer for local investigation by order dated September 17, 1970. From the judgment of Mookerjee, J. it appears that in the course of the hearing of the appeal his Lordship was prepared to give the defendant another opportunity of having a local inspection of premises No. 8.A, Rashbehari Avenue but the learned Advocate for the defendants-appellants did not press his prayer for local inspection of the said premises. In these circumstances his Lordship was of the view that it was not open to the defendant to make any grievance that the trial court wrongly refused the defendants' prayer for local investigation. It also appears from the order passed by the trial court on September 17, 1970 that on the defendants' prayer a Commissioner was appointed for local inspection and the Commissioner had proceeded with his work to some extent, but ultimately the defendants themselves applied before the trial court for withdrawal of their application for local inspection. The writ issued to the Commissioner was accordingly recalled by the trial court. After the writ, was recalled the defendants filed a fresh application for appointment of a Commissioner for local investigation. This prayer was rejected by the trial court. Mookerji, J. took into consideration this fact and came to the conclusion that in the circumstances the application for local investigation was rightly rejected by the trial court. We do not see how any exception can be taken to the view which Mookerjee J. took on this aspect of the case. Mr. Bhose drew our attention to the trial court's order dated April 16, 1970 and contended that the prayer made by his clients was wrongly rejected by the trial court and Mookerjee J. did not consider this aspect of the matter. The prayers made by the defendants before the trial court were as follows:

    1. That the plaintiff may be directed to arrange for the production of the original map of premises No. 8.A, Rashbehari Avenue which does not belong to the plaintiff; and

    2. That the plaintiff may be directed to cause the presence of all tenants and occupiers of the aforesaid premises with their respective rent receipts and cation cards at the time of local inspection.

    8. This prayer was rejected by the trial court on the ground that the premises No. 8.A, Rashbehari Avenue admittedly does not belong to the plaintiff and that the tenants of the said premises who were not parties to the suit could not be compelled to produce rent receipts and nation cards. In our view this extraordinary prayer made by the defendants was rightly rejected by the trial court.

    9. The next point canvassed on behalf of the appellants is that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants was originally a tenant in the disputed premises under the plaintiff's vendor. It was contended that after the disputed house was purchased by the plaintiff a new tenancy came into existence and that tenancy is not in accordance with the English Calendar. In support of this proposition reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants upon the case of Bimalendu Bhusan Das v. Firm Mitra and Ghosh, AIR 1973 Cal 515. In our view the appellants cannot be permitted to raise this point at this stage. In the written statement no such averment was made. No issue was framed in the trial court regarding the commencement of the tenancy. It is true that the appellants tried to raise this point in the appeal before Chittatosh Mookerjee J. But his Lordship rightly held that the appellants in the circumstances of the present case could not be permitted to raise this point us the question as to the commencement of the tenancy is not a pure question of law. In order to determine such a point facts must be gone into, and there must be evidence on record upon which the court has to come to its conclusion. In the present case as there was no avernment in the written statement and as there was no issue framed on this question the trial court had no occasion to consider the point which was sought to be raised in the appeal. The decision in Bimalendu Bhusan's case (supra) is distinguishable on facts. There it was found that by a mutual agreement dated 20th September, 1965 there was a privity of contract between the parties establishing a new tenancy running from the 20th day of the English Calendar month. On that finding Amaresh Roy J. held that the ejectment notice was invalid and it did not terminate the tenancy, in the present case it was nowhere pleaded by the defendants that there was any fresh agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants' predecessor altering the date of commencement of the tenancy. If there was no fresh contract between the parties creating a fresh tenancy, then the old tenancy under the plaintiff's vendor would continue and the notice served in the present case would be quite sufficient and valid.

    10. Lastly, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that the ejectment notice dated 19th December, 1966 served by the plaintiff-landlord upon the defendants terminating their tenancy on the expiry of the last day of January, 1967 is invalid inasmuch as there was an earlier ejectment notice dated 16th February, 1957 which was served by the plaintiff-landlord. In the present case the plaintiff landlord previously issued a notice dated 16th February, 1957 purporting to determine the tenancy of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. Upon the service of that notice the plaintiff brought the suit No. 1123 of 1957 in the City Civil Court for eviction of the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement. The suit was decreed by the trial court. Bipin Krishna, the predecessor-ininterest of the defendants in the present case preferred an appeal against the said decree but it was dismissed by the learned Chief Judge, Smell Cause Court. Calcutta. There was a second appeal to this Court during the pendency of which the original tenant, died and the present appellants were substituted in his place. This Court held that the appeal preferred before the Court of Small Causes was not maintainable. Thereafter the memorandum of appeal was taken back from the lower appellate court and it was re-filed in this Court and it was registered as F.A 61 of 1966. The Division Bench hearing that appeal was of the opinion that the notice dated 16th February, 1957 was not in compliance with the requirement of Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Their Lordships without expressing any opinion on the other points involved in the appeal allowed the appeal on the said ground alone and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff thereafter issued a fresh notice dated 19th December, 1966 and on the basis of that notice had brought the present suit out of which this appeal arises. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that the present notice is invalid cannot be accepted for the simple reason that after this Court had dismissed the earlier suit the tenancy of the defendants continued and therefore the plaintiff could not institute a suit for eviction without determining the tenancy. The earlier notice dated 16th February, 1957 became ineffective by reason of the decision of this Court in F.A 61 of 1966. No fresh suit could have been filed on the basis of that notice, Moreover, that notice was found to be defective and, therefore, no suit for eviction could be filed on the basis of that notice. Learned Advocate for the appellants relied upon the case of Tayebali Jefarbhai Tankiwala v. Ahsan and Co., (1970) 1 SCC 46 : AIR 1971 SC 102 in support of his contention. In that case the landlord gave a first notice to quit on the ground of arrears of rent. The tenant did not vacate in spite of that notice. Thereafter a second notice was served after about a year demanding rent for the period between the first notice and the second notice. In a suit for ejectment the landlord claimed damages for use and occupation for the period subsequent to the second notice which showed that the landlord had made a distinction between the rent and damages for use and occupation. It was held that the first notice was waived and the landlord had treated the tenancy as subsisting. In our view, this decision is of little assistance to the appellants in the present case.

    11. During the course of hearing of the appeal, a question arose as to whether in the event of the appeal being ultimately dismissed and the order of remand passed by Mookerji, J. being set aside a decree for partial eviction could be passed in favour of the landlord, Mr. Bhose, learned Advocate for the appellants stated before us that in such an event his clients were prepared to have a decree of partial eviction being passed against them. By consent of both parties we, therefore, by our order dated 5th August, 1976 appointed a learned Advocate of this Court to hold a local inspection of the disputed premises to ascertain certain points as mentioned in the said order, with a view to decide whether a decree for partial eviction could be passed in the present case. The learned Advocate Commissioner submitted his report dated 10th August, 1976 together with a sketch map. The said report and the map were accepted by both parties and the learned Advocates for the appellants as well as the respondent referred to the same in support of their respective contentions. It appears from the said report and the map that although there are a number of rooms in the ground floor besides the rooms on the second floor, most of the rooms in the ground floor are in a dilapidated and dangerous condition and those are not fit for human habitation. After having carefully considered the said report and the map and the contentions of the respective parties we have come to the conclusion that it is not possible in the present case to pass a decree for partial eviction.

    12. The only point which remains for our consideration in this appeal is whether the order of remand made by Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. Should be allowed to stand or whether we would dispose of the entire suit ourselves in this appeal. Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. affirmed the finding of the trial court with regard to the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff but his Lordship has remanded the suit to the trial Court with a direction to decide whether the plaintiff was the owner of the disputed premises. At the hearing of the appeal before his Lordship learned Advocate for the appellants raised a contention that the plaintiff in his evidence before the trial court stated that the premises No. 99/2, Hazra Road which belonged to his wife was sold, and with the sale proceeds the plaintiff purchased the disputed premises It was contended on behalf of the defendants-appellants that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence whether the sale proceeds of 99/2 Hazra Road had been gifted to him by his wife. Mookerjee J. took the view that the trial court was not right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises, and he therefore, remanded the suit to the trial court on that point alone.

    13. In paragraph 1 of the plaint the plaintiff stated that the plaintiff became the owner of the disputed premises by purchase on December 14, 1949. To this averment made in paragraph 1 of the plaint the averment in paragraph 2 of the written statement is that the plaintiff is not the sole owner of the disputed premises. The defendants do not mention who else are the owners of the disputed premises along with the plaintiff. There is no dispute that the registered sale deed dated, 14th December, 1949 stands in the name of the plaintiff. The contention that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property has been raised on the basis of a statement made by the plaintiff in his evidence to the effect that the house at 99/2, Hazra Road belonged to his wife and that house was sold in 1944. With the sale proceeds of that house the plaintiff purchased the disputed premises. In the absence of any pleading the defendants cannot be permitted to set up a new case. In our view, the trial court was right in pointing out that the defendants cannot be permitted to say that the plaintiff is merely a benamdar for his wife in the absence of any pleading to that effect. What the defendants are now trying to say is that although the disputed premises stand in the name of the plaintiff the real purchaser is his wife and the plaintiff is merely a benamdar. The defendants cannot be permitted to make out such a case by utilising the statement made by the plaintiff in his evidence when there is no such pleading in the written statement and when there is no specific issue to the effect that the plaintiff is a benamdar of his wife. On the other hand, upon the defendants' pleading as contained in paragraph 2 of the written statement the issue was raised as to whether the plaintiff is the sole owner of the disputed premises and is the plaintiff alone entitled to sue. Amongst the other issues the parties went to trial on this issue. So far as this issue is concerned there is no material on record to hold that there are any other owners of the disputed premises who ought to have been joined as plaintiffs in the suit. That being the position we do not think that an order of remand on a point as has been made in the present case was called for. We, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred upon an appellate court by Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC set aside the order of remand passed by Mookerjee, J. and decree the suit in favour of the plaintiff. We are supported in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Pannalal v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516.

    14. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is dismissed. The order of remand passed by the first appellate court is set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs in this appeal.

    15. In view of the fact that the defendants have been residing in the disputed premises for a long time we allow them time, at first instance upto the 15th November, 1976. If within that period they file a written undertaking to this Court to vacate the disputed premises and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession to the plaintiff the time will be extended till the 31st March, 1977 provided however they go on depositing the current damages or mesne profits at an amount equivalent to the rate of rent month by month within the 15th of next succeeding month in the trial court. In default, of such deposit or deposits being made the decree will become executable forthwith. If the deposits are made as aforesaid the plaintiff would be entitled to withdraw the same without security.

    16. In view of the order which we have made it is not necessary for us to pass any separate order on the application under Order 41, Rule 27 filed on behalf of the respondent. The said application stands disposed of.

    17. R. Bhattacharya, J.:— I agree but I add to what my learned brother has said on the question whether we can interfere with and set aside the limited order for remand passed in the first appeal by Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. for the decision by the trial court whether or not the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises No. 198, Upper Circular Road.

    18. It is needless to state the cases of the parties elaborately as they have been dealt with by my learned brother. The plaintiff as landlord has brought the action in ejectment against his tenants or the allegation that he purchased the premises for the purpose of the use and occupation of himself and the members of his family. He now reasonably requires the premises for such use and occupation and the suit has been started. The defence case is the denial of the reasonable requirement. The ground for eviction has been accepted by both the trial and the appellate courts. The first appellate court, however, sent back the case to the trial court to decide the question whether the plaintiff was the real owner of the suit premises or whether the money with which the property was purchased was made a gift of in favour of the plaintiff by his wife. A question has arisen on the contention of Mr. Bhose whether the plaintiff respondent can object to the order of remand without filing any appeal against the same. There is the provision in Order 41, R. 33 of the CPC read with R. 4. The R. 33 should be liberally construed to give effect in practice to secure ends of justice and also for doing complete justice between the parties after proper adjudication of the disputes raised. This wide and special power under Rule 33 of Order 41 should be used sparingly and with great caution by the appellate Court under special circumstances only when the Court's conscience will not be at rest unless it gives relief under Rule 33. The Court should see that by the relief granted under this provision, no party gets an unreasonable and undue advantage to make up his deficiency in the litigation.

    19. In the instant case we find that the plaintiff asserts in paragraphs 1 and 2 of his plaint that he became the owner of the suit premises by purchase on the basis of a sale deed and that he had ‘purchased the premises for the purpose of this and family members’ own use and occupation’. Against this statement, the defendants say in paragraph 2 of their written statement. “The defendants do not admit that the plaintiff is sole owner of the house…… and the suit as framed is not maintainable in law and also bad for non-joinder of parties”. It is to be particularly noted that the defendants simply denied at best that the plaintiff was the sole owner of the house. They do not assert that the house belonged to several other co-sharers or that the house did not belong to the plaintiff or that the plaintiff purchased the house with money belonging to others. The trial court struck the following relevant issue on the pleadings of the parties.

    1. Is the plaintiff the sole owner of premises No. 198, Upper Circular Road, now Prafulla Chandra Road, Calcutta, and is the plaintiff alone entitled to sue?

    20. The plaintiff himself gave evidence and he stated that he had purchased the disputed premises by a conveyance dated 14-12-49. One of the defendants Biva Banerji was examined on commission. During the examination-in-chief the question put to her by her own Advocate, was “How long the tenants continued their occupation after the plaintiff became the owner?” and the answer was, ‘For about 5/6 years’. The question itself suggested that the plaintiff was the sole owner. There is no indication or suggestion that the plaintiff was not the owner or that there were other co-sharer owners. The following question and answer in course of the examination-in-chief of Biva Banerji should be particularly noted:

    Q. Regarding your assumption that the plaintiff does not require the premises for his own use and occupation,. have you got anything further to state about it?

    Ans. Manmatha Babu has purchased this premises at a very, low price. He wants to evict us and sell the property at a higher price.

    21. In view of the evidence of the defendant herself it is clear that the defendants admitted at the time of trial the plaintiff's case that he was the owner of the house by virtue of the purchase. There is, no evidence on the side of the defendants that the plaintiff is not the sole owner or that there were other co-owners of the plaintiff in respect of the suit house, besides the evidence as mentioned above, there is the deed of sale in favour of the plaintiff brought in evidence. In the circumstances the only irresistible and reasonable conclusion would be, as the trial court drew, that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises. Chittatosh Mookerjee, J., however, held that the plaintiff should prove that he was the owner of the house before he could get a decree for eviction. In this respect about onus there is no dispute, Mookerjee, J., however, found that the evidence regarding ownership is inconclusive. His Lordship has felt this as during cross-examination the plaintiff stated that there was a house on Hazra Road belonging to his wife and the said house was sold away. If is also stated that with the money obtained by the sale of that house, the plaintiff had purchased the suit premises. There was no further, question put to the plaintiff from the side of the defendant challenging the sole ownership of the plaintiff or suggesting that there were other co-sharers with the plaintiff relating to the suit premises. At the time of argument it was contended by the learned Advocate for the defendants that the plaintiff was the benamdar of his wife as he had purchased the premises with money coming out of sale proceeds of the plaintiff's wife's house. This new case set up at the time of argument contradicts the case of joint ownership of the plaintiff and nonjoinder of other necessary parties. This new case was set up at the time of argument on speculation getting the evidence of the plaintiff that he purchased the suit premises with the money he got out of the sale proceeds of his wife's house. There was no suggestion to the plaintiff even that he was the benamdar on behalf of his wife or that the real owner was his wife. Had there been any such case pleaded or even suggested to the plaintiff during ‘cross-examination, the plaintiff could have stated how he became the owner of the said money. In view of the pleadings of the parties and the clinching and unambiguous evidence an record, particularly the admission of the defendant, Biva Banerji regarding the sole ownership of the plaintiff, there was no scope for remanding the case to ascertain whether the suit premises was purchased with the money belonging to the plaintiff's wife. This question of benami is foreign to the pleading of the defendants and without any evidence on the defendants' side ought not to have been considered or allowed to be canvassed either by the trial court or by the appellate court. This order for remand passed by the first appellate court below was against the provision of law and has caused failure of justice. To remedy the injustice done to the plaintiff the order for remand and the connected findings of the first appellate court on issue No. 1 relating to the ownership of the suit premises are liable to be set aside in the exceptional circumstances of this case.

    22. The next point that arises is whether the provision as contained in Rule 33 of Order 41 of the CPC is applicable in a Letters Patent Appeal. Order 41 of the CPC relates to appeals from Original Decree. Order 42, Rule 1 says that rules of Order 41 shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from appellate decrees. According to clause 15 of the Letters Patent for the Calcutta High Court an appeal lies from the judgment of the appellate court as indicated therein.

    23. In the present case the first appeal was finally decided by a judgment in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on all points except one which was to be reconsidered by the trial court on remand on taking further evidence to the prejudice of the plaintiff's case. ‘Decree’ is but a formal expression of the adjudication in the judgment. Decree is, therefore, not distinct from the judgment of the court in an appeal, Judgment of an appeal means a judgment and/or a decree based thereon Judgment for the purpose of clause 15 of the Letters Patent includes a decree. The present Letters, Patent appeal is against the decision in a first appeal and as such the provisions of Order 41 including Rule 33 shall be applicable in this appeal by virtue of Order 42, Rule 1.

    24. In this connexion I may refer to the, decision of the Privy Council in the case of Sabitri Thakurain v. Savi reported in (1921) 25 Cal WN 557 : (AIR 1921 PC 80). This was an appeal before the Board against the decision passed in a Letters Patent Appeal of this Court A contention was raised whether the Orders and Rules made under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 had any application to appeals brought under the Letters Patent of 1865 and whether in particular Order 41, Rule 10 applied to such appeals. The decision in that case is as follows:—

    “The Orders and Rules made under the Code are, by Section 121, given the same effect as if they had been enacted in the Code, and therefore Order 41, Rule 10, is one of the provisions of the Code. It applies to appeals in the High Court including the present appeal, unless any particular section of the Act can be found to exclude it.”

    25. Considering several provisions of law their Lordships of the Privy Council further held:

    “Thus regulations duly made by Orders and Rules under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are applicable to the jurisdiction exercisable under the Letters Patent, except that they do not restrict the express Letters Patent Appeal.”

    26. It is clear, therefore, that the Court in Letters Patent Appeal may apply Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code to suitable cases

    27. It should be noted that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature and the Court is to follow the prescribed procedure in Letters Patent Appeals, Even if it is assumed that Order 41, Rule 33 is not strictly applied, in the absence of any bar in law to the contrary, the Court can for just and proper decision act on the principles laid down in Order 41, Rule 33 under the inherent power and jurisdiction under Section 151 of the CPC.

    28. In the case before us, we have no doubt that Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code will apply and under that provision we modify the judgment and the decree passed in the first appeal as indicated already by my learned brother.

    29. Appeal dismissed.

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    Sm. Biva Banerjee And Another v. Manmatha Nath Banerjee .
    (Sep 21, 1976)