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  • provisions in Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Clause (f) in that Section
  • Section 13 sub-section (1) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
  • Section 13 of the Amending Act (Act XXXIV of 1969)
  • Section 13 of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.3.
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act.
  • Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13
  • Section 13(1)(f) of the W.B.P.T Act, 1956.
  • Clauses (f) and (ff). Relevant provision
  • Section 13 of the Amending Act
  • Section 13(1)(f).(e) Trade
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citation codes
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  • provisions in Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Clause (f) in that Section
  • Section 13 sub-section (1) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
  • Section 13 of the Amending Act (Act XXXIV of 1969)
  • Section 13 of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.3.
  • SECTION 106 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act.
  • Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13
  • Section 13(1)(f) of the W.B.P.T Act, 1956.
  • Clauses (f) and (ff). Relevant provision
  • Section 13 of the Amending Act
  • Section 13(1)(f).(e) Trade
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The tenant-appellant, Bimalendu Bhusan Ghose, occupied a portion of the ground floor (the northern block, including courtyard and shed) at 65 Keshab Chandra Sen Street, Calcutta, as a long-standing tenant for about 25–26 years at a monthly rent of Rs. 45. In 1965 the plaintiffs, the firm Mitra and Ghosh, purchased the property. After purchase the plaintiffs took possession of a portion of the old tenancy (the old bathroom and structure in the courtyard), constructed a new bathroom, and gave that to the tenant by mutual arrangement dated 20 September 1965.

The plaintiffs installed a printing machine in a structure in the courtyard which began operating in 1966; the tenant complained about noise. The landlord served a notice to quit terminating the tenancy in July 1966, demanding possession at the end of August 1966, and then filed the present suit on 20 September 1966 seeking eviction. The notice stated the ground for eviction as the landlord's reasonable requirement of the tenant's portion "for its own use and occupation as well as occupation of its karmacharies."

At trial the tenant contested mainly on two grounds: (1) that a new tenancy had been created on 20 September 1965 (so that the tenancy month ran 20th–19th) and therefore the notice expiring 31 August did not comply with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; and (2) that the pleaded ground for eviction did not satisfy Section 13 of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The Trial Court found there was no new tenancy and granted relief to the plaintiffs on the ground of reasonable requirement under Section 13(1)(f). The tenant appealed; the appellate court heard argument and delivered the judgment summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts, the change in occupancy and the acceptance of rent by the purchasers on 20 September 1965 resulted in the creation of a new monthly tenancy commencing 20 September 1965 (so that the month of tenancy ran from 20th to 19th), thereby rendering the notice expiring 31 August 1966 non-compliant with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs established a "reasonable requirement" for possession under Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (as then in force), sufficient to sustain an eviction decree — in particular, whether the plaintiffs proved they did not have reasonably suitable accommodation in their possession such that the requirement would be objectively reasonable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The tenancy was effectively renewed or a new tenancy created on 20 September 1965 when the plaintiffs purchased the property and accepted rent from that date; therefore the tenancy month ran from 20th of one month to 19th of the next, and a notice expiring on 31 August did not comply with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • The ground for eviction as pleaded by the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements of Section 13 of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956; specifically, the plaintiffs failed to establish the absence of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation in their possession and thus did not establish an objectively reasonable requirement.
  • Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Banerjee) contended the Trial Judge's reasons for finding no new tenancy were erroneous and that on the facts (acceptance of rent from 20 September, alteration in extent of occupation, different rent receipts) a new tenancy had been created.

Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs maintained that the rent remained the old rent of Rs. 45 per month and that the changes (new bathroom, alteration in extent) did not amount to an implied surrender and creation of a new tenancy. The Trial Court accepted that view and found no new tenancy was intended.
  • The plaintiffs pleaded that they required parts of the premises for their business as booksellers, publishers and printers: they stated they had offices, store rooms and a godown at other addresses, had installed a printing machine in the courtyard shed which was being damaged by exposure, required at least two ground-floor rooms for the machine, and had many karmacharies requiring accommodation. The plaint asserted that possession of the portion would relieve rental liability of Rs. 285 per month and help the business.
  • Counsel for the respondents (Mr. Mitter) argued to uphold the Trial Court's conclusion that plaintiffs had made out a case of genuine requirement under Section 13(1)(f) as it stood at trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sailendra Nath Ghosh v. Sm. Ena Dutt, 75 Cal WN 331; AIR 1971 Cal 331 Authority cited concerning whether the amendment to Section 13 (by Act XXXIV of 1969) had retrospective effect; the decision held that the amendment was not retrospective. The court noted the decision but observed that on the facts of the present case the question of retrospectivity of the amendment had no bearing on the result. The court also explained it had deferred judgment pending clarity on this point but ultimately concluded the point did not affect the outcome here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court reviewed two principal lines of reasoning corresponding to the two main grounds pleaded by the defendant.

1. On whether a new tenancy arose on 20 September 1965 (Section 106, Transfer of Property Act)

  • The court set out the legal principle that a landlord–tenant relationship is contractual and depends on privity of contract; when the landlord's interest is transferred to a purchaser, privity with the purchaser is established when the purchaser accepts the occupier as tenant by accepting rent or when the tenant attorns by paying rent to the purchaser.
  • Applying those principles to the facts, the court found that privity between the plaintiffs and the tenant was established on 20 September 1965, in respect of an altered portion left with the tenant, and that the present landlord accepted rent from that date. The court therefore concluded that a new landlord–tenant relationship commenced on 20 September 1965.
  • Although subsequent rents were apparently paid on calendar-month receipts, the court held that the essential fact remained that the tenancy commenced on 20 September and, therefore, the tenancy month ran from 20th to 19th. Consequently, a notice purporting to terminate a tenancy by reference to expiry on 31 August 1966 did not comply with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and was ineffective to terminate the tenancy.
  • The appellate court also explained why the Trial Judge's reasons for holding there was no new tenancy were erroneous: the Trial Judge emphasized continuity of the "bulk of the subject-matter" and changes in amenities, but the appellate court regarded the acceptance of rent and the altered extent of occupation as establishing a fresh privity and new tenancy date.

2. On whether the plaintiffs established "reasonable requirement" under Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act

  • The court examined the plaintiffs' pleaded need: consolidation of scattered business premises (offices, store rooms, godown), danger to a costly printing machine in a temporary shed, requirement of at least two ground-floor rooms, accommodation needs for karmacharies, and financial considerations (saving Rs. 285 monthly).
  • The Trial Court had accepted these factors and found a genuine requirement under Section 13(1)(f). The appellate court accepted that the Trial Court did not deny the factual assertions but held that the Trial Court's findings were not supported by adequate consideration of whether the plaintiffs possessed reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
  • The appellate court explained that objective reasonableness is required under Section 13: the court must consider whether the plaintiffs had reasonably sufficient accommodation in their possession and weigh the landlord's need against the inconvenience to the tenant. The addition (by amendment) of words now in clause (ff) making explicit that the landlord must not be in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation only endorsed an existing line of authority that the absence of suitable accommodation in the landlord's possession is a relevant consideration.
  • The court took judicial notice of locality-specific facts (concentration of publishers and book trade in Shyama Charan Dey Street and related localities) and observed that many of the plaintiffs' business premises were in the known localities for the trade. On a proper evaluation of the evidence, the plaintiffs had not discharged the onus of proving that the rented accommodations already in their possession were not reasonably sufficient for the business. The court emphasised that subjective bona fides or financial convenience to the landlord do not alone satisfy the statutory standard of reasonable requirement.
  • On this basis the appellate court held that the plaintiffs' pleaded requirement was not shown to be objectively reasonable under Section 13(1) and therefore did not justify an eviction decree.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SET ASIDE; THE SUIT FOR EVICTION IS DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties: the eviction suit brought by the plaintiffs (Mitra and Ghosh) fails and the relief sought (possession of the contested portion) is denied. The appellate court also ordered that there shall be no order as to costs in the appeal.

Broader implications: the court applied and emphasised (a) the legal effect of acceptance of rent and attornment in creating privity and a new tenancy date, and (b) the requirement that a landlord's claimed need under Section 13(1) must meet an objective standard of "reasonable requirement," which includes consideration of whether the landlord already has reasonably suitable accommodation in his possession and the inconvenience eviction would cause the tenant. The opinion did not purport to set a new binding precedent beyond its application to the facts before the court.

Disposition recorded in the judgment: "There will be no order as to costs in this appeal." "Appeal allowed."

    Bimalendu Bhusan Das v. Firm Mitra And Ghosh

    JUDGMENT

    1. Appellant Bimalendu Bhusan Ghose is a tenant in a portion of Ground floor of premises No. 65 Keshab Chandra Sen Street, Calcutta. He has been a tenant there for about 25 or 26 years under the previous owner, and occupied entire northern block of the ground floor including the courtyard and shed therein at a monthly rental of Rs. 45/-. The plaintiffs, a firm Mitra and Ghosh represented by the partners, purchased the property in 1965. Old rent of Rs. 45/- per month continued to be paid to the plaintiffs but a portion of the old tenancy namely the old bathroom and the structure in the courtyard, was taken possession of by the landlord and a new bathroom was constructed and was given to the tenant. That was by mutual arrangement arrived at on 20th of September, 1965. Trouble arose when the plaintiffs set up a printing press in the structure in the courtyard and the machine started operating in 1966. Regarding the noise caused by the machine the defendant raised protests. The landlord served a notice to quit and termination of the tenancy in July, 1966 demanding delivery of possession on the expiry of last day of August, 1966 and then instituted the present suit on 20th September, 1966. The notice (Ext. 1) was issued by a lawyer on behalf of his clients, Mitra and Ghosh, and ground for eviction mentioned in the notice was that the landlord reasonably requires the portion in occupation of the tenant “for its own use and occupation as well as occupation of its karmacharies”.

    2. The tenant contested the suit mainly on two grounds first, that a new tenancy was created on 20th September, 1965 under the new landlord at the old rent of Rs. 45/- per month. The month of tenancy was therefore from 20th of one month to 19th of following month. Therefore the notice to quit expiring with the last day of August is not a notice expiring with month of tenancy and should be held to be insufficient to terminate the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The second ground of contest raised by defendant was that ground for eviction pleaded does not satisfy the requirement of Section 13 of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

    3. On the first of these points the learned Trial Judge found upon evidence that there had been changes brought about in the extent of the tenancy in occupation of the defendant on 20th September, 1965 immediately on purchase of the property by the present plaintiffs, so much so that a portion of courtyard with the structure on it and the old bathroom were taken possession of by the landlord and a new bathroom was constructed and given to the possession of the tenant. The rent payable by the tenant remained the same that was being paid by the tenant to the old landlord, that is Rupees 45/- per month. The rent for 1st to 19th of September, 1965, was paid to the old landlord and rent from 20th to 30th September was paid to the present plaintiff. Thereafter rent for full months have been paid under receipts according to English Calendar month. He also noticed the difference in the description of the tenancy appearing between the rent receipts granted by the old landlord describing it as “northern portion of the ground floor”, and those granted by the plaintiffs as “six rooms with bath and privy of the northern portion in the ground floor.”

    4. But on those facts the learned Judge of the City Civil Court held that it did not appear to him that the parties intended thereby that a new tenancy would be brought into being and the nature of modification does not import a new demise. The reasons that weighed with the learned Judge to hold that view have been expressed in the judgment in these terms:

    “The bulk of the subject-matter of the tenancy having remained constant, a change in the amenities such as having a new bathroom in place of an old one, does not, in my opinion, create a new tenancy by implied surrender of the old tenancy.”

    ******

    “Looking at the substance of the matter, it is not possible to hold that the old tenancy was put an end to by implied surrender and a new tenancy was created.”

    ******

    “It is well known that the devolution of the interest of the landlords whether by ordinary succession or by transfer inter vivos, does not ipso facto operate to create any new tenancy.”

    ******

    “There is nothing on record to show that the parties had agreed that the tenancy month should be from the 20th of one month to the 19th of the next month.”

    5. Mr. Banerjee appearing in support of the appeal has contended that the learned Judge's finding is wrong and each of the reasons for that finding is erroneous. After considering the arguments advanced by Mr. Mitter for the respondents in his endeavour to repel Mr. Banerjee's contentions I have reached the conclusion that upon the facts appearing in the evidence which the learned Trial Judge has correctly and fairly ascertained, his conclusion on the resultant effect in fact and legal effect thereof is wrong and reasons for that conclusion are erroneous. Mr. Banerjee's contention should therefore prevail.

    6. It has to be remembered that relationship of landlord and tenant is established contractually and their mutual rights and liabilities under the law depend on privity of contract. When either of the parties transfers his interest in the property, a new privity of contract need be established between the parties to establish a relationship of landlord and tenant. That happens when a purchaser of the landlord's interest accepts the occupier of the tenanted portion as a tenant under him by accepting rent, or when the tenant attorns to the purchaser by paying rent to him as a tenant. Acceptance of rent and attornment establish the relationship by privity of contract spelled out from those acts of the parties. In the event of succession by inheritance of the interest of either landlord or tenant, the successor inherits the property with the rights and liabilities under the contract of tenancy and the privity of the contract continues, though there may not be any act of parties.

    7. In the present case that privity was established on 20th September, 1965, in respect of an altered portion left with and given to the occupation of the tenant and new relationship of landlord and tenant was established. Commencement of that relationship between the parties is 20th September, 1965 and that is emphasised by the fact that the present landlord accepted rent from 20th September, 1965. Common case of the parties is that the tenancy was a monthly tenancy according to English Calendar. The fact that subsequent monthly rents were paid for the whole months of that calendar does not alter the inescapable fact that the monthly tenancy commenced on 20th September. The month of tenancy was therefore 20th of each month to 19th of following month, that being so notice that expired on 31st August is not complying with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and was ineffective to terminate the tenancy, which alone could give the plaintiff cause of action for the suit for eviction. On this ground alone the suit must fail.

    8. The other ground urged by Mr. Banerjee for appellant is also substantial. The ground for eviction of the tenant as elaborated in the plaint is that plaintiffs' firm has a business of booksellers and publishers in a room at No. 10, Shyama Charan Dey Street, Calcutta. They have office in 4 rooms at 84-A, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Store room at 7, Tamar Lane and a godown at 12, Patwar bagan Lane.

    9. The plaintiff has installed the printing machine in a temporary shed at the courtyard. The machine is a costly one and due to the temporary shed the costly machine was getting rusted and other mechanical difficulties, as it was exposed to sun, air and rains.

    10. The plaintiffs have stated in the plaint.

    “In order to solve the shortage of accommodation and in order to meet financial strain on the business, the plaintiff purchased the Premises No. 65, Keshab Chandra Sen Street to shift the office, the printing and publishing business and also for storing books at the suit premises”.

    “The plaintiff requires at least 2 rooms on the ground floor for accommodation of the printing machine.”

    “The contract of service with Karmacharies is to provide accommodation. The plaintiff has got as many as 32 Karmacharies and at present he has to provide them one room, only, at the ground floor, which is under plaintiff's possession and the demand for further accommodation has been highly voiced and failing which one fine morning the door of the business shall be closed. Now-a-days papers are dear and supply of papers are irregular and without storing them beforehand, the business could not be running smoothly and efficiently.”

    “The plaintiff may, also, be relieved of the financial liability to the extent of Rupees 285/-, which have been paid as monthly rent, if, the plaintiff could have the possession of the said portion.”

    11. Regarding these contentions of the plaintiff the learned Trial Judge rightly pointed out that there is no denial of this aspect of the matter by the defendant, who only contended that the tenancy held by the defendant would fall far short of the total accommodation required by the plaintiffs for those purposes. That contention has been rejected by the learned court below on the reasons mentioned in the judgment which may be summarised as:—

    (a) This is no answer to the plea of the plaintiff's requirement.

    If this proves insufficient they can proceed against the other tenants.

    (b) It is beyond doubt that their business is scattered at so many places.

    (c) Their anxiety to shift some of their offices and godowns to the suit premises from the rented premises can be well understood.

    (d) They have made out a case of genuine requirement in terms of Section 13(1)(f).

    (e) Trade Licence in the name of three persons including one who is not a plaintiff does not militate against the plea of bona fide requirement.

    (f) The premises in suit are required reasonably by the plaintiffs in connection with their business.

    12. Mr. Banerjee for the appellants relies on the provisions in Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. Clause (f) in that Section as it stood at the date of the suit has been amended and recast into Clauses (f) and (ff). Relevant provision for our purpose is what is now clause (ff). In that clause the words “the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation” have been added which were not in clause (f) as it stood before that amendment. But reasonable requirement was insisted by that unamended clause (f) also.

    13. I have held that the words now added in clause (ff) were relevant consideration even before clause (f) was amended and the legislature added those words in cl. (ff) only by way of abundant caution and legislative confirmation of decisions of this Court holding that for establishing the reasonableness of requirement plaintiffs needed to show that they had not suitable alternative accommodation in their possession. Otherwise the requirement pleaded could not be held to be reasonable at all. True, for judging that reasonableness, financial aspect is also a relevant consideration but cannot be made a decisive or sole consideration. In that view I do not consider the question of validity of retrospective effect of the amendment sought to be given by Section 13 of the Amending Act (Act XXXIV of 1969) to be relevant for the purpose of decision of this case.

    14. Reasonableness of the requirement pleaded by the plaintiffs would make the question of suitable accommodation existing in. his possession an essential and relevant consideration if the case is considered under Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 as it stood before amendment or if the case is considered under Clause (ff) as it now stands after amendment, which came into force after the decision of this suit in the trial Court but during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. Whether, that amendment is retrospective as Section 13 of the Amending Act seeks to make it or that provision is ultra vires and the amendment is not retrospective as was held by a decision of Division Bench of this Court reported in 75 Cal WN 331 : (AIR 1971 Cal 331), (Sailendra Nath Ghosh v. Sm. Ena Dutt). It was told that the question is awaiting decision in some other litigations and for that reason I deferred delivering this judgment for a length of time since the conclusion of hearing of this appeal. No decision on the point has been brought to notice upto now and on deliberation I have reached the conclusion that on the facts of the present case, re-trospectivity of the amendment or otherwise has no bearing.

    15. The learned Trial Judge has held that

    “Even if the entire accommodation at 65, Keshab Chandra Sen Street, be insufficient the plaintiffs can have some of their offices and Godowns outside in rented premises, but their anxiety to shift some of their offices and Godowns to the suit premises from the rented premises can be well understood. They have made out a case of genuine requirement, in terms of Section 13(1)(f) of the W.B.P.T Act, 1956.” and that “a business in publications and agencies and purchase and sale of books and in printing has necessarily to be carried on in some premises and such a business postulates and certainly does not exclude acquisition of house for location of such business.”

    16. In my view, those findings are not based on sufficient material in evidence and their proper consideration, nor are those findings sufficient to enable the Court to pass a decree for eviction of the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement of the landlord for his own occupation under Section 13(1) of the Premises Tenancy Act. The relevant provision insists on “reasonable requirement” and not ‘genuine requirement’ or ‘bona fide requirements’. For considering reasonableness of the requirement pleaded by plaintiff it is very material consideration if the accommodation existing in the possession of the plaintiffs are reasonably sufficient for the purposes of their business of Book Sellers and Publishers. It is common knowledge that in the City of Calcutta there is definite concentration of such trade in the locality of Shyama Charan Dey Street Where the plaintiffs have their office and shop. It is also well known that essential operatives of business of publishers that the Daftaries and book binders are to live and work in the locality of Patwarbagan Lane. For those reasons all Book Sellers and Publishers reasonably desire to have their offices and business shops in the locality of Shyama Charan De Street and their godowns in the locality of Patwarbagan Lane to put the printed forms within easy reach of bookbinders to work in day and night to make the books ready for publication and sale. These are so loud and notorious facts that those can and should be taken judicial notice of by the Court for appreciating the evidence given in the case and proper decision according to the relevant provision in the Act. The learned trial Judge has not devoted any consideration to that aspect. On devoting consideration to the evidence in the case for proper appreciation, I hold that the finding of the trial court in favour of the plaintiffs cannot be sustained. The plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus to establish that accommodations which are admittedly in their possession in rented premises are not reasonably sufficient for the purposes of their business of booksellers and publishers. Calcutta is a crowded city both for business and residential accommodation. Every inconvenience or feeling of smallness of space or anxiety to shift from rented premises to property owned by the plaintiffs may be ‘genuine’ or ‘bona fide’ and ‘well understood’ as held by the learned Trial Judge, but would not make the requirement pleaded reasonable within Section 13 of the Act.

    17. Reasonable requirements within the meaning of Section 13 in my view is not merely the subjective reasonableness from the stand point of the landlord. But it means objective reasonableness which should be ascertained by considering a subjective effect on the tenant as well along with the subjective requirement of the landlord. In other words by weighing the genuine or real requirement of the landlord with the inconvenience that the tenant will suffer by effect of an eviction decree reasonableness of the requirement of the landlord should be ascertained for its purpose as a ground for eviction.

    18. A requirement that only emphasises the benefits intended by the landlord to achieve, be it convenience of business, be it financial gain by cutting down the rent expenses of the landlord or be it the psychological emphasis of concentrating their business in the property owned by the landlord instead of in several premises rented by them, without any consideration to what the tenant will suffer does not in my view satisfy the reasonable requirement within the meaning of Section 13 sub-section (1) of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. By applying that standard I hold that the evidence in the case do not establish that the landlord's requirement is reasonable. For that reason also the plaintiff is not entitled to the decree prayed for.

    19. In the result, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and dismiss the suit.

    20. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

    21. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Bimalendu Bhusan Das v. Firm Mitra And Ghosh
    (Mar 14, 1973)