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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 of Order 22,
  • sub-rule (4) of Order 22, Rule 4
  • Order 22, Rule 4(1) of the CPC
  • Order 22, Rule 4 of the CPC,
  • Rule 9, Order 22 of the CPC
  • Order 22, Rule 4, sub-rule (4)
  • O. 22, Rule 4. sub-rule (3),
  • Order 22, Rule 4(4)
  • Order 22, Rule 9
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 of Order 22,
  • sub-rule (4) of Order 22, Rule 4
  • Order 22, Rule 4(1) of the CPC
  • Order 22, Rule 4 of the CPC,
  • Rule 9, Order 22 of the CPC
  • Order 22, Rule 4, sub-rule (4)
  • O. 22, Rule 4. sub-rule (3),
  • Order 22, Rule 4(4)
  • Order 22, Rule 9
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted on 24 August 1938 by Pramila Sundari concerning the Will of Debendra Deb Manna, certain Debuttar properties alleged to have been dedicated by Debendra Deb Manna, and other properties purchased by Jogendra Deb Manna out of funds or income of the dedicated properties. The plaintiff sought, among other reliefs, a declaration that alienations of properties appertaining to the Debuttar estate were void and that a consent decree in an earlier suit (Suit No. 372 of 1915) was void as not binding on the deities. The writ of summons was served on the defendants on record at that time.

The original plaintiff Pramila Sundari Laha died on or before 2 February 1943. On about 20 December 1943 Karunamayee Dassi was appointed next friend of the plaintiff Deity. By order dated 10 April 1970 Karunamayee Dassi was removed and Tarasundari Dassi (the present petitioner) was appointed next friend with liberty to proceed. After that appointment, several defendants who were on record died. The opinion lists specific deceased defendants and their dates of death where shown:

  • Harendra Deb Manna (defendant No. 9(c)) — died 14 December 1971;
  • Manindra Deb Manna (defendant No. 9(b)) — died 16 January 1971;
  • Ramendra Deb Manna (defendant No. 14(a)) — died 3 July 1973;
  • Hemendra Deb Manna (defendant No. 4(b)) — died 7 October 1973;
  • Defendant No. 23, Asim Krishna Dutta — died (no date given in the opinion).

The petitioner states that she first learned of some of these deaths from an affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Makhanlal Assadas Joshi on 30 November 1973. On 31 January 1974 the petitioner filed a Master's Summons seeking (a) condonation of delay, (b) setting aside abatement or partial abatement, (c) recording of the deaths, (d) substitution of heirs and legal representatives as indicated in an annexed document, and (e) service of the order and amended plaint on substituted defendants. Several respondents opposed the application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's delay in moving for substitution of heirs and for setting aside abatement (after deaths of defendants) can be condoned and the abatement set aside, having regard to the time limits in Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the petitioner has shown "sufficient cause" (within the meaning discussed in Union of India v. Ram Charan) for not knowing of the deaths earlier and for not applying within the prescribed periods.
  3. Whether the Court can, under Order 22, Rule 4(4), exempt the petitioner from substituting legal representatives of deceased defendants when the application for exemption or substitution is made after abatement has already occurred.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on Order 22, Rule 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (as incorporated by the Court) which provides that whenever the Court thinks fit it may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representative of a defendant who has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing, and judgment may be pronounced notwithstanding death. The petitioner argued that some of the deceased defendants had not filed written statements and therefore exemption from substitution should apply.
  • The petitioner asserted that she first became aware of some deaths from the affidavit affirmed by Makhanlal Assadas Joshi on 30 November 1973 and relied on that as the basis for the timing of her application (filed 31 January 1974).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Standing Counsel Mr. D. Gupta relied on the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Ram Charan (AIR 1964 SC p. 215) to submit that the expression "sufficient cause" under Order 22, Rule 9 should not be liberally construed, and that the plaintiff must prove that she was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit; mere allegation of not coming to know of death is insufficient.
  • One respondent (defendant No. 5(i) Nripendra Deb Manna) asserted by affidavit that the petitioner frequently came to and stayed at the premises where the deceased family members resided and therefore had sufficient knowledge of their deaths at the material times; this challenged the petitioner's claim of ignorance.
  • Respondents relied on a Division Bench decision reported at (1955) 59 Cal WN p. 304 (Nani Gopal Mukherjee v. Panchanan Mukherjee) holding that where no application for substitution was made under Order 22, Rule 4(1) and no order for exemption was made under sub-rule (4), the suit shall abate. From that decision it was argued that sub-rule (4) cannot be invoked after abatement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 SC p. 215 The expression "sufficient cause" under Order 22, Rule 9 should not be liberally construed; the plaintiff must prove that he was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit; mere allegation of ignorance is not enough; reasons must be stated and established when challenged. The Court applied this principle to require the petitioner to satisfactorily explain and prove why she did not know of the deaths within reasonable time. The Court treated the petitioner's bare assertion of first learning about deaths from a stranger's affidavit as insufficient, especially when challenged by respondent affidavits.
Nani Gopal Mukherjee v. Panchanan Mukherjee, (1955) 59 Cal WN p. 304 Where no application has been made for substitution under Order 22, Rule 4(1) and no order for exemption has been made under sub-rule (4), the suit shall abate. The power to exempt under sub-rule (4) must be exercised before abatement. The Court held this decision binding and concluded that the petitioner could not rely on Order 22, Rule 4(4) after abatement had occurred. Consequently, sub-rule (4) was of no help to the petitioner and substitution could not be permitted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded stepwise and was confined to the materials and authorities before it:

  1. Statutory time-limits: The Court noted that under Order 22, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure the petitioner should have applied for substitution within 90 days from the date of the death of each defendant. That 90-day period had expired for the deceased defendants identified in the petition. Further, under Order 22, Rule 4(3) the suit abated as against deceased defendants where substitution was not effected in time, and an application to set aside such abatement should have been made within 60 days from the date of abatement. For most deceased defendants the 60-day period had also passed.
  2. Petitioner's asserted date of knowledge: The petitioner claimed to have first learned of some deaths from an affidavit affirmed by Makhanlal Assadas Joshi on 30 November 1973. The Court observed that the affidavit affirmed on that date would normally be filed and a copy supplied to the petitioner's solicitor, who would then make it available to the petitioner, and therefore it was implausible that the petitioner's knowledge began only on that date. The Court emphasised the absence of particulars in the petition about when and how the petitioner actually received knowledge.
  3. Proximity and relationship: The Court observed that the deceased defendants belonged to the Manna family, resided at a common address shown in the plaint, and were closely related to the petitioner (who was alleged to be interested in the Seva and Puja of the Deity at the same premises). Given that close relationship and proximity, the Court found it surprising that the petitioner would learn of the deaths only from an affidavit of a stranger and yet have no difficulty as to ascertaining heirs and legal representatives.
  4. Onus under precedent: Applying the Union of India v. Ram Charan principle, the Court held that a bare allegation of ignorance was insufficient; the petitioner had to state and establish reasons explaining the delay, particularly when those reasons were challenged by the legal representatives of the deceased. The Court found the petitioner's explanations inadequate in this respect.
  5. On sub-rule (4) of Order 22, Rule 4: The Court considered the petitioner's reliance on the provision allowing the Court to exempt the plaintiff from substituting legal representatives where a defendant failed to appear. The Court accepted the binding authority of the Division Bench decision in Nani Gopal Mukherjee v. Panchanan Mukherjee to the effect that the power to exempt under sub-rule (4) can only be exercised before abatement occurs and cannot be availed of after abatement. Because abatement had already occurred in respect of these deceased defendants and no prior exemption order had been made, sub-rule (4) could not assist the petitioner.
  6. Conclusion drawn from facts and authorities: Considering the statutory time limits, the petitioner's limited explanations, the challenge from a closely related respondent that the petitioner had opportunities to know of the deaths, and the binding precedents requiring proof of sufficient cause and pre-abatement exercise of exemption, the Court concluded that the petitioner had not shown entitlement to the reliefs sought in the Master's Summons.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final disposition was that, except for recording the deaths of the deceased defendants, the petitioner's application was dismissed. The Court ordered the petitioner to pay the costs of the appearing respondents and certified the matter for counsel. The opinion concludes with the phrase "Application dismissed."

Core Ruling: The petitioner's application to condone delay, set aside abatement, and substitute heirs/legal representatives was dismissed; recording of deaths only was allowed.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The suit is treated as having abated as against the deceased defendants because the petitioner did not apply within the statutory periods and did not establish sufficient cause for delay.
  • The petitioner cannot rely on Order 22, Rule 4(4) to exempt substitution after abatement; that power must be exercised before abatement.
  • No new legal principle was laid down by the Court; it applied and followed binding precedents (including Union of India v. Ram Charan and the Division Bench decision in Nani Gopal Mukherjee v. Panchanan Mukherjee) to reach its result.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or reasoning beyond what the opinion contains.

    Annapurna Debi v. Harsundari Dassi

    1. The original plaintiff in this suit was one Pramila Sundari who instituted this suit on the 24th August, 1938, for certain reliefs in respect of the Will of Debendra Deb Manna, deceased, certain Debuttar properties alleged to have been dedicated by the Debendra Deb Manna and in respect of certain other properties purchased by one Jogendra Deb Manna out of the funds or income of the properties dedicated as aforesaid. A declaration that all alienations of properties appertaining to the said Debuttar estate were void and that the consent decree made in an earlier suit being Suit No. 372 of 1915 in this Court was void and of no effect and not binding on the deities was also claimed. It appears that the Writ of Summons was duly served on the defendants who were on record at that time.

    2. Pramila Sundari Laha, the original plaintiff, died on or before 2nd February, 1943. On an application made thereafter on or about 20th December, 1943 one Karunamayee Dassi was appointed as the next friend of the plaintiff Deity in place and stead of the original plaintiff. Thirty seven years thereafter by an order of this Court made on the 10th April, 1970, Karunamayee Dassi was removed from her office as the next friend and one Tarasundari Dassi, the present petitioner was appointed the next friend of the plaintiff Deity with liberty to proceed with the suit. It does not appear what particular steps were taken to have the suit heard thereafter. After the present petitioner was appointed the next friend and was brought on record several of the defendants who were on record died. The particulars of the said deceased defendants are as follows: (1) Harendra Deb Manna, the defendant No. 9 (c) who died on 14th December, 1971; (2) Manindra Deb Manna, the defendant No. 9 (b) who died on 16th January, 1971; (3) Ramendra Deb Manna the defendant No. 14 (a) who died on 3rd July, 1973; (4) Hemendra Deb Manna the defendant No. 4 (b) who died on 7th October, 1973 and (5) defendant No. 23. Asim Krishna Dutta also died.

    3. The case of the present petitioner is that from the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by one Makhanlal Assadas Joshi on the 30th November, 1973, she for the first time came to know of some of the deaths.

    4. On the 31st January, 1974, the present petitioner took out the present Master's Summons praying inter alia for the following orders: (a) that the delay in making this application, if any be condoned; (b) abatement or partial abatement if any, be set aside; (c) the death of the deceased defendants as stated in paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the petition be recorded (d) the heirs and legal representatives of the said deceased defendants be substituted in place and stead of the deceased defendants as indicated in red ink in a copy of the Cause Title and suit register including the genealogical table of the deceased defendants annexed to the petition and collectively marked with the letter “B” (e) a copy of the order made herein together with a copy of the amended plaint be served on the substituted defendants.

    5. This application has been opposed by several of the defendants including some of the purchasers of the properties which are the subject-matters of this suit.

    6. The last of the defendants to die, except the defendant No. 23 as stated hereinbefore was Hemendra Deb Manna who died on 7th October, 1973. All the other defendants died prior to that date. Under Order 22, Rule 4 of the CPC, the present petitioner should have made this application within 90 days from the date of death of the defendants. That 90 days expired in respect of all the defendants who have died. No particulars have been given of the death of the defendant No. 23 or the date when the petitioner knew of such death. In the circumstances under O. 22, Rule 4. sub-rule (3), the suit has abated as against the deceased defendants. The application to set aside the abatement should have been made within 60 days from the date of abatement. In case of most of the deceased defendants the said period of 60 days has also passed. The only ground on which, limitation is sought to be excluded is that the present petitioner came to know about the deaths for the first time on or about 30th November, 1973.

    7. The said Makhanlal Assadas Joshi affirmed his affidavit on the 30th November, 1973. No particular allegation at the said affidavit have been quoted in the petition. It is surprising that the petitioner admits knowledge as from the 30th November, 1973, being the date of the affirmation of the affidavit. Some time should have normally elapsed from the affirmation and the petitioner's knowledge of the same. The affidavit must have been filed and a copy tendered to the petitioner's solicitor on usual charges. The petitioner's solicitor must have obtained such copy and made over the same to the petitioner.

    8. The deceased defendants, all belong to the Manna family. From the Cause Title of the plaint it appears that all of them resided at No. 15 Surendra Nath Banerjee Road, Calcutta. The petitioner is related to them and is alleged to be interested in the Seva and Puja of the Deity located at No. 15 Surendranath Banerjee Road, Calcutta. To say the least it is surprising that the petitioner should come to know of the death of the various members of the Manna family who are rather closely related to her from the affidavit of a stranger. It is also significant that so far as ascertainment of the heirs and legal representatives are concerned, the present petitioner did not have any difficulty or any time was shown to have elapsed for the purpose of such enquiry.

    9. The Standing Counsel Mr. D. Gupta, appearing on behalf of some of the respondents has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC at p. 215 in the case of Union of India v. Ram Charan, where it was laid down that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ under Order 22, Rule 9 should not be liberally construed. The Supreme Court further held that Rule 9, Order 22 of the CPC requires proof that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit. The mere allegation about his not coming to the know of the death of the opposite party is not sufficient. He has to state reasons which, according to him, led to his not knowing of the death of the defendant within reasonable time and he has to establish such reasons to the satisfaction of the Court, specially when the correctness of those reasons is challenged by the legal representatives of the deceased.

    10. In the instant case, a challenge has been thrown by one of the respondents, namely, defendant No. 5 (i) Nripendra Deb Manna. It is alleged in his affidavit that the petitioner frequently came and stayed in the premises No. 15 Surendranath Banerjee Road, Calcutta with her brothers and she has sufficient knowledge of the death of the defendants at the material time. In her affidavit-in-reply the petitioner has not denied that she came to Calcutta at any time but no particulars have been given as to when she came to Calcutta and visited the said premises. No explanation has been furnished by the petitioner why the deaths of her relatives and kinsmen were not known to her.

    11. Mr. Somnath Chattereje, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied on Order 22, Rule 4, sub-rule (4) as incorporated by this Court. The said Rule is as follows.

    “(4) Whenever the Court thinks fit, it may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representative of a defendant who has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may in such case be pronounced against the defendant notwithstanding his death, and such judgment shall have the same force and effect as if it had been pronounced before the death of such defendant”. It is argued that some of the deceased defendants did not file their Written Statement and the necessity of substituting their legal representatives is exempted under the sub-rule.

    12. In answer Mr. Gupta has relied on a case reported in (1955) 59 Cal WN at p. 304 (Nani Gopal Mukherjee v. Panchanan Mukherjee). In this decision, a Division Bench of this Court held that where no application has been made for substitution under Order 22, Rule 4(1) of the CPC and no order for exemption has been made under the provisions of sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 of Order 22, the suit shall abate.

    13. The Court's power to exempt under Order 22, Rule 4(4) can be exercised only before an abatement has taken place and cannot be exercised after abatement. This decision is binding on me and the sub-rule (4) of Order 22, Rule 4 is of no help to the petitioner.

    14. Considering the facts and circumstances and the law as discussed above, I hold that the petitioner is not entitled to any order in this application. Except recording the death of the deceased defendants this application is dismissed. The petitioner will pay the costs of the appearing respondents.

    15. Certified for counsel.

    16. Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Annapurna Debi v. Harsundari Dassi
    (May 3, 1974)