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  • Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 156(3) and Section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code.
  • provisions of Section 200 as amended by Act 26 of 1955.
  • SECTION 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Sections 156(3) and 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Sections 147, 448, 504, 427, 506, 341 and 323, I. P. C.
  • Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506, I.P.C.
  • Sections 147. 448, 504, 427 and 506, I.P.C.
  • Section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 537, Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Section 156(3) of the Code
  • Amending Act 26 of 1955,
  • Section 323, I. P. C.
  • Section 341, I. P. C.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • Section 156(3) and Section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code.
  • provisions of Section 200 as amended by Act 26 of 1955.
  • SECTION 200 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Sections 156(3) and 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Sections 147, 448, 504, 427, 506, 341 and 323, I. P. C.
  • Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506, I.P.C.
  • Sections 147. 448, 504, 427 and 506, I.P.C.
  • Section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 537, Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Section 156(3) of the Code
  • Amending Act 26 of 1955,
  • Section 323, I. P. C.
  • Section 341, I. P. C.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 30 January 1973 the complainant, Md. Shar-fuddin, filed a petition before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, described in the cause title as being under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code, alleging offences under Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The petition contained an alternative prayer that the police be directed to take cognizance treating the complaint as an F.I.R. or, in the alternative, that process be issued against the accused; a list of witnesses was appended to the petition.

By order dated 30 January 1973 the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate examined the complainant on solemn affirmation, held that a prima facie case was made out and summoned the accused under various sections (147, 448, 504, 427 and 506 I.P.C.; accused No.1 additionally under Section 323; accused Nos.5 and 6 also under Section 341). Accused No.5, Mac Culloch (the present petitioner), appeared on 19 February 1973 and was released on bail of Rs. 500. Mac Culloch obtained the present Rule seeking quashing of the proceedings (Case No. C/293/73) pending before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the materials on record disclose mens rea or a criminal offence such that the criminal proceedings should not be quashed at this interlocutory stage (i.e., whether the dispute is essentially civil and lacks requisite mens rea).
  2. Whether the petition was a hybrid application (combining Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and Section 4(1)(h) Cr.P.C.), and if so whether the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate was bad and vitiates subsequent proceedings.
  3. Whether there was non-conformance with the mandatory provisions of Section 200 Cr.P.C. because the learned Magistrate examined only the complainant and did not examine the witnesses “present, if any”, and if such non-conformance vitiates the proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused-Petitioner (Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy)

  • Merits: The materials do not disclose mens rea; the dispute is essentially a tenant-landlord/sub-tenant civil matter inappropriate for criminal forum; continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process.
  • Hybrid petition: The petition's cause-title invoked Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. but the prayer sought either police investigation (treating complaint as F.I.R.) or issuance of process, making it a hybrid petition under Section 156(3) and Section 4(1)(h) Cr.P.C.; cognizance taken was therefore bad.
  • Section 200 compliance: The petition listed six witnesses yet only the complainant was examined; the Magistrate failed to comply with the mandatory duty under Section 200 to examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, thereby vitiating the proceedings.

Complainant / Opposite Party No. 2 (Mr. Abul Hossein)

  • On merits: It is premature to quash criminal proceedings on merits at this stage for lack of mens rea; that point should be decided after trial and proper materials.
  • Hybrid petition: The Magistrate's cognizance was taken on the alternative prayer; therefore taking cognizance and issuing process was not bad or improper.
  • Section 200 compliance: There are no materials on record establishing that other witnesses were present in court with the complainant; hence there was no non-conformance of Section 200.

State (Mr. Barendra Nath Sur)

  • The Rule to quash should not be made absolute at this stage; points raised may be better decided on full evidence at trial.
  • The complainant was examined and relevant papers were perused before issuing process, so there was no prejudice to the accused.
  • If any procedural defect existed, Section 537 Cr.P.C. could cure it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab High Court would be reluctant to interfere with criminal proceedings at interlocutory stage; quashing is an extraordinary remedy. The court cited and followed this principle to hold that the first ground (merits/mens rea) was premature for quashing and that quashing is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised only in proper cases.
Quebec Railway Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry (AIR 1920 PC 181) Interpretive principle: give effect to all words used by the legislature; do not treat statutory words as wasted. The court invoked this authority to support the view that the words of Section 200 must be given effect and that the provision is mandatory rather than directory.
Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor (1936) 63 Ind App 372; 37 Cri LJ 897 (PC) Where power is given to do a thing in a certain way, it must be done in that way or not at all. The court relied on this principle to hold that compliance with the procedure prescribed in Section 200 is obligatory and other methods are forbidden.
Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar v. Wadilal Panchal (AIR 1958 Bom 335; 1958 Cri LJ 1134) Held that if the complainant did not ask the Magistrate to examine witnesses, there was no obligation on the Magistrate to take such evidence suo motu. The court noted this decision but observed that subsequent judicial opinion had favoured a more stringent view; the decision was discussed but not followed as the prevailing view favours mandatory enquiry about witnesses.
P. S. Ramaswami Nadar v. R. Viswanathan (1957 Cri LJ 673 (Mad)) Section 200 is mandatory; magistrate should ask the complainant whether witnesses are present and, if so, examine them or record that none were present. The court expressly approved these observations and held that the magistrate should state whether witnesses were present; absence of such a finding in the impugned order entitled the accused to benefit.
Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal Purpose of examination at complaint stage: to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case and to prevent issue of process on a false, vexatious or harassing complaint; to find whether sufficient ground exists for proceeding. The court relied on this Supreme Court exposition to reinforce that Section 200 is substantive protection for accused and not a mere formality, supporting the conclusion that non-conformance vitiates proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the three dimensions of the accused-petitioner's challenge in sequence.

1. Merits (mens rea / civil nature): The court accepted that Mr. Roy's submissions raised questions of merits — principally whether the dispute was essentially civil and whether mens rea was absent — but held these were not appropriate for determination at the interlocutory stage. Citing R.P. Kapur, the court reiterated that quashing is an extraordinary remedy and the High Court is generally reluctant to interfere before trial. The court therefore found the merits argument premature and not a basis for quashing at this stage.

2. Hybrid petition / cognizance: The court examined the application and its prayers, noting that the petition contained alternative prayers (police investigation treating complaint as F.I.R. or issuance of process). The learned Magistrate ultimately proceeded on the alternative prayer to issue process. The court concluded that the procedure followed was not illegal or improper and that the taking of cognizance on that basis did not vitiate the proceedings. The court rejected the contention that the amalgam petition rendered the cognizance bad, and held that this ground failed.

3. Compliance with Section 200 Cr.P.C.: The court undertook a detailed statutory and precedential analysis. It set out the amended text of Section 200 (as amended by Act 26 of 1955) which requires the Magistrate to "at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath" and reduce the substance to writing. Applying the interpretive principle that statutory words must be given effect (citing Quebec Railway) and the principle that a power given to be exercised in a certain way must be exercised in that way (citing Nazir Ahmed), the court held that the language of Section 200 is mandatory, not merely directory.

The court considered earlier authority (Dattatraya) that took a more permissive view, but observed that subsequent judicial opinion, including the Madras High Court in P. S. Ramaswami Nadar, has treated Section 200 as imposing an obligation on the magistrate to inquire whether witnesses are present and to examine them if so, or to record that none are present. The court expressly approved that approach and concluded that the impugned order contained no finding that no witnesses were present; the record did not show that witnesses were absent nor did the complainant aver their absence.

Relying further on the Supreme Court's statement in Nirmaljit Singh Hoon regarding the protective purpose of examination under Section 200 (to ascertain prima facie case and prevent vexatious complaints), the court concluded that non-conformance with Section 200 amounted to a non-conformance with the procedure established by law and vitiated the proceedings. The court rejected the submission that Section 537 Cr.P.C. cured the defect, holding that the alleged non-compliance was with mandatory statutory procedure and that the absence of any finding about presence or absence of witnesses entitled the accused to relief.

On this basis the court found the procedural defect substantial and concluded that further continuance of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court made the Rule absolute and QUASHED the proceedings in Case No. C/293/73 pending before Shri H. N. Sen, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta under Sections 147, 448, 504, 427, 506, 341 and 323 I.P.C. against all the accused; additionally under Section 323 I.P.C. against accused No.1; and under Section 341 I.P.C. against accused Nos.5 and 6.

Direct implications: The immediate and direct effect is that the criminal proceedings identified above were quashed as a consequence of the court's finding of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 200 Cr.P.C.; the accused are relieved of the processes issued in that case. The court did not issue directions for a fresh prosecution, noting that such a direction would go beyond the ambit of the Rule and that a fresh prosecution (if lawful) is a matter for the complainant to pursue.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasizes that Section 200 Cr.P.C., as amended, must be given effect to as a mandatory protective procedure and that non-conformance may vitiate proceedings. The opinion does not, in its text, purport to lay down a novel principle beyond application and exposition of existing authorities cited.

    Mac Culloch v. The State And Anr

    1. This Rule is at the instance of the accused-petitioner, Mac Culloch for quashing proceedings under Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, being case No. C/293/73, pending against the petitioner and others in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta.

    2. The facts leading on to the Rule are short and simple. A petition was filed by the complainant, Md. Shar-fuddin on the 30th January, 1973 before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta under Sections 147, 323, 341, 448, 504, 427 and 506, I.P.C. The cause title mentioned that the application is under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code and it contained a prayer to the effect that the police may be directed to take cognizance of the offences committed on treating the complaint as F.I.R. or in the alternative process may be issued against the accused. A list of witnesses was Riven below the said application. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and by his order dated the 30th January, 1973 held that a prima facie case was made out and summoned all the accused persons under Sections 147. 448, 504, 427 and 506, I.P.C. : the accused No. 1 further under Section 323, I.P.C.; and the accused Nos. 5 and 6 also under Section 341. I.P.C. The accused No. 5 Mac Culloch, who is the present petitioner appeared in the Court below on the 19th February, 1973 and was directed to be released on a bail of Rs. 500/-. He impugned the said proceedings and obtained the present Rule.

    3. Three points have been raised by Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy, Advocate (with Mr. S. P. Roy Choudhury, Advocate) in support of the Rule. The first one relates to merits and is to the effect that the materials on the record do not disclose any mens rea on the part of the accused in a dispute, between a tenant-landlord and a sub-tenant, that is essentially of a civil nature, and for a proper determination whereof the criminal court is not the proper forum. The second dimension of his arguments is that the petition filed is a hybrid one being both under Sections 156(3) and 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code and the cognizance taken thereupon by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta has been bad, vitiating thereby all the subsequent orders. The third and last branch of Mr. Ray's contention relates to a non-conformance to the mandatory provisions of Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code inasmuch as the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, while taking cognizance of the offences, did not examine the witnesses present along with the complainant. In this context he submitted that no less than six witnesses were mentioned in the petition of the complaint. Mr. Abul Hossein, Advocate (with Mr. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, Advocate) appearing on behalf of the complainant-opposite party No. 2 joined issue contending inter alia that it is premature at this stage to quash the criminal proceedings on merits on the ground that there is no mens rea disclosed; that the cognizance taken by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta is on the alternative prayer made in the petition of complaint; and that there has been no non-conformance to Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code; inasmuch as there are no materials on the record to establish that witnesses were present on the occasion along with the complainant. Mr. Barendra Nath Sur, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State also opposed the Rule. He submitted in the first instance that there should be no quashing of the criminal proceedings at this stage and the points raised may be decided on proper materials adduced during the trial. Mr, Sur further contended that the complainant was examined and the relevant papers were perused before the processes were issued and as such there has been no prejudice.

    4. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties and on going through the materials on the record I will now take up for consideration the first dimension of the arguments advanced on behalf of the accused-petitioner. Mr. Roy contended that the dispute on ultimate analysis does not disclose a criminal offence and the continuance of the present proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the Court. He further submitted in this context that there is clearly no mens rea on the part of the accused. Mr. Roy's submissions relate to the merits of the cases and it is difficult at this stage to decide either way. Whether the accused persons had mens rea or not can only be determined on proper materials adduced during the trial. It is pertinent in this context to refer to the case of R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab. wherein Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar (as his Lordship then was) delivering the judgment of the Court observed that

    "ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage"
    , I respectfully agree with the same and I hold that quashing is always an extraordinary remedy and can only be allowed in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The first ground urged by Mr. Roy is a point which is to be decided on merits and on proper materials adduced before the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta at the proper stage, and is therefore premature. I agree therefore with the submissions made by Mr. Hossain and Mr. Sur and I hold that on this ground alone the proceedings in the Court below cannot be quashed. I will proceed therefore to consider the other two contentions.

    5. The second dimension of Mr. Ray's contentions relates to the cognizance as taken being bad and improper. The steps of Mr. Ray's reasoning in this context are that the cause-title of the application filed is under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code; that the prayer portion is however two fold, viz. that the police may be directed to take cognizance on treating the complaint as F.I.R. or in the alternative, processes may be issued against the accused; and that the petition filed is a hybrid one both under Section 156(3) and Section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Ray submitted that under Section 156(3) of the Code the learned Magistrate, empowered under Section 190, may order an investigation into a cognizable case. But the amalgam petition filed by the complainant led to a hybrid procedure being followed by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, The resultant cognizance is therefore bad. Mr. Hossain contended that prayers being made in the alternative, the taking of cognizance on the application is on a complaint under Section 4(1)(h), Criminal Procedure Code and is therefore not bad and improper. Mr. Sur appearing on behalf of the State also joined issue and submitted that there has been no defect and even if there was any, the same has been cured under Section 537, Criminal Procedure Code. On a consideration of the petition and prayers made therein, I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 and the State. By and large, the application is in the alternative and ultimately the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta has proceeded on the second part of the prayer contained in the petition and issued the processes. The procedure followed accordingly has not been illegal or improper. The proceedings therefore pending in the Court below cannot be quashed on this around also and the second dimension of Mr, Ray's arguments accordingly fails.

    6. The third and last branch of Mr. Ray's contentions is one of law and relates to procedure based on the interpretation of Section 200. Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Ray submitted that in the present case there are no less than six witnesses mentioned in the petition of complaint and there is no reason as to why the complainant alone was examined. Mr. Hossain joined issue and submitted that the emphasis by the legislature is "on examining the witnesses present, if any". The learned Magistrate is not bound to examine witnesses who are not present and in any event the purported defect is curable under Section 537. Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Sur, appearing on behalf of the State, supported the submissions of Mr. Hossain, It is pertinent therefore to refer to the provisions of Section 200 as amended by Act 26 of 1955. It provides as follows:

    A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate". This is followed by a proviso containing four paragraphs but those will not be pertinent for consideration at this stage. Mr. Hossain submitted that the word 'shall' is not mandatory and in any event a non-examination of the witnesses along with the complainant will not vitiate the proceedings. The provisions, in my opinion, are undoubtedly mandatory. Some meaning and effect must be given to the intention of the legislature as incorporated in the words of the statute. As was observed by Lord Sumner in the case of Quebec Railway Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry AIR 1920 PC 181 at p. 186 that effect must be given if possible to all the words used, for the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain.

    I respectfully agree with the same and giving effect to all the words incorporated in Section 200, I hold that the provisions thereof are undoubtedly mandatory and not discretionary. The provisions of the Section are not a mere formality and a non-conformance thereto will be a non-conformance to the procedure established by law. It is pertinent to refer to the observations of Lord Roche in the wellknown case of Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor (1936) 63 Ind App 372 at pp. 381-382 : 37 Cri LJ 897 (PC) viz. that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

    It is difficult therefore to agree with the submissions of Mr. Hossain that the provisions are merely directory and/or a mere formality, a non-conformance whereof will amount at best to a defect curable under Section 537, Criminal Procedure Code. The second branch of Mr, Hossain's submissions in this context is more material, as to whether any witnesses at all were present at the time when the complainant was examined, because the legislature in its wisdom has laid down that the learned Magistrate shall examine "the witnesses present, if any". In the first place it does not appear from the record that such witnesses were not present and secondly no averments have been made that witnesses were not so present. After the Amending Act 26 of 1955, a cloud was raised on the point as to whether the examination of the witnesses is obligatory at the time of the examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation. In the case of Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar v. Wadilal Panchal AIR 1958 Bom 335 : 1958 Cri LJ 1134 it was held that if the complainant did not ask the Magistrate to examine the witnesses, there was no obligation on his part to take such evidence suo motu. The imprimatur of judicial decisions however, took a different view. By and large the present view is that the section having cast an imperative duty to examine the witnesses as well, the more rational interpretation would perhaps, be that the magistrate ought to enquire if there are witnesses to be examined. In a recent decision of the Madras High Court in the case of P. S. Ramaswami Nadar v. R. Viswanathan 1957 Cri LJ 673 (Mad) Mr. Justice Somasundaram observed that The Section is mandatory, and it is therefore obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to examine not only the complainant, but also the witnesses who are present in Court. The Magistrate in future will do well in asking the complainant as soon as he is examined on oath whether any witnesses are present in Court, and if witnesses were present, it is his duty to examine them on oath; but if no witnesses are present, he will do well to mention in the order itself that no witnesses were present according to the statement of the complainant or the advocate who appeared in Court.

    I respectfully agree with the observations made above and in my view the same dovetails into the intention of the legislature as incorporated in the amended provisions of Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case there is no such finding in the order impugned and the benefit must enure to the accused.

    7. It is pertinent in this context to refer also to a recent case of the Supreme Court viz. the case of Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The State of West Bengal . Mr. Justice Shelat delivering the judgment on behalf of himself, Mr. Justice Dua and Mr. Justice Khanna observed at p. 2646 that "the object of such examination is to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case against the person accused of the offence in the complaint, and to prevent the issue of process on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such a person". The Supreme Court further proceeded to observe that "such examination is provided therefore to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding". I respectfully agree with the said observations and I ultimately hold that the provisions of section 200 are not a mere formality, but have been intended by the legislature to be given effect to for the protection of the accused persons against unwarranted complaints. It was urged by Mr. Sur on behalf of the State that the defect if any is cured under Section 537, Criminal Procedure Code and that there has been no prejudice because the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate before issuing processes not only examined the complainant on solemn affirmation but also perused the relevant papers. It is difficult to agree with this view inasmuch as the non-conformance alleged is a non-conformance to the mandatory provisions of the Statute resulting in a non-conformance to the procedure established by law. There are no materials on the record to establish that besides the complainant, other witnesses were not present in Court on the date when cognizance was taken and processes were issued. The complainant has thrown no light on the point at issue and there is also no finding thereupon. In view of the facts and circumstances and in view of the position in law, I uphold the objection raised in this behalf by Mr. Ray on behalf of the accused-petitioner, that the proceedings have been vitiated and any further continuance thereof would be an abuse of the process of the Court. Defects in procedure brought to the notice of the Court should be set right at the earliest stage as otherwise there will ultimately be prejudice to all concerned. Mr. Hossain lastly submitted that a direction may be given for a fresh prosecution in accordance with law. This will be travelling beyond the ambit of the Rule. No such directions by the Court are necessary, if such a prosecution otherwise lies and the complainant chooses to do so. The third and last dimension of Mr. Ray's contentions accordingly succeeds.

    8. In the result, I make the Rule absolute; and I quash the proceedings, being case No. C/293/73, pending before Shri H. N. Sen, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta under Sections 147, 448, 504, 427, 506, 341 and 323, I. P. C. against all the accused, also under Section 323, I. P. C. against the accused No. 1, and under Section 341, I. P. C. against the accused Nos. 5 and 6.

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    Mac Culloch v. The State And Anr
    (Mar 19, 1973)