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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a judgment and order dated May 24, 1972, where the appellants were held guilty of contempt of court for not complying with an ad interim injunction issued by this Court on September 22, 1971. The appellants were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, which was remitted following a verbal unqualified apology, but they were directed to pay costs assessed at twenty gold mohurs. The case involves two respondents, Hari Shankar Pant and Subhash Kumar Saksena, who were appointed as Higher Grade Clerks in the Andaman and Nicobar Administration on deputation from the Uttar Pradesh Government. The Administration reverted the respondents to their parent department by orders dated September 4, 1971, and relieved them of their duties in mid-September 1971.

The respondents challenged the reversion orders by filing writ petitions and obtained an ad interim injunction restraining the appellants from giving effect to the reversion orders and directing them to allow the respondents to continue in service until disposal of the Rule. Despite communication of this injunction, the respondents were not allowed to resume duties. The Administration awaited a certified copy of the order before compliance and eventually moved to vacate the injunction, which was vacated on January 14, 1972, with a stay on the operation of that order. The respondents then applied for punishment of the appellants for contempt of court, resulting in the impugned judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants wilfully and deliberately violated the ad interim injunction issued by this Court on September 22, 1971.
  2. Whether the appellants’ failure to allow the respondents to continue in service constituted contempt of court.
  3. The effect and scope of the injunction order in relation to the respondents’ service, given that they had already been relieved before the injunction was passed.
  4. The legal sufficiency and effect of the unqualified apology tendered by the appellants in the contempt proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellants denied any wilful or contumacious disobedience of the Court’s order and submitted that the failure to comply was due to reasons beyond their control.
  • The respondents were appointed on deputation for a fixed period and there was no assurance of permanent absorption; the Administration was bound by Central Government orders directing reversion of deputationists.
  • The appellants had made diligent efforts to secure permanent absorption of the respondents but were refused by the Central Government.
  • The ad interim injunction restraining the appellants from giving effect to the reversion was in fructuous as the respondents had already been relieved before the injunction was issued.
  • There was no positive order from the Court directing reinstatement or continuation of the respondents in service.
  • An unqualified apology was tendered before the Trial Court and again before this Court, which was bona fide and should be accepted.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the appellants wilfully disobeyed the injunction by refusing to allow them to resume duties after communication of the Court’s order.
  • The refusal to permit the respondents to join was a gross violation of the Court’s order and contemptuous conduct.
  • The apology tendered by the appellants was neither sincere nor bona fide, given that the appellants had not complied with the Court’s order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dinabandhu Sahu v. State of Orissa, (1972) 4 SCC 761 An apology tendered through counsel at the time of hearing, if sincere, is sufficient and conviction cannot rest solely on apology not being in writing. The court found the appellants’ unqualified apology bona fide and accepted it, relying on this precedent to support leniency.
Mulkh Raj v. State of Punjab, (1972) 3 SCC 839 An apology must be offered at the earliest opportunity and in good faith to be accepted; a late apology may be regarded as insincere. The court held this precedent not applicable as the appellants tendered apology at the outset, not belatedly.
A.I.R 1967 A.P 19 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Compliance with a High Court order is mandatory, and no excuse of awaiting superior authority’s directions excuses non-compliance. The court distinguished this precedent, noting that here the appellants were bound by Central Government orders and did not wilfully refuse compliance.
A.I.R 1969 Mad. 232 (Madras High Court) No government officer can independently judge the correctness of a Court order and act contrary to it; refusal to comply amounts to contempt. The court found this precedent inapplicable as there was no refusal to comply but compliance was constrained by higher authority orders.
A.I.R 1951 Cal. 397 Failure to carry out Court orders for a prolonged period constitutes serious contempt, even if not wilful. The court found this precedent irrelevant due to the different facts and the absence of prolonged delay or wilful disobedience here.
72 C.W.N 431 A party cannot disobey an order known to it, regardless of legal advice; acting contrary to Court orders is contempt. The court held this precedent not applicable as the issue here was different and related to the termination of deputation by higher authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the facts and legal context surrounding the appellants’ alleged contempt. It noted that the respondents had already been relieved of their duties before the injunction was granted, rendering the injunction restraining further effect to the reversion orders inoperative or in fructuous. The Court emphasized that the appellants were bound by the Central Government’s directive to revert deputationists and had no discretion to extend deputation or absorb the respondents permanently without approval. The Court found no positive order from itself directing reinstatement or continuation of the respondents in service.

The Court distinguished the precedents cited by the respondents, finding them inapplicable due to differing factual circumstances, particularly the absence of wilful or deliberate defiance by the appellants. It held that the failure to comply was due to reasons beyond the appellants’ control and not contumacious conduct. The Court also considered the unqualified apology tendered by the appellants before the Trial Court and at the hearing of the appeal, and found it bona fide and deserving acceptance under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The Court reiterated the principle that contempt must arise from wilful and deliberate violation of Court orders that substantially interferes with the due course of justice, as provided under Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It concluded that the appellants’ conduct did not meet this threshold and the Trial Court erred in convicting and punishing them for contempt.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed.

The judgment and order convicting the appellants for contempt and imposing a fine along with costs are set aside. The Rule nisi issued in the contempt proceedings is discharged, and there is no order as to costs. The decision directly affects the parties by exonerating the appellants from contempt liability and remitting the fine and costs. No new legal precedent is established by this judgment.

    Butalia H.S And Ors. () v. Subhash Kumar Saksena And Anr. (S).

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    B.C Mitra, J.:— This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated May 24, 1972, whereby the appellants were held guilty of contempt of court and were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- which, however, was remitted by reason of the verbal unqualified apology tendered on their behalf. But they were directed to pay the costs of the application which ware assessed at twenty gold mohurs. As the facts involved in this appeal and in F.M.A No. 518 of 1972 are the same and as one judgment was delivered to cover both the applications for contempt, this judgment will cover both the appeals mentioned above.

    2. The respondents were appointed Higher Grade Clerks under the Andaman and Nicobar Administration, on deputation. Their parent department was the Home Department of the Uttar Pradesh Government. The respondent Hari Shankar Pant in F.M.A No. 518 of 1972 was originally appointed as a clerk in the Office of the Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate Examination, and thereafter having been successful in a competitive examination, he was appointed a Lower Division Assistant, in the Office of the Home Secretary, Uttar Pradesh Government on April 4, 1969. Subhash Kumar Saksena the respondent in F.M.A No. 519 of 1972 was appointed a Lower Division Assistant on May 21, 1955 in the Home Department of Uttar Pradesh Civil Secretariat. The Andaman and Nicobar Administration (hereinafter referred to as the Administration) addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Government dated September 28, 1964, requesting the services of a few experienced and efficient Upper Division Clerks, for appointment on deputation basis, as Higher Grade Clerks in the various offices of the Administration. By an order dated July 22, 1965, the Uttar Pradesh Government placed the services of the two respondents at the disposal of the Administration, as both the respondents had opted to work on deputation on the terms mentioned in the Administration's letter on September 28, 1964. Accordingly both the respondents joined as Higher Grade Clerks in the Administration with effect from July 29, 1965. According to the respondents they were assured by the Administration that they would be permanently absorbed in the service of the Administration.

    3. On September 4, 1971, the Administration passed an order reverting the respondents to their parent office namely Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, with effect from the date of sailing of T.S.S State of Bombay, Ex-Port Blair for Calcutta on or about September 15, 1971. Both the respondents were directed to report for duty to the Assistant Secretary Government of Uttar Pradesh, Home (Police E) Department, Lucknow, after availing themselves of the joining time as admissible on transfer. Thereafter the respondent Pant was relieved of his duties under the Administration with effect from September 15, 1971 and the respondent Saksena was similarly relieved from his duties with effect from September 13, 1971.

    4. Aggrieved by the order of reversion both the respondents filed writ petitions in this Court challenging the order of reversion dated September 4, 1971 and the two orders dated September 13 and September 15, 1971, whereby they were relieved of their duties under the Administration. The writ petition was moved on September 22, 1971, and on the same day a Rule nisi was issued in both the petitions and an ad interim order was made in terms of prayer (f) of the petition which was as follows:—

    “For an interim injunction restraining the respondents and/or their agents and servants from giving effect to or any further effect to the impugned orders made annexure [A-1, “X” and “K” in C.R 6362(W)/1971 and “N” and “O” in C.R 3263(W)/1971] respectively to this application and reverting and/or relieving the petitioner from his present posting as Higher Grade Clerk in the Scale of Rs. 130-300 in the office of the Chief Commissioner's Secretariat, Pori Blair (in case of Hari Shankar Pant) in the office of Andaman Public Works Department (in case of Subhas Kumar Saksena) and further directing the respondents to allow your petitioner to continue as a Higher Grade Clerk in the scale of Rs. 130-300 under the Andaman and Nicobar Administration in the Chief Commissioner's Secretariat, Port Blair till the disposal of the Rule.”

    5. The learned Advocate of the respondents by his letter of September 22, 1971, communicated the ad interim order made by this Court to the appellants. On September 24, 1971, both the respondents reported for duty in the Office of the Chief Secretary of the Administration when they carried with them a written representation addressed to the Chief Secretary together with a copy of a letter of their Advocate dated September 22, 1971.

    6. The respondents' case is that inspite of the ad interim injunction issued by this Court and inspite of communication of the same by the letter of their Advocate mentioned above, they were not allowed to resume their duties on September 24, 1971. On the next day the respondents were served with a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Administration by which the respondents were informed, that intimation from this Court regarding the Rule issued and the Order made on the writ petition was awaited for compliance. It was added that the Administration would be most willing to comply with the order of this Court both, in letter and spirit, as soon as an authorised copy of the order was received. The memorandum concluded by saying that till the receipt of the order the status quo must remain.

    7. On September 27, 1971, the respondents again made representations to the administration that certified copy of the order of this Court could not be procured as this Court was closed for the long vacation. This was followed by a letter dated Octobers, 1971, from the learned Advocate of the respondents to the appellant No. 1, intimating that communication of an order of this Court by letter of the Advocate was always accepted as an authentic report, and requesting that the respondents should be allowed to resume their duties in compliance with the order mentioned above. This was followed by some communication from the respondents for payment of their salary. On October 27, 1971, the Administration made an application for vacating the interim order mentioned above before the Vacation Bench of this Court. This application was disposed of on January 14, 1972, by an order vacating the ad interim order mentioned above. The operation of the order, however, was stayed. This completes the narration of events.

    8. As the respondents were not allowed to resume their duties inspite of the ad interim order made by this Court both of them moved two separate applications for punishment of the appellants for contempt of court. Rule nisi was issued and this Rule was made absolute by the judgment and order under appeal.

    9. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the appellants apology was tendered in the following terms:—

    “That before I proceed to deal with the statements made and/or contention raised in the petition paragraph wise, I say that it is far from our intention to violate the order of this Hon'ble Court. I and the other respondents have not wilfully disobeyed and/or disregarded the order of the interim injunction as issued on 22nd September, 1971. I and the other respondents did not act contumaciously and I and the answering respondents did not disobey the order dated 22nd September, 1971 as passed by this Hon'ble Court as alleged. If it appears to this Honb'le Court that there has been a violation of the interim order of the injunction as issued by this Hon'ble Court on 22nd September, 1971 either by the deponent or by any of the answering respondents or jointly. I hereby tender unqualified apology to this Hon'ble Court for such violation and I being also specifically authorised by the others answering respondents offer similar apology on their behalf and pray that our apology be accepted.”

    10. The principal contention of the appellants in this appeal is that in answer to a circular dated September 28, 1964, issued to the Chief Secretaries of all State Governments, requesting the services of experienced Upper Division Clerks on deputation basis, the candidature of the respondents was sponsored by the U.P Government, and the respondents were appointed as Higher Grade Clerks on deputation basis for a period of three years in the first instance with effect from July 29, 1965 on the terms and conditions laid down in a letter of the Administration dated September 16, 1965. It is denied that there was any possibility of the respondents' permanent absorption in the services of the Administration as a condition of deputation. The other contentions raised in the affidavit-in-opposition are as follows:—

    (a) On 2-11-68 the respondents on their own accord applied for permanent absorption under the Administration and while this was under consideration, the Government of India by its letter of 4-6-69 intimated the Administration that appointments to Class III and Class IV posts under the Administration should be made locally in the Islands and if suitable candidates were not available locally the administration should obtain specific approval of the Home Ministry before making recruitment from the mainland. It was clarified that deputationists appointed against specified posts for specified periods for deputation could not be considered as local persons and they should not be permanently absorbed against Class III and Class IV posts and that if suitable candidates were not available locally, the Administration should obtain the approval of the Central Government for each individual case of permanent absorption.

    (b) The case of permanent absorption of the respondents was referred to the Central Government by the Administration by its letter of 26-4-71. But this proposal was rejected by the Central Government by its letter dated 22-5-71. The matter was again referred to the Central Government by the Administration's letter of 21-6-71 by which the Central Government was requested to re-consider its earlier decision and to allow the deputationists to be permanently absorbed under the Administration. The Central Government refused to accede to the request of the Administration and directed that all deputatationists should be reverted to their parent departments.

    (c) Thereafter the deputationists, including the respondents, made representations to the Central Government requesting their permanent absorption and these representations were forwarded to the Central Government by the Administration's letter of 5-8-71.

    (d) The respondents were informed that their representations had been forwarded to the Central Government and pending receipt of its decision, the respondents should keep themselves ready to proceed on reversion.

    (e) Ultimately the Central Government did not agree to the proposal of permanent absorption and directed the Administration to take immediate action for reversion of the deputationists to their parent departments.

    (f) It is only thereafter that orders were issued reverting the respondents to their parent departments and they were relieved of their duties by the two letters of September 13 and September 15, 1971.

    11. Mr. A.K Dull Counsel for the appellant commenced his arguments by tendering unqualified apology to this Court for what has been done by his clients. He submitted that apology was tendered on behalf of his clients before the Trial Court also who had accepted the same, and had on that basis remitted the punishment. He argued, however, that without in any way detracting from or impairing the apology tendered, it should be held that the appellants were not guilty of contempt of court, as there was neither wilful defiance to the order of the Court, nor was there any contumacious conduct on the part of the appellants, which was likely to interfere with the due course of justice, or likely to offend the dignity of the Court. It was argued that the appellants were all the time eager end anxious to retain the services of the respondents in the Administration, and to that end had made diligent efforts to persuade the Central Government to agree to the absorption of the respondents in the Administration's service. He also argued that his clients had no option but to pass the order relieving the respondents of their duties, as the Central Government mere than once refused to argue to the proposal of the Administration, and even refused to extend the deputation of the respondents. With regard to the letter dated September 25, 1971, which is Annexure Y to the petition, in which it was stated that the Administration would be most willing to comply with the order of this Court both in letter and spirit, Mr. Dutt argued that the letter clearly showed that the Administration was eager to comply with and carry out the order of this Court. There was not, it was argued, the least evidence of defiance or unwillingness to carry out the order of the Court.

    12. The ad interim order made by this Court on September 22, 1971, restrained the respondents from giving the effect or any further effect to the order relieving them of their duties. But on the date that ad interim injunction was issued, the respondents had already been relieved of their duties by the two orders dated September 13 and September 15, 1971. Quite plainly the injunction orders restraining the appellants from giving effect to the order had become in fructuous as the order had already been made. The respondents also understood that so far as their services in the Administration were concerned, there was a termination of the same and it is for that reason that they wrote to the Chief Secretary of the Administration on September 24, 1971, that although they had been relieved of their duties, they were submitting a duty report. It is also clear that the injunction so far as it restrained the appellants from giving any further effect to the orders was concerned, that also became in fructuous, as on the day the order was made the respondents were already relieved of their duties and nothing further remained to be done which could be restrained by the ad interim order of injunction. The deputation of the respondents had come to an end under the orders of the Central Government. In the matter of the extension of the deputation or in the matter of absorption of the respondents in the service of the Administration, the appellants clearly were bound by the orders of the Central Government, which in no uncertain terms directed the appellants to put an end to the deputation of the respondents. There was no order of this court directing the appellants to reinstate the respondents in the service of the Administration, although the respondents stood relieved of their duties. Indeed if there was any such order of this court directing the appellants to reinstate the respondents or to re-appoint them or even to extend their deputation, there would have been some force in the argument of counsel for the respondents that there was wilful disobedience to the order of this court.

    13. Turning now to the second part of the ad interim order which directed the appellants to allow the respondents to continue as Higher Grade Clerks under the Administration till the disposal of the Rule, counsel for the appellants contended, and we think rightly, that the directions to continue the respondents postulated that there was something in existence, which could be continued. In other words, it was argued that something which had ceased to exist could not be continued, and as the respondents' service under the Administration stood terminated, it could not possibly be continued after September 13 and September 15, 1971. It seems to us that this contention of counsel for the appellants is well founded and must be upheld. The order, as I have noticed earlier, directed the appellants to continue the respondents in the service of the Administration. But on the day the order was made, such service had already come to an end, and therefore in the absence of a positive older or direction upon the appellants to reinstate or re-appoint the respondents, it cannot be said that the appellants by reason of their failure to allow the respondents to join their duties under the Administration had violated the order of this Court.

    14. Counsel for the respondents, however, argued that it was the duty of the appellants, after receipt of the communication from the learned Advocate of the respondents, communicating the order of this Court, to allow the respondents to join their duties until further orders of this Court. It was argued that the refusal of the appellants to allow the respondents to join their duties was a gross violation of this Court's order. In the peculiar facts of this case, in which the Administration was bound by the orders of the Central Government, this contention on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted. It was not open to the appellants, having regard to the orders made on September 13, 1971, to allow the respondents to continue to discharge their duties of which they stood relieved, on the day the order of this Court was made. The appellants were not free agents in the matter of appointing the staff of the Administration, they were bound by the order of the Central Government and that position should not be lost sight of. The eagerness of the appellants to retain the service of the respondents in the Administration cannot be questioned and in relieving the respondents of their duties it had merely given the effect to the directive issued to them by the Central Government.

    15. Turning now to the question of apology it is to be noticed that apart from the written apology tendered in the affidavit-in-opposition mentioned earlier in this judgment, counsel for the appellants tendered unqualified apology to this Court at the commencement of the hearing of this appeal and also before the Trial Court. Under the Explanation to Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. We have do reason to think that the apology tendered before the Trial Court and also before this Court is anything but bona fide. On the question of apology counsel for the appellants relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court (1) Dinabandhu Sahu v. State of Orissa, (1972) 4 SCC 761 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 180. In that case it was held that where the Court was convinced about the sincerity of the apology tendered through counsel at the time of hearing, the conviction merely on the ground that apology was not in writing was not sustainable. On the question of any further effect being given to the order of relieving the respondents of their duties counsel for the appellants relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1972) 3 SCC 345 : A.I.R (1971) S.C 2147. We do not think that this decision has any application to the facts in this case as the question in that case was interpretation of Section 34(1-B) of the U.P Municipalities Act.

    16. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand strenuously contended before us that the apology tendered on behalf of the appellants was neither sincere nor bona fide. It was also argued that the appellants had not yet given effect to the order of this Court and therefore the apology tendered was shorn of all its merits. In support of his contention on the question of apology counsel for the respondents firstly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court (2) Mulkh Raj v. State of Punjab, (1972) 3 SCC 839 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 1197 in which it was held that an apology was an act of contrition and unless it was offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, it was short of penitence and was therefore liable to be rejected and that if apology was offered at the time when the contemner found that the Court was going to impose punishment it ceased to be an apology and became an act of a cringing cowered. I do not think this decision is of any assistance to the respondents in this case because apology was tendered before the Trial Court not at the time when the appellants found that they were likely to be found guilty or punish. But it is clear that unqualified and unconditional apology was tendered by counsel for the appellants at the very outset. Before this Court also unqualified and unconditional apology was tendered by Mr. Dutt on behalf of the appellants at the very commencement of the hearing of this appeal. The next case relied upon by counsel for the respondents was a Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in A.I.R 1967 A.P 19, in which it was held that when an order of the High Court directed a person to do something, it was incumbent upon him to comply with the Court's order without any doubt or hesitation in his mind and that the excuse that he might be found fault with by higher authorities for complying with the orders of Court would be of no avail when he was asked to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt. In that case a Tehsildar held some cattle in his custody and by an order of the High Court, he was directed to release the cattle upon security being furnished. Such security was furnished by a bond but the cattle was not released. Thereafter an order was made that the Tahsildar was under a wrong impression that security was to be furnished in cash and he was again directed to release the cattle. It appeared that the, Tahsildar did not carry out the order and informed the learned Advocate of the party who was engaged to secure the release order of the cattle, that he was waiting for appropriate directions from the superiors and that the cattle would not be released until he received orders of the superior. It was in these facts that it was held that there was a violation of the order of the Court and it was incumbent upon a party to carry out the order of this Court and no excuse could be pleaded that he would be found fault with by higher authorities. The unconditional apology tendered in that case however was also accepted and no action was taken on the application for committal for contempt I do not think this decision is of any assistance to the respondents either, inasmuch as, there was a clear refusal by the Tahsildar to carry out the order of the Court and he went further and said that he would not carry out the Court's order until he received directions from his superior officers.

    17. Reliance was next placed by counsel for the respondents on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in A.I.R 1969 Mad. 232 for the proposition that no officer of the Government however high or exalted he might be, could take upon himself the responsibility of judging the correctness or validity of an order of Court and if he honestly felt that the order was erroneous, he should approach the Court by way of review or modification or higher Court by an appeal and that it was not open to him to take upon himself the responsibility of judging the order and take any action contrary to the same. In that case the contempt petition was moved by a party who had earlier challenged the validity of certain provisions in the Madras General Sales Tax Act on a writ petition. A Rule was issued on the writ petition and an order was made staying all further assessments proceedings for certain years. A copy of this order was served on the Sales Tax Officer who made an order demanding security by a Bank guarantee or cash as such security, before stay order could be given effect to. A contempt application was moved and it was contended on behalf of the Sales Tax Officer that the action taken had nothing to do with the writ petition and the interim order of stay, and also that he had no intention to disobey the order of the Court. It was in these facts that it was held that the officer concerned was guilty of contempt of court. Unconditional apology however was tendered on behalf of the contemner and that was accepted and no further action taken. I do not see how this decision is of any assistance to the respondents in this appeal because in that case there was a clear violation by the Sales-Tax-Officer of the stay order of the court inasmuch as he refused to give effect to the stay order until security was furnished. Further more it is to be noticed that the unqualified apology tendered was accepted by the Court and no further action was taken against the contemner. The next case relied upon by counsel for respondents was a Bench decision of this Court reported in A.I.R 1951 Cal. 397. In that case an application was filed before the Municipal Magistrate complaining about a nuisance at a certain premises. The Magistrate on being satisfied that nuisance existed, ordered the removal of the cattle which caused the nuisance within three months and certain other consequential directions were also given. Though this order was made in 1946 no step was taken by the Officers of me Corporation even as late as 1950 to give effect to the order of the Magistrate. At the time of the hearing of the contempt rule however it appeared that the order was carried out sometime after the contempt petition was filed and before the rule came up for final hearing. It was contended on behalf of the contemners that they had not deliberately flouted or disobeyed the order of the Magistrate and that the delay was due to administrative and financial difficulties. A petition was also filed tendering unqualified apology for delay in carrying out the Court's order. It was in these facts that it was held that when a party obtained an order of court for getting relief and the order if carried cut would give him the relief somebody's failure to carry out Court's order after long period of four years tendered to bring into discredit the administration of justice in the country and the contempt of the contemner was a serious contempt although they bad no intention to flout the Court's order. I do not think that this case is of any assistance to the respondents as the facts in that case were entirely different from the facts with which we are concerned in this appeal. There was no doubt that in that case that the order of the Court was not carried out for four years and the observations of the Division Bench was made in the background of these facts.

    18. The last case relied on by counsel for respondents was a decision of this Court reported in 72 C.W.N 431. In that case it was held that a party who knew of an order, whether null and void or regular or irregular, could not be allowed to disobey the order and that acting according to legal advice would be no defence for violating an order of Court. I do not think that the questions discussed in that case are of any assistance to the respondents in this appeal, as the question involved in that case was whether the Court could by an interim order extend the operation of a trading licence which admittedly expired on a certain date namely September 30, 1967.

    19. In a contempt petition as indeed, in every other case the decision must necessarily rest on the facts of that case. In my view none of the decisions on which counsel for the respondents relied throw any light on the questions which arise from the peculiar facts of this appeal. There can be no doubt that where there has been an unequivocal, deliberate and wilful disobedience to the order of Court, punishment for contempt of Court is called for, and should be unhesitatingly imposed upon the party, if found guilty. But it should be remembered that the Court's power to punish for contempt in summary proceedings must be sparingly used and with circumspection. In dealing with the allegations of contempt it is not for the Court to assume a vindictive attitude in judging the allegations made against the contemner. Such allegations should be considered dispassionately in order to see if there has been deliberate and wilful defiance to the order of the Court so as to attract an order of conviction and sentence for contempt. Every infraction of the Court's order does not amount to contempt of court. It is only a wilful and deliberate violation of the Court's order and contumacious conduct on the part of the contemner which is to be condemned in contempt proceedings. In considering this question notice should also be taken of Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which provides that no Court shall impose a sentence under this Act for contempt of Court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interfere and tends to substantially interfere with due course of justice. A wilful and deliberate violation of the order of court must be shown to interfere with the due course of justice before such conduct can be punished for contempt.

    20. We are satisfied that on the facts of this case the appellants did not wilfully and deliberately violate the order of injunction issued by this Court on the material before us we cannot but come to the conclusion that the failure on the part of the appellants to give effect to the ad interim order of injunction made on September 22, 1971, was due to reasons entirely beyond their control. In our view the Trial Court was in error in finding the appellants guilty of contempt. The Trial Court was also in error in imposing the punishment upon the appellants of a sentence to pay fine of Rs. 100/- and also directing the appellants to pay the costs to the respondents assessed at twenty gold mohurs. In our view the trial court even if it came to the conclusion that the appellants were guilty of contempt should have, after having accepted unqualified apology, discharged the Rule.

    21. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed.

    22. The judgment and order under appeal are set aside. The Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.

    23. As no further argument was advanced in appeal from original order No. 518 of 1972 the order mentioned above will govern that appeal also.

    24. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Butalia H.S And Ors. () v. Subhash Kumar Saksena And Anr. (S).
    (Jul 20, 1973)