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Smart Summary

Analyst Summary of the Reported Opinion — Ghose, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant and the respondent (Union of India) entered into a written contract dated 31 August 1951 granting the appellant exclusive timber-felling rights in the North Andamans for 25 years. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Disputes arising up to March 1961 were referred by the parties to a first arbitration (appointed arbitrators included Mr. R. Singh and Mr. A.N. Lahiri). In that first reference the arbitrators considered, among other questions, whether the Government was entitled to claim royalty on account of shortfall in felling below the guaranteed minimum; the arbitrators held that the Government was not so entitled.

Subsequently, the respondent referred claims for royalty on account of shortfall for the years 1961–62 and 1962–63 to a second arbitration (initially other arbitrators were appointed; later Mr. H. Mahapatra and Mr. R.R. Choudhury served as arbitrators). In that second reference the arbitrators raised issues whether the Government's claim was barred by res judicata (or principles analogous thereto) by reason of the earlier award, and whether the Government was estopped from raising the claim.

The appellant challenged the second arbitrators' jurisdiction to decide those questions and sought (inter alia) (a) supersession/revocation of the arbitration agreement, (b) a declaration that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference, and (c) an injunction restraining the arbitrators from proceeding. Masud, J. dismissed the application on 1 September 1970. The appellant appealed to the present Court, pressing only the reliefs seeking an injunction and a declaration as to lack of jurisdiction.

The record also shows that the appellant itself had earlier applied to set aside the award in the first reference (application made 25 August 1967), that the application to set aside was dismissed on 9 August 1968, and that an appeal against that dismissal was filed on 20 December 1968.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether principles of res judicata (or principles analogous thereto) operate to oust the jurisdiction of the arbitrators in the second reference to adjudicate the Government's claim for royalty on account of shortfall for the years 1961–62 and 1962–63.
  2. Whether the arbitrators in the second reference could be restrained by injunction from proceeding (i.e., whether the Court should declare they have no jurisdiction to proceed and prevent them from doing so).
  3. Subsidiary issue (framed and argued): Whether res judicata is a jurisdictional question that the arbitrators cannot decide for themselves (and if an arbitrator does decide it improperly, whether the proceedings are tainted with illegality and subject to being set aside).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Chaudhury)

  • The appellant argued that principles of res judicata (and principles analogous thereto) oust the jurisdiction of both Courts and arbitrators — i.e., that res judicata prohibits any enquiry and therefore the arbitrators have no jurisdiction to decide the second reference on the same question.
  • The appellant sought an injunction restraining the arbitrators from proceeding and a declaration that the arbitrators had no jurisdiction.
  • Counsel relied on quoted observations of Mahmood, J. (reported in (1886) ILR 8 All 324 and reproduced in Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure) to distinguish res judicata from estoppel — specifically the passage that res judicata "prohibits an enquiry in limine" whereas estoppel is evidentiary.
  • Counsel cited authorities (Radharani v. Benodamoyee, AIR 1942 Cal 92, and Allah Bux v. Nusserwanji & Co., AIR 1936 Sind 99) for the submission that res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of courts (and, by analogy, arbitrators).

Respondent / Opposing Counsel's Argument (as summarized in the opinion)

  • It was contended by opposing counsel (referred to as Mr. Choudhury in the opinion) that, like courts, arbitrators cannot decide their own jurisdiction when res judicata is invoked; if arbitrators attempt to do so the proceeding would be tainted with illegality and should be set aside by the Court. (This contention was recorded by the Court as the position pressed before it.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1886) ILR 8 All 324 (as quoted in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure) Quoted distinction between res judicata and estoppel: res judicata prohibits an inquiry in limine; estoppel is a piece of evidence. The quotation was relied upon by appellant's counsel to support the contention that res judicata ousts jurisdiction. The Court recorded the quote but did not accept the absolute proposition that res judicata is a jurisdictional bar.
Radharani v. Benodamoyee, AIR 1942 Cal 92 Cited for observations (quoting Mahmood, J.) that res judicata may turn into a question of law when applied to particular facts. The decision was cited by appellant's counsel. The Court noted the citation but proceeded to analyze the nature of res judicata and rejected the submission that it is a jurisdictional bar that cannot be waived.
Allah Bux v. Nusserwanji & Co., AIR 1936 Sind 99 Observed (per the opinion) that res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court recorded the citation relied on by counsel yet treated the proposition as contestable, concluding that res judicata is not a jurisdictional bar in the absolute sense for reasons explained in its reasoning.
Rajani Kumar Mitra v. Ajmaddin Bhuiya, AIR 1929 Cal 163 Held that the bar of res judicata does not affect the jurisdiction of the court; it is a plea in bar which a party may waive. The Court relied on this Division Bench authority to support the proposition that res judicata is not a jurisdictional question and can be waived; this formed a central plank of the Court's reasoning that arbitrators may entertain and decide the plea.
(1907) 34 Ind App 125 (PC) Principle cited that a valid award is a final adjudication and will operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings unless the arbitrators acted without jurisdiction. The Court invoked this principle to explain that awards generally operate as res judicata but that such conclusiveness depends on the award being valid and made by arbitrators acting with jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed whether the plea of res judicata is a question touching the jurisdiction of a court or arbitrator in an absolute sense. It analysed the nature of the plea and its legal effect, reasoning as follows:

  1. The Court treated the plea of res judicata as analogous to other legal pleas (for example, limitation) which the deciding forum must examine and decide on its merits; in other words, the forum must go into the question and determine whether the claim is barred.
  2. The Court emphasised that res judicata may be waived by a party. Because jurisdiction (in the strict sense) cannot be conferred by waiver or consent, a matter that can be waived cannot be a pure jurisdictional question. The Court relied on the Division Bench decision in Rajani Kumar Mitra v. Ajmaddin Bhuiya to support the proposition that the bar of res judicata does not affect the court's jurisdiction and is a plea in bar that a party may omit or waive.
  3. The Court recognised that principles of res judicata apply to arbitration proceedings and that a valid award constitutes a final adjudication which operates as res judicata in subsequent proceedings — but subject to the qualification that this effect obtains only if the arbitrators acted with jurisdiction (citing (1907) 34 Ind App 125 (PC)).
  4. Applying the facts of the case, the Court observed that the first arbitration expressly concerned disputes arising between 1951 and March 1961 and that the arbitrators in that reference decided (as a question of fact) that the Government was not entitled to claim royalty on account of shortfall for that period.
  5. The Court contrasted the subject-matter of the two references: the second reference concerned alleged shortfalls and royalty claims for 1961–62 and 1962–63. The Court found that these are factual issues dependent on the availability, size and quality of timber during those later periods as defined by contract clauses (Clauses 4, 5 and 6). The Court stated that both the earlier issue and the later issue are questions of fact rather than pure questions of law or contract construction.
  6. Given that the plea of res judicata is not a jurisdictional bar preventing inquiry, and given that the issues in the second reference concern different periods and factual circumstances, the Court concluded that the arbitrators in the second reference are entitled to entertain, try and adjudicate upon the plea of res judicata — i.e., the arbitrators must decide that question rather than being ousted from jurisdiction as a matter of law.
  7. The Court expressly refrained from expressing any definitive opinion on the substantive contention advanced by the appellant that the second-reference issues are in fact barred by the earlier award, leaving that question to be decided by the arbitrators in the second reference.

The Court also recorded the procedural posture that the appellant had earlier applied to set aside the first award (application dismissed) and had appealed that dismissal — a fact the Court noted in its consideration of the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Court ordered the dismissal of the appeal with costs. (The printed order records that there will be a stay of proceedings for one week from the date.)
  • On the key legal point, the Court held that the plea of res judicata (or principles analogous thereto) is not an absolute jurisdictional bar that ousts arbitrators from deciding the matter in the second reference. Consequently, the arbitrators are entitled to entertain and decide the question whether the respondent's claim for royalty for 1961–62 and 1962–63 is barred by the earlier award.
  • The Court did not decide the substantive merits of whether the later claims are actually barred; rather, it left that determination to the arbitrators. The Court refrained from expressing any final view on the substantive contention of the appellant.
  • No statement in the opinion purports to lay down a novel or binding precedent beyond the reasoning used; the decision resolves the application at hand by dismissing the appeal and allowing the arbitral process to proceed on the issue of res judicata to be decided by the arbitrators.

This summary is limited to the content and reasoning expressly set out in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond the text.

    P.C Ray And Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Of India .

    Ghose, J.:— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated September 1, 1970 delivered and passed by Masud, J. on an application made by the appellant. In the application the appellant claimed mainly supersession of an arbitration agreement contained in the agreement dated August 31, 1951 between the appellant and the respondent. The appellant in the said application also prayed for a declaration that the Arbitrators appointed by the parties in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in the said agreement dated August 31, 1951 have no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference on the ground that the issues involved before the Arbitrators are barred by principles analogus to res judicata in view of an Award made in a previous reference between the parties on the basis of the very same arbitration agreement. The appellant also in the petition prayed for an injunction restraining the Arbitrators from proceeding with the reference.

    2. In the appeal before us Mr. Chaudhury appearing on behalf of the appellant has pressed only two of the reliefs claimed before the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance, viz., for an injunction restraining the Arbitrators from proceeding with reference and a declaration that the Arbitrators have no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference before them. In the appeal the rest of the judgment and order of Masud, J. was not touched upon. The prayers for declaration that the Arbitrators had or has no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference and injunction restraining them from proceeding with the reference are connected with each other although in the main application before Masud, J. the prayer for injunction seems to have been made as and by way of consequential relief to the main relief of supersession of the arbitration agreement or revocation of the authority of the appointed Arbitrators. The facts leading to the making of the application before Masud, J. are set out hereunder:

    By a contract dated August 31, 1951 executed by and between the appellant and the respondent Union of India, the appellant was granted exclusive rights to cut, fell and extract timber from the forests in the North Andamans for a period of 25 years on the terms and conditions contained in the said contract. Pursuant to the said contract the appellant commenced to fell and extract timber from the said forests. In or about 1961 the appellant referred certain disputes between itself, and the Union of India to the arbitration of one Mr. R. Singh, a retired Judge of Allahabad High Court and one Mr. A.N Lahiri, a retired member of the West Bengal Higher Judicial Service as Arbitrators appointed by the parties in terms of the arbitration agreement contained in the aforesaid contract. In the said arbitration the respondent Union of India made a counter claim for a sum exceeding Rs. 2 crores on account of royalty on the basis of shortfall in felling timber below the minimum guaranteed quantity by the appellant in terms of the said agreement dated August 31, 1961.

    3. By and under the said agreement the appellant, inter alia, covenanted to cut, fell and extract timber of different kinds and different quantities in various areas as set out in Cl. 6 of the said contract. The said guarantee given by the appellant under the said term of the said contract was subject to force majeure and availability of quantities and qualities of timber mentioned in Cls. 4 and 5 of the said contract between the parties. It should be noted here that only the disputes between the parties between 1951 and March, 1961 were referred to the Arbitrators in the aforesaid first reference. In the aforesaid first reference an issue was raised by the Arbitrators, inter alia, as follows:—

    “Is the Government entitled to claim royalty on shortfall? If so, how much?” In the Award made and published by the Arbitrators in the said reference the Arbitrators held, inter alia, that “we are of opinion that the Government is not entitled to claim any royalty on account of shortfall in this case.”

    4. In or about 1964 the respondent referred the disputes with regard to its claim for royalty on account of shortfall in felling timber below the guaranteed quantity for the years 1961–62 to 1962–63 to arbitration again. Initially said Mr. R. Singh (since deceased) and Mr. A.K Sinha, then a member of the Bar of this Court were appointed Joint Arbitrators in the said second reference. Ultimately on account of death and/or resignation of Arbitrators, Mr. H. Mahapatra, a retired Judge of Patna High Court and Mr. R.R Choudhury, a practising Barrister of this Court came to be appointed by the parties as Joint Arbitrators for adjudicating upon the disputes referred to the said second arbitration.

    5. In the said second reference the learned Arbitrators settled, inter alia, an issue to the following effect, to wit.

    “Is the Union Government's claim barred by res judicata on principles analogous thereto with reference to the Award given in the first arbitration on 18th March, 1967?”

    6. And a further Issue to the following effect, viz.

    “Is the Union Government estopped by principles of estoppel from raising their claim or part thereof in the present proceeding with reference to the award in the first arbitration case between the parties?”

    7. The appellant contended before the learned Arbitrators that the said Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to proceed with the aforesaid issues and wanted the said Arbitrators to state a case to the Court for deciding the said contention of the appellant. The learned Arbitrators refused to state any case to the Court. Thereupon the appellant applied before the learned Arbitrators to adjudicate upon the said two issues as and by way of preliminary issues and make a separate Award on the same. The learned Arbitrators refused to do so as well.

    8. Thereupon the aforesaid application was made for the reliefs mentioned hereinabove before Masud, J. By judgment and ???er delivered and passed by Masud, J. on September 1, 1970 the said application was dismissed.

    9. Mr. Chaudhury appearing on behalf of the appellant contended before us that the res judicata in fact ousts the jurisdiction of a Court as well as of the Arbitrators. Mr. Chaudhury cited the observations of Mahmood, J. in (1886) ILR 8 All 324 quoted in the First Volume of Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition at p 51 to the following effect:—

    “………… Perhaps the shortest way to describe the difference between the plea of res judicata and estoppel, is to say that while the former prohibits the Court from entering into an enquiry at all as to the matter already adjudicated upon, the latter prohibits a party after the enquiry has already been entered upon, from proving anything which would contradict his own previous declaration or acts, to the prejudice of another party who relying upon those declarations or acts, has altered his position. In other words, res judicata prohibits an enquiry in limine, whilst an estoppel is only a piece of evidence.”

    10. Mr. Choudhury contended that like Courts, Arbitrators cannot decide their own jurisdiction inasmuch as res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of Courts as well as Arbitrators. The Arbitrators cannot go into such question If they do so the proceeding would be tainted with illegality and must be set aside by the Court.

    11. In support of his contention Mr. Chaudhury cited the decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Nasim Ali, J. and Pal J. reported in AIR 1942 Cal 92, Radharani v. Benodamoyee. In the said case the aforesaid observations of Mahmud, J. were quoted and it was observed that res judicata was a question of fact which upon its application to the facts of a certain case turned into a question of law Mr Choudhury also cited the case of Allah Bux v. Nusserwanji & Co., reported in AIR 1936 Sind 99 and the observations at p 101 of the said Report to the effect that res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of the Court.

    12. Before we proceed further it must be noted that an application was made by the appellant itself for setting aside the said Award made in the aforesaid first reference on August 25, 1967, On August 9, 1968 the said application for setting aside the said Award was dismissed whereupon on December 20, 1968 an appeal was filed by the appellant itself against the said order of dismissal.

    13. Although under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act no appeal can be preferred against a judgment and decree passed in terms of an Award except for the reasons mentioned in the said section, if an appeal against the order of dismissal of an application setting aside an Award be allowed, the Award would be set aside automatically as a consequence thereof.

    14. The plea of res judicata, in our opinion, is not a plea touching the jurisdiction of a Court in the total or absolute sense. The Court has to go into the said plea as any other plea of law, as for example, limitation and then decide whether the issue or the claim is barred by res judicata or principles analogous thereto.

    15. It has been held that the plea of res judicata may be waived by a party to a proceeding. In the premises the plea of res judicata can never be a jurisdictional question. For jurisdiction can be conferred neither by waiver nor even by consent of the parties. It has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajani Kumar Mitra v. Ajmaddin Bhuiya reported in AIR 1929 Cal 163 at p. 164 as follows: to wit:—

    “The bar of res judicata is one which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court but is a plea in bar which a party is at liberty to waive. If a party does not put forward his plea of res judicata in a suit he must be taken to have waived it ………………. The party omitting to plead res judicata intentionally invites the court to decide the case on the merits ……………”

    16. The said question or issue that the claim of respondent. Union of India on account of shortfall (i.e felling timber less than the quantity guaranteed) is barred by the principles analogous to res judicata, not being a jurisdictional issue, the arbitrators in the second reference in our opinion, are entitled to entertain, try and adjudicate upon the same. Principles of res judicata as principles of general law are applicable to arbitration proceedings as well as awards. An award if valid is in fact a final adjudication by a competent forum chosen by the parties themselves and until set aside is conclusive upon the merits of the controversy submitted. An award will operate as res judicata in subsequent proceeding between the parties either in court or before the arbitrators unless the arbitrators in making the said award had acted without jurisdiction. (See (1907) 34 Ind App 125 (PC)).

    17. In the first arbitration the disputes referred by the parties were whether in the facts and circumstances prevailing during the period covering the dispute i.e from 1951 to March, 1961, the respondent, Union of India was entitled to royalty on the basis of shortfall of the quantities of timber felled by the appellant. The said issue was an issue of fact depending upon the availablity of timber, of the conditions and sizes as mentioned in Cls. 4 and 5 of the said contract between the parties, during the aforesaid period covering the dispute. The said issue could never be an issue of law or construction of the said terms of the contract as urged by Mr. Chowdhury before us.

    18. In the second reference the issue involved is whether the Union of India as entitled to any royalty on the basis of shortfall of timber felled during the period 1961–62 and 1962–63, on the basis of covenant of minimum guarantee contained in Cl. 6 of the contract between the parties.

    19. This issue also is a question of fact and is dependent upon the existence or otherwise of timber and the quality or size thereof as mentioned in Cls. 4 and 5 of the contract during the period for which the said royalty has been claimed by the Union of India.

    20. Mr. Chowdhury contended before us that the said issue in the second reference are barred by the principles analogous to res judicata in view of the award made and published in the first reference mentioned above. For the reasons stated herein above we are of the opinion that the arbitrators must decide the said question or issue. We refrain from expressing any opinion on the aforesaid contention of Mr Chowdhury.

    21. For the reasons stated above this appeal must fail and dismissed with cost.

    22. There will be stay of proceeding for one week from date.

    23. S.K Mukherjea, J.:— I agree.

    24. Appeal dismissed.

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    P.C Ray And Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Of India .
    (Jul 20, 1971)