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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Manik Chand Nahata, challenged two identical notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the assessment year 1949-50. The notices were dated 5 March 1966 and 8 March 1966. At the time the rule nisi was obtained, the Income-tax Officer had not disclosed reasons for the impugned notices. The original petition alleged that the conditions precedent to exercising power under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Act had not been satisfied.

In an affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the Income-tax Officer (Sebabrata Saha) on 28 July 1966, it was stated that reassessment proceedings were initiated on receipt of information that Rs. 72,513-7-6 was shown in the books of Messrs. Hanutmull Budhmall in the name of the petitioner. The affidavit records that the petitioner was summoned under earlier provisions (Section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and Section 131 of the Act) and that contradictions appeared in the petitioner's statements. The ITO averred that, on the material in his possession, he had reason to and bona fide believed that income had escaped assessment and that proceedings under Section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 had been initiated and notices under Section 148 were duly served after fulfilling conditions precedent.

Before the main rule was heard, the petitioner applied to amend the petition to add grounds that the right to reopen the relevant assessment was already barred under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 because the alleged escaped income was less than Rs. 1 lakh when the new Income-tax Act, 1961 came into force on 1 April 1962. By consent order dated 9 December 1969, the petitioner was allowed to urge those grounds at the main hearing; the order recorded that it was without prejudice and provided timetables for affidavits, but no further affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the respondents pursuant to that leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (dated 5 and 8 March 1966) are valid where, on the facts, the right to reopen the assessment for the year 1949-50 was already barred by the eight-year limitation in Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 because the escaped income did not amount to Rs. 1 lakh or more.
  2. Whether the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (specifically Section 297(2)(d)(ii) as interpreted in precedent) revive the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment which was barred under the 1922 Act when the new Act came into force.
  3. How the phrase "amount to" or "likely to amount to" one lakh of rupees in Section 34(1)(a)(ii) of the 1922 Act should be interpreted for the purpose of issuing a notice after the eight-year period.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Dr. Debi Pal)

  • Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 placed an eight-year bar on reopening assessments unless the escaped income amounted to, or was likely to amount to, Rs. 1 lakh or more; because eight years had elapsed, the ITO's power was limited by this threshold.
  • The material in the ITO's affidavit, even at its highest figure (Rs. 72,513-7-6), did not reach Rs. 1 lakh; therefore the right to reopen the assessment for 1949-50 had become time-barred on 31 March 1958 under the 1922 Act.
  • A letter from the petitioner (annexure "C") indicated that Rs. 53,983-12-3 was shown in the relevant accounting year in the books of Hanutmull Budhmall, which included transfers from earlier years; the petitioner contended that the total deposit including interest amounted to Rs. 41,692-2-0 (as presented in the petitioner's computations), and in any event fell short of Rs. 1 lakh.
  • Relying on the Supreme Court decision in J. P. Jani v. Induprasad Devshanker Bhatt, it was submitted that Section 297(2)(d)(ii) of the new Act cannot be construed to revive the right to reopen an assessment already barred under the old Act.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Dipak Sen)

  • The respondent could not point to material in the affidavit or file records to show that the escaped income in this case exceeded Rs. 1 lakh.
  • It was argued that the words "amount to" or "likely to amount to" in Section 34 allow the Income-tax Officer to reopen proceedings if, in the course of investigation, he felt that the escaped income was likely to exceed Rs. 1 lakh in the aggregate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
J. P. Jani, Income-tax Officer v. Induprasad Devshanker Bhatt (Supreme Court) Held that an Income-tax Officer cannot issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to reopen an assessment in a case where the right to reopen was already barred under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 at the date when the new Act came into force (1 April 1962). Section 297(2)(d)(ii) of the new Act does not revive a right already barred by the old Act. The court found this decision "on all fours" with the facts of the present case and applied it to conclude that the notices under Section 148 were illegal and invalid because the right to reopen had been barred under the old Act before the new Act commenced.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps, founded on the material in the opinion:

  1. The court examined Section 34(1)(a)(ii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which precludes issuance of a notice for years if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year, unless the escaped income "amount to, or are likely to amount to, one lakh of rupees or more".
  2. The petitioner argued and adduced documentary material (a letter annexed to the petition) to show that the sum shown in the books (and the petitioner's own calculation of deposits and interest) fell well short of Rs. 1 lakh; the ITO's affidavit gave the highest figure as Rs. 72,513-7-6.
  3. The court considered the respondent's contention that the phrase "likely to amount to" allowed the ITO to form an expectation in the course of investigation that the escaped income might exceed Rs. 1 lakh, thereby justifying reopening.
  4. The court interpreted "likely to amount to" as requiring some antecedent belief, suspicion or tentative satisfaction by the Income-tax Officer at the time of issuing the notice that the escaped income may amount to Rs. 1 lakh or more. That belief must have a factual basis or material upon which it is formed; it cannot be a speculative or after-the-event hope that further investigation might reveal an aggregate exceeding Rs. 1 lakh.
  5. Because the respondent was unable to point to material showing that the escaped income was likely to exceed Rs. 1 lakh, and because the Supreme Court decision in J. P. Jani (which holds Section 297(2)(d)(ii) does not revive a barred right) was directly applicable, the court concluded that the right to reopen was already barred under the 1922 Act before the 1961 Act came into force.
  6. Accordingly, the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were held to be illegal and invalid, and the court ordered their cancellation and recall and restrained the respondents from giving them effect.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court made the rule absolute and held that the notices dated 5 March 1966 and 8 March 1966 issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were illegal and invalid because the right to reopen the assessment for the year 1949-50 was already barred under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 before the 1961 Act came into force.

Direct consequences ordered by the court:

  • A writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Income-tax Officer (respondent No. 1) to forthwith recall, cancel and withdraw the notices dated 5 March 1966 and 8 March 1966 issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • A writ in the nature of prohibition restraining the respondents from giving effect to the notices in any manner whatsoever.
  • No order as to costs.

Implication regarding precedent: The court applied existing Supreme Court authority (J. P. Jani) rather than announcing a new principle; the decision concretely prevented the revival of a time-barred right to reopen assessments in the circumstances before the court.

    Manik Chand Nahata v. Income Tax Officer, "K" Ward And Anr.

    1. In this application, the petitioner, Manik Chand Nahata, challenges a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), in respect of the assessment year 1949-50. It appears that two notices in identical terms for the same assessment year had been issued, one on the 5th March, 1966, and the other on the 8th March, 1966.

    2. At the time, the rule nisi was obtained, no reasons had been disclosed by the Income-tax Officer in respect of the impugned notices. The original petition contains the usual grounds of challenge stating that the conditions precedent to the exercise of power under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Act had not been satisfied.

    3. In the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Sebabrata Saha, the Income-tax Officer, "K" Ward, District III(2), Calcutta, and affirmed on the 28th July, 1966, it is stated that the proceedings for reassessment for the assessment year 1949-50 was started against the petitioner on receipt of certain informations. Information was received that a sum of Rs. 72,513-7-6 was standing in the name of Sri Manik Chand Nahata in the books of account of Messrs. Hanutmull Budhmall. It is further stated that the assessee was summoned under Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and thereafter, under Section 131 of the Act. According to the affidavit certain contradictions were found in the different statements made by the assessee. Paragraph 2 of the affidavit further proceeds to state as follows:

    "In view of these facts On the basis of the material in my possession I had reason to believe and I bona fide believe that due to the failure and/or omission on the part of the assessee to file the return and disclose all material facts relevant for the assessment, the income of the petitioner has escaped assessment and/or has been under-assessed and as such proceedings under Section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, have been initiated and notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act was duly served after fulfiling all conditions precedent."

    4. Before the main rule was heard the petitioner came up with an appli cation for amendment of the petition by adding, inter alia, the following grounds: . -.

    "For that in view of the fact that the alleged escaped income is less, than Rs. 1 lakh the rigfit to reopen and/or make the assessment and/or recompute the income of the petitioner for the relevant assessment year was barred under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, at the date when -the Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force, i.e., 1st April, 1962, and as such the Income-tax Officer has no competence, jurisdiction and/or authority to issue the notices under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in order to make an assessment and/or recompute the income which had become barred under the Income-tax Act, 1922, at the date when the Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force."

    5. On the application for amendment I made the following order, by consent of parties, on the 9th December, 1969 :

    "The petitioner will be allowed to urge the grounds taken in this application at the time of the hearing of the main rule. Main rule to appear in the peremptory list for hearing on December 22, 1969. A/O if any by December 16, 1969, A/R if any by December 20, 1969. This order is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties."

    6. It may be noted that no further affidavit-in-oppositiort was filed by the respondents pursuant to the leave granted by me while allowing the amendment application.

    7. Dr. Debi Pal, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, draws my attention, in the first place, to Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The relevant portion of Section 34 is as follows:

    "Provided that the Income-tax Officer shall not issue, a notice under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1)-

    (i) for any year prior to the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1941: . . .

    (ii) for any year, if eight years have elapsed after the expiry of that year, unless the income, profits or gains chargeable to income-tax which have escaped assessment or have been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under this Act or the loss, or depreciation allowance which has been computed in excess, amount to, or are likely to amount to, one lakh of rupees or more in the aggregate, either for that year, or for that year and any other year or years after which or after each of which eight years have elapsed, not beings year or years ending before the 31st day of March, 1941."

    8. On the strength of the above provisions, Dr. Pal submits that the power of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the proceedings under Section 34(1)(a) of the old Act was fettered by one important limitation if eight years had elapsed after the expiry of the relevant assessment year. In such a case the Income-tax Officer could only issue a notice if the amount of escaped income was likely to be one lakh of rupees or more in the aggregate either for that year or for that year and any other year. Relying on the statements of the Income-tax Officer in paragraph 2 of the affidavit-in-opposition, Dr. Pal contends that taking the figure of escaped income at its highest it cannot exceed a sum of Rs. 72,513-7-6. My attention is drawn in this connection to a letter dated the 21st April, 1968, which was addressed by the petitioner to the Income-tax Officer, "K" Ward, Distt. III(2), Calcutta, and which is annexure "C" to the petition. From the letter it appears that in the relevant accounting year a sum of Rs. 53,983-12-3 was standing in the name of the petitioner in the books of Hanutmull Budhmall of 143, Cotton Street, Calcutta. That sum included a sum of Rs. 12,291-10-3 which had been standing in the books of Messrs. Hanutmull Harackchand in the earlier years and was transferred to the books of Hanutmull Budhmall in the relevant year of account. Therefore, according to the petitioner's contention, the total deposit in his name in the books of Hanutmull Budhmall including the interest of Rs. 2,692-2-0 comes to Rs. 41,692-2-0 only. Dr. Pal pointed out that the sum of Rs. 72,513-7-6 which is mentioned in paragraph 2 of the affidavit of the Income-tax Officer consists ,of the sum of Rs. 53,983-12-3 together with subsequent interest accrued thereon upto the date when the information with regard to the deposit was alleged to have been received by the Income-tax Officer. According to Dr. Pal even if the entire amount of Rs. 72,513-7-6 is construed to be the escaped income of the petitioner in the relevant year of account, it falls short of the sum of one lakh rupees. Consequently, accordingly to the provisions of Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, no action could have been taken by the Income-tax Officer beyond a period of eight years from the relevant assessment year. In other words, the proceedings for reassessment would have become time-barred under the provisions of the old act on the 31st March, 1958.

    9. According to Dr. Pal if proceedings for reassessment become time-barred under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, before the new Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force, it cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of the new Act. Reliance is placed in this connection on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. P. Jani, Income-tax Officer v. Induprasad Devshanker Bhatt, . In that case it was held that the Income-tax Officer cannot issue a notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in order to reopen the assessment of an assessee in a case where the right to reopen the assessment was harried under the 1922 Act at the date when the new Act came into force (i.e. 1st April, 1962). It was not permissible to construe Section 297(2)(d)(ii) of the new Act as reviving the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment which was already barred under the old Act. Neither by express language nor by necessary implication does Section 297(2)(d)(ii) disclose that there was a revival of the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment which was already barred under the old Act. The section is applicable only to those cases where the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment was not barred under the repealed Act.

    10. Mr. Dipak Sen, appearing on behalf of the revenue, was entirely unable to refer me to any material either in the affidavit of the Income-tax Officer or in the records of the file to establish that the amount of escaped income in the instant case could exceed one lakh of rupees. It was not seriously disputed that unless the escaped income amounted to rupees one lakh or more, the Income-tax Officer would have no right to reopen the proceedings under the old Act beyond the expiry of eight years from the relevant assessment year. Mr. Sen drew my attention to the language of Section 34 which uses the words "amount to" or "likely to amount to" a lakh of rupees or more. Mr. Sen sought to argue that it was open to the Income-tax Officer to reopen proceedings if he felt that in the course of investigation the amount of income that had escaped assessment was likely to exceed rupees one lakh in the aggregate.

    11. In my view, this contention of Mr. Sen is without any merit. The expression "likely to amount to", in my view, means that the Income-tax Officer must form some kind of belief or even a suspicion before the notice under Section 34 is issued that the amount of escaped income for the year or any other year may amount to rupees one lakh or more in the aggregate. The satisfaction or belief or suspicion must necessarily be tentative because after the final adjudication it may be found that no income had escaped assessment at all. This is the context and background in which the expression "likely to amount" is to be construed. Mr. Sen did not contest the position that unless the factual basis, viz., that the amount of actual income was likely to exceed rupees one lakh, could be established, the revenue could not possibly get out of the mischief of the decision of the Supreme Court which I have mentioned above.

    12. Since there is no material before me to hold, that the amount of escaped income in the instant case is likely to exceed rupees one lakh, I must hold that the decision of the Supreme Court is on all fours with the facts of the present case. Consequently, it must be held that since the right to reopen the proceedings was barred under the old Act before the new Act came into force, it could not be revived by the new Act. As such the notice under Section 148 of the Act, which is impugned in the present case, must be held to be illegal and invalid and must be struck down.

    13. In the result, this application succeeds and the rule is made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Income-tax Officer, the respondent No. 1, to forthwith recall, cancel and withdraw the notices dated the 5th March, 1966, and the 8th March, 1966, issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and a writ in the nature of prohibition restraining the respondents from giving effect to the notices in any manner whatsoever.

    14. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Manik Chand Nahata v. Income Tax Officer, "K" Ward And Anr.
    (Jan 7, 1970)