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Judgment Summary — Mitter, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a money decree obtained by Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy in Suit No. 247 of 1948 against Subodh Chandra Chakravorti and others. In execution of that decree an attachment (dated 24-1953) for Rs. 26,000 was levied in respect of moneys in the hands of the Executive Engineer, North Eastern Railway, on the allegation that Subodh Chandra Chakravorti was the sole proprietor of Chakravorti & Company.

The appellant, Sachindra Chandra Chakravorti, claimed the attached moneys (in or about June 1953) asserting that a registered deed of dissolution dated 9-8-52 made him, not Subodh Chandra Chakravorti, the owner. On 21-6-54 Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy filed Suit No. 307 of 1954 seeking declarations that the dissolution deed of 9-8-52 was void as against him and that the moneys payable to Chakravorti & Company were liable to attachment for recovery of the decretal amount in Suit No. 247 of 1948. That suit was contested and a decree was passed in favour of Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy on 22-12-61; the trial judge stayed operation until 15-3-62.

The plaintiff (Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy) died on 23-3-62. The decree was settled and passed on 18-6-62. On 16-7-62 the appellant filed the present appeal (with leave of the Court and without a certified copy of the decree), obtaining an ex parte stay of execution on an undertaking to file the certified copy when available. When attempts were made to serve notices relating to the stay, the appellant's solicitors discovered the plaintiff's death. A sequence of correspondence and solicitor work followed: the solicitors learned the names of the legal representatives by 31-8-62; the appellant was informed and correspondence occurred through September; draft substitution petition work was done in mid-September; the engrossed petition was dispatched to the appellant by registered post on 20-9-62; the appellant avers vacation-related difficulties in affirming the petition locally and returned to Cuttack in November to have it affirmed on 17-11-62 and sent to Calcutta the next day.

The present application by the defendant appellant sought various reliefs including setting aside any abatement and amendment of the cause title and the body of the memorandum of appeal to bring the deceased plaintiff's legal representatives on record. The application was opposed and the Court heard argument on whether relief should be granted despite the delay in seeking substitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the procedural provisions (Order 22, Rules 4 and 11, read with Rule 2 of Chapter 31 and related rules) require that when a respondent dies the legal representatives must be brought on record within the period limited by law, and whether failure to do so causes abatement of the appeal.
  2. Whether Section 153 of the Civil Procedure Code (power to amend proceedings) can be invoked to correct the cause title of a memorandum of appeal that names a respondent who had died before the appeal was filed.
  3. Whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to excuse the delay in making application for substitution and to prevent abatement.
  4. Whether the alternative limitation period (Article 181 — three years) or exclusion of time under Section 12(2) (time to obtain a certified copy) can salvage the appellant’s position.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that Order 22, Rule 4 (and Rule 11) did not apply where the respondent had died before the filing of the appeal; instead, the Court could amend the memorandum of appeal under Section 153 CPC to correct the cause title and bring the legal representatives on record.
  • Reliance was placed on the Madras Full Bench decision in Gopala Krishnayya v. Abivi Lakshmana Rao (ILR 49 Mad 18 : AIR 1925 Mad 1210 (FB)) as authority for the proposition that where an appeal was presented against a person who was dead at the date of presentation the court may permit the cause title to be amended under S.153 or return the document for amendment.
  • It was further argued (by implication) that limitation and abatement rules should not defeat such an amendment where the appellant was not guilty of laches and sought amendment as soon as he discovered the respondent's death.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any separate arguments advanced on behalf of the deceased plaintiff's legal representatives beyond the Court's recounting of the factual chronology and legal submissions addressing the applicability of rules and limitation provisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopala Krishnayya v. Abivi Lakshmana Rao, ILR 49 Mad 18 : AIR 1925 Mad 1210 (Full Bench) Held that where an appeal was presented against a person who was dead at the date of presentation the Court may permit amendment of the cause title under S.153 or return the document for amendment in appropriate cases. The appellant relied on this authority to argue that Section 153 could be used to amend the memorandum of appeal. The Court considered the decision and observed that the Madras Full Bench did not lay down a blanket rule; rather, it allowed S.153 in appropriate cases but did not countenance its use to excuse laches.
Govinda Kaviraj Purohita v. Gauranga Saw, AIR 1924 Mad 56 Division Bench decision refusing to exercise power under S.153 in similar circumstances (earlier conflicting authority noted by Madras Full Bench). The Full Bench decision in Gopala Krishnayya did not approve of this earlier division bench judgment. The present Court noted the conflict and analysed the scope of S.153 in context of laches and substitution.
Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khutna v. Protab Chandra Ghose, AIR 1946 FC 13 (Federal Court) Held that where a party (respondent) had died before the appeal was filed, he was not in law a party to the appeal as originally preferred; addition of parties cannot cover bringing on record the representative of a person in whose favour a decree was passed — the proper course is to prefer an appeal against him; thus an application for substitution in such circumstances is misconceived. Also considered sufficiency of cause where delay resulted from erroneous assumption about date of death. The Court relied heavily on this Federal Court decision to hold that when a respondent was dead before filing of the appeal the situation is not a mere addition of parties and cannot be treated as one under Order 22 so as to permit S.153 to be used to excuse laches. The decision was used to support dismissal of the appellant's application for substitution without satisfactory explanation of delay.
Santi Prasanna Mukherjee v. Harendra Nath Ballabh, ILR 1948 (1) Cal 25 (Division Bench) Considered the Madras Full Bench and the Federal Court decision and held that where a plaintiff died before presentment of the memorandum of appeal the case is not merely addition of parties; it must be treated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act — only if sufficient reason is shown under Section 5 should the legal representative be added and the cause title amended. The Court followed and approved the reasoning of this Division Bench: that Section 153 cannot be used to cover up laches and that the matter must be governed by Section 5 of the Limitation Act in cases where the respondent died before the appeal was filed.
Secretary of State for India v. Parijat Debi, ILR 59 Cal 1215 : AIR 1932 Cal 331 (Full Bench) Explains that to exclude from limitation the time for obtaining a certified copy (under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act), the appellant must show due diligence in requisitioning the certified copy (e.g., requisitioning at the right time, stamping, folio marking), and related procedural steps. The Court cited this authority to reject the appellant's contention that the appeal should be treated as filed only when the certified copy became available (1-2-63). The Court held that to rely on exclusion of time the appellant must demonstrate he had diligently taken the necessary procedural steps to obtain the certified copy — which the appellant did not do in the present record.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing (a) the chronology and the appellant's conduct; (b) the applicable procedural and limitation provisions; and (c) relevant precedents.

  1. Chronology and lack of diligence: The Court reviewed detailed correspondence and events after the appellant’s solicitors learned of the plaintiff’s death (news received by appellant on 20-8-62; solicitor learned names of legal representatives on 31-8-62). It found delay in preparing and presenting the petition for substitution (petition not ready before 17-9-62; engrossed petition sent 20-9-62; affirmation not completed until 17-11-62). The Court held the appellant (and his solicitor) failed to take prompt steps and that the appellant had not satisfactorily explained the delay between receiving knowledge of the death and the eventual application.
  2. Application of limitation and procedural rules: The Court identified the relevant limitation and procedural provisions: Article 151 of the Limitation Act (20 days for appeals in original jurisdiction), Rule 2 of Chapter 31 (form of memorandum of appeal), Order 41, Rule 1 CPC (memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a copy of the decree), Section 12(2) Limitation Act (exclusion in computation for time to obtain certified copy), and Order 22 (substitution on death) including Rules 4 and 11.
  3. Treatment of the date of filing the appeal: The Court treated the memorandum of appeal as filed on 16-8-62 (date when the appeal was filed without certified copy on undertaking), and hence held that the appellant must demonstrate sufficient cause to excuse failure to bring the deceased plaintiff’s legal representatives onto the record within the period permitted by law.
  4. Precedents and scope of Section 153 CPC: The Court considered the appellant's reliance on Section 153 CPC and the Madras Full Bench. It contrasted that authority with the Federal Court decision in Bank of Commerce Ltd. v. Protab Chandra Ghose and with the Division Bench decision in Santi Prasanna Mukherjee. The Court accepted the Federal Court and Calcutta Division Bench approach that where a respondent died before the filing of the appeal the matter is not a mere addition of parties; it is in substance an appeal that must be treated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and substitution cannot be effected by invoking S.153 to excuse laches.
  5. Rejection of alternate limitation arguments: The Court rejected the contention that Article 181 (three-year period) applied to this application, finding it illogical to afford a longer period where the respondent was already dead at the time of appeal filing. The Court also rejected the attempt to treat the appeal as filed only on 1-2-63 (date certified copy became available) because to exclude time under Section 12(2) the appellant would have to demonstrate consistent and timely efforts to obtain the certified copy (as explained in Secretary of State for India v. Parijat Debi), which the record did not disclose.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Applying these principles, the Court concluded the appellant failed to show sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the delay in bringing the legal representatives on the record. The appellant's delay was attributable to inaction and lack of diligence (including his solicitor's default), and S.153 could not be invoked to cure such laches.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Application dismissed.

Direct consequences:

  • The appellant's application for setting aside any abatement and for amendment of the cause title/memorandum of appeal to bring the deceased plaintiff's legal representatives on record was dismissed.
  • The interim order (stay of execution previously granted) was vacated.
  • The application was dismissed with costs.

Broader implications: The Court applied and affirmed the principle (following the Federal Court and the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court) that where a respondent has died prior to the filing of the appeal the matter is not merely one of adding a party under Order 22; substitution in such a case is governed by the limitation regime (Section 5 of the Limitation Act) and courts should not use Section 153 CPC to remedy delays attributable to laches. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel rule beyond applying these established authorities.

Disposition

Order: Application dismissed. Interim order vacated. Costs awarded against the applicant. Bose, C.J. agreed with the judgment.

    Sachindra Chandra Chakravarti v. Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Mitter, J.:— This is an application by a defendant appellant praying for various reliefs including one for setting aside abatement if any, amendment of the cause title and body of the memorandum of appeal etc.

    2. One Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy filed a suit in this Court being Suit No. 247 of 1948 against Subodh Chandra Chakravorti and several others and obtained a money decree therein in execution of the decree he levied attachment on 24-1953 to the extent of Rs. 26,000/- in respect of moneys in the hands of the Executive Engineer, North Eastern Railway on the allegation that Subodh Chandra Chakravorti was the sole proprietor of Chakravorti and Company. The appellant Sachindra Chandra Chakravorti preferred a claim against the said attachment in or about June 1953 alleging that under a registered deed of dissolution dated 9-8-52, it was he and not Subodh Chandra Chakravorti who was the owner of the moneys attached. On 21-6-54 Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy filed a suit in this Court being Suit No. 307 of 1954, against Sachindra Chandra Chakravorti and Subodh Chandra Chakravorti praying for a declaration that the dated of 9-8-52 was void as against him and a further declaration that the moneys lying with the North Eastern Railway and payable to Chakravorti and Company were liable to attachment for recovery of the decretal amount in Suit No. 247 of 1948. The suit was contested by the appellant herein and a decree was passed on 22-12-61 in favour of the said plaintiff. By an order made by the Trial Judge the operation of the decree was stayed till 15-3-62. The plaintiff died on 23-3-62 leaving him surviving his Widow Sm. Ava Singh Roy and three children. The decree was settled and passed on 18-6-62. On 16-7-62, the present appeal was filed by Sachindra Chandra Chakravorti without a certified copy of the decree with leave of this Court and stay of execution was obtained ex parte an his undertaking to file a certified copy. On the next day a clerk of the appellant's solicitor went to serve a copy of the notice of motion in connection with the application for stay on the solicitor for the respondent Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy and came to learned that he was dead. The appellant's solicitor S.K Guha wrote to his client informing him of the death of the respondent and he also asked T.P Mitra solicitor for the respondent to supply him with particulars regarding the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. On 20-8-62, the appellant received his solicitor's letter and wrote back requesting him to take the necessary steps. The respondents' solicitor T.P Mitra wrote to the appellant's solicitor on 31-8-62 informing him that the respondent had died on 23-3-02 leaving a widow and minor children. On receipt of this letter S.K Guha wrote to the appellant enclosing a copy of T.P Mitra's letter and asking him for instructions. It is said that the appellant received the solicitor's letter at Koraput after it had been redirected from Cuttack on 10-9-62 and on 11-9-62, he wrote to his solicitor asking him to make an application for substitution. S.K Guha received the letter on 15-9-62 and instructed counsel to draw the necessary petition. On 17-9-62 a draft petition was receiver, from counsel. The solicitor Guha caused the same to be engrossed and stamped on 19-9-62 and despatched the same to the appellant by registered post on 20-9-62. The appellant is unable to give the date on which he received this registered packet but he states in paragraph 7 of his affidavit affirmed on 7-2-63 that the Judge's Court at Cuttack closed for the Puja vacation one day after the receipt of this letter and when he went to the said Court the day-next after receiving the said petition for affirmation of the same before a Commissioner he found that although the Criminal Courts were open the Judge's Court was closed for the long vacation. According to the appellant he knew that this Court would remain closed from 28-9-62 to 18-11-62 and he therefore left for his worksite away from Cuttack. He received a letter from his solicitor on 14-11-62 reminding him about affirmation and return of the petition. Ha went back to Cuttack on 17-11-62 got the petition affirmed in the Judge's Court and sent the same to Calcutta the next day.

    3. It will thus be seen that although the appellant came to know about the date of the death of defendant Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy on 20-8-62 and although his solicitor had immediate Instructions to take the necessary steps in the matter which could only mean making an application for substitution of the legal representatives and was apprised of the names of the legal representatives on 1-9-62 the petition was not made ready before 17-9-62 and Wig-application for substitution was not made even up to 27-9-62 when the Court closed for the long vacation. The period of 90 days for making an application for substitution from the death of the deceased as also the period of making an application for setting aside the abatement had both passed when news of the death was received by the appellant, and if we are to judge of the diligence of the appellant during the period beginning on the receipt of the said news till the malting of the application it must be held that the appellant has failed to account for the delay in coming to this Court it was the duty of the appellant to take prompt steps in making the application after receipt of the news of the death on 20-8-62 but he left things in the hands of his solicitor who instead of preparing the petition after receipt of particulars of the legal representatives on 1-9-62 chose to wait and write to the appellant again for instructions. The solicitor should have had the petition made ready early in September and sent the same to client for affirmation. It is not known when exactly the petition was received by the appellant but it is clear that even if the appellant could not come down to Calcutta to affirm it he could have done so at Cuttack before the closing of this Court and sent it back to Calcutta. If he could not affirm it in the Judge's Court at Cuttack he could have done so before a Magistrate. The solicitor had informed the appellant as far back as 3-9-62 that the application had to be made immediately and by a letter of 20-9-62 that the same would soon be barred by limitation. It should not have been difficult for the appellant to state the exact date when he received the said letter of 20-9-62, nor the date when he found the Judge's Court at Cuttack closed although the Criminal Courts were open. Whether this information has been deliberately withheld or not is difficult to say but clearly the appellant has failed in his duty to explain the delay in making the application before the closing of the Court for the long vacation.

    4. The period of limitation for filing an appeal from a decree or order of this Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is 20 days from the date of the decree or order under Article 151 of the Limitation Act. Under R. 2 of Chapter 31 of the Rules of the Original Side of this Court every memorandum of appeal from the Original Side is to be in form No. 1 of Appendix L to the said Rules and has to be drawn up in the manner prescribed by O. 41, R. 1 of the Civil P.C and presented with a copy of the decree appealed from. Under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from have to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Under O. 41, R. 1 of the Civil P.C the memorandum of appeal must be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the judgment on which it is founded. It is the usual practice of this Court especially when stay of execution is asked to allow a memorandum of appeal to be filed without a certified copy of the decree on the undertaking of the appellant to file it as soon as the same is obtained in this case we were Informed that the certified copy was not available before February 1, 1963. This however does not and cannot mean that the appeal is to be treated as one which could not have been filed before February 1, 1963 because long before that date the appellant was allowed leave to file the memorandum of appeal and obtain an interim order restraining the plaintiff from executing the decree. But for the Interim order made on 16-8-62, the plaintiffs' legal representatives might have withdrawn the money long ago rendering the appeal Infructuous. We must therefore proceed on the basis that the appeal was filed on August 16, 1962 and then determine whether the appellant can be excused for the delay in making the application for bringing the representatives of the deceased plaintiff on record.

    5. Under O. 22, R. 11 of the Civil P.C the words ‘plaintiff, ‘defendant’ and ‘suIV in the said order are to include an ‘appellant’, a ‘respondent’ and an ‘appeal’ respectively. By virtue of O. 22, R. 4 when one of two or more respondents dies and full relief cannot he had from the surviving respondents alone the Court must on an application made in that behalf cause the legal representatives of the deceased respondent to be made a party and proceed with the appeal. By virtue of sub-rule (3) of R. 4 where no application is made under sub-r. (1) within the 1 time limited by law the appeal shall abate as against the I deceased respondent. If this rule applies to the presentj appeal it must be held that the appellant has not been able to make out a case that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal within the period allowed by law under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

    6. As against this it was argued by learned advocate for the appellant that O. 22, R. 4 read with R. 11 did not apply to a case where the respondent had died before the filing of the appeal and where the Court finds that an appeal has been preferred against a respondent who is already dead it can order necessary amendments to be made under Section 153 of the CPC. Section 153 empowers the Court, on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, to amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit at any time and all necessary amendments may be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding. It was argued that the memorandum of appeal showing a dead person as one of the respondents was a defect in the proceeding and could be put right by the Court under the powers given by this section. Reference was made in this connection to a judgment of a full bench of the Madras High Court in Gopala Krishnayya v. Abivi Lakshmana Rao, ILR 49 Mad 18 : (AIR 1925 Mad 1210) (FB). There the Court was of opinion “that where an appeal was presented against a person who was dead at the date of presentation the Court may permit the cause title to be amended under 5, 153 or return the document for amendment and representation” for if the appeal memorandum was not allowed to be amended the appellant might apply for a refund of the spoilt stamp and file a fresh appeal in ordinary cases where the appellant is not guilty of any laches and asks for amendment of the memorandum as soon as he comes to know that a respondent had died before the filing of the appeal no objection might be raised thereto. The full bench did not approve of the earlier division bench judgment in Govinda Kaviraj Purohita v. Gauranga Saw, AIR 1924 Mad 56 where the Court refused to exercise power under S. 153 while another course, e.g, of filing another appeal and having the delay due to mistake committed in good faith condoned, was opera to the appellant.

    7. The situation arising on the death of a respondent before the institution of the appeal impleading him came up for consideration by the Federal Court in Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khutna v. Protab Chandra Ghose, AIR 1946 FC 13. There one Amal Krishna Ghose died on 23-9-44, and an appeal was filed in the Federal Court on 29-9-44 with his name on the record as a respondent. When notice of the appeal was attempted to be served on him it was reported that he had died. The appellant's agent at Delhi Informed the appellant at Calcutta of the death of the respondent by letter dated 9-1-45. On 23-1-45 the managing director of the appellant wrote to the company's advocate at Calcutta to take the necessary steps. A petition for substitution was filed in this Court on 6-245. By an order dated 22-345 the High Court reported that Sushtta Bals Ghose was the proper person to be substituted in the place of Amal Krishna Ghose but the learned Judges of the Division Bench were of the opinion that there was no reason for excusing the delay in filing the application. When the matter came up for hearing before the Federal Court on receipt of the report of the High Court on 5-1145, it was noticed for the first time that Amal Krishna Ghose had died before the appeal was filed and not thereafter. The application was dismissed as misconceived. On 15-1145 a fresh application was made before the Federal Court for having the name of Sushila Bala Ghose entered as a respondent to the appeal in place of her son. According to the federal Court

    “the matter has in effect to be dealt with on the footing that so far as the heir of Amal Krishna Ghose is concerned, an appeal is for the first time being preferred now.”

    8. Two contentions were raised on behalf of Sushila Bala Ghose: (1) an application to add Amal Krishna's legal representative as a party should have been made to the High Court under O. 15, R. 6 of Federal Court Rules and (2) no sufficient cause had been shown for not making the application or preferring the appeal within the period allowed by law.

    9. Rule 6, O. 15 of the Federal Court Rules provided:

    “A petition for an order of revivor or for substitution or addition of parties shall in the first instance be filed in the High Court and where it is sought to bring on record the legal representative of the deceased party, the petition shall, subject to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, be filed within 60 days of the death of the deceased party.”

    10. The Federal Court held that the case did not come in the first category because Amal Krishna Ghose was not in the eye of the law a party to the appeal as originally preferred as he had died before and observed:

    “the addition of parties referred to in the rule cannot cover the representative of a party in whose favour a decree had been passed by the lower Court, because in such a case the proper course will be to prefer an appeal against him and not merely add him as party to an appeal that had already been preferred against other parties. That this was the intention of the rule is shown by the fact that the reference in the same rule to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is limited to applications to bring the legal representative of a deceased party on the record……. Where an appeal has to be preferred for the first time against the heir of a person in whose favour the lower Court had passed a decree, the mere fact that the appeal had already been preferred as against other person will not justify the application being treated merely as one to add a party.”

    11. On the question whether sufficient cause had been shown for not making the application earlier the Federal Court came to the conclusion that the delay had been sufficiently explained because everybody had acted on the assumption that Amal Krishna Ghose had died after the appeal had been filed.

    12. The Madras Full Bench judgment was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Santi Prasanna Mukherjee v. Harendra Nath Ballabh, ILR 1948 (1) Cal 25 in this case one of the plaintiffs died in October 1944 before the Trial Court passed a decree but his legal representatives were not substituted in his place. Against this decree the defendant preferred an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, 24 Parganas and a rule was Issued on this Court for transfer of the appeal from the District Court to this Court in the memorandum of appeal the dead plaintiff was mentioned as one of the respondents. The learned advocate appearing for the defendant appellant was informed of the death of the plaintiff on 25-146. The application to this Court was moved on 13-246. The Division Bench of this Court referred to the judgment of the Federal Court in 1946 FCR 32 : AIR 1946 FC 13, and observed that in view of that decision it could not allow the cause title to be amended by entering the name of the legal representatives of the dead man on the record under Section 153 of the CPC. According to the Division Bench where a plaintiff had died before the presentment of the memorandum of appeal the case was not one of mere addition of parties but was in substance a case, where an appeal was being filed against the legal representatives of the dead party on the day on which the application for adding him as party respondent to the appeal was filed. The learned Judge said

    “the case has to be treated on the footing of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and if the Court is satisfied that there was sufficient reason within the meaning of that section it would then and then only add the legal representative as a party respondent to the appeal which had already been filed. As a matter of procedure if the conditions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act be satisfied, the memorandum of appeal already filed is to be amended by correcting the cause title.”

    13. With respect, it appears to me that there is good logic and sound reasoning behind the decision in the Calcutta case. Section 153 cannot be invoked by a party who is guilty of laches to cover up his default. The powers thereunder can be exercised by the Court in a case where the defect or error which would vitiate the proceeding is not due to a party's default. A negligent party cannot ask the Court to overlook his laches and rectify the defect.

    14. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court did not lay down as a general proposition that the Court ought to exercise its power under S. 153 whenever it found that an appeal had been preferred against a person who was already dead by substituting his legal representatives. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that in a proper case powers under S. 153 could be exercised by the Court and remanded the case back to the admission Court for finding out whether there were just grounds for doing so.

    15. The appellant here is certainly not to blame for having filed an appeal showing Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy as a respondent when he did not have knowledge of his death but on coming to know of it he was bound to take immediate steps to find out who were the legal representatives of the deceased and to bring them on the record. It appears from a letter of his addressed to his solicitor on 20-8-62 that he had already been informed of the death and had instructed the solicitor to do whatever was necessary. The appellant seems to have taken no steps himself at any time to find out who should be brought on record but left everything to his solicitor. The solicitor came to know of the heirs and legal representatives on 31-8-62 and as a diligent agent and lawyer he should then have proceeded to have the petition drafted under the instructions already given and there was no need for him to write to the client again for further instructions. By this process a delay of at least three weeks, viz., from 21-8-62 to 15-9-62 when the attorney instructed counsel to draw the necessary petition was allowed to occur. As a solicitor for the appellant it was the duty of S.K Guha to proceed to have the petition drawn up even before any funds were supplied to him and as a matter of fact none appear to have been forthcoming between August 21, and September 15, 1952. The appellant must be held responsible for the delay which was caused by the solicitor's default. The engrossed petition which was despatched by S.K Guha to the appellant at Cuttack on 20-9-62 could without difficulty have been affirmed at Cuttack before the closing of the Courts and sent back to Calcutta in time to move this Court before the long vacation. The appellant seems to have taken for granted that he could wait and have his petition moved on the reopening of the Courts in November in my opinion, no satisfactory explanation of the delay in making the application when information of the death was received on 20-8-62 till the making of it on 19-11-62 has been given.

    16. It was argued that an application like this does not come under the provisions of O. 22 and the period of limitation for making such an application is three years under Article 181 of the Limitation Act. I find myself unable to accept this contention in view of the decision of the Federal Court and of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court already referred to it would be illogical to hold that while in the case of the death of a respondent after the institution of the appeal the appellant must be diligent in making an application for the substitution of his heirs and legal representatives after he comes to know of the death he will have three years from the date of such knowledge for making a similar application where the respondent was dead on the date of the filing of the appeal. Further I cannot accept the argument that the appeal is within time as the certified copy of the decree was obtained only on 1-2-63 in order to have the time for obtaining the copy excluded the appellant will have to show that he had throughout been dillgently trying to get it by putting in requisition in time to have the decree drawn up, by filing stamps for the appropriate amount after the folios were marked etc. as explained in Secretary of State for India v. Parijat Debi, ILR 59 Cal 1215 : (AIR 1932 Cal 331) (FB). These data have not been disclosed nor has the application proceeded on the basis that it was properly filed after obtaining the certified copy. As already observed the appellant filed the appeal in August 1962 and was allowed to do so on condition that he put in the copy when obtained. It was on the strength of such filing that he obtained the interim order. He cannot now turn round and ask the Court to ignore whatever has gone before. The appeal must be treated as having been filed in August 1962 and the appellant must make out a case for condoning the delay in bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on the record. This he has failed to do. in the result the application must be dismissed with costs. Interim order is vacated.

    Bose, C.J:— (18) I agree.

    DG/R.G.D

    17. Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Sachindra Chandra Chakravarti v. Jnanendra Narayan Singh Roy
    (Mar 11, 1963)