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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal arising from a suit for specific performance brought by the plaintiff Satyanarayan Ghosh (a major) against the first defendant Dasarath Gayen (a major) and nine other defendants, seven of whom were minors represented by their natural guardian and father. Defendants 2–10 (including the minors) were pro forma defendants; the first defendant was the principal defendant.

The Subordinate Judge decreed specific performance against the first defendant, directing him to execute the conveyance (kobala) in favour of the plaintiff within one month, failing which the plaintiff could have the conveyance executed through the Court at his cost. The first defendant appealed to the District Judge, who dismissed the appeal on 24 April 1961 and confirmed the decree. The first defendant then filed this second appeal to this Court on 13 May 1961.

Four principal points were argued on the second appeal (see Legal Issues Presented). There was also a connected application concerning rents and profits collected by the appellant during an interim stay of the decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the contract for reconveyance is without consideration and therefore not specifically enforceable.
  2. Whether the contract for reconveyance lacks mutuality and therefore is specifically unenforceable.
  3. Whether the contract for reconveyance is void for uncertainty (notably the phrase “other necessary and indispensable expenses”).
  4. Whether the time within which the money had to be paid to demand reconveyance had expired under the clause in the reconveyance agreement (ambiguity between “4 years” and the specific Bengali Samvat years stated).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The reconveyance agreement is without consideration because the sale consideration of Rs. 8,000 was allegedly a past consideration (the sale and the reconveyance were on different dates), and therefore cannot support specific performance.
  • The reconveyance contract lacks mutuality: the option to call for reconveyance rests wholly with the intending purchaser (no corresponding right for the vendor to call for payment), and therefore it is not mutually enforceable.
  • The phrase “other necessary and indispensable expenses” is uncertain and makes the contract void for uncertainty.
  • The period for exercising the option to reconvey is ambiguous (both “4 years” and a specified range “from 1360 B.S to 1362 B.S” appear), and on the appellant’s construction the required deposit was not made within the prescribed time.
  • On the question of minors, reliance was placed on Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri (Privy Council) to argue that a guardian or manager cannot bind a minor by a contract for purchase of immovable property; thus, minority vitiates mutuality.
  • At one stage the appellant also argued that necessary costs had not been deposited by the plaintiff.

Plaintiff's (and lower courts') Position as Recorded in the Opinion

  • The reconveyance agreement is itself supported by consideration: the promise by the intending purchasers to pay Rs. 8,000 and incidental costs is a valid consideration.
  • On the facts, the sale deed and the reconveyance agreement were part of one transaction: the deeds were presented for registration on the same day (16 January 1950), the Rs. 8,000 payment was made the same day before the Sub-Registrar and endorsed in the document, and the registration numbers were consecutive.
  • The plaintiff deposited Rs. 8,000 and an additional sum of Rs. 175 in Court (the latter addressing part of the costs question).
  • The sale was pleaded to have been in substance a loan of Rs. 8,000 advanced for the maintenance and education of the minors and for their properties, structured as a sale and a reconveyance to avoid contravening the Bengal Money Lenders Act (the plaintiff so pleaded in the plaint).
  • Minors were pro forma defendants; the suit for specific performance was between majors (plaintiff and first defendant), and the plaintiff did not pursue specific performance on behalf of any minor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N.B. Sitarama Rao v. Venkatarama Reddiar (Madras Full Bench), A.I.R. 1956 Madras 261 A sale followed by an agreement of reconveyance should be treated as one transaction; consideration for reconveyance may be the sale deed itself. Quoted and relied on to support the conclusion that the sale deed and reconveyance were part of one transaction and that the sale consideration could support the reconveyance agreement.
Srini-vasalu Naidu v. Raju Naicker, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 635 Similar principle: sale followed by reconveyance to be treated as one transaction so the sale deed can be regarded as consideration for reconveyance. Cited (via the Madras Full Bench decision) to support the finding that the two instruments formed one transaction.
Weeding v. Weeding, I.J. & H. 424 Conditional contracts may become absolute by performance of condition (exercise of option); illustrates mutuality principles. Used to illustrate that a contract conditional on exercise of an option becomes mutual and enforceable when the option is exercised.
Chesterman v. Mann, 9 Ha. 206; Palmer v. Scott, I.R. & My. 391 Examples of contracts where one party had a right to performance (conditional contracts) but could become mutually enforceable when condition performed. Referenced in discussion of mutuality to show that absence of mirrored clauses does not negate mutual enforceability.
Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri, 39 I.A. 1 (Privy Council) Held that a guardian or manager cannot bind a minor or his estate by a contract for purchase of immovable property; absence of mutuality where minor not bound prevents specific performance by minor. Cited by appellant; Court considered it but distinguished it on facts because here the claim for specific performance was between majors and minors were only pro forma defendants; therefore Mir Sarwarjan did not prevent enforcement between the major parties.
Jamna Bai v. Vasanta Rao, 43 I.A. 99 (Privy Council) Where two promisors (one a minor) are jointly liable, the plea of minority of one does not bar the promisee's claim against the co-promisor; a joint promisor cannot plead co-promisor's minority to defeat claim. Relied upon by the Court to support the proposition that the minority of co-promisors does not defeat a claim for specific performance against a major co-promisor.
Srikakulam Subrahmanyam v. Kurra Subba Rao, 75 I.A. 115 (Privy Council) Where guardian acts within competence and the transaction is for the minor's benefit, the transaction may bind the minor; considered in the context of guardian competency. Referred to support the view that where guardian acts within competence and transaction benefits the minor, enforceability can follow; used to distinguish Mir Sarwarjan.
Venkatachalam Pillai v. Sethirum Rao, A.I.R. 1933 Madras 322 (Full Bench) A sale to a minor containing a covenant to resell could still be enforced as an executory contract; sale to a minor is not ipso facto invalid for specific performance. Cited to show authorities holding that contracts involving minors (where guardians act) can be specifically enforceable in certain contexts.
A.T. Raghava Chariar v. O.M. Srinivasa Raghava Chariar, I.L.R. 40 Madras 808 Explains and applies principles about sales and contracts involving minors and guardians; clarifies limits of invalidity. Referred to as explaining the Full Bench decision and supporting the proposition that minor-related transactions are not necessarily void.
Vadakattu Suryaprakasam v. Ake Gangaraju, A.I.R. 1956 Andhra 33 (Full Bench) A guardian's power is conditioned by legal necessity/benefit; even if contract is enforceable, Court has discretion to refuse enforcement if circumstances adversely affect minors. Used to acknowledge the court's discretion and the limitation that enforceability does not override protection of minors when circumstances demand.
Jagdeosingh v. Bisambar, I.L.R. 1938 Nagpur 41 Not all purchasers need join as plaintiffs; specific performance can be enforced where minors are involved if the transaction is such that it would have bound them if of age. Quoted to support the principle that minors can be bound by agreements made by competent actors (e.g., managing member) and to distinguish Mir Sarwarjan.
Baumann v. James, L.R. 3 Ch. 508 Illustrates that indefinite words like “other works” or “etc.” do not necessarily render a contract too uncertain for performance when context supplies sufficient meaning. Quoted in relation to the “other necessary and indispensable expenses” phrase to show such wording can be sufficiently certain by reference to context.
Mohori Bibee (30 I.A. 114) and Hunoomanpersaud Panday (6 Moo. I.A. 393) Authorities concerning competency of guardians/minors and validity of certain transactions under Indian law (cited in context). Referred to in the discussion on guardianship and the competence of guardians to bind minors in certain transactions; used in the line of authorities distinguishing Mir Sarwarjan.
Additional later/unnumbered Madras decisions (I.L.R. 18 Madras 415; A.I.R. 1951 Madras 431) Supportive authorities on the same subject-matter (contracts with minors and enforceability). Mentioned by the Court as further authorities in the established line of cases that allow enforcement in appropriate circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each of the four main points in turn, applying facts and legal principles expressly cited in the opinion.

1. Consideration

  • The Court held the reconveyance agreement was supported by valid consideration in two alternative ways explicitly found in the record:
    • First, the reconveyance agreement itself was supported by the promise of the intending purchasers to pay Rs. 8,000 and incidental and indispensable costs — which the Court treated as a sufficient legal consideration.
    • Second, on the facts, the sale deed and the reconveyance agreement were part of one transaction: both deeds were presented for registration on the same day (16 January 1950), the Rs. 8,000 was paid on the same day before the Sub-Registrar (and so indicated by an endorsement in the document), and the registered numbers were consecutive. Therefore the sale deed could properly be considered the consideration for the reconveyance.
  • The Court relied on the Madras Full Bench decision in N.B. Sitarama Rao v. Venkatarama Reddiar (and the authorities it cites) to support treating the instruments as one transaction.
  • Conclusion: appellant's contention that the reconveyance lacked consideration was overruled.

2. Mutuality

  • The Court stated the settled principle that a contract for specific performance must be mutual in the sense that each party must have the freedom to enforce his contractual rights against the other; mutuality does not require literal or arithmetical correspondence of clauses.
  • Applying that principle, the Court held that the option in the reconveyance (to require reconveyance upon payment) did not render the contract non-mutual. The covenant that the vendor could insist on payment when reconveying was a sufficient mutual right.
  • Regarding minors: the Court examined the appellant's reliance on Mir Sarwarjan but found that case distinguishable because this suit was between majors (plaintiff and the first defendant); minors were only pro forma defendants and no claim for specific performance for or against a minor was before the Court. The reconveyance was joint and several so that as between the major parties it was binding.
  • The Court invoked section 43 of the Indian Contract Act (joint promise liability) and section 16 of the Specific Relief Act (severability and direction for specific performance of separable parts) to confirm that the minority of others could not bar specific performance between the major parties.
  • Authoritative precedents (Madras Full Bench and others) were discussed and relied upon to show that contracts entered into by guardians for minors can be enforceable where within competence and for the minor's benefit; consequently, minority did not defeat specific performance here.

3. Uncertainty

  • On the clause “other necessary and indispensable expenses,” the Court agreed with the District Judge that these words should be construed ejusdem generis (i.e., in the same class as the preceding particular items) and related to the execution of the deed.
  • The Court observed that the plaintiff had deposited Rs. 175 in Court in addition to Rs. 8,000, and noted that no objection had been taken on this point in the lower courts; thus the appellant could not raise that point for the first time in the second appeal.
  • The Court cited Fry on Specific Performance and Baumann v. James to support the proposition that indefinite words do not necessarily make a contract too uncertain for performance when the surrounding context supplies sufficient meaning.
  • Conclusion: the expression was not so uncertain as to render the contract incapable of specific performance.

4. Time for Deposit / Ambiguity in Term

  • The reconveyance contained both a reference to “4 years” and an expressed range “from 1360 B.S to 1362 B.S,” creating an apparent inconsistency. The Court analysed which description should prevail.
  • The Court accepted the District Judge’s interpretation that the option was to be exercised by the later specified date (2nd Magh 1362 B.S), and that the clause giving “4 years” was intended to give the vendor usufruct (i.e., income) during an interim period rather than to shorten the purchaser’s option period.
  • Applying the principle of construction that ambiguity in a covenant is to be construed most strongly against the covenantor (Norton on Deeds cited), and construing the ambiguity against the appellant (the covenantor who executed the reconveyance), the Court concluded the deposit had to be made by 2nd Magh 1362 B.S. The deposit in the record was within that time.
  • The Court also noted that the appellant had not raised this point in the lower courts and could not reopen factual contests in a second appeal limited to questions of law.

Connected Application Regarding Rents and Profits

  • The appellant had obtained an interim stay of execution of the decree (decree dated 19 August 1960) and thereby collected rents and profits from the property (stated in respondent’s petition to be about Rs. 145 per month), amounting to Rs. 4,025 while the stay subsisted.
  • Having dismissed the appeal, the Court directed that the first respondent (plaintiff) be free to pursue appropriate proceedings in the appropriate forum to claim that amount and to assert that the usufruct properly belonged to him.
  • The Court directed that the amount claimed by the first respondent should be secured either by payment by the appellant or by securing the respondent's claim out of the money deposited in Court that was lying there.
  • The application was disposed of accordingly, and there was no order as to costs in that application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED AND THE DECREE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS AFFIRMED.

Direct consequences and orders made by the Court:

  • The decree of the Subordinate Judge directing the appellant (first defendant) to execute the kobala (conveyance) in favour of the plaintiff at the plaintiff's cost, and in default to have it executed through the Court at plaintiff's cost, as confirmed by the District Judge, is affirmed.
  • The first defendant is directed to execute the kobala within one month from receipt of the records in the court below; in default the court will execute it as earlier directed.
  • The connected application concerning rents and profits is disposed of by permitting the first respondent to claim the amount (Rs. 4,025 as stated) in appropriate proceedings; the Court directed that the respondent's claim be secured either by payment or by using funds already deposited in Court. There will be no order as to costs in that application.
  • The appeal is dismissed with costs (as to the main appeal).

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion applies established principles on consideration, mutuality, contractual construction (including resolving ambiguity against the covenantor), and the treatment of transactions involving minors (including authorities distinguishing Mir Sarwarjan). The judgment resolves the specific factual disputes before the Court and affirms the lower courts’ factual findings and legal conclusions. This summary does not purport to identify any novel legal principle created by the opinion beyond its application of existing authorities.

    Dasarath Gayen v. Satyanarayan Ghosh And Ors.

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

    P.B Mukharji, J.:— This is a second appeal arising out of a suit for specific performance instituted by the plaintiff Satyanarayan Ghosh, a major, against the first defendant Dasarath Gayen, a major and 9 other defendants of whom seven are minors represented by their natural guardian and father. The first defendant alone is the main defendant. The rest of the defendants from 2 to 10 including these minors are only pro forma defendants. The suit was decreed against the first defendant and he was called upon to execute the conveyance at the plaintainff's costs in favour of the plaintiff within one month from the date of the decree, in default of which execution the plaintiff would have it executed through the Court at his costs.

    2. The first defendant appealed to the learned District Judge who dismissed his appeal on the 24th April, 1961 and also dismissed some of the cross-objections which were not pressed. The learned District Judge confirmed the decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge. The appellant, the first defendant, preferred the second appeal to this Court on the 13th May, 1961. Four main points have been argued before us in this second appeal. They are:—

    1. That the contract for reconveyance in this case is without consideration, and therefore should not be specifically enforced.

    2. That the contract for reconveyance lacks in mutuality and therefore specifically unenforceable.

    3. That the contract for reconveyance was void for uncertainty and therefore should not be specifically enforced.

    4. That the time within which the money had to be paid in order to demand the transfer had expired under the clause contained in the contract for reconveyance.

    3. On the first point that the contract for reconveyance is without consideration it is necessary to state some relevant facts. There was a sale deed in respect of the properties in suit on the 14th January, 1950 corresponding to 30th Pous 1356 B.S Thereafter on the 16th January, 1950, corresponding to the 2nd Magh 1356 B.S a contract for reconveyance was made. Between the date of sale and the contract for reconveyance intervened a week-end Saturday and Sunday.

    4. The main argument on the ground of consideration on behalf of the appellant has been that the deed of sale cannot be taken as a consideration for the contract for reconveyance because they were executed on different dates. The consideration by which the property was sold was Rs. 8000/-. In other words the contention for the appellant is that because Rs. 8000/- the consideration for the sale was a past consideration therefore it could not be treated as good consideration for the contract for reconveyance. The argument suffers from a number of fallacies and cannot succeed.

    5. In the first place the agreement for reconveyance dated the 2nd Magh 1356 B.S corresponding to the 16th January, 1950, need not call in aid the deed of sale as its consideration. The agreement for reconveyance dated the 16th January, 1950 is itself supported by consideration. That consideration is the promise by the intending purchasers in reconveyance to pay Rs. 8000/- and incidental and indispensable costs. That promise is good enough consideration in law. That short answer completely meets the appellant's challenge to the contract for reconveyance on the ground of absence of consideration.

    6. The consideration can also be the sale deed in the facts of this case. It was on this point that the lower courts proceeded. We are satisfied that they proceeded correctly and came to the right conclusion on the question of consideration. The facts show that such consideration was present and not past. The two deeds were presented on the same day for registration and the payment of the consideration money of Rs. 8000/- was made also on the same day. The registered numbers of these two deeds are two consecutive numbers. The date on which all these facts and events took place is the same date the 16th January, 1950. The parties were the same and the properties were the same. It is an admitted case of both the parties that the entire consideration money for the sale deed passed before the Sub Registrar on the same day the 16th January, 1950 and there is an endorsement to that effect in the document itself. We are, therefore, satisfied that on the facts of this appeal the sale deed is a sufficient consideration for the contract for reconveyance and these facts justify the finding that these two deeds formed really part of one and the same transaction.

    7. In the Madras Full Bench decision N.B Sitarama Rao v. Venkatarama Reddiar (1) reported in A.I.R 1956 Madras 261, Govinda Menon, J. observed at page 268 as follows:

    “A similar case in point is the judgment of the Chief Justice and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. in Srini-vasalu Naidu v. Raju Naicker, A.I.R 1955 Mad. 635, confirming the decision of Viswanatha Sastri, J. in App. No. 287 of 1947, where it was held that a sale followed by an agreement of reconveyance should be treated as one transaction and that consideration for the reconveynace should be the sale deed itself.”

    8. We, therefore, overrule the argument of the appellant that the contract for fee reconveyance is not supported, by consideration.

    9. The second point contended on behalf of the appellant is that the contract for reconveyance lacks in mutuality. It is settled law that the contract for specific performance must be mutual. The appellant's argument on this point is that in the contract for reconveyance, the option belongs entirely to the intending purchaser to call for the reconveyance on payment of the sum of Rs. 8000/- and certain other costs. Mr. Ghosh appearing for the appellant argues that there is no corresponding right on the part of the appellant who is executing this contract for reconveyance to call for the money. This he says makes the contract not mutual. This argument is unsound. The doctrine of mutuality means that the contract must be mutually enforceable by each party against the other. It does not, however, mean that right for right there must be a corresponding clause. A contract may contain series of clauses and convenants which form the total bargain between the parties and each of them is the consideration for the other. Mutuality in this context does not mean equality and exact arithmetical correspondence. It means each party to the contract must have the freedom to enforce his rights under the contract against the other. On this particular clause the right of the appellant is to get the money when he reconveys. It cannot be said that this provision lacks mutuality because the appellant cannot call for the money. His right under the contract is that if he is asked to reconvey he can insist on his right to the money. The learned editor of Fry on Specific Performance, Sixth Edition at page 223 in Article 465 states the correct proposition of law on the point of mutuality in this respect as follows:

    “The contract may be of such a nature as to give to the one party a right to the performance which it does not give to the other,—as for instance, where a lessor covenants to renew upon the request of his lessee: (Chesterman v. Mann, 9 Ha. 206) or where the contract is in the nature of an under-taking (Palmer v. Scott, I.R & My. 391). But these are merely cases of conditional contracts: and when the condition has been performed, as for instance in the case above stated, by a request to renew, the contract becomes absolute and mutual and capable of enforcement alike by either party. (Cf. Weeding v. Weeding, I.J & H. 424.)”

    and in support of this proposition the authority of the case of (2) Weeding v. Weeding, I.J & H. 424 is quoted, where a conditional contract had become absolute by the exercise of an option of purchase.

    10. On this point of mutuality it has also been argued on behalf of the appellant that because there are minors involved, therefore, this contract is not specifically enforceable. In support of that argument Mr. Ghosh relies on the well known decision of the Privy Council in (3) Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri, 39 IA. 1 which lays down the proposition that neither the guardian of a minor nor his manager is competent to bind the minor or his estate by a contract for the purchase of immoveable property. One of the questions before the Privy Council was whether the first plaintiff in that case had the right to enforce specific performance of the contract The agreement there was made by Mir Sarwarjan and Basanta Kumar Guha, who acted as manager for one Mr. Garth who was himself the manager of the plaintiffs' estate. The well known observation of Lord Macnaughten at page 6 of that report is as follows:

    “Without some authority their Lordships are unable to accept the view of the learned Judges of the Division Bench that there is no difference between the position and powers of a manager and those of a guardian. They are, however, of opinion that it is not within the competence of a manager of a minor's estate or within the competence of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property, and they are further of opinion that as the minor in the present case was not bound by the contract there was no mutuality, and that the minor who has now reached his majority cannot obtain specific performance of the contract.”

    11. The difficulty of the appellant on this point is that here in the instant Appeal before us, it is the case of a major plaintiff suing a major defendant for specific performance. No claim for specific performance for or against a minor is made in this suit. The minor defendants are only pro-forma defendants in this suit. The contract for reconveyance is between the appellant and the 9 other parties of whom some are minors. This particular contract for reconveyance by its very clause expressly says that this right to reconveyance is to be had by either of the parties or anyone of them on paying Rs. 8000/- and other incidental and indispensable costs. If so, the contract for reconveyance is a joint and several contract by each one of the parties. Therefore, as between the appellant who is a major and the first defendant also a major, it is a binding contract without any question of minority of one. Simply because other minors have certain rights under the contract independently of the first defendant (that does not vitiate the contract between the appellant and the first defendant or the major first defendant's claim of a specific performance of the contract against the major appellant.

    12. Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act provides that when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise. As between the appellant and the first defendant, therefore, the argument based on the minority of others can not prejudice this claim for specific performance. Even under section 16 of the Specific Relief Act when a part of a contract which, taken by itself, can and ought to be specifically performed stands on a separate and independent footing from another part of the same contract which cannot be specifically performed, the Court may direct specific performance of the former part. Therefore, when the contract is several and not merely joint and when the fact that the other part of the contract which is severable is between persons who are minors, “the minority of others cannot be a bar to the claim for specific performance between the major parties.

    13. Besides-reliance on. Mir Sarwar jan's case cannot help the appellant in this case. The authority of Mir Sarwarjan has been the occasion of many comments and many differences. In (4) Jamna Bai v. Vasanta Rao, reported in 43 I.A 99 the Privy Council considered the question of compromise of a suit where two defendants, of whom one was a minor, entered into a bond by which they jointly agreed to pay a certain sum to the plaintiff at a future date and where the leave of the Court was not obtained on behalf of the minor under the then Civil Procedure Code. It was held by the Privy Council there that the bond was not enforceable against the minor but that it was enforceable to the full amount against the joint contractor. The following observation of Sir Lawrence Jenkins who delivered the advice of the Privy Council at page 103 of the report supports the view we are taking here:—

    “Stripped of all that is not relevant, the plea advanced on her behalf is that one of two promisors can plead the minority and consequent immunity of the other as a bar to the promisee's claim against him. This is a position that cannot be maintained, and has been properly rejected by the High Court.”

    14. That is the real issue in the present appeal before us and we therefore, do not think that the minority of the defendants in this case against whom no claim for specific performance is made can prevent the first defendant who was not a minor at the time of the contract from making his claim for specific performnce against the appellant who equally was not a minor at any time relevant to the contract. Then again in (5) Srikakulam Subrahman-yam v. Kurra Subba Rao, reported in 75 I.A 115 the Privy Council had occasion to deal with the sale of land by a minor through his guardian. Lord Morton who delivered the advice of the Privy Council after considering Hunoomanpersaud Panday's case (6 Moo. I.A 393) and Mohori Bibee's case (30 I.A 114) expressed the view that the contract being one which it was within the competence of the guardian to enter into on the respondent's behalf so as to bind him by it, and being for his benefit, it was binding on him and having regard to all the circumstances in that case, the respondent was the person who most aptly answered the description of “the transferor” in the sense in which those words were used in section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    15. This leads to some considerations of the facts which are relevant for this purpose. It was expressly pleaded in the plaint in this case that the sale was really intended to be in the nature of a loan of Rs. 8000/-. But as the appellant had not had a licence under the Bengal Money Lenders Act it was taken through the device of a sale in the first instance and the contract for reconveyance thereafter. It was also expressly pleaded in the plaint that this money was necessary for maintenance of the properties of the minor and also for their educational expenses. No issue was raised on this point. In fact it is significant that the appellant never challenged the contract on the ground that minors were parties to the contract through their guardians and therefore, it lacked mutuality. It was not an issue before either the court of the first instance or in the first court of appeal. The only ground on which the contract was challenged for lack of mutuality was the first ground to which I have referred, namely, that the contract for reconveyance did not give a correspond-right to the appellant to call for the money as independent right and then offer to recovery. It is, therefore, not open to the appellant now in second appeal which is confined only to the questions of law to reopen any question of fact or to contest the fact that the money or sale was not for the benefit of the minors or for legal necessity. The parties in this case are Hindus. The fathers of the minors acted as their natural guardians both in the deed of sale as well as in the contract for reconveynce. There are number of authorties on this point. The authorities in this respect are very clear inspite of the decision of the Privy Council in (3) Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri, 39 I.A 1 on which Mr. Ghosh for the appellant relied.

    16. These authorities may be briefly noticed. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court is (6) Venkatachalam Pillai v. Setihuram Rao, A.I.R 1933 Madras, 322. This was a sale deed in respect of a minor's property, executed by his guardian. There was a covenant that in case the vendee sold the property, he should resell it to the minor or his heirs. It was held that the agreement for resale in the sale deed being an executory contract without mutuality was enforceable by either party in a suit for specific performance irrespective of the question whether the contract was for the benefit of the minor or not. This decision followed the Privy Council decision in (3) Mir Sarwarjan's case and was explained in another Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in (7) A.T Raghava Chariar v. O.M Srinivasa Raghava Chariar, I.L.R 40 Madras, 808. But even there in that decision in (6) A.I.R 1933 Madras, 322, Sun-daram Chetty, J., who delivered the the judgment of the Full Bench, observed at page 324 of that report as follows:

    “But on a careful perusal of that decision it is clear that the mere fact that a sale of a mortgage is in favour of a minor is not enough to hold that it is valid and enforceable. Where a mortgage or sale has been effected as a completed transaction in favour of the minor and it does not involve the performance of any onerous act by the minor by reason of any contractual obligation in respect of the sale or mortgage, such a sale or mortgage would not be invalid. This is clearly indicated in the following pasaage on p. 313 in the judgment of Willis, C.J:

    “The question then is whether it makes any difference that the transfer in favour of the minor by way of sale or mortgage is made in consideration of a price paid on a loan advanced by the minor. No doubt, according to their Lordships' decision in such a case, the minor could not bind himself by contract to pay the price or advance the mortgage money; but when he has done so and the vendor or mortgagor has executed a registered conveyance in his favour, is there any reason why the transfer in his favour should not take effect.”

    17. The Andhra Full Bench decision in (8) Vadakattu Suryaprakasam v. Ake Gangaraju, is reported in A.I.R 1956, Andhra, 33. It is distinctly laid down there that a contract entered into by a guardian of a Hindu minor for sale or for purchase of immovables is specifically enforceable against the minor. But the existence of a valid and enforceable contract cannot in itself deprive the Court of its discretionary power to refuse to enforce the contract, if the supervening circumstances obviously affect the interests of the minor. At page 37 Subba Rao, C.J, delivering the judgment of the Full Bench makes the following observations:—

    “A minor has no legal competency to enter into a contract or authorise another to do so on his behalf. A guardian therefore steps in to supplement the minor's defective capacity. Capacity is the creation of law whereas authority is derived from the act of parties. The limit and extent of his capacity are conditioned by Hindu Law. He can only function within the doctrine of legal necessity or benefit. The validity of the transaction is judged with reference to the scope of his power to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor.”

    18. The other decision which requires to be noticed is (9) Jagdeosingh v. Bisambar, reported in I.L.R 1938 Nagpur, 41. There Bose, J. lays down that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell it is not necessary that all the persons agreeing to purchase must be joined as plaintiffs, although it is essential that all the parties to the contract should be before the Court either as plaintiffs or defendants. It is also laid down in that decision that specific performance can be enforced where minors are involved when the agreement is made by the managing member of a joint Hindu family, provided of course the transaction is of such a nature that it would have bound the minors if they had been of age. The learned Judge discussed the Privy Council decision in (3) Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri, I.L.R 39 Cal. 232 and distinguished it on this point.

    19. The transaction in this appeal is also of such nature that it would have bound the minors. It is justified for the educational expenses of the minors and the maintenance of their properties. Indeed the appellant cannot say that he is not bound because his whole title depends on this very sale deed to which the vendors and the natural guardians of the minors subscribed.

    20. It will be unnecessary to refer to the other decision such as (10) I.L.R 18 Madras, 415, and (11) A.I.R 1951 Madras 431.

    21. We are satisfied that the contract in this case can be specifically enforced because the party asking for specific performance is not a minor and party against whom it is sought is also not a minor.

    22. The next point of the appellant is that this contract for recoveyance was void for uncertainty. This argument is based on the particular clause in the contract stating that not only Rs. 8000/- is to be deposited but also costs of the execution of the deed and other necessary and indispensable expenses. Mr, Ghosh contends for the appellant that the expression “other necessary and indispensable expenses” is an uncertain expression. The learned District Judge rightly overruled this objection on the ground that such necessary and indispensable expenses having regard to the expression ‘other’ should be construed ejusdem generis and related to the execution of the deed. In fact not only Rs. 8000/- but an additional sum of Rs. 175/- was deposited in Court by the plaintiff.

    23. At one stage Mr. Ghosh has also tried to urge that these costs have not been put in. This argument must fail because no objection was taken in any of the lower courts on this point. Indeed no issue was raised that the plaintiff has not satisfied the condition of the contract for recoveyance by putting in the necessary and indispensable costs. The appellant, therefore, cannot be allowed in the second appeal to raise this point.

    24. We are also satisfied that the words “other necessary and indispensable expenses” is not such an expression that makes the contract so void for uncertainty as to render it incapable of performance. In Fry's Specific Performance of Contract quoted above at page 181 in Article 382 it is observed:

    “The mere fact of indefinite words, such as “et cetera” being used in a contract does not necessarily make it too uncertain for performance. Such words may be understood with sufficient certainty by reference to the words to which they are added and the surrounding facts of the case. Again where, by the contract for a lease, the tenant was to do certain specified works, and “other works” upon the property at a total estimated cost of about £150, and the specified works were such as would evidently cost nearly that sum, the Court considered the “other works” to be of such a trifling description that their being left undefined was not a ground for refusing specific performance. (Baumann v. James, L.R 3 Ch. 508)”.

    25. The last point urged by the appellant is that the plaintiff has not deposited within time the sum of Rs. 8000/- and the costs so as to claim specific performance of reconveyance. The contention is the ambiguity in the clause where both the words ‘4 years’ and the words “from 1360 B.S to 1362 B.S” are used as indicating the period of time within which the option to claim the reconveyance by depositing Rs. 8000/- and costs was to be exercised. Obviously the period from 1360 to 1362 B.S is not a period of four years. The question now is which is the false description. The words “1362 B.S” appear twice and it is expressly stated in the deed that it is from the 2nd Magh 1360 B.S to the 2nd Magh 1362 B.S The deposit was certainly within that time of 2nd Magh 1362 B.S which corresponds to the 16th January, 1956, when the suit was filed. The appellant's contention is that the deposit should have been made within four years from the date of the execution of the deed, that is, by the 2nd of Magh 1360 B.S which must have expired on or about the 16th January, 1954. The interpretation put on by the learned District Judge appears to us to be correct. He emphasised that the stipulation as made in the agreement, if taken as a whole, would give a cumulative effect as this that the option was to be exercised not within 2nd Magh 1360 B.S but within the 2nd Magh 1362 B.S and this last date as to the exercise of the option was stated in unqualified and in ambiguous term. In other words option was not to be exercised within four years of the date of the execution of the same, for this period is intended to give usufruct to the appellant who would enjoy the rent, or income out of the property. It is appropriate here to recall that the properties in suit were let out to different tenants fetching income. In fact this was one of the reasons why it was alleged by the plaintiff that the whole transaction was really in the nature of a conditional mortgage. But having regard to the fact that the lender appellant did not have a license and having regard to the proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act expressly declaring that

    “provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale.”

    26. (Which was introduced by way of amendment in 1929) this was done by this device of a sale deed and thereafter a contract for reconveyance.

    27. Again the interpretation for which the appellant is contending cannot be made for the simple reason, that on the principle of construction if there is an ambiguity, it must be resolved against the appellant. After all it was the appellant who is executing the contract for reconveyance. He was executing that contract. He was signing the deed contained in the contract. One of the leading principles of construction of deed is that ambiguous words in covenant are to be taken most strongly against the covenantor. (See Norton on Deeds, Second Edition, page 549). This would also be an interpretation which will help the covenant to be performed. Taking, therefore, the construction that is in favour of intending purchaser and against the party contracting and allowing reconveyance to be effected. It must be held that the limit within which the deposit had to be made is 2nd Magh, 1362 B.S The deposit was made within that time in this case.

    28. The last argument on behalf of the appellant was that the time for deposit of the sum of Es. 8000/- was ambiguous; therefore, this was an uncertain contract and should not be specifically enforced. This was not again a point that was taken in any of the lower courts. Indeed the appellant never suggested that it was uncertain on that ground On the merits of this argument the answer is that on any reasonable interpretation the time is not uncertain and the clause in the contract clearly specifies the day, the month and the year within which the deposit is to be made. It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons for this interpretation already discussed elsewhere in this judgment.

    29. This disposes of all the points raised by the appellant in this appeal.

    30. The appeal fails on all the points. The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed with costs. The decree for specific performance of the learned Subordinate Judge directing the appellant to execute the kobala at plaintiff's costs, in favour of the plaintiff and in default through court and as confirmed by the learned Additional District Judge is affirmed. The kobala must be executed by the first defendant within a month from the date of receipt of the records in the court below and in default thereof it will be done through the court as directed by the learned Subordinate Judge.

    31. It remains now to dispose of a connected application previously ordered to be disposed of along with the appeal. The appellant obtained a stay of the decree for specific performance. The decree for specific performance was ordered on the 19th August, 1960. Due to the interim stay so long the appellant has been enjoying the rents and profits of the property in suit which in the petition of respondent No. 1 is stated to be about Rs. 145/- per month. So for about these last two years from August 1960 a large sum amounting to Rs. 4025/- had been collected by the appellant. This money is claimed in this application by the first respondent. It is this application which was directed to be disposed of along with the appeal.

    32. In the circumstances and having regard to the fact that we have dismissed the appeal, the best order on this application will be that the first respondent will be free to make the claim made in this application in appropriate proceedings before the appropriate court and in taking such proceeding it will be open to the first respondent to claim that the money is rightly due to him, on the ground that the appellant by reason of his obtaining a stay of execution and by reason of having collected all the usufruct in the meantime which should properly belong to the respondent.

    33. We only direct this that the amount claimed by the first respondent on this ground should be secured either by the payment by the appellant of this amount or by the appellant securing the first respondent's claim on this account out of the money that was deposited in court and which is lying in court.

    34. The application, therefore, is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs in this application.

    N. Sen, J.:— I agree.

    S.K.B

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    Dasarath Gayen v. Satyanarayan Ghosh And Ors.
    (Jul 20, 1962)