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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (appellants in this Court) instituted a suit in the Subordinate Judge (Second Court, Midnapore) seeking (a) a declaration that they had an occupancy right in certain disputed land based on a settlement and possession for more than twelve years, and (b) a permanent injunction restraining defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession. In paragraph 14 of the plaint the plaintiffs alleged that the present market value of the disputed properties was Rs. 5,500, net profits Rs. 175 and that 15 times net profits equated to Rs. 2,625. The plaintiffs valued the relief of an injunction at Rs. 100 for the purpose of court-fees and paid court-fees accordingly.

At trial an issue as to whether the plaint was sufficiently stamped was raised but not pressed and was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned Subordinate Judge ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court and the memorandum of appeal was valued by them at Rs. 5,500 (apparently following the plaint's market-value allegation) though they had paid court-fees on Rs. 100. The Stamp Reporter objected to this dual valuation on the basis of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The Taxing Officer reviewed authorities and, citing difficulty after the decision in Sailendra Nath Mitra v. Ram Chandra Pal, placed the matter before the Chief Justice for consideration by a Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the valuation for jurisdiction must be the same as the valuation for court-fees under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act (i.e., whether a single valuation must be used for both purposes).
  2. Whether the plaint's valuation for injunction (Rs. 100) can be revised by the Court when the plaintiffs allege possession of the lands in dispute and have valued the relief accordingly.
  3. Whether section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act prevents respondents from challenging the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge when no objection was taken at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed.
  4. Whether the appeal to this Court is maintainable if the memorandum of appeal is valued at Rs. 100 (i.e., whether this Court has pecuniary jurisdiction over the appeal when the valuation is Rs. 100).
  5. Whether, and to what extent, the plaintiffs should be permitted or required to amend the valuation in the plaint and memorandum of appeal to place the suit/appeal within appropriate pecuniary jurisdictional limits (in light of the decisions such as Kali Pada Mukherji).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Mr. Panda)

  • Conceded that the suit falls under section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act but contended specifically that it comes under section 7(iv)(d).
  • Relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan concerning the effect of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and related CPC provisions (sections 21 and 99) to support protection of the trial Court's decision from technical jurisdictional objections.

Respondent / State Arguments (Senior Government Pleader)

  • Contended that the suit comes under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act (i.e., a different sub-clause than the appellants asserted).

Other Interested Officers' Positions

  • The Stamp Reporter objected that under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the valuation for jurisdiction must follow the valuation for court-fees and that there must be a single valuation for both purposes; the Stamp Reporter took objection to plaintiffs putting two different valuations for jurisdiction and court-fees.
  • The Taxing Officer, after reviewing authorities, indicated difficulty in directing plaintiffs to value the plaint/appeal at a figure higher than Rs. 100 in view of the decision in Sailendra Nath Mitra v. Ram Chandra Pal, and therefore placed the matter before the Chief Justice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sailendra Nath Mitra v. Ram Chandra Pal (1) (25 C.W.N 768) Authority cited on valuation/jurisdiction issues; cited as creating difficulty in directing plaintiffs to amend valuation upwards in some circumstances (noted in connection with second appeals in the decision of Mookerjee, J.). The Taxing Officer thought this decision made it difficult to require plaintiffs to value the plaint/appeal at a figure higher than Rs. 100. The Judge, however, distinguished Sailendra Nath Mitra as dealing with a second appeal and held it did not prevent the present requirement to amend valuation for this appeal.
Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society, Limited v. Mafijuddin Ahmed (2) (38 C.W.N 589) Full Bench decision cited on the limitation of Court's power to revise a plaintiff's valuation where the plaintiff is in possession of the lands in dispute and in the absence of rules framed for revision. Used to support the proposition that where plaintiffs allege possession, the valuation given by the plaintiffs for the relief asked cannot be revised by the Court (i.e., the injunction valuation of Rs. 100 could not be revised without appropriate rules).
Sarojemohan Chatterjee v. Jibanmull Babu (3) (57 C.W.N 909) Decision cited for the same principle as the Narayanganj Full Bench decision regarding restriction on revising plaintiffs' valuation when possession is alleged. Relied on to confirm that the valuation of relief for injunction given by the plaintiffs in their plaint cannot be revised or altered by the Court under those circumstances.
In the matter of Kali Pada Mukherji (4) (34 C.W.N 870) — observations of Sir George Rankin Principle that where a plaintiff's valuation has resulted in trial before a Court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaintiff may be required to value the suit at a figure above the lower court's maximum jurisdiction (i.e., fairness in amending valuation so appellate rights are aligned with the forum resulting from earlier valuation). The Court applied Sir George Rankin's recommended procedure: the plaintiffs were required to amend the valuation in the plaint and memorandum of appeal to a figure over the maximum pecuniary jurisdiction of the relevant Munsif (Rs. 3,500), so that forum and appeal rights would be aligned.
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (5) [(1954) S.C.A 725] (Supreme Court) Considered the effect of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act alongside sections 21 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure; established the policy that technical jurisdictional objections should not lead to reversal unless there has been prejudice on the merits. The Court noted this decision supports protection of the Subordinate Judge's decision (i.e., respondents who did not object at trial cannot challenge jurisdiction in appeal), but the Judge held that Kiran Singh would not assist the appellants in maintaining this appeal in this Court if the memorandum of appeal remains valued at Rs. 100.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps (as expressly set out in the opinion):

  1. Classification under the Court-fees Act: The Judge considered competing contentions about whether the suit fell under section 7(iv)(c) or section 7(iv)(d). Observing that the prayer for injunction was consequential and ancillary to the primary relief for declaration, the Court held the case comes under section 7(iv)(c). The Judge noted, however, that the practical result would be the same for the purposes under discussion because in either clause the plaintiffs have a right to value their relief subject to the Court's power under section 8C (power to revise grossly inadequate valuations).
  2. Effect of Suits Valuation Act, section 8: The Court explained that section 8 requires that "the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same." The established interpretation (citing earlier cases) is that there must be a single valuation for both purposes and that the valuation for jurisdiction is to be determined by the valuation for court-fees (i.e., the court-fees valuation controls).
  3. Consequence of plaintiffs' court-fees valuation: Because the plaintiffs had valued the injunction relief at Rs. 100 (and paid court-fees on that amount), the valuation for both court-fees and jurisdiction would be Rs. 100 under section 8, which is below the pecuniary jurisdictional minimum of this Court and below the maximum jurisdiction of the Munsif of Jhargram (Rs. 3,500). If Rs. 100 governed, the Subordinate Judge would not have had jurisdiction to try the suit and this Court would lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
  4. Application of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act to the trial Court's decision: Section 11 provides protection against jurisdictional objections to a decision of a Court of first instance if no objection was taken at or before the hearing when issues were first framed, unless the appellate Court records reasons that the over- or under-valuation prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. Because the defendants did not raise jurisdictional objection before the Subordinate Judge, they are precluded from challenging that trial Court's decision on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.
  5. Distinction between challenge to trial Court's decision and maintainability of the present appeal: Section 11 cannot be invoked to save the present appeal because the appeal has not yet been heard and the respondents have not yet entered appearance; they remain free to take a preliminary objection to maintainability of the appeal in this Court on the ground that the appeal has been valued at only Rs. 100.
  6. Reliance on Kali Pada Mukherji (Rankin): Applying Sir George Rankin's observations, the Court concluded that fairness required allowing the plaintiffs to amend the valuation in the plaint and memorandum of appeal, but that the amended figure must be above the maximum pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif of Jhargram (i.e., over Rs. 3,500). The plaintiffs have the liberty to value the matter below Rs. 5,000 or above Rs. 5,000, thereby affecting the appellate forum (this follows Rankin's guidance as quoted).
  7. Distinguishing Sailendra Nath Mitra: The Taxing Officer had hesitated to order amendment because of Sailendra Nath Mitra. The Court distinguished that decision as dealing with a second appeal where the jurisdictional objection had not been raised earlier, and thus held Sailendra Nath Mitra did not prevent the present course (i.e., requiring amendment for this appeal).
  8. Effect of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan: The Judge accepted that Kiran Singh supports the policy that technical objections to jurisdiction should not upset merits decisions (and thus helps protect the trial Court's decree), but held that Kiran Singh would not assist the appellants in maintaining this appeal if the memorandum of appeal remains valued at Rs. 100, because this Court would lack pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain an appeal valued at Rs. 100.
  9. Practical direction: On balancing these considerations and following the Kali Pada Mukherji approach, the Court directed the appellants to amend the valuation in both the memorandum of appeal and the plaint to a figure over Rs. 3,500 and to pay the deficit court-fee on the amended valuation by 30 November 1954; failure to comply would result in the memorandum of appeal being returned to the learned Advocate.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court directed that the appellants must amend the valuation in the memorandum of appeal and in the plaint to a figure exceeding Rs. 3,500 (the maximum pecuniary jurisdictional limit of the Munsif of Jhargram) and must pay the deficit court-fee on the amended valuation by 30 November 1954. If the appellants comply, the memorandum of appeal will be registered; failure to comply will result in the memorandum being returned to the learned Advocate.

Implications:

  • The Subordinate Judge's decision is protected from a jurisdictional challenge under section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act because the respondents did not raise such an objection at or before the hearing; accordingly respondents cannot now challenge the trial Court's jurisdiction on that ground.
  • The present appeal, as presently valued at Rs. 100, cannot be entertained by this Court because that valuation places the subject-matter below this Court's pecuniary jurisdiction; respondents remain free to raise a preliminary objection to maintainability of the appeal on that ground.
  • The Court has required an amendment to the valuation in order to align the valuation with the forum that resulted from the plaintiffs' earlier valuation (following the approach in Kali Pada Mukherji). The plaintiffs may choose to value below Rs. 5,000 or above Rs. 5,000, which will determine whether an appeal to this Court or another forum lies.
  • The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent; it applies and distinguishes prior authorities and directs amendment in the particular circumstances of this case.

Order dated with a compliance deadline of 30 November 1954. Reported procedural and substantive references drawn strictly from the provided opinion.

    Bhupat Singh And Ors. v. Jnanendra Kumar Choudhury And Ors.

    Lahiri, J.:— This is a reference under section 5 of the Court Fees Act.

    2. The plaintiffs who are the appellants in this Court filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, (Second Court, Midnapore, praying for (a) a declaration that they had an occupancy right in the disputed land on the strength of a settlement and also on the ground of possession for more than twelve years; and (b) for a permanent injunction restraining defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession on the strength of a decree which had been obtained by them. In paragraph 14 of the plaint the plaintiffs allege that the present market value of the properties in dispute is Rs. 5,500 and the net profits from the properties amount to Rs. 175 and fifteen times the net profits will be equivalent to Rs. 2,625. The aforesaid amounts were mentioned for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Court, but the plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed lands and that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were merely threatening to dispossess the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, therefore, valued the relief for an injunction against defendants Nos. 1 and 2 at Rs. 100 and paid court-fees upon that amount. In the trial Court an issue was raised as to whether the plaint had been sufficiently stamped. At the trial, however, this issue was not pressed and it was decided in favour of the plaintiffs. As a result of the trial, the learned Subordinate Judge has dismissed the plaintiffs' suit and against that decree the plaintiffs have brought this appeal. The memorandum of appeal, which has been presented to this Court, has been valued by the plaintiffs at Rs. 5,500 presumably on the basis of the valuation which was given by the plaintiffs in paragraph 14 of the plaint as to the market value of the properties in dispute. The court-fees, however, were paid by the plaintiffs on the valuation of Rs. 100. The Stamp Reporter took an objection to the manner in which the plaintiffs have put two valuations for jurisdiction and for court-fees. It was pointed out that under section 8 of the, Suits Valuation Act, the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction must follow and be the same as the valuation for the purpose of court-fees, and that, at any rate, there must be a single valuation both for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the purpose of court-fees.

    3. The Stamp Reporter has further suggested that in this case as the overvaluation made by the plaintiffs has resulted in the suit being tried by a Subordinate Judge, the plaintiffs must be directed to amend the valuation to a figure which is above the maximum limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. The matter was then considered by the Taxing Officer and upon a review of the authorities on the point, the Taxing Officer came to the conclusion that in view of a judgment of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee in the case of Sailendra Nath Mitra v. Ram Chandra Pal (1) (25 C.W.N 768); there was some difficulty in asking the plaintiffs to value the appeal or the plaint at a figure higher than Rs. 100 and as the question is a question of general importance, he placed the matter before the learned Chief Justice for being considered by a Judge.

    4. Mr. Panda appearing in support of the plaintiff-appellants has conceded that the case comes under section 7(iv), but he contends that it comes under section 7(iv)(d) of the Court-fees Act. On behalf of the State the learned Senior Government Pleader has contended that the case really comes under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. On a consideration of the prayers made by the plaintiffs in their plaint, it seems to me that the prayer for injunction is really a consequential relief which flows from or is ancillary to the prayer for declaration made by the plaintiffs in their plaint. I therefore hold that the present case comes under section 7(iv)(c), but the question whether the case comes under clause (c) or clause (d) is of no practical importance in this case, because in either case the plaintiffs will have a right to value their own relief subject, of course, to the provisions of section 8C of the Court-fees Act, under which the Court is given the power to revise the valuation put by the plaintiff, if it appears to the Court to be grossly inadequate. In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court however in the case of the Narayanganj Central Co-operative Sale and Supply Society, Limited v. Mafijuddin Ahmed (2) (38 C.W.N 589), and the decision of this Court in the case of Sarojemohan Chatterjee v. Jibanmull Babu (3) (57 C.W.N 909), it cannot now be disputed that having regard to the fact that according to the plaintiffs' allegations they are in possession of the lands in dispute the valuation given by the plaintiffs for the relief asked for by them cannot be revised by the Court in the absence of rules framed for that purpose. The valuation of the relief for injunction which has been given by the plaintiffs in their plaint cannot, therefore, be revised or altered by this Court. Since, however, the suit comes under section 7, paragraph (iv), it is governed by section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act which requires that in a suit of this description “the value as; determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.” It has been established by a series of decisions that this provision of the Suits Valuation Act means that there must be a single valuation both for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the purpose of court-fees and further that the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be determined by the valuation for the purpose of court-fees, but not vice versa. [Vide Sailendra Nath Mitra v. Ram Chandra Pal (1) (25 C.W.N 768), and in the matter of Kali Pada Mukherji (4) (34 C.W.N 870)]. If that be so, the valuation of the present suit and the present appeal must be Rs. 100, but in that case neither the Subordinate Judge would have jurisdiction to try the suit, nor will this Court have the jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, because I am informed that the Munsif of Jhargram, where the disputed properties are situate, has pecuniary jurisdiction up to the value of Rs. 3,500. If the suit had been properly valued by the plaintiffs in the trial Court, the Munsif of Jhargram would have been competent to try the suit and the appeal to this Court would be incompetent, because the value of the subject-matter of the appeal is below the minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court. So far as the decision of the Subordinate Judge is concerned, the plaintiffs are perhaps protected by the provision of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act which provides that “an objection that by reason of the over-valuation * * * of a suit * * * a Court of first instance * * * which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit * * * exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed * * or the appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit * * was over-valued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit.” In the present case the defendants did not raise any objection as to the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to try the suit. Therefore, under section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, they are precluded from challenging the decision of the Subordinate Judge on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. So far as the appeal to this Court however is concerned, section 11 will not apply, because the appeal has not yet been heard and the respondents have not yet entered appearance and it will be open to the respondents to take a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal in this Court on the ground that the valuation of the appeal is Only Rs. 100. In a situation like this, it seems to me that the procedure recommended by Sir George Rankin in the case of In the matter of Kali Pada Mukherji (4) (34 C.W.N 870) should be followed. In the case his Lordship made the following observations at page 876:

    “But the figure at which he (plaintiff) values it is not to be less than Rs. 2,000 in view of the fact that he has represented the value for purposes of jurisdiction to be a figure which has resulted in the case being already tried by a Subordinate Judge It will be open to the Plaintiff to value it at less than Rs. 5,000 or at more than Rs. 5,000 and, according as he does that or not, he will have an appeal to the High Court or somewhere else.”

    5. Applying this principle to the circumstances of the present case, I think the fairest thing for me to do will be to require the plaintiffs to amend the valuation in the memorandum of appeal as well as in the plaint, but the figure at which the plaintiffs will value the plaint and the memorandum of appeal must be over Rs. 3,500, which, I am told, is the maximum limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif of Jhargram. In this case also the plaintiffs will have the liberty to value the relief asked for in the plaint and in the memorandum of appeal at less than Rs. 5,000 or more than Rs. 5,000 and according as they do that or not, they will have a right of appeal in this Court or elsewhere. The Taxing Officer refused to make this order, because according to him the decision of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee in the case of Sailendra Nath Mitra v. Ram Chandra Pal (1) (25 C.W.N 768), stood in the way. In that case Mookerjee, J., was dealing with a second appeal and the objection as to jurisdiction had not been raised either in the Court of first instance or in the lower appellate Court and there was no doubt that a second appeal would lie even upon the valuation which the plaintiffs were required to give and for that reason Mookerjee, J., observed that section 11 would protect the plaintiffs. In the case before me, however, although section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act will protect the plaintiffs' right so far as the decision of the Subordinate Judge is concerned, that section will be of no assistance to the plaintiffs with regard to the appeal in this Court. For that reason I have come to the conclusion that section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act will have no application to the present appeal and if section 11 stands out of the way, the only decision which will govern the rights of the parties will be the decision of Sir George Rankin in the case of Kali Pada Mukherji (4) (34 C.W.N 870).

    6. Mr. Panda appearing for the appellants has invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (5) [(1954) S.C.A 725]. In this decision their Lordships have considered the effect of section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act as well as of section 21 and section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    7. After considering those sections, their Lordships laid down the following principle: “The policy underlying sections 21 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.” This decision certainly assists Mr. Panda's clients so far as the decision of the Subordinate Judge is concerned and, as I have already pointed out, it will not be open to the respondents to challenge the decision of the Subordinate Judge on the ground of want of pecuniary jurisdiction in view of the fact that they did not raise that point in that Court; but this judgment of the Supreme Court will not help the appellants, so far as the present appeal is concerned, because, in my view, if the memorandum of appeal in this Court is valued at Rs. 100 only, it cannot be entertained by this Court.

    8. For the reasons given above, I direct that the appellants should be given time till the 30th November, 1954, to file an application for the amendment of the valuation in the memorandum of appeal as well as in the plaint on the lines indicated above, and they will also pay deficit court-fee on the amended valuation within the aforesaid time.

    9. I have given time till the end of November, 1954, at the special request of Mr. Panda, who has represented to me that his clients being agriculturists cannot, at this season of the year, collect sufficient funds for payment of deficit court-fees. If the valuation in the memorandum of appeal and in the plaint be amended and the deficit court-fees paid as directed above, the memorandum of appeal will be registered, failing which it will be returned to the learned Advocate.

    A.K.D.G

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    Bhupat Singh And Ors. v. Jnanendra Kumar Choudhury And Ors.
    (Jul 30, 1954)