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  • Rent Control Act.
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Summary of Opinion — Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1953 (Das, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs were tenants of premises No. 115, Lansdowne Road, Calcutta. On 5 July 1947 the defendant (landlord) served a notice determining the tenancy and instituted Title Suit No. 117 of 1947 for ejectment. The trial court decreed the suit on 18 December 1950. The tenants appealed and the lower appellate court dismissed that appeal on 12 July 1951.

After the lower appellate decision, the tenants remitted sums by postal money order on 14 July 1951 and on subsequent dates (17 September 1951; 5 November 1951; 10 November 1951; 27 December 1951; 30 January 1952; 3 March 1952) with coupon endorsements requesting acknowledgement as rent for the holding.

The tenants filed a second appeal (Second Appeal No. 1086 of 1951) to this Court on 24 July 1951; that appeal was dismissed by Das Gupta and P.N. Mookerjee, JJ., on 19 March 1952, leaving open the effect of the subsequent rent payments. On 24 March 1952 the tenants instituted a suit seeking a declaration of tenancy and an injunction restraining execution of the ejectment decree. The trial court dismissed that suit on 27 January 1953; the lower appellate court dismissed the ensuing appeal on 26 March 1953, holding the payments did not create a fresh tenancy.

The plaintiffs obtained leave and succeeded before a learned Judge of this Court on 15 June 1953 who held the money orders' payments and their acceptance created a new tenancy; leave was given to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The defendant (landlord) brought the present Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1953. The principal question before Das, J. was whether a new tenancy was created by the payments alleged by the plaintiffs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a new tenancy was created by the payments of rent transmitted by postal money order and by the landlord's acceptance of those sums.
  2. Whether the factual finding of the lower appellate court (that the facts relied upon were insufficient to infer a tenancy) is binding on this Court in a Second Appeal and could not be set aside here.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs / Respondents (tenants)

  • Plaintiffs alleged they had been sending the defendant postal money orders at the monthly rent rate of Rs. 305 for the premises, and that the defendant had signed acknowledgement receipts for rents from June to December 1951.
  • They contended that in consequence of these payments and their acceptance a fresh tenancy had been created from month to month at Rs. 305 per month and that the prior ejectment decree did not entitle the defendant to evict them.
  • During the hearing of the earlier second appeal, their counsel (Dr. Sen Gupta) asked the Court to take note of the subsequent rent payments.

Defendant / Appellant (landlord)

  • The defendant asserted that the money was neither tendered as alleged nor received by him "as rent". He testified he received the money as damages and had no intention to create a fresh tenancy in favour of the plaintiffs.
  • The defendant contested that acceptance of the money was an unequivocal acceptance of rent creating a new tenancy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Doe d Cheny v. Batten (1775) 1 Cowp. 243 at 245 (per Lord Mansfield) The test whether a payment of rent gives rise to a tenancy: "quo animo the rent was received" — the real intention of both parties is decisive. The Court invoked this test as the fundamental inquiry when deciding whether the money-order payments and their acceptance created a new tenancy.
Clarke v. Grant [(1949) 1 All E.R. 768] (per Lord Goddard, C.J.) Acceptance and endorsement of the test cited from Doe d Cheny — confirming that the "quo animo" test remains authoritative. The Court cited Clarke v. Grant to show that the "real intention" test has been accepted by later authority and applied that principle to the facts.
Panchanan Ghose v. Haridas Banerjee (58 C.W.N. 438) (Bench of this Court) Domestic application by this Court of the principle that the parties' real intention determines whether a tenancy arises from payments. The Court noted that the principle has been applied by a Bench of this Court and treated it as instructive precedent for assessing intention in the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in discrete steps:

  1. Characterisation of issue: The Court regarded the question whether a new tenancy was created as essentially a question of fact.
  2. Application of appellate constraints: The Court observed that the lower appellate court had found the facts relied upon by the plaintiffs were insufficient to infer tenancy; that factual finding is binding on this Court in a Second Appeal and could not properly be set aside by this Court on Second Appeal.
  3. Application of the legal test: Even if the factual finding were open to re-examination, the Court applied the established test — "quo animo the rent was received" — i.e., the real intention of both parties, as stated by Lord Mansfield and accepted subsequently (citing Clarke v. Grant and an earlier Bench decision of this Court).
  4. Examination of surrounding circumstances: The Court examined the context in which the money orders were sent and received: the landlord had already succeeded in two courts in his ejectment suit; the tenants were contemplating an appeal; the first money orders were sent after the landlord's appellate success. The Court found it unlikely the tenants were offering to create a new lease in those circumstances, or that the landlord, having succeeded, would intend by accepting payments to nullify the ejectment result.
  5. Assessment of evidence: The plaint contained only bare assertions that rent was transmitted and that acknowledgements were signed; none of the plaintiffs gave oral evidence; the defendant testified he received sums as damages and not as rent; the only witness produced by plaintiffs (Sushil Kumar Sarkar) gave evidence that rents had been deposited with the Rent Controller up to Sept/Oct 1947, thereafter no rent for fifteen months, and later payments were by money order after a change in the law.
  6. Interpretation of the money-order endorsements: The Court found the endorsement on the money-order coupons ("Please acknowledge the receipt of rent for holding No. 115...") was not an unequivocal indication that the payments were meant to create a new tenancy. The Court considered the endorsements consistent with the view that the payments were made to preserve rights under the Rent Control Act rather than to offer a fresh tenancy.
  7. Conclusion on intention and burden of proof: The Court emphasised that the central inquiry is the real intention of both parties and that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that intention to create a new tenancy. On the evidence as presented, the Court concluded the parties were not ad idem (did not share the same intention) and that the plaintiffs had failed to discharge the burden of proof.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

NO NEW TENANCY WAS CREATED.

Consequent disposition and direct effects:

  • The Court held that the finding of the lower appellate court must be affirmed and that, on the evidence, no fresh tenancy arose from the contested payments.
  • Accordingly, the Letters Patent appeal succeeded; the judgment under appeal (which had allowed the plaintiffs' second appeal) was set aside; and the plaintiffs' suit for declaration of tenancy and injunction was dismissed.
  • Costs were awarded against the plaintiffs in all the courts. The hearing fee in this appeal was assessed at five gold mohurs.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion does not set out any broader legal reformulation or new precedent beyond applying established tests of intention and affirming the binding character of a lower appellate court's factual findings on Second Appeal.


Judges: Das, J. (author); Guha Ray, J. agreed. (The text closes with the notation "P.S".)

    Bhabatosh Ghatak v. Joy Kumari Devi

    Das, J.:— This is an appeal by the defendant under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a learned Judge of this Court, dated the 15th of June, 1953.

    2. The plaintiffs were admittedly tenants under the defendant in respect of premises No. 115, Lansdowne Road, Calcutta. On the 5th of July, 1947, a notice determining the tenancy was served on the plaintiffs. Thereupon the defendant who is the landlord instituted a suit for ejectment, being Title Suit No. 117 of 1947. The suit was decreed by the trial court on the 18th of December, 1950. The tenants preferred an appeal. The appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate court on the 12th of July, 1951. It appears, that on the 14th of July, 1951, and on subsequent dates, namely, 17th September, 1951, 5th November, 1951, 10th November, 1951, 27th December, 1951, 30th January, 1952, and 3rd March, 1952, the plaintiffs, that is, the tenants, remitted by money order certain sums as rent payable by them in respect of premises No. 115. Lansdowne Road, Calcutta. In the coupon there is an endorsement to the effect. “Please acknowledge the receipt of rent for holding No. 115, Lansdowne Road, Calcutta,” for the months; in question. The plaintiffs, that is, the tenants preferred an appeal against the decision of the lower appellate Court, dated the 12th of July, 1951. The appeal was filed in this Court on the 24th of July, 1951, and was registered as Second Appeal No. 1086 of 1951. The appeal was dismissed by Mr. Justice Das Gupta and Mr. Justice P.N Mookerjee on the 19th March, 1952. During the hearing of the appeal Dr. Sen Gupta, the learned Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the tenants-appellants submitted that the Court should take note of the subsequent payments of rent by the tenants to which I have just now referred. The learned Judges did not deal with the effect of such payments of rent and left the question open. On the 24th of March, 1952, the tenants as plaintiffs instituted the present suit for a declaration of the tenancy right and for an injunction restraining the defendant, the landlord, from, executing the, decree for ejectment obtained by him. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the 27th of January, 1953. Against that decision the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court. The appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate Court on the 26th of March, 1953. The lower appellate Court was of the opinion that no fresh tenancy was created as a result of payments of rent as alleged by the plaintiffs. Against that decision the plaintiffs preferred a Second Appeal to this Court, being Second Appeal No. 682 of 1953. This appeal was heard by a learned Judge of this Court and the appeal was allowed by a judgment, dated the 15th of June, 1953. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the payment evidenced by the money orders was an unconditional payment of rent and the acceptance of the money orders was unequivocal with the result that a new tenancy came into being. The learned Judge was also of the opinion that no question of statutory tenancy arose after the decree for ejectment had been passed. The learned Judge, however, gave leave to prefer an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The defendant landlord preferred the present appeal, being Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1953. The question before us is whether a new tenancy was created as alleged by the plaintiffs.

    3. The question whether a new tenancy has been created or not is essentially a question of fact. The lower appellate Court had come to a finding that the facts relied on by the plaintiffs were not sufficient to raise an inference of tenancy. In our opinion the finding of the lower appellate Court was binding on this Court in Second Appeal and it could not have been set aside by this Court on Second Appeal.

    4. But even assuming that the question is open to debate in this Court, the question still remains whether the facts and circumstances of this case raise an inference of a tenancy in favour of the plaintiffs.

    5. The question is whether the facts relied on, namely, the transmission of money as rent by money order and the acceptance thereof by the landlord, raise an inference of a new tenancy.

    6. The test in cases like these is whether “qvo animo the rent was received, and what the real intention of both parties was?” [Per Lord Mansfield in Doe d Cheny v. Batten (1) (1775) 1 Cowp. 243 at 245]. This test has been accepted ever since. See per Lord Goddard, C.J, in Clarke v. Grant (2) [(1949) 1 All E.R 768]. The principle thus enunciated has been applied by a Bench of this Court in the case of Panchanan Ghose…Defendant, v. Haridas Banerjee…Plaintiff, . (3) (58 C.W.N 438).

    7. In deciding the question whether the new tenancy has been created or not we have to bear the above principles in mind. The facts which have been relied upon by the plaintiffs respondents are that the rent was transmitted by them by money order with an endorsement thereon “please acknowledge receipt of rent for holding 115, Lansdowne Road, for the rent of a particular month”. The money so sent was accepted by the landlord, that is, by the defendant appellant. In order to find out whether the money transmitted by the plaintiffs as rent was transmitted as such and whether the receipt of the money by the defendant landlord was received by the latter as such, reference may be made to the surrounding circumstances of the case. At the time when the money was so transmitted for the first time by money order the defendant landlord had succeeded up to the lower appellate-Court in his suit for ejectment of the plaintiffs tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement of the premises for his own use and occupation. The plaintiffs-tenants were contemplating to file an appeal against the decree for ejectment passed against them. Can it be conceived that in this setting the transmission of the money was an offer by the plaintiffs-tenants for a new lease? In my opinion, the answer must be in the negative. Even if it be assumed that it was an offer by the plaintiffs-tenants, can it be imagined that the defendant landlord in accepting the money really intended to create a new tenancy thus nullifying the effect of his hard-earned success in a suit for ejectment, in two courts? It is the case of the defendant landlord that) the money was neither tendered as alleged nor was received by him as rent. The defendant in his evidence has stated that he received the money as damages and not as rent and that he had no intention to create a fresh tenancy in favour of the plaintiffs. None of the plaintiffs has deposed in this case. In the plaint there is a bare assertion that rent was transmitted. The relevant paragraphs in the plaint are as follows:

    “For a long time and specially after 12-7-51 when your plaintiffs' title appeal against the ejectment decree obtained by the defendant was dismissed, the plaintiffs have been sending to the defendant by Postal Money Order rents at the rate of Rs. 305 per month in accordance with English Calendar month for the premises No. 115, Lansdowne Road, and the defendant actually received the same rent month after month by duly signing the acknowledgment receipts. Acknowledgment receipts so signed by defendant for rents from June, 1951, to December, 1951, are filed herewith.”

    “In consequence of the payments and acceptance of rents as stated above a fresh tenancy has been created between the plaintiffs and the defendant in respect of the premises in suit at a monthly rent of Rs. 305, and the decree in T.S 117 of 1947, obtained by the defendant now confirmed by the High Court based on a determination of the old lease by the usual service of notice does not entitle the defendant to evict the plaintiffs from the premises in suit.”

    8. In paragraph 8 of the plaint the plaintiffs state that the cause of action arose on the 19th March, 1952, when their Lordships Das Gupta and P.N Mookerjee, JJ., announced their judgment dismissing the Second Appeal *** In paragraph 9 of the plaint the plaintiffs pray for a declaration that the plaintiffs are tenants from month to month under the defendant at a rent of Rs. 305 in respect of premises No. 115, Lansdowne Road, Calcutta-26.

    9. It appears from the paragraphs quoted above that in the plaint the plaintiffs do not suggest any specific date when the tenancy came into existence nor do they state the terms of the tenancy Sushil Kumar Sarkar, the only witness examined by the plaintiffs, stated in cross-examination that rents were deposited with the Rent Controller up to September and October, 1947.

    10. That thereafter no rent was paid for fifteen months and that then there was some change in the law and “we again began to pay rent, this time by money order” In the above circumstances the fact that the money order coupons contained a statement already referred to, is not unequivocal. It is consistent with the view that the sums were being transmitted by money order for preserving the rights, real or assumed, of the plaintiffs under the then Rent Control Act. This is borne out by the deposition of Sushil Kumar Sarkar just referred to. Whether payment of rent would or would not benefit the plaintiffs-tenants or whether or not the defendant landlord was entitled to accept it as rent is not material. We are concerned with the real intention of the parties. The facts of this case do not show that the parties did intend to bring into existence a new tenancy in my opinion, the parties were not ad idem. The burden of proof lay on the plaintiffs. In my opinion, the plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden. The finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court must, therefore, be affirmed.

    11. We accordingly hold that no new tenancy was created as alleged by the plaintiffs

    12. In the result this appeal succeeds the judgment under appeal is set aside and the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed with costs in all the courts—the hearing fee in this appeal being assessed at five gold mohurs

    Guha Ray, J.:— I agree.

    P.S

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    Bhabatosh Ghatak v. Joy Kumari Devi
    (Apr 9, 1954)