Lahiri, J.:— In these five appeals the appellants challenge the validity of paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949. The appellants are owners of Rice Mills in Barasat Subdivision in the District of 24-Parganas, and carry on the business of husking paddy. By an order, dated October 12, 1950, the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, Alipore, granted permits to the appellants restricting the quantity of paddy to be husked by them and by another order, dated December 7, 1950, he directed that the husking mill-owners would be authorised to husk half of their previously permitted quantities up to December 14, 1950, and that no husking mill should be run after that date without obtaining further orders.
2. The appellants applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and obtained Rules upon the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, Alipore, requiring him to revoke his order, dated December 7, 1950, and to forbear from giving effect to the said order and also to show cause why a writ in the nature of a Mandamus should not issue directing the Assistant Regional Controller not to impose any restriction as regards the quantity of paddy to be husked by the appellants. Bose, J., who heard the Rules, set aside the order of the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, dated December 7, 1950, holding that the said order was illegal and pave liberty to the appellants to apply for fresh licenses and directed the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement to deal with the applications according to law. Bose, J., however, refused to issue the writ in the nature of a mandamus directing the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement not to impose any restriction upon [the quantity of paddy to be husked by the appellants and it is against that part of the judgment that the appellants have filed the present appeals.
3. Mr. Das, appearing in support of these appeals, has argued that restrictions on the quantity of paddy to be husk ed are imposed under paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949, and that this paragraph is invalid, inasmuch as it imposes an un reasonable restriction on the exercise of the appellants' fundamental right guar anteed by Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the imposition of these restrictions would render the running of the appellants' rice mills uneconomical and it is also argued that the power conferred by paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949, may be abused. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Das upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chintamon Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1) [(1950) S.C.R 759 : A.I.R 1951 S.C 118].
4. Before dealing with the merits of the arguments of Mr. Das, it is necessary to point out that by Memo. No. 19121 (75) Ap/Vit 144(51), dated December 27, 1951, issued by the Assistant Regional Controller of Procurement, it was directed that from that date onwards no permits for husking paddy would be necessary. Mr. Das himself placed this notification before us and in view of the fact that no permits are now necessary for husking paddy it must be held that the appellants have at present no grievance in respect of their fundamental rights.
5. Mr. Das has argued that so long as paragraph 15 is there, there is a potential threat to the exercise of the appellants' fundamental rights. In an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, we are not required to grant a declaration in favour of the applicant unless that declaration is necessary for the exercise of the applicant's rights. In the well-known case of Chiranjit Lal Choudhury v. The Union of India (2) [(1950) S.C.R 869 : A.I.R 1950 at 899-900], Mukherjea, J., made tithe following observations with regard to Art. 32 of the Constitution of India:
“To make out a case under this Article it is incumbent upon the petitioner to establish not merely that the law complained of is beyond the competence of the particular legislature…………but that it affects or invades his fundamental rights guaranteed by the. Constitution, on which he could seek enforcement by an appropriate writ or order……. A proceeding under this Article cannot really have any affinity to what is known as a declaratory suit.”
6. The power of issuing writs granted to the High Court by Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is wider, as the High Court is authorised to issue a writ not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also “for any other purpose”; but if the appellants on their own showing have no existing grievance, I cannot give the declaration asked for. See the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (3) [(1952) 3 S.C.R 28 at p. 33].
7. Turning now to the merits of the appellants' arguments, it is to be noticed that in the case of Chintamon Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1) [(1950) S.C.R 759 : (1951) S.C 183 (C.W.N)], it was decided that a statute which arbitrarily or excessively interferes with the running of private business by a citizen cannot be said to contain the element of reasonableness. In that case an Act was passed imposing total prohibition on carrying on business of bidi manufacture in a particular season and the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that this was an unreasonable restriction of the applicant's right under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. In the case before us, however, there is no total prohibition of the carrying on of the appellants' business. As what is sought to be done is to control the husking of paddy by issuing permits and the object of the imposition of this control is to guard against unauthorised movement of paddy and rice, smuggling and blackmarketing, the fact that the imposition of the control has rendered the running of the appellants' mills uneconomical cannot, in my opinion, be said to be an unreasonable restriction of the appellants' fundamental rights.
8. Mr. Das has further argued that the power conferred by paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949, is liable to be abused, and it must, therefore, be held to be invalid. On this point the Supreme Court held in the case of Dr. N.B Khare (Dr.) v. State Of Delhi (4) [(1950) S.C.R 519, 526 : (1950) S.C 258, 264-265 (C.W.N)], as follows:—
“Abuse of the power given by a law sometimes occurs; but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension.”
9. In the cases before us, the appellants have produced in court certain permits granted to the rice-mill-owners.
10. Mr. Das states that these permits are granted under paragraph 15 of the West Bengal Rice Mills Control Order, 1949…… Reading paragraph 15, however, I find that there is nothing in it to authorise the granting of permits to mill-owners. That paragraph merely authorises the issue of permits to persons to whom the husked paddy is to be delivered by the owners of the mills who have obtained licenses for the running of their mills. We are told that this practice of granting permits to mill-owners has now been discontinued by the authorities.
11. For the reasons given above, I see no reason to interfere with the judgment of Boss, J.
12. These appeals must accordingly fail, but in the circumstances of these cases, I think that the parties should bear their own costs.
13. The cross-objections are not pressed and they are, therefore, dismissed without costs.
Guha Ray, J.:— I agree.
A.K.D.G