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  • (f) of sec. 11(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • West Bengal Premises (Temporary Provisions) Rent Control Act, 1948,
  • West Bengal Premises (Temporary Provision) Rent Control Act, 1948,
  • sec. 11 (1), proviso (f) of the Rent Control Act, 1948,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • (f) of sec. 11 (1) of the Rent Act of 1948.
  • (f) of sec 11 (1) of the Rent Act, 1948.19.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rent Control Act.
  • Rent Act of 1920,
  • Rent Act, 1920,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • (f) of sec. 11(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • West Bengal Premises (Temporary Provisions) Rent Control Act, 1948,
  • West Bengal Premises (Temporary Provision) Rent Control Act, 1948,
  • sec. 11 (1), proviso (f) of the Rent Control Act, 1948,
  • West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948.
  • (f) of sec. 11 (1) of the Rent Act of 1948.
  • (f) of sec 11 (1) of the Rent Act, 1948.19.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rent Control Act.
  • Rent Act of 1920,
  • Rent Act, 1920,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a suit by the Plaintiff for recovery of possession of premises described in the opinion variously as No. 260, Amherst Row, Calcutta and more consistently as No. 26C, Amherst Row, and for a decree for Rs. 705 alleged to be due as arrears of rent for the period April 1947 to June 1948, together with mesne profits and costs.

The Plaintiff's case was that the Defendant was a monthly tenant at Rs. 47 per month and that notices to quit were given (a notice dated 26 May 1948 calling upon the Defendant to vacate by the end of June 1948 is recorded). The Plaintiff pleaded that he required the house for his own occupation and had obtained permission from the Rent Controller on 17 December 1947. The suit was instituted on 12 July 1948.

The Defendant filed a written statement denying default in rent, denying the validity of the notice to quit and denying that the Plaintiff had any bona fide requirement. The Defendant also alleged in the written statement that the Plaintiff owned many other properties in Calcutta and that the suit was maliciously motivated (paragraph 7) because the Plaintiff sought to increase the rent when the Defendant refused an offer.

Procedural history and key events recorded in the opinion:

  • Purchase by the Plaintiff of the premises in suit on or about 18 December 1946 (the Plaintiff purchased Nos. 26B and 26C, with Rent Controller permission granted only for 26C).
  • First notice to quit by the Plaintiff dated 6 March 1947; application to the Rent Controller was made on 3 April 1947 and permission to sue was granted on 17 December 1947.
  • The Defendant appealed to the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court on 14 January 1948; that appeal was dismissed on 25 May 1948. A further notice was given on 26 May 1948 calling for vacation by end of June 1948; a review application by the Defendant was later dismissed on 6 August 1948 for default.
  • The Plaintiff filed the suit on 12 July 1948 and the matter proceeded to trial on evidentiary issues. The Defendant had deposited rents with the Rent Controller until an order under Chapter 13A, after which payments were made to the Plaintiff's solicitors. Counsel for the Defendant confined his defence to the issue of bona fide requirement.

The Plaintiff gave evidence about his personal circumstances: he and his wife had previously taken vacant land in the wife's name at Balai Singhi Lane in 1940 and had built a pucca structure of about 8–9 rooms; the Plaintiff said he and his family were living at 17.H/B, Balai Singhi Lane but were under a notice to quit there and therefore in precarious occupation; the family numbered about eight. The premises No. 26C, Amherst Row were said to have about seven rooms on about 1½ cottas of land.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Does the Plaintiff bonâ fide require the house (No. 26C, Amherst Row) for his own occupation within the meaning of proviso (f) of section 11(1) of the Rent Control Act, 1948?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Evidence and Contentions

  • The Plaintiff purchased the premises in suit (26C, Amherst Row) on or about 18 December 1946 and gave earlier notices to quit and pursued the Rent Controller proceedings promptly.
  • The Plaintiff and family currently resided at 17.H/B, Balai Singhi Lane in premises built on land taken in the wife's name; they are under notice to quit there and the Plaintiff said he had no other house or properties in Calcutta (this testimony was not challenged in cross-examination).
  • The Plaintiff intended to occupy No. 26C with his family; the house had about seven rooms and was suitable for the family of about eight persons.
  • The Plaintiff acted without unreasonable delay in pursuing statutory remedies (applications, appeals, review) and filed suit when he would not wait further.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The Defendant denied default in payment of rent and denied the validity of the notice to quit.
  • The Defendant disputed the Plaintiff's claim of bona fide requirement, pleading (a) that the Plaintiff owned many other properties in Calcutta and (b) that the suit was malâ fide—instituted because the Plaintiff wanted to raise the rent when the Defendant refused an increase (paragraph 7 of the written statement).
  • Counsel for the Defendant (Mr. Dilip Kumar Sen) confined the defence at trial to the single issue of bona fide requirement and argued that the Plaintiff and his wife already had accommodation (at Balai Singhi Lane), that the landlord of Balai Singhi Lane could not easily evict them because of the Rent Control Act, and that hardship would be caused to the Defendant and his family (including school-aged children) if ejectment was ordered.
  • The Defendant's evidence included his own circumstances: he had been in government service and was a Sub-Divisional Relief and Rehabilitation Officer, with family members residing at 26C, Amherst Row; he described his own postings and historic residence at the house to support his position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rekhab Chand Dugar v. D.'Cruz (Buckland, J.) The construction of the word "require" (the word implies more than mere wish or desire and involves an element of need). The Court expressly adopted Buckland, J.'s construction of “require” and applied it to the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1948, holding that "require" involves some element of need though not an absolute necessity.
Rustomji Dinshaw Bilimori v. Dosibai Rustompi Master (Sir Norman MacLeod, C.J.) Authority for the proposition that a landlord is not bound to accept precarious rented accommodation and that such precariousness does not prevent a bona fide requirement of his own house. The Court relied on this observation to reject the Defendant's argument that the Plaintiff's temporary residence in rented premises precluded his requirement of his own house. The presence or absence of the word "reasonably" in the Bombay statute was noted but the principle was applied.
Neville v. Hardy (Peterson, J.) — English authority That a landlord's temporary residence because a tenant refuses to deliver possession is not a reason to hold that the landlord does not require his own dwelling-house. The Court cited this English authority to support the view that temporary residence in other premises is not decisive against a claim of bona fide requirement.
Saleh Abraham v. Manekji Cowasji (Court of Appeal) Consideration of the same construction; Richardson, J. observed that a landlord is not acting bona fide unless he "reasonably requires" the house for his own occupation (even where the statute did not use the word "reasonably"). The Court referred to the Court of Appeal's treatment of similar language. Although the point was not decided by Sanderson, C.J. or Richardson, J. in that case, the present Court relied on the observation to state that questions of reasonableness may be relevant to assessing bona fides, while stressing that gross unreasonableness could be evidence of malâ fides depending on facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the statutory test to be satisfied by a landlord under the West Bengal Premises (Temporary Provisions) Rent Control Act, 1948 as requiring satisfaction on three points: (1) that he "requires" the premises; (2) that such requirement is for his "own occupation"; and (3) that the requirement is "bona fide."

The Court's step-by-step analysis proceeded as follows:

  1. Evaluation of procedural history and promptness: The Court reviewed the chronology of notices, applications to the Rent Controller, appeals and review applications and concluded the Plaintiff did not delay unreasonably and had acted promptly to recover possession.
  2. Assessment of factual evidence on accommodation: The Plaintiff's unchallenged testimony that he had no other house in Calcutta and that he and his family were in precarious accommodation at Balai Singhi Lane was accepted. The Defendant's written allegation that the Plaintiff owned many other properties was not supported by evidence at trial and the Defendant did not produce evidence in oral testimony to substantiate that claim.
  3. Statutory construction of "require": The Court adopted the construction of "require" from Rekhab Chand Dugar v. D.'Cruz (Buckland, J.), holding that "require" involves something more than a mere wish and entails an element of need, but it does not demand absolute destitution before relief can be granted.
  4. On temporary accommodation: The Court rejected the contention that the Plaintiff's temporary residence in rented premises prevents him from requiring his own house. Citing Rustomji Dinshaw Bilimori and Neville v. Hardy, the Court held that a landlord is not obliged to endure precarious tenancy and that such temporary residence is not decisive against bona fide requirement.
  5. On "bona fide" as a question of fact: The Court emphasized that bona fides is a factual question and that the Court may consider all relevant circumstances — the nature of the landlord's temporary accommodation, insecurity of tenure, whether he himself is under notice to quit, the size and character of the requirement, and other relevant facts in assessing bona fides.
  6. On relevance of tenant hardship: The Court held that potential hardship to the tenant caused by ejectment is not a proper or relevant consideration under proviso (f) of section 11(1) of the Rent Act, 1948. The tenant may of course point to facts relevant to bona fides, but mere hardship does not negate a landlord's bona fide requirement under the proviso.
  7. Evaluation of Defendant's pleaded grounds: The Court found no evidence to support the Defendant's allegations that the Plaintiff had other properties or that the suit was malâ fide for the purpose of raising rent; both grounds failed on the evidence.
  8. Conclusion on statutory tests: On the facts found — the Plaintiff’s need, family size, the number of rooms in the purchased house, and the precarious situation of the Plaintiff's present residence — the Court concluded the Plaintiff satisfied the three statutory requirements (requires; for own occupation; bona fide).

The Court explicitly refrained from importing extra words into the statute (for example "reasonably") and treated questions of reasonableness as relevant to assessing bona fides, rather than as a separate statutory requirement.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court entered judgment for the Plaintiff for possession of premises No. 26C, Amherst Row, and for costs. The Court answered the principal issue — whether the Plaintiff bonâ fide requires the house for his own occupation — in the affirmative.

Direct practical orders and consequences recorded in the opinion:

  • The Defendant was granted time to vacate the premises until 3 November 1949.
  • Until delivery of possession, the Defendant was ordered to continue to pay mesne profits at the rate of rent to the Plaintiff's solicitors by the 7th of each succeeding month for which the same is due.
  • Because the Defendant had paid all arrears of rent (as stated by counsel for the Defendant), the Plaintiff did not press for a decree for such arrears.
  • The Plaintiff was given liberty to withdraw any deposit of rents with the Rent Controller, if not already withdrawn.

Implications for legal principle: The Court applied and reaffirmed existing interpretations of "require" and "bona fide" drawn from prior authority (as cited) and applied them to the West Bengal statute. The decision applies established tests and factual inquiry rather than creating a novel statutory gloss. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new precedent beyond applying and following prior authorities and statutory construction to the facts of this case.

    Basant Lal Saha v. P.C Chakravarty.

    P.B Mukherji, J.:— This is a suit by the Plaintiff for the recovery of possession of premises No. 260, Amherst Row, Calcutta, and for a decree for the sum of Rs. 705 alleged to be due in respect of arrears of rent from April, 1947 to June, 1948, and for mesne profits and costs.

    2. The case of the Plaintiff is that the Defendant was a monthly tenant under the Plaintiff in respect of premises No. 26C, Amherst Row at the rent of Rs. 47 per month. A notice to quit was given on the 26th May, 1948, calling upon the Defendant to vacate the premises by the end of June, 1948. The Plaintiff also pleads that he requires this house for his own occupation. He obtained permission from the Rent Controller on the 17th December, 1947. The suit was instituted on the 12th July, 1948. The Defendant filed his written statement. The default in the payment of rents is denied. The Defendant also denies the validity of the notice to quit. The Defendant denies that there is any bonâ fide requirement by the Plaintiff.

    3. In the written statement the Defendant has gone further to say that the Plaintiff owns and possesses many other properties in Calcutta and does not require the premises in suit for his own occupation. The Defendant has imputed a motive to the Plaintiff for filing this suit by the plea in paragraph 7 of the written statement that the Plaintiff wanted to increase the rent and because the Defendant did not accept the proposal for increase of rent set out in that paragraph the Plaintiff wants to turn out and evict the Defendant.

    4. Mr. Dilip Kumar Sen who appears for the Defendant confined himself only to the issue of bona fide requirement. The only issue he raised is:

    Does the Plaintiff bonâ fide require the house for his own occupation?

    5. Mr. Sen does not raise any issue with regard to the notice to quit. Nor does Mr. S. Dutt who appears for the Plaintiff raise any issue with regard to the arrears of rent. The position with regard to the arrears of rent is this that the Defendant has gone on depositing all the rents with the Rent Controller up to the date when an order was made on an application under Ch. 13A in this suit; since that order the payments are being made to the Plaintiff's solicitors. Mr. Dutt admits that payments up to date have been made in this way.

    6. The Plaintiff has given evidence in this suit. He says that he resides at 17.H/B, Balai Singhi Lane with his family, wife and children. His present residence in those premises arose in this way: In 1940 a piece of vacant land was taken in the name of the wife of the Plaintiff as a tenant. The land was administered by the shebaits of a debutter estate which includes the said premises No. 17.H/8, Balai Singhi Lane.

    7. After taking the piece of vacant land the Plaintiff built structures on it. They were pucca structures with tiled roofs. The structures now contain about 8 to 9 rooms and a godown. In fact he describes the structure as a two-storied construction with 6 rooms on the first floor and two rooms and a godown in the ground floor. (Question 12). On or about 28th December, 1945, the Plaintiff's wife Smt. Durga Debi received a notice from her landlord asking her to vacate the portion of the land by the end of January, 1946. The Plaintiff thereupon looked out for a house and purchased the premises in suit No. 26C, Amherst Row on or about the 18th December, 1946. The first notice to quit was given by the Plaintiff as owner and purchaser of this house to the Defendant on the 6th March, 1947. Thereafter, proceedings had to be started before the Rent Controller against the Defendant. On the 3rd April, 1947, an application was made before the Rent Controller and he gave permission on the 17th December, 1947, to sue in respect of No. 26C, Amherst Row. It may be mentioned here that the Plaintiff purchased two properties adjoining to each other, one is No. 26B, Amherst Row and the other is 26C, Amherst Row, the latter being the premises in suit. The Rent Controller refused permission in respect of 26B, but he granted permission in respect of No. 26C, Amherst Row. The Defendant it appears from the records of the Rent Controller tried at every step to oppose and delay the grant of permission. After the permission was granted he filed an appeal to the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court on the 14th January, 1948. The appeal took four months before it could be disposed of and was ultimately dismissed on the 25th May, 1948. On the very following day that is the 26th May, 1948, the Plaintiff gave another notice to quit asking the Defendant to vacate by the end of June, 1948. Then followed a review application by the Defendant and it was kept pending for some time. But the Plaintiff did not want to wait any longer to file his suit and he filed this suit on the 12th July, 1948. The review application was dismissed on the 6th August, 1948, for default of the Defendant which shows that the Defendant was only gaining time by these processes.

    8. Immediately after the filing of the suit an application was made for final judgment by the Plaintiff. The Defendant opposed and the suit had to be set down for trial on evidence.

    9. From this record it appears to me that the Plaintiff tried his best to recover possession of the property. A point was made by Mr. Sen appearing for the Defendant that although a notice to quit was given by the landlord of Durga Debi on the 28th December, 1945, the Plaintiff and his wife have managed to live there for the last four years. But I do not see what else the Plaintiff could do in the circumstances. The dates of the proceedings taken before the Rent Controller, the appeal and the review from those proceedings show that the Plaintiff did not lose a day and was very anxious to recover possession. Indeed there is in his evidence the further point that he wished to get some other house at Guru Prosad Chowdhury Lane which purchase did not ultimately take place. As the Plaintiff puts it he with folded hands approached the landlord of Durga Debi and has promised his wife's landlord that he will vacate the moment he gets possession of this house. I do not think in these circumstances it can be said that this delay is due to any fault on the part of the Plaintiff. The position of the Plaintiff and his wife at Balai Singhi Lane premises is precarious and they are liable to be turned out at any moment. If they are still living there that is on mere sufferance of the landlord. Mr. Sen has argued that it is difficult for the landlord of Balai Singhi Lane to evict Durga Debi because of the Rent Control Act. I do not accept his argument. It is a case of vacant land let out and not within the scope of the Rent Control Act at all. Then Mr. Sen fell back upon Calcutta Thicka Tenancy Act but there is not the slightest suggestion in evidence that Durga Debi was a thicka tenant in Balai Singhi Lane.

    10. The question is whether the Plaintiff bonâ fide requires the premises No. 26C, Amherst Row for his own occupation. He says in his evidence that he has no other house or properties in Calcutta. His evidence on the point has not even been challenged in cross-examination. I accept his evidence on the point that he has no other place to go to. The Defendant has said in his written statement that the Plaintiff owns many other houses and properties in Calcutta and verified that statement as true to his knowledge. But the Defendant has not said a word about any property of the Plaintiff in his evidence. I, therefore, have no hesitation in accepting the unchallenged testimony of the Plaintiff that he has no other house in Calcutta. The family members of the Plaintiff are about eight in number. The evidence of the Plaintiff on this point is that he lives with his wife and one son and one daughter. Besides he has other dependants of the family, namely, his mother, his brother and the brother's wife and an uncle. There are two servants also (Questions 44-51). The house No. 26C, Amherst Row has about seven rooms standing on an area of about 1½ cottas. The idea behind purchasing No. 26C, Amherst Row, was to come and live there with his family. Sm. Durga Debi, along with her husband the Plaintiff, is under a notice to quit so far as Balai Singhi Lane premises are concerned.

    11. In these circumstances, the point for decision is, does the Plaintiff bona fide require the house for his own occupation within the meaning of proviso (f) of sec. 11(1) of the Rent Control Act, 1948? On the facts I have no hesitation in holding that the Plaintiff bona fide requires premises No. 26C, Amherst Row for his own occupation.

    12. In my opinion a landlord under the West Bengal Premises (Temporary Provision) Rent Control Act, 1948, is to satisfy the Court on three points: (1) that he “requires” the premises, (2) that such requirement is for his “own occupation” and (3) that this requirement is “bona fide.”

    13. The word “require” was construed by Mr. Justice Buckland in Rekhab Chand Dugar v. D.’Cruz(1), while dealing with a similar provision in the Calcutta Rent Act of 1920, and the construction that the learned Judge put upon the word “require” is this: The word in the Act is not “desire” but “require.” This in my opinion involves something more than a mere wish and it involves an element of need to some extent at least.” I respectfully follow the same meaning and construction of the word “require” in construing that word in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948. Mere wish or convenience or whim or fancy of the landlord will not in my view be enough to show that the landlord “requires” the premises. The landlord must show certain circumstances or facts proving some need or some necessity for the landlord. At the same time the statute does not say that it must be an absolute need or an absolute requirement in the sense that the landlord will not have any accommodation of any description and that he must actually be in the streets before he can demand his own house for his own occupation. This in my opinion will be taking the most unreasonable and im- possible view of the statute and I do not consider such was its intention.

    14. Counsel for the Defendant has argued that the Plaintiff and his wife have already got an accommodation where they are living with their family. Therefore, he submits that the Plaintiff cannot be said to “require” No. 26C, Amherst Row. In my judgment the landlord is not bound to continue his residence at rented premises with all the uncertainties of that tenure. Although he may have a rented and tenanted accommodation, such accommodation in my view of the construction of the statute does not prevent the owner of a house from requiring his own house for his own occupation. The fact that the landlord owing to the refusal of the tenant to give up possession has to live in other premises temporarily or in a precarious condition of tenure at some place at the time of hearing is no reason in my view for holding that the landlord does not require the dwelling-house for himself.

    15. Sir Norman MacLeod, the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court observed in Rustomji Dinshaw Bilimori v. Dosibai Rustompi Master(2) that the landlord was not bound to accept such precarious existence and the fact that he had such precarious accommodation does not mean that he cannot require his own house for his own occupation. Mr. Sen tried to distinguish the Bombay case by his argument that the words of the Bombay Act are both “bona fide” and “reasonably.” The word “reasonably” does not appear in proviso (f) of sec. 11(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948. But I do not think that this argument helps Mr. Sen at all. On the contrary, it goes very much against his contention. With both the words “bona fide” and “reasonably” in the statute the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court came to the decision that the landlord was not bound to continue residing in the rented premises and his demand of his own house for his own occupation where he can live will be considered to be “reasonable” within the meaning of the statute. Even in such a case and under such a statute the landlord's demand or requirement was not held to be unreasonable. The word “reasonably” finds expression also in the English Statute although the word “bona fide” is not there. Even under the English Statute, Peterson, J., in Neville v. Hardy(3) held that the temporary residence of a landlord because the tenant refused to deliver him possession of his own house is never a reason for holding that the landlord does not require his own dwelling-house.

    16. It is not necessary for me to decide if there is any difference and if so what between our Act and the English and the Bombay Acts. It is not equally necessary for me to decide whether the meaning of sec. 11 (1), proviso (f) of the Rent Control Act, 1948, would be different and, if so, to what extent, if the word “reasonably” occurred in the statute. That will be dealing with a hypothetical statute and a hypothetical case. It is common learning that in constructing a statute no extra word should ordinarily be imported. As I understand the word “require” I am content to accept the view and the construction of that word which Buckland, J., expressed on the point. This construction came up before the Court of Appeal in Saleh Abraham v. Manekji Cowasji*(4) for consideration but neither Sanderson, C.J, nor Richardson, J., decided the point. Although the word “reasonably” does not appear in the statute questions of reasonableness or unreasonableness may come in for consideration in deciding the “bona fides” of the landlord. Gross unreasonableness of the landlord may in proper circumstances lead the Court to the conclusion that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide. How much unreasonableness will be regarded by the Court as evidence of malâ fides on the part of the landlord will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Richardson, J., in the Court of Appeal, in the decision to which I have just referred, expressed at p. 505 of Saleh Abraham v. Manekji Cowasji* the same view dealing with almost similar expression used in the Calcutta Rent Act, 1920, when he observes “I agree that a landlord is not acting bonâ fide under the Act unless he reasonably requires the house for his own occupation” although there also the statute did not use the word “reasonably.”

    17. As to what is “bona fide” under the statute, it is always in my opinion a question of fact. The Court in this context and with a view to find out whether the requirement of the landlord is bonâ fide, is entitled to look to every relevant fact or circumstance affecting the landlord and his position. The nature and character of the landlord's temporary accommodation at the time when he is asking for the decree for possession, the insecurity or otherwise of the tenure that he might be holding at the time, the fact that he himself is under a notice to quit, the scope, size and character of his requirement are all relevant factors that the Court might consider in this context.

    18. Mr. Sen with considerable force has argued about the hardship of the tenant that may arise in this case. In considering the question as to whether the landlord bona fide requires the house for his own occupation, my view is that the hardship which might be caused to the tenant by granting the decree for possession is not a proper or relevant consideration under proviso (f) of sec. 11 (1) of the Rent Act of 1948. The tenant is always entitled to draw the attention of the Court to any factor bearing on the question of bonâ fide requirement or on the need of the landlord. But any possible hardship of the tenant that might be entailed by the passing of the decree for ejectment is not in my judgment a proper or a relevant consideration under proviso (f) of sec 11 (1) of the Rent Act, 1948.

    19. Mr. Sen has argued that the Defendant is a Lawyer Magistrate who has been in Government service and still is and whose family members reside in his house. The Defendant is a Sub-Divisional Relief and Rehabilitation Officer of the Government of West Bengal. At present he says he is at Siliguri and he will remain there until October of this year. He has his wife and two children, one is aged 9 years and the other is 13 years who live at 26C, Amherst Row, Calcutta, and from where they attend Scottish Churches Collegiate School. In 1943 he was practising in the Bankshall Police Court as a pleader and was residing at 26C, Amherst Row. He joined Government service in 1945. In January, 1945, he was posted at Barisal for 2 years and 8 months and he left his family to live in that house in Calcutta-Then from Barisal he was posted to Contai for 6 months. Mr. Dutt has on these facts argued that the tenant really does not need the house. On the same facts Mr. Sen argues that it will be a very great hardship on the Defendant if he is to leave the house. In my view both such arguments are misconceived. The test that is to be satisfied and considered under the Statute is whether the landlord bona fide requires the house for his own occupation and not whether the tenant needs the house or that a decree for ejectment will cause hardship to the tenant Proviso (f) of sec. 11 (1) of the Act engrafts an exception where a decree for recovery of possession can still be made in favour of a landlord who bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation. The statute thereby recognises a wholesome principle that a man should not be deprived of his own house if he bona fide requires it for his own occupation. Under the common law or the Transfer of Property Act the landlord has considerable rights to evict a tenant from his property. A good many of these rights have been taken away by the Act in order to meet the prevailing and acute shortage of housing accommodation for the citizens of this province. A Statute like the West Bengal Premises (Temporary Provisions) Rent Control Act, 1948, is designed to meet the fugitive exigencies of the hour and in doing so the Legislature in its wisdom has still left the landlord with that remnant of his right, which is an incident of ownership, to be-able to evict a tenant, when he bona fide requires his property for his own occupation. This Court will be loath to confiscate that valuable right of the landlord without express statutory provision.

    20. In this case, in the written statement as I have said before, the Defendant challenged the Plaintiff's case of bonâ fide requirement on two grounds. The first ground was that the Plaintiff had many other properties and houses in Calcutta and the second ground was as pleaded in paragraph 7 of the written statement, namely, that this was a malâ fide suit and was instituted because the Defendant did not agree to the Plaintiff's demand for increment of rent. I find nothing from the evidence of the Defendant in support of either of these allegations made in the written statement and nothing in my opinion has been proved in support of any one of such allegations. Both the grounds, therefore, on which the Defendant has challenged the bonâ fide requirement of the landlord Plaintiff fail.

    21. But nevertheless the Plaintiff has to satisfy this Court that he bonâ fide requires the premises for his own occupation.

    22. On the facts as I have found above, I have no hesitation in holding that the Plaintiff has satisfied the three tests required under proviso (f) of sec. 11(1) of the Act, namely, (1) that he “requires” the house, (2) that the requirement is for his “own occupation” and (3) that such requirement is “bonâ fide.” I, therefore, hold that the Plaintiff requires No. 26C, Ahmerst Row, Calcutta, for his own occupation and accordingly answer the issue in this suit in the affirmative.

    23. Therefore, there will be judgment for the Plaintiff for possession of premises No. 26C, Amherst Row and for costs.

    24. Mr. Sen asks for some time to vacate the premises. Time is granted till the 3rd November, 1949, to the Defendant to vacate. The Defendant will continue to pay to the Plaintiff's solicitors mesne profit at the rate of rent until the delivery of possession within the 7th of each succeeding month for which the same will be due. As the Counsel for the Defendant says that the Defendant has paid all arrears of rent, the Plaintiff does not ask for a decree for such arrears of rent. The Plaintiff, however, will have this direction that he has the liberty to withdraw the deposit of rents with the Rent Controller, if not withdrawn already.

    N.D.R

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    Basant Lal Saha v. P.C Chakravarty.
    (Aug 10, 1949)