Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion.

The petitioners are agricultural tenants of the Bhowanipur Wards Estate. Opposite parties Nos. 1–8 are the proprietors represented by the Manager, Court of Wards. Two tenancies held by the petitioners fell into arrear; two rent certificates were issued and, in execution of those certificates, the two tenancies were brought to sale on 24 January 1938. Possession through Court was taken on 17 June 1939.

Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was inserted by Bengal Act II[2] of 1942 and came into force by notification on 18 June 1942. On 4 June 1943 the debtors (petitioners) filed two applications under Section 37A; these were registered as Cases Nos. 625(S) and 626(S) of 1943 before the Special Debt Settlement Board, Diamond Harbour. Certificate-holders (auction-purchasers) and the landlords were parties to those applications. On 7 September 1945 opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 were added as parties after an objection by the Manager, Court of Wards; Nos. 6 and 7 contended they were lessees under the Wards Estate and that the leases became operative on 16 August 1939.

On 24 November 1945 the Special Debt Settlement Board dismissed the applications solely on the ground that the certificate-holder (auction-purchaser) was not in possession on or after the relevant date (20 December 1939); other objections were overruled. The petitioners appealed to the Appellate Officer (Debt Settlement Board Appeals Nos. 132 and 134 of 1945–1946), and on 27 June 1946 the Appellate Officer allowed those appeals.

Thereafter four revision petitions were filed before the District Judge (Nos. 150, 151, 152 and 153 of 1946); by order dated 23 September 1947 the District Judge allowed all those petitions, holding that the leases in favour of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 were completed on 16 August 1939 and hence the Section 37A applications could not be maintained. The petitioners took two petitions to this Court (Civil Revision cases Nos. 2067 and 2068 of 1947). Mukherji J. allowed those revisions on 29 June 1948, holding that the crucial point was when there was a completed agreement for lease. The cases were remanded to the District Judge for disposal according to law and directions in the judgment.

On remand the learned Additional District Judge, by order dated 10 January 1949, found that the leases were not completed before 7 July 1940 (i.e., after the relevant date), but held the petitioners' applications under Section 37A barred by the special limitation in Section 37A(2) because opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 had been impleaded more than one year after the Act came into force. The petitioners moved this Court and obtained Rules (Civil Revision Rules Nos. 345 and 346 of 1949), which are the subject of the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Additional District Judge exceeded the scope of the remand from Mukherji J. by deciding the question of limitation and thereby went beyond what the remand permitted.
  2. Whether the leases in favour of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 were completed before the relevant date (with competing dates 16 August 1939 and 7 July 1940 in the record), and whether completion affected possession for the purposes of Section 37A.
  3. Whether the application under Section 37A was barred by the limitation provision in Section 37A(2) as regards opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 who were added as parties after the one-year period.
  4. Whether an application under Section 37A is competent and effective when certain persons (alleged lessees or present occupiers) are not named or served at the time the application is filed, given the procedural requirements (Form 19A and accompanying rules).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as represented by Mr. S. K. Das)

  • The learned Additional District Judge was not entitled to go beyond the order of remand issued by this Court; specifically, the Additional District Judge should not have raised or decided the question of limitation on remand.
  • Because the remand directed disposal according to the earlier judgment and the merits already considered, the Additional District Judge should have dismissed the petitions that Court of Wards and opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 had filed in the District Court after remand.

Court of Wards / Opposite Parties' Arguments (preliminary points and objections)

  • Preliminary objection 1: The names of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 appear in the revision petitions as "Wards of Court represented by the Manager, Court of Wards" and not in their personal capacities; notices of the Rule were served on them in their personal capacities, so the argument was that no order should be passed in the revision cases due to incorrect description.
  • Preliminary objection 2: The petitioners omitted to mention revision cases Nos. 152 and 153 in the list of revision petitions before the District Judge, which was said to be a defect in the petitions.
  • Substantive objection (earlier stage): Opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 contended they were lessees under the Wards Estate and that the leases had become operative on 16 August 1939 (a date before the "relevant date").

Senior Government Pleader's / Certificate-holders' Argument (as advanced in the record)

  • The relevant enquiry under Section 37A is whether the certificate-holder (auction-purchaser) was in possession on the relevant date (20 December 1939), not when the lease agreement was sanctioned by the Board of Revenue or when the lease was completed.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured way: first addressing preliminary objections, then the merits (factual findings regarding completion of leases and possession), and finally the contention on limitation.

Preliminary objections: The Court rejected both technical objections raised by the Court of Wards.

  • On the description of opposite parties as "Wards of Court represented by the Manager, Court of Wards": the Court observed that opposite parties had been described in the same way in earlier revision petitions and no objection was raised previously; the case including the defence of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 had been heard at all stages. The Court declined to allow a technical objection to impede the course of justice.
  • On the omission of revision petition numbers (152 and 153): the Court noted the correct numbers of the appeals to the Appellate Officer had been provided, the records were before the Court, and procedural rules should not be used to deny relief when the mistake was a drafting error. The Court considered amendment unnecessary given that the substantive proceedings were identifiable.

Merits — factual findings on lease completion and possession:

  • The Additional District Judge's factual finding that the leases in favour of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 were completed on 7 July 1940 was supported by two pieces of evidence in the record: (a) a memorandum of the Manager, Court of Wards dated 15 April 1940 indicating the leases were not completed on that date, and (b) a challan dated 7 July 1940 showing deposit of the requisite amount. On that evidentiary material the court concluded the Additional District Judge's finding was correct.
  • As to the Senior Government Pleader's contention that the real question under Section 37A was whether the certificate-holder was in possession on 20 December 1939, the Court noted the record showed an assumption before Mukherji J. that possession followed the conclusion of the agreement. Because the agreement was not completed until 7 July 1940, the possession of the lessees (opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7) did not commence until after the relevant date; the Senior Government Pleader's contention was therefore overruled.

Limitation analysis:

  • The Court clarified the nature of the limitation enquiry. Section 37A(2) requires an application to be filed within one year of either (a) the date when the Act came into force (18 June 1942) or (b) the date when possession was delivered to the certificate-holder. The date of delivery of possession is a question of fact, not a pure question of law; thus the Additional District Judge was wrong in treating the limitation question as purely legal and in raising it at a late stage.
  • Nevertheless, the Court examined the limitation point substantively. The petitioners filed their application on 4 June 1943 (within one year of the Act coming into force). Certificate-holders were made parties to that application. Opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 were impleaded on 7 September 1945 — more than one year after the Act came into force.
  • The Court accepted the legal proposition that for parties added later the period of limitation is to be governed (in this local and special Act context) by the Limitation Act: specifically Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act and Section 22 of the Limitation Act govern the effect of adding parties late; accordingly, proceedings as regards the added parties are deemed to have commenced on the date they were added (7 September 1945).
  • However, the Court proceeded to examine whether an application under Section 37A had to include or give notice to alleged present occupiers or under-raiyats in order to be a competent application. The procedural rules (Rule 77(a) of Rule B under the Agricultural Debtors Act prescribing Form 19A and its Appendix) require naming decree-holders/certificate-holders (Column 3), under-raiyats in occupation at the date of sale (Column 9), present occupiers and particulars of their title (Column 10), and landlords/mortgagees who may fall under Section 37A(4) (Columns 11 and 12). Rule 77(bb) requires notice of the application to be served only on decree-holders, landlords and mortgagees, but not on under-raiyats or present occupiers whose names are merely to be stated in specified columns.
  • From the foregoing, the Court reasoned that an effective application under Section 37A requires that the names of the decree-holder and the landlords/mortgagees (as relevant) be stated and that notice be served on them; it is not necessary to serve notice on, or initially join as parties, alleged present occupiers or under-raiyats whose names are to be listed in the form. Therefore, the fact that alleged lessees (opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7) were added after the one-year period did not automatically attract the bar of limitation as to the competence of the original application under Section 37A.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Rules made absolute; the order of the Additional District Judge is set aside and the applications under Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act are allowed.

Immediate consequences and practical implications:

  • The Additional District Judge's order relying on limitation to dismiss the Section 37A applications was overturned and set aside.
  • The petitioners' applications under Section 37A are allowed by this Court.
  • The petitioners were awarded costs in these rules; the hearing fee was assessed at two gold mohurs in each case.
  • No broader legal precedent beyond the application of the cited statutory provisions and procedural rules is identified or announced in the opinion. The decision's direct effect is to vindicate the petitioners' Section 37A applications and to reject the particular limitation objection and the two technical preliminary objections raised by the Court of Wards.

    Kunja Behari Barman And Others Judgment-Debtors, v. Mritunjoy Prosad Roy Choudhury And Others Opposite Party.

    1. These two Rules are at the instance of the applicants under Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The facts are shortly these: The petitioners are agricultural tenants under the Bhowanipur Wards Estate the proprietors whereof are opposite parties Nos. 1 to 8 represented by the Manager, Court of Wards. The petitioners held two tenancies and rents having fallen into arrears at the instance of the Bhowanipur Wards Estate two certificates for rent were issued and in execution of these certificates the two tenancies were brought to sale on 24th January 1938. Possession through Court was taken on 17th June 1939. Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act was inserted by Bengal Act, II[2] of 1942, and came into force by a Notification on 18th June 1942. On 4th June 1943 two applications which have given rise to the present revision cases were filed by the debtors under Section 37A of the Act. These two applications were registered as Cases Nos. 625(S) of 1943 and 626(S) of 1943 of the Special Debt Settlement. Board of Diamond Harbour. The parties impleaded in these applications were the disqualified proprietors, namely opposite parties Nos. 1 to 8, represented by the Manager, Court of Wards. On an objection raised by the Manager, Court of Wards, opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 who are two of the disqualified proprietors were added as parties to the application, on 7th September 1945. These two opposite parties filed an objection on the ground that they were lessees under the Wards Estate, the leases having become operative on 16th August 1939, that is, before the relevant date mentioned in Section 37A of the Act. On 24th November 1945 the Special Debt Settlement Board dismissed the applications solely on the ground that the certificate, holder who was the auction-purchaser was not in possession on or after relevant date, that is, 20th December 1939. The other objections raised were overruled by the Debt Settlement Board. Against the order of the Debt Settlement Board the petitioners took two appeals to the Appellate Officer. These were numbered as Debt Settlement Board Appeals Nos. 132 of 1945-1946 and 134 of 1945-1946. On 27th June 1946 the Appellate Officer allowed these appeals. Against the order of the Appellate Officer four petitions in revision were filed before the District Judge, two of these were filed by the Court of Wards being numbered as 150 of 1946 and 152 of 1946. Two other petitions which were filed by opposite parties nos. 6 and 7 were numbered as 151 of 1946 and 153 of 1946. By an order dated 23rd September 1947, the District Judge allowed all these petitions being of the opinion that the leases in favour of opposite parties nos. 6 and 7 were completed on 16th August 1939 and as such the applications under S. 37A could not be maintained. Against the order of the District Judge the petitioners filed only two petitions in this Hon'ble Court. On these petitions two Rules were issued by Mukherji J., being numbered as Civil Revision cases nos. 2067 of 1947 and 2068 of 1947. It appears that in the petitions which were filed in this Court the number of the corresponding revision petitions before the District Judge was given respectively as 150 of 1946 and 161 of 1946. The corresponding numbers of the appeals before the Appellate Officer were given as 132 of 1945-1946 and 134 of 1945-1946. It would appear, therefore, that in the petitions filed there was a mistake in not putting down the numbers of all the revision cases which were filed before the District Judge but the number of the appeals which were filed before the Appellate Officer was correctly given in both the petitions. These revision cases came on for hearing before Mukherji J. By his order dated 29th June 1948 the learned Judge allowed these applications. In the course of his judgment it was observed that the real point for decision was not when sanction of the Board of Revenue was obtained to the grant of the two leases in favour of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 but when there was a completed agreement for a lease. The Rules were accordingly made absolute and the case were sent back to the learned District Judge for disposal according to law and in accordance with the directions contained in the judgment. The learned Assistant Government Pleader who appeared on behalf of the Court of Wards did not then raise any objection that there was an omission in the revision petitions to mention the correct numbers of the corresponding revision petitions before the District Judge. The whole case was heard on the merits and as I have already observed an order in favour of the present petitioners was made by the learned Judge. After the matter was received back on remand by an order dated 10th January 1949 the learned Additional District Judge was of the opinion that the leases in favour of opposite parties nos. 6 and 7 were not completed before 7th July 1940, that is, still after the relevant date. The learned Additional District Judge, however, went on to observe that the applications of the petitioners before the Debt Settlement Board were barred by limitation, opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 having been added as parties to the proceedings after the lapse of the period of one year mentioned in Section 37A(2) of the Act. Against the order of the learned Additional District Judge the debtors moved this Court and obtained two Rules which are numbered as 345 and 346 of 1949.

    2. Mr. S.K Das appearing on behalf of the petitioners has contended that the learned Additional District Judge was not entitled to go beyond the order of remand made by this Court and his finding on the question of limitation was therefore uncalled for and the learned Additional District Judge should have dismissed the petitions which were filed before him by the Court of Wards and by opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7.

    3. Before I deal with this contention it is necessary to consider two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the Court of Wards by the learned senior Govt. Pleader appearing on behalf of the Court of Wards.

    4. The two preliminary objections are: (1) that no order can be passed in these revision cases because the names of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 appear in the revision petitions as Wards of Court represented by the Manager, Court of Wards, and not in their personal capacities, notices of the Rule were however served on them. It would appear however that in the earlier revision cases, viz. 2067 and 2068 of 1947 opposite parties were described in the same way as they are in the present revision cases. No objection was raised at the time as regards the incorrect description of the opposite parties. When the matter went back before the District Judge no grievance was made that the opposite parties had no opportunity of placing their cases before the Court. The whole case including the defence of the opposite parties Nos. 6, 7 has been heard at all stages of this litigation.

    5. In these circumstances I am not inclined to accede to a technical objection like this which would not advance the course of justice.

    6. (2) The second objection is that in mentioning the numbers of the revision cases before the District Judge the petitioners have omitted to mention revision cases Nos. 152 and 153. This mistake also appears in the earlier revision cases but the correct numbers of the appeals before the Appellate Officer have been given in the present petitions and they were also given correctly in the earlier revision cases. If the correct numbers of the Debt Settlement Board cases and the correct numbers of the appeals before the Appellate Officer are mentioned, in my opinion, this Court is entitled to consider all the cases which were filed at the instance of the present petitioners and the Court of Wards. Rules of procedure are meant not for the purpose of hindering justice. The records were and are now before the Court and I do not feel pressed to deny the petitioners the appropriate relief simply on the ground that somebody entrusted to draft the petitions made mistake in putting down two numbers on the revision petitions. If necessary, I would have allowed the petitioners to amend the present petitions but in my opinion this is not necessary as the correct numbers of the proceedings before the Debt Settlement Board and before the Appellate Officer have been correctly given.

    7. The two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the Court of Wards must therefore be overruled.

    8. As regards the merits the learned Additional District Judge has found that the leases in favour of opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 were completed on 7th July 1940. This finding is based on two important pieces of evidence, viz., the memorandum of the Manager, Court of Wards, dated 15th April 1940 which clearly shows that the leases were not completed on that date and a challan dated 7th July 1940 depositing the requisite amount. The finding of the Additional District Judge is therefore correct on the materials before him.

    9. The learned Senior Government Pleader, however, contends that this is not the relevant question for enquiry under Section 37 a of the Act. The relevant enquiry is whether the certificate holder was in possession on the relevant date that is on 20th December 1939 This point again was not raised by Assistant Government Pleader before Mr. Justice Mukherjee when the learned Judge heard Civil Revision cases Nos. 2067 and 2068 of 1947. But quite apart from this, it would appear from the record that it was assumed before Mukherji J. that possession followed the conclusion of the agreement. As the agreement was not completed till 7th July 1940, the possession of the lessees, opposite parties nos. 6 and 7 did not begin till after that date. This contention on behalf of the opposite parties must therefore be overruled.

    10. The only other question which remains for discussion is the question of limitation. As I have already indicated the question of limitation was not raised at any previous stages. It was, however, after the case had gone back on remand that the learned Additional District Judge thought that the application under S. 37-A was barred by the special limitation contained in S. 37-A(2). Before I deal with this point, I may point out that the learned Additional District Judge was clearly wrong in thinking that the question of limitation in the present case is a pure question of law. Under S. 37A(2) an application is to be filed within one year of the date when the relevant Act being Act II[2] of 1942 came into force or when possession was delivered to the certificate holder. The learned Additional District Judge seemed to think that the latter date synchronised with the former, an assumption for which there was no foundation in the records. The question of limitation may depend on the date when possession was delivered to the certificate holder. This is essentially a question of fact and in my opinion Mr. Das was right in contending that the question of limitation ought not to have been allowed to be raised at that late stage. But apart from this ground let us see the validity or otherwise of the objection raised by the Court of Wards I have already said that S. 37-A came into force on 18th June 1942. The application under S. 37-A was filed within time on 4th June 1943. To this application the certificate holders were all made parties. On objection being raised by the certificate holders that they have granted leases to opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 the latter were impleaded on 7th September 1945 which is more than a year from the date when S. 37-A came into force. It is contended that as opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 were added as parties on 7th September 1945 the proceedings as against them must be deemed to have commenced on that date. This contention is correct, Act II[2] of 1942 is a local and special Act and the period of limitation applicable would, under Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act, be governed, as regards parties added, by Section 22 of the Limitation Act. In so far as opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 are concerned, the proceedings must be deemed to have commenced on that date. The question, however, remains whether the application under Section 37-A was a competent application in the absence of the alleged lessees. Rule 77(a) of the Rule B framed by the Local Government under the Agricultural Debtors Act prescribes a form for filing an application under S. 37-A. This is Form 19A. Appendix a of the revised form states that the names of certain persons have to be mentioned in different columns. Column 3 requires the applicant to state the names and addresses of the decree-holder or the certificate holder. Column 9 requires the applicant to state the names and addresses of the under-raiyats in occupation of the land at the date of sale Column 10 requires the applicant to mention the names of the present occupiers of land and the date from which and the title under which the occupants are in possession. Columns 11 and 12 require the applicant to mention the names of the landlord and mortgagees who may come within Section 37-A(4) of the Act. Rule 77(bb) requires notice of the application to be served only on the decree holders landlords and the mortgagees but not on the under-raiyats or the present occupires whose names and addresses are to be mentioned in columns 8 and 10.

    11. In the above circumstances it is obvious that in order that an application under S. 37-A may be an effective application all that is necessary is to mention the names of the decree-holder and the landlord and the mortgagees who may come within Section 37A(4) of the Act. It was not necessary to state in the petition under S. 37A the names of the alleged present occupiers or of the under-raiyats. The addition of the alleged lessees, opposite parties Nos. 6 and 7 at a date beyond the period mentioned in Section 37-A(2) of the Act does not attract the bar of limitation. The reasons given by the learned Additional District Judge, for allowing the petitions before him cannot, therefore, be sustained.

    12. The result, therefore, is that these rules must be made absolute, the order of the Additional District Judge set aside and the applications under Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act are allowed. The petitioners are entitled to their costs in these rules the hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs in each case.

    V.R.B

    13. Rules made absolute.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kunja Behari Barman ... v. Mritunjoy Prosad Roy...
    (Sep 1, 1949)