Harries, C.J:— These are two petitions under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. In Miscellaneous Case No. 85 of 1948, the Petitioner is one Jnan Prasanna Das Gupta who has filed the petition on behalf of his brother Satya Prasanna Das Gupta who is at present detained in the Presidency Jail, Alipore. In Misc. Case No. 108 of 1948 the Petitioner is Balendra Nath Mukherjee who has filed the petition on behalf of his brother Hiren Mukherjee who is also detained in the Presidency Jail, Alipore. In the petition filed in Misc. Case No. 85 of 1948, it is stated that the detained person Satya Prasanna Das Gupta was an active worker in the Communist Party of India and an important Trade Union leader in the industrial area of Barrackpore. It is alleged that Satya Prasanna Das Gupta was very successful in persuading industrial workers in the Barrackpore area to join the All-India Trade Union Congress and to break away or refuse to join the Indian National Trade Union Congress, an organization which he regarded as hostile to the real interests of the working classes. It is further alleged that the said Indian National Trade Union Congress is an organization supported by the Congress party and that its leaders include two Ministers of the Province, Sri Kalipada Mukherjee and Sri Niharendu Dutta Mazumdar, and other members of the Legislative Assembly belonging to the Congress Party. It is suggested that Satya Prasanna Das Gupta was detained under the West Bengal Security Act, in order to prevent him carrying on propaganda for the All-India Trade Union Congress and further to prevent him from supporting communist candidates in bye-elections which have become necessary by reason of the appointment of certain persons as Ministers in West Bengal who are at pre sent not members of the Legislature. In short it is suggested that the detention of Satya Prasanna Das Gupta was ordered maliciously and that the conduct of the Provincial Government has been through out mala fide.
3. In the petition filed on behalf of Hiren Mukherjee it is stated that the latter is a Master of Arts of the Universities of Calcutta and Oxford, a Bachelor of Literature of the University of Oxford, a member of the English Bar and an Advocate of this Court. It is said that he had a brilliant academic career both in the University of Calcutta and at Oxford and that he was-called to the Bar by Lincoln's Inn in or about the year 1934. On his return to India he was enrolled as an Advocate in this Court and has been for some time a Professor of History first at the Andhra University and now at Ripon College, Calcutta. It is then alleged that Hiren Mukherjee is a journalist of repute and has been engaged to contribute articles to well-known papers such as the “Statesman “and the equally well-known legal journal, the “Calcutta Weekly Notes.” It is further stated that he is an author of repute and that a number of his books in English and Bengali are widely read. It is alleged that in or about the year 1942 Hiren Mukherjee who had been a member of the Indian National Congress for several years, severed his connection with that party and joined the Communist Party. It is stated, how ever, that he has never been guilty of any unlawful act and that there were no grounds whatsoever to justify his detention. Like Satya Prasanna Das Gupta, he also alleges that one of the reasons for his detention is that he has been an active worker in the All-India Trade Union Congress which is the rival organization to the Indian National Trade Union Congress said to be sponsored by the Congress Party. It is alleged that the arrest and detention of Hiren Mukherjee was ordered maliciously in order to prevent his carrying on propaganda for the All-India Trade Union Congress and attacking the Indian National Trade Union Congress.
4. Satya Prasanna Das Gupta was arrested on May 5, 1948, whereas Hiren Mukherjee was arrested on June 1, 1948. It is said that neither was informed why he was arrested, but later they were both served with orders purporting to be made under sec. 16 of the West Bengal Security Act (West Bengal Act III of 1948) here in after referred to as the Security Act. They were both detained in the Presidency Jail and later they were served with documents setting out the grounds for their detention.
5. When these two cases came before a Bench consisting of Das, J., and myself, it was contended that both the cases involved a point which had arisen in an earlier case, namely, Kanaklata Bose v. The Province of West Bengal (Miscellaneous Case No. 86 of 1948) which Das, J., and myself had referred to a Full Bench for reasons stated in our judgments in that case. It is clear that the reasons which caused us to refer Misc. Case No. 86 of 1948 to a Full Bench are equally applicable to these cases. The matter has, however, been complicated because since we referred Misc. Case No. 86 of 1948 to a Full Bench His Excellency the Governor of this Province has promulgated an Ordinance, being West Bengal Ordinance No. VIII of 1948, which purports to amend certain provisions of the Security Act. The validity of this Ordinance is challenged, and Das, J. and myself sitting as a Bench could have decided that question. In the event, however, of our coming to a conclusion that the Ordinance was invalid, the same questions would arise as arose in Misc. Case No. 86 of 1948 which we had previously referred to a Full Bench. That being so, Das, J. and myself were of opinion that these two petitions should also be referred to a Full Bench and by an order, dated July 7, 1948, we referred these two petitions to a Full Bench for the reasons which we had stated at length in our order referring the case of Kanaklata Bose to a Full Bench.
6. When the case of Kanaklata Bose (Misc. Case No. 86 of 1948) and the two present petitions came up for hearing before this Full Bench, we were informed that the detained person, Arun Bose, had been re leased. We, therefore, directed that the petition in his case (Misc. Case No. 86 of 1948) be dismissed and the Rule discharged, and we proceeded to hear the two petitions with which we are now concerned.
7. As I have already stated, the orders served upon Satya Prasanna Das Gupta and Hiren Mukherjee were orders made under sec. 16 of the Security Act and each of the orders was in these terms:
“Whereas the person known as
Satya Prasanna Das Gupta, son of
Hiren Mukherjee”.
……………………………..of……………………………………………………………………………..
is detained in the Presidency Jail under the provisions of section 30 of the West Bengal Security Act. 1948 (West Bengal Act III of 1948);
And whereas having considered the materials against the said person, the Governor is satisfied that, with a view to preventing the said person from doing any subversive act, It is necessary to make the following orders for the purpose of continuing his detention;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub section (4) of section 16 of the said Act the Governor is pleased to direct—
(a) that the said person shall subject to the provisions of section 17 of the said Act be detained until the 6th day of July, 1948;
(b) that subject to the provisions of clause (a) of this paragraph the said person shall, until further orders, continue to be detained in the Presidency Jail; and
(c) that during such detention the said person shall be subject to the conditions laid down in the Bengal Security Prisoners Rules, 1940, as applicable for the time being to security prisoners referred to in the said rules.”
8. It will be seen that the order does not show in any detail why these two persons were detained and there is nothing on the face of the orders to show that the Provincial Government had any reasonable grounds for detaining them. On behalf of the Petitioners it was alleged that the orders were illegal by reason of the fact that there were no reasonable grounds upon which such orders could be made and further that they had been made mala fide and maliciously. The Provincial Government has appeared to show cause by the learned Advocate-General. He produced the orders made by the Provincial Government under sec. 16 of the Security Act and con tended that those orders justified the detention and afforded an answer to each of these petitions. No affidavit was filed by the learned Advocate-General in either of these cases and he relied on the English case of Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs(1) for his contention that the orders were good answers to the petitions and completely justified the detention in each case. There can be no doubt that Greene's case decides that the production of a valid order of detention under Regulation 18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939 which was promulgated in England was a good return to a writ of Habeas Corpus and it appears to me that the orders produced in this case would be a complete answer to each of the petitions if the orders were validly made under sec. 16 of the Security Act.
9. The contention of the Provincial Government was that the order served on each of these detained persons was a valid order under sec. 16 of the Security Act as amended by Ordinance VIII of 1948 or in the alternative was a valid order under sec. 16 of the Security Act as it was originally enacted as held in the case of Jyoti Basu v. The Province of West Bengal(2) decided on May 31, 1948. In that case a Bench of this Court held that an order similar in terms to the orders in the pre sent cases was a valid order under sec. 16 of the Security Act and justified the detention of the Petitioner in that case. When these Two petitions came before Das, J., and myself it was strenuously argued that the case of Jyoti Basu was wrongly decided and should not be followed and it was for that reason the case of Kanaklata Bose and the cases of the present Petitioners were referred to a Full Bench. In Jyoti Basu's case (2) it was held that the Court could not consider the grounds upon which the order of detention was made whereas in Kanaklata Bose's case, Das, J. and myself were of opinion that an order of detention under sec. 16 of the Security Act would be invalid unless the Court found that it had been made on reasonable grounds, that is, grounds which were in fact reasonable. By reason of the amendment of sec. 16 of the Security Act by Ordinance VIII of 1948 the question whether reason able grounds exist for making an order cannot arise and the point can only be one of importance if the amending ordinance is for any reason invalid.
10. Sec. 16 of the Security Act as it was originally enacted was in these terms:
“(1) The Provincial Government, if satisfied on reasonable grounds, with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from doing any subversive act it is necessary so to do, may make an order—
(a) directing that he be detained;
(b) directing that, except in so far as he may be permitted by the provisions of the order, or by such authority or person as may be specified therein, he shall not be in any such area or place in West Ben gal as may be specified in the order;
(c) requiring him to reside or remain in such place or within such area in West Bengal as may be specified in the order and if he is not already there to proceed to that place or area within such time as may be specified in the order;
(d) requiring him to notify his movements or to report himself or both to notify his movements and report himself in such manner, at such times and to such authority or person as may be specified in the order;
(e) Imposing upon him such restrictions as may be specified in the order in respect of his employment, business or movements, in respect of his association or communication with other persons, and in respect of his activities in relation to the dissemination of news or propagation of opinions.
(2) Where an order is made under sub-sec. (i) directing any person to be detain ed, the Provincial Government may, if it so thinks fit, grant to such person, in accordance with such rules as it may make in this behalf, such allowance or expenses as it may deem appropriate.
(3) If any person is in any area or place in contravention of an order made under the provision of this section, or fails to leave any area or place in accordance with the requirements of such an order then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-sec. (5), he may be removed from such area or place by any police officer or by any person acting on behalf of the Provincial Government.
(4) So long as such an order as afore said in respect of any person directing that he be detained, is in force, he shall be liable to be removed to and detained in such place and under such conditions, which may include conditions as to maintenance, discipline or punishment for offences and breaches of discipline, as the Provincial Government may from time to time by general or special order specify.
(5) If the Provincial Government has reason to believe that a person in respect of whom such an order as aforesaid has been made directing that he be detained has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, it may—
(a) Make a report in writing of the fact to a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides; and thereupon the provisions of secs. 87, 88 and 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall apply in respect of the said person and his property as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by the Magistrate.
(b) by notified order direct that the said person to appear before such officer, at such place, and within such period as may be specified in the order; and if the said person fails to comply with such direction he shall, unless he proves that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the period specified in the order, informed the officer of the reason which rendered compliance there with impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
(6) If any person contravenes any order made under this section, other than an order of the nature referred to in cl. (b) or sub-sec. (5), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may ex tend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
11. It will be seen that the Provincial Government could make an order directing any person to be detained or restricting his movements and such like if satisfied on reasonable grounds that it was necessary so to do with a view to preventing such person from doing any subversive act. The term “subversive act” is de fined in sec. 2(7) of the Act. In Jyoti Babu's case it had been contended that the order detaining Jyoti Basu was illegal by reason of the fact that there were no reasonable grounds in fact upon which the satisfaction of the Provincial Government could be founded. The Provincial Government had argued that all that sec. 16 of the Act required was that the Provincial Government were of opinion that there were reasonable grounds for ordering detention, and that it was not open to the Court to question the grounds or to consider whether the grounds were reasonable or not. The Bench in Jyoti Basu's case following the well-known English case of Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson(3) held that the Court could not scrutinize or question the grounds upon which the Provincial Government were satisfied and that it was sufficient if the Provincial Government honestly believed that there were good grounds for the order which they had made.
12. When the case of Kanaklata Bose came before Das, J. and myself the correctness of the decision in Jyoti Basu's case was vehemently challenged. We were unable to agree with the reasons given in the judgment in Jyoti Basil's case and as we could not dissent from that judgment we referred the case to a Full Bench for the reasons given by each of us in some what lengthy judgments in that case. The judgment in Kanaklata Bose's case was delivered on June 30, 1948, and it undoubtedly raised doubts as to the correct ness of the decision in Jyoti Basu's case. On Saturday, July 3, 1948, West Bengal Ordinance No. VIII of 1948 was promulgated and published in the official gazette of that date. In the preamble to the Ordinance it is recited:
“Whereas it is expedient and necessary to amend the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, for the purpose of removing certain doubts which have arisen as to the interpretation of sec. 16 thereof end for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing:
And whereas the West Bengal Legislature is not in session and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action;
13. The Governor is pleased in exercise of the power conferred by sub-sec. (I) of sec. 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935 to make and promulgate the following Ordinance.”
14. Sec. 1(1) of the Ordinance states that it is to be called the West Bengal Security (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948; and by cl. (2) of sec. 1 it is provided that it shall come into force on the date of its publication in the official gazette. Then follows a most important provision, namely, that the provisions of cls. (I) and (5) of sec. 2 shall be deemed to have taken effect on and from the date of the commencement of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, as if or that date this Ordinance had been in force. In other words cl. (?) makes it clear that the Ordinance is to have retrospective effect and that its provisions shall be deemed to have been inserted in the Security Act from the date when that Act came into force. By cl. (I), sec. 2 of the Ordinance the words “on reasonable grounds” appearing in sub-sec. (I) of sec. 16 are deleted. By cl. (2) of this section certain amendments are made relating to the length or the period of detention made under sec. 16. But this provision is not important in this case. This clause also amends certain provisions in secs. 17 and 18 of the Act. But those amendments are also not material to the present case. Cl. (4) of this section creates a new offence, namely, of harboring any person against whom an order or detention under sec. 16 has been made. Sec. 3 of the Ordinance is important and is in these terms:
“For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no order heretofore made against any person under sub-sec. (I) of sec. 16 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, shall be deemed to be invalid or shall be called in question on the ground that at the time of making the order the authority making it had no reasonable grounds.”
15. It will be seen that this Ordinance, if valid has removed any doubt which may have arisen as to the validity of orders made under sec. 16(I) of the Security Act as it was originally enacted. Doubts had arisen as to the meaning of the words “The Provincial Government if satisfied on reasonable grounds.” The words “on reasonable grounds “are deleted from sec. 16(7) of the Security Act. Further, the Ordinance is retrospective and the effect is that sec. 16 must be construed as never having contained the words “on reason able grounds” and further it is expressly provided that no order made before the amending Ordinance can now be challenged on the ground that there existed no reason able grounds upon which the Provincial Government could be satisfied of the necessity of making such an order. In short the Ordinance purports to take away the jurisdiction of this Court to consider the validity of orders previously made upon the ground that there existed no reason able grounds upon which such orders could be founded. It is to be observed that the jurisdiction of this Court under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was expressly reserved by sec. 33(I) of the Security Act. That sub-section provided:
“Subject to the provisions of sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act, shall be called in question in any Court.”
16. Clearly this section expressly reserves the right of this Court to question the validity of orders by proceeding under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
17. There can be no doubt that if this amending Ordinance is valid then orders made under sec. 16(I) of the Security Act can not now be challenged as suggested by Das, J. and myself in Kanaklata Bose's case.
18. It was, however, argued on behalf of the Petitioners that this Ordinance was invalid as the requirements of sec. 88 of the Government of India Act had not been com plied with. Sec. 88 is in these terms:
“(1) If at any time when the Legislature of a Province is not in sessions the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require:
Provided that the Governor shall not, without instructions from the Governor-General, promulgate any such Ordinance if an Act of the Provincial Legislature containing the same provisions would under this Act have been invalid unless, having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General, it had received assent of the Governor-General.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this section shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Provincial Legislature assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance
(a) shall be laid before the Provincial Legislature and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature, or, if a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council;
(b) (Omitted);
(c) May be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this section makes any provision which would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Provincial Legislature assented to by the Governor, it shall be void;
19. Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Act relating to the effect of an Act of a Provincial Legislature which is repugnant to an Act of the Dominion Legislature or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Con current Legislative List, an Ordinance promulgated under this section in pursuance of instructions from the Governor-General shall be deemed to be an Act of the Provincial Legislature which has been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General and assented to by him.”
20. It will be seen that sub-sec. (I), authorizes the Governor when the Legislature of a Province is not in session to promulgate, such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require if he is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. In the present amending Ordinance it is re cited that doubts have arisen as to the interpretation of sec. 16 of the Security Act and as the West Bengal Legislature was not in session the Governor found it necessary to promulgate the Ordinance as he was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action. It is, therefore, clear that prima facie the Ordinance is valid as falling within the provisions of sub-sec. (I) of sec. 88 of the Government of India Act.
21. The proviso, however, to this sub-section does raise difficulties. From this proviso it will be seen that the Governor cannot without instructions from the Governor-General promulgate any Ordinance if an Act of the Provincial Legislature containing the same provisions would under the Government of India Act, have been invalid unless it had received the as sent of the Governor-General. We are in formed by the learned Advocate-General that no instructions were received from the Governor-General before this Ordinance was promulgated. As there were no such instructions, Counsel for the Petitioners contend that the Ordinance is invalid as an Act of the Provincial Legislature containing the same provisions would require the assent of the Governor-General for its validity.
22. Whether an Act of a Provincial Legislature requires the sanction of the Governor-General for its validity depends upon the construction to be given to secs. 99,100 and 107 of the Government of India Act as adapted by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947. These sections are as follows:
“99. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Dominion Legislature may make laws (including laws having extra territorial operation) for the whole or any part of the Dominion, and a Provincial Legislature may make laws for the Province or for any part thereof.
(2) Omitted.”
“100. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding sub-sections, the Dominion Legislature has, and a Provincial Legislature has not, power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to this Act (hereinafter called the ‘Federal Legislative List’).
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the next succeeding sub-section, the Dominion Legislature and, subject to the preceding sub-section, a Provincial Legislature also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the ‘Concurrent Legislative List’).
(3) Subject to the two preceding sub sections the Provincial Legislature has, and the Dominion Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the ‘Provincial Legislative List’).
(4) The Dominion Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List except for a Province or any part thereof.”
“107. (1) if any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to any provision of a Dominion Law which the Dominion Legislature is competent to enact or to any pro vision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, then subject to the provisions of this section, the Dominion Law, whether passed before or after the Provincial Law, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the Provincial law shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier Dominion Law or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, if the Provincial Law, having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General has received the assent of the Governor-General, the Provincial law shall in that Province prevail, but nevertheless the Dominion Legislature may at any time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter:
Provided that no Bill or amendment for making any provision repugnant to any Provincial law, which, having been so re served, has received the assent of the Governor-General, shall be introduced 01 moved in the Dominion Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General.
(3) If any provision of a law of an Acceding State is repugnant to a Dominion law which extends to that State, the Dominion law, whether passed before or after the law of the State shall prevail and the law of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.”
23. It will be seen that sec. 100(I) prohibits the Provincial Legislature from legislating on matters in the Federal Legislative List (List I in the Seventh Schedule of the Act) which are matters reserved solely for the Federal Legislature. Sub-sec. (3) of this section empowers the Provincial Legislature to legislate on matters in the Provincial List and forbids the Dominion Legislature from legislating on such matters for any Province or part thereof. The Dominion by sub-sec. (4), however, has power to make laws with respect to these matters in the Provincial Legislative List for parts of India other than the Provinces as defined in the Act.
24. Sub-sec. (2) of this section deals with the Concurrent Legislative List, that is, the list of items upon which both the Dominion and the Provincial Legislature may legislate. The fact that both the Legislatures may legislate on these items raises the question which piece of legislation is to prevail in the event of both the Legislatures legislating on the same subject. The possible inconsistency between Dominion and Provincial Legislation respecting matters in the Concurrent Legislative List is dealt with in sec. 107 and sub-sec. (I) of that section makes it clear that if any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to any pro vision of a Dominion law or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List then the Dominion law whether passed before or after the Provincial Law or as the case may be, the existing law shall prevail and the Provincial Law is declared to be void to the extent of the repugnancy. Existing law is defined in sec. 311 of the Government of India Act and clearly includes Acts passed by the Central Legislature before August 15, 1947. It was contended that the terms of the Governor's Ordinance was repugnant to a number of sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that being so, if the Ordinance had been an Act of the Provincial Legislature it would have been void to the extent of the repugnancy. It is suggested that all the provisions of the Ordinance are repugnant and, therefore, all would be void.
25. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 107 deals with a case where-proposed Provincial Legislation would be repugnant to Dominion or existing laws. That section provides that if the Provincial Legislation is reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General and receives his assent the Provincial Law, though repugnant to Dominion or existing law will prevail in the Province.
26. As I have already stated, the proviso to sec. 88(I) requires previous instructions of the Governor-General to validate any Ordinance if an Act of the Provincial Legislature containing the same provisions would under the Act have been invalid unless it had received the assent of the Governor-General. What is stated on behalf of the Petitioners is that the provisions of this Ordinance being repugnant to the existing law, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the assent of the Governor-General would be necessary to validate an Act containing those provisions. If the provisions are contained in an Ordinance the proviso to sec. 88(I) clearly requires the previous instructions of the Governor-General to the Governor to make such an Ordinance, and as apparently there are no such instructions the Ordinance it is urged is invalid and, therefore, these cases must be decided upon the terms of sec. 16(I) of the Security Act as originally enacted. Whether previous instructions of the Governor-General were necessary depends upon whether the provisions of this Ordinance, if contained in an Act of the Provincial Legislature, would require the assent of the Governor-General for their validity.
27. When the Ordinance is carefully examined it will be seen that it relates entirely to three matters, namely, maintenance of public order, preventive detention for reasons connected with public order and the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of such matters. The Ordinance purports to amend secs. 16 and 18 of the Act and creates a new offence of harboring a person who has been ordered to be detained and thus adding a new section to the Act, namely, sec. 18A. The only other provision of the Ordinance is the provision taking away the right of the Court under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to enquire into the reasonableness of the grounds upon which orders made be fore the promulgation of the Ordinance were founded.
28. In my view the amending Ordinance is entirely concerned with preventive detention, persons subjected to such detention, public order and jurisdiction of the Courts in respect thereof.
29. These matters fall within items 1 and 2 of List II of the Provincial Legislative List of the 7th Schedule of the Act.
30. Item 1 of List II is in these terms:
“Public order (but not including the use of His Majesty's naval, military or air forces in aid of the civil power); the ad ministration of justice, constitution and organization of all Courts, except the Federal Court and fees taken therein; preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order; per sons subjected to such detention.”
31. Item 2 reads: “Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts except the Federal Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list, procedure in Rent and Revenue Courts.”
32. In my view, therefore, the impugned Ordinance deals entirely with matter in Items 1 and 2 of the Provincial Legislative List, that is, with matters upon which the. Provincial Legislature is alone competent to legislate. Legislation upon matters in the Provincial Legislative List is valid without the assent of the Governor-General and indeed the Governor-General in ordinary cases has no concern whatsoever with such legislation. That being so, the Ordinance which deals with these matters could be promulgated without the previous instructions of the Governor-General and the proviso to sub-sec. (z) of sec. 88 can have no application.
33. It was, however, contended that the legislation though it might be regarded as legislation on items 1 and 2 in the Provincial Legislative List was also legislation re pealing or amending the criminal law and criminal procedure and in particular, the Code of Criminal Procedure. Criminal Law appears in item 1 of List III, the Con current Legislative List, and Criminal Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the date of the passing of the Act is item 2 of that list.
34. On behalf of the Petitioners it was urged that as the Ordinance added to the criminal law and amended or repealed important provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then it must be regarded as an Ordinance dealing with matters in the Con current List. Provincial legislation dealing with such matters would require the assent of the Governor-General or other wise they would by reason of sec. 107(I) of the Government, of India Act be void for repugnancy. That being so it is urged the previous instructions of the Governor-General were essential for the validity of this Ordinance.
35. There can be no doubt that the provisions of this Ordinance are in conflict with certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it appears to me that it would be practically impossible to legislate on preventive detention and with regard to persons subjected to such detention with out affecting the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
36. Secs. 54, 60, 75 to 81, 85 and 86 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deal with arrest and upon what grounds a person can be arrested. Preventive detention may well contemplate arrest without the person arrested being even suspected of commit ting a crime. He may be arrested because it is feared that he may take a course which would be dangerous to public order. Further, secs. 60, 61 and 86 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide for judicial orders authorizing detention after arrest. But legislation with regard to preventive detention might well authorize detention without reference to the Courts as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. In short, it appears to me that it must have been clear to the framers of the Government of India Act that legislation with regard to the matters in item 1 of the Provincial List might well be repugnant to Legislation on items 1 and 2 in the Con current Legislative List. Nevertheless a Provincial Legislature is entitled to legislate on these matters.
37. Again, legislation with regard to the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of preventive detention and of persons subjected to such detention might well come in conflict with existing law, e.g, the Letters Patent of this High Court and sec. 491, Criminal Procedure Code. Nevertheless, the Provincial Legislature was expressly authorized to legislate on such subjects. If the whole of a piece of legislation is confined to matters within the Provincial Legislative List can that Legislation or any part of it be void for repugnancy because it may come in conflict with Dominion laws or existing laws applicable to the Dominion of India, and does a Provincial Act relating to such matters require the assent of the Governor-General to prevent the whole of it or certain provisions in it being void for repugnancy?
38. On behalf of the Petitioners it was urged that sub-sec. (I) of sec. 107 is in the widest possible terms. It provides that if any provision of a Provincial law is repugnant to a provision of a Dominion law or existing law then such provision in the provincial law is void for repugnancy unless the assent of the Governor-General is obtained for the piece of legislation as required by sub-sec. (2) of that section. It is, therefore, necessary to consider what construction should be given to sec. 107 of the Act and in particular to sub-sec. (I) of that section.
39. Fortunately this matter has come before their Lordships of the Privy Council in recent cases and in my view the effect of these decisions is that legislation by a Provincial Legislature on matters falling within the Provincial Legislative List is valid though such legislation may also to some extent be regarded as legislation touching matters in the Concurrent Legislative List.
40. In Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, Lid.(8), their Lordships had to consider the Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940. This Act inter alia restricted the amount of interest which a lender could recover on a loan. It had been contended in the Courts of India that in so far as the Act dealt with interest on promissory notes it was ultra vires because the Provincial Government had no right to legislate on negotiable instruments and promissory notes which were matters reserved for the Federal Legislature being item No. 28 in the Federal Legislative List. The Bengal Money-Lenders Act undoubtedly restricted the rights of the holder of a promissory note to-recover interest be yond a certain rate and to that extent the legislation could be regarded as legislation in respect of item 28 in the Federal Legislative List. Nevertheless their Lordships of the Privy Council held that as the Act was in pith and substance an Act dealing with money lending which is item 27 in the Provincial Legislative List, the legislation was intra vires and valid. It is true that in this case the conflict was between the Provincial Legislative List and the Federal Legislative List and no question arose as to the effect of a possible conflict between the Provincial Legislative List and the Concurrent Legislative List. Lord Porter who delivered the judgment of the Board, however, dealt generally with the question of conflict between these Lists. At page 42, dealing with the question whether Provincial Legislation was valid though it incidentally trenched on matters reserved for the Federal Legislature, he observed as follows:
The second is a more difficult question and was put with great force by counsel for the respondent. The principles, it was said, which obtain in Canada and Australia have no application to India. In the former instances either the Dominions and provinces or the Common wealth and States divide the jurisdiction between them, the Dominion, or as the case may be, the States retaining the power not specifically given to the provinces or the Commonwealth, in such cases it is recognized that there must be a considerable overlapping of powers. Cut in India, it is asserted; the difficulty in dividing the powers has been foreseen. Accordingly three, not two lists, have been prepared in order to cover the whole field, and these lists have a definite order of priority attributed to them so that anything contained in List I is reserved solely for the Federal Legislature, and however incidentally it may be touched on in an Act of the provincial legislature that Act is ultra vires in whole or at any rate, where in any place it affects an entry in the Federal List, Similarly any item in the Concurrent List if dealt with by the Federal legislature is outside the power of the provinces, and it is only the matters specifically mentioned in List II over which the province has complete jurisdiction, although so long as any item in the Concur rent List has not been dealt with by the Federal Legislature the provincial legislature is binding.
In their Lordships' opinion this argument should not prevail. To take such a view is to simplify unduly the task of distinguishing between the powers of divided jurisdictions. It is not possible to make so clean a out between the powers of the various legislatures; they are bound to overlap from time to time.
No doubt experience of past difficulties has made the provisions of the Indian Act more exact in some particulars, and the existence of the Concurrent List has made it easier to distinguish between those matters which are essential in determining to which list particular provisions should be attributed and those which are merely incidental. But the overlap ping of subject-matter is not avoided by substituting three lists for two, or even by arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions. Subjects must still overlap, and where they do the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of the subjects entrusted to provincial legislation could never effectively be dealt with”.
41. At page 44 the learned Lord observed:
“No doubt where they came in conflict List I has priority over Lists III and II and list III has priority over List II, but the question still remains, priority in what respect? Does the priority of the Federal legislature prevent the provincial legislature from dealing with any matter which may incidentally affect any item in its list, or in each case has one to consider what the substance of an Act is and, whatever its ancillary effect, attribute it to the appropriate list” according to its true character? In their Lordships' opinion the latter is the true view.”
42. The question of conflict between Lists II and III arose directly in another case decided by the Privy Council, namely, Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia(9) in which it was held that sec. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, had no application in a case where the province could show, as it did in that case, that it was acting wholly within its powers under the Provincial List and was not relying on any power conferred on it by List III of the Concurrent List. In that case it was argued that the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1938, was invalid in that a number of its provisions were in fact legislation on matters falling within List III, namely, Items 7, 8 and 10 of that List.
43. Their Lordships, however, held that the impugned Act which dealt with mortgages on agricultural lands was legislation falling entirely within Item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List, that is, land or any interest in land and, therefore, no question of repugnancy could arise by reason of the fact that the Act might trench to a certain extent upon the items in the Con current Legislative List to which I have referred. The whole argument in the case turned upon the effect of secs. 100 and 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935. At page 19, Lord Wright who delivered the judgment of the Board observed:
“The stress of the argument before the Board was laid on sections 100 and 107. The respondent contended that the provisions of the impugned Act were wholly within item 21. supplemented, if need be, by item 2 of the Provincial Legislative List, that accordingly the respondent did not need to rely for the validity of the Act on any powers of the province under the Con current Legislative List, and therefore section 107 was irrelevant to the decision of the ease. The appellants, on the other hand, contended that the impugned Act went beyond the limits of the legislative powers of the province under List II and could not be supported by invoking con current powers of the province under List in because the provisions which had to be invoked for this purpose were repugnant to existing Indian laws and were thus invalid under section 107. They instanced the Indian Contract Act,” sections 37, 69 and 70, and the Code of Civil Procedure, section 4, sub-Sections (1) and (2) and section 9 as containing provisions to which the impugned Act is repugnant”.
44. Later Lord Wright observed:—
“Thus both parties rightly construed section 107 as having no application in a case where the province could show that it was acting wholly within its powers under the Provincial List and was not relying on any power conferred on it by the Concurrent List.”
45. Again at page 22 the learned Lord observed:
“It follows that in their Lordships' judgment there is not sufficient ground for holding that the impugned Act, or any part of its, was in valid As a whole it fell within the powers given to the province by items 2 and 21 of List-II, without any necessity to invoke any powers from the Concurrent List, List III-Accordingly questions of repugnancy under section 107 of the Constitution Act do not arise and need not be considered here.”
46. It is clear from these two decisions that if the subject-matter of a piece of provincial Legislation falls wholly within an item in the Provincial Legislative List then the legislation is valid and no question of repugnancy can arise under sec. 107(I) of the Government of India Act even if the legislation trenches incidentally upon items in the Concurrent List.
47. The Federal Court in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia(10) had expressed the view that the doctrine of pith and substance had no application to cases falling within sec. 107(I), Government of India Act. Their Lordships of the Privy Council do not expressly refer to this view in the judgment of the Board but it is clear from the observations of Lord Wright to which I have referred that questions of repugnancy under sec. 107(I) cannot arise if the impugned legislation is upon an item in the Provincial List. To ascertain whether Provincial Legislation is really upon an item in the Provincial Legislative List the doctrine of pith and substance might have to be applied and it is at least doubtful whether the observations of the Federal Court in Megh Raj's case can now be regarded as good law. This appears to be the view of a Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Om Prokash Mehta v. Emperor(11).
48. In my view the subject-matter of the impugned Ordinance in this case falls clearly within Items 1 and 2 of the Provincial Legislative List and there was no need to rely on any items in the Concurrent Legislative List to entitle the Governor to promulgate the impugned Ordinance.
49. Counsel for the Petitioners, however, strongly urged that this Ordinance dealt really with matters which fell within Items 1 and 2 of the Concurrent Legislative List. In one sense it can be said to deal with these matters, but it is only incidental to the legislation in the Ordinance. What the Ordinance deals with is preventive detention and persons subjected thereto and the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of those matters. A new criminal offence, it is true, is created by cl. (4) of sec. 2 of the Ordinance but that matter is in my view clearly legislation relating to preventive detention and persons so detained. That being so, if the Ordinance is to be regarded as standing by itself, it is in our view legislation falling entirely within Items 1 and 2 of the Provincial Legislative List and is, therefore, valid and no question of repugnancy under sec. 107(I) of the Government of India Act can arise.
50. The Petitioner then argued that the Security Act itself was invalid by reason of the fact that it dealt with matters in the Federal Legislative List. It was of course unnecessary to consider whether it dealt with matters in the Concurrent Legislative List as the Security Act had obtained the assent of the Governor-General. It was urged that the original Act dealt with a number of items in the Federal Legislative List, namely, Posts and Telegraphs, item 7, Aerodromes, item 24, Arms and Ammunition, item 29, Explosive Sub stances, item 30, and offences in respect of such items, item 42. It is true that the Security Act does deal with these matters, but in my view it only incidentally trenches upon these items in the Federal Legislative List. In pith and substance the legislation is legislation on items 1 and 2 of the Provincial Legislative List and the encroachments upon the items to which I have made reference in the Federal Legislative List are merely ancillary to the main purpose of the legislation. Mr. Niren De on behalf of the Petitioners has urged that the Security Act is really a Criminal law and a Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, but I am unable to accept that view. Every section in the Act deals with matters germane to public order, preventive detention, per sons so detained, and with the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect thereof. The pith and substance of the Act is undoubtedly these matters and that being so, the fact that incidentally it trespasses or encroaches on the Federal Legislative List is immaterial. This is clearly the result of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the very recent case of Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, Limited to which I have al ready referred. Mr. Niren De's argument was that as the parent Act, namely, the Security Act, was ultra vires by reason of these encroachments upon the Federal Legislative List, any piece of legislation amending the same must be equally invalid. For the reasons which I have given I am satisfied that the original Act, namely, the Security Act, was not ultra vires and the amending ordinance is valid as no question of repugnancy between the provisions of that Act and the existing law on matters in List III can possibly arise.
51. It was then argued that in any event no circumstances existed which entitled the Governor to legislate by Ordinance. It is conceded that when this Ordinance came into force, namely, July 3, 1948, the Provincial Legislature was not in session. But it was argued that there were no circumstances existing which rendered it necessary for the Governor to take immediate action. It was said that the Ordinance was passed to meet a possible ad verse decision by a Full Bench of this Court on the construction of the opening words of sec. 16(I) of the original Act. In the preamble it is stated that the purpose of the Ordinance was to remove certain doubts which had arisen as to the interpretation of sec. 16 of the Security Act and Mr. Niren De has urged that these doubts would have been resolved one way or the other by the Full Bench of this Court when it sat. In my view, however, the existence of these doubts as to the meaning of sec. 16 of the Security Act might give rise in certain events to serious consequences and might well constitute the necessary circumstances entitling the Governor to legislate by Ordinance under sec. 88 of the Government of India Act.
52. It appears to me, however, that the Court cannot go into the question whether such circumstances exist as to render it necessary for the Governor to promulgate this Ordinance. By sub-sec. (I) of sec. 88 of the Government of India Act it is provided that if the Governor is satisfied that such circumstances exist he may promulgate an ordinance if at the time the legislature is not in session. The satisfaction must be the satisfaction of the Governor and there is nothing to suggest that the Courts would be entitled to question the grounds upon which the Governor was satisfied. The position is very similar to that of an emergency which entitles the Governor-General to make ordinances. It was expressly held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma(12) that whether an emergency existed at the time an ordinance was made and promulgated was a matter of which the Governor-General was the sole judge. His view that there was an emergency justified and authorized the ordinance. In this case their Lordships followed an earlier decision of the Privy Council, Bhagat Singh v. The King-Emperor(13). In my view these cases apply with equal force to sec. 88(I) of the Government of India Act and, therefore, whether circumstances existed requiring immediate action was a matter upon which the Governor was the sole judge.
53. It was contended, however, that even if in ordinary cases the Court could not question the satisfaction of the Governor; nevertheless it could do so if the Governor himself had stated his reasons. If the matter is one for the Governor and the Governor alone, I do not think that this Court could hold that there were no sufficient reasons for promulgating an Ordinance even if the Governor stated the reasons which satisfied him that urgent legislation was necessary. That being so, this Court cannot go into the question whether circumstances did or did not exist which entitled the Governor to act under sub-sec. (I) of sec. 88 of the Government of India Act.
54. It was then argued that in any event the Ordinance was not made in good faith. But if this Court cannot question the sufficiency of the grounds upon which the Governor was satisfied that urgent legislation was necessary, I think it would be very difficult for any Court to say that the Ordinance was not passed in good faith. The preamble gives the reason why it was passed, namely, the removal of doubts as to the meaning of one of the most import ant and crucial sections in the Security Act. The Provincial Government might well have thought that it was essential for the maintenance of public order and internal security of the province that they should have the powers which they con tended the original sec. 16 of the Act gave them. Doubts had been cast upon the ex tent of these powers and I can see nothing mala fide in the Provincial Government de siring to remove those doubts and to make certain that their powers were such as they wanted. If the Provincial Government had waited for the decision of the Full Bench and that had been adverse to their contention they could well have then amended the Act. Why could they not do so before such a decision of the Court? It may perhaps have been more graceful if the Provincial Government or His Excellency the Governor had waited for the decision of the Full Bench, but even so, that would not make the act of promulgating this Ordinance mala fide.
55. It was then argued that even if circum stances existed which entitled the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance, nevertheless he could not promulgate an Ordinance repealing or amending provincial legislation. The contention was that the Governor was only empowered to promulgate an Ordinance dealing with matters not already provided for by the provincial law. In my view it cannot possibly be said now that legislation by ordinance cannot repeal or amend existing legislation by a legislature. This question was expressly considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma. In that case the Governor-General by Ordinance had undoubtedly re pealed or amended a number of sections in the Criminal Procedure Code. But nevertheless their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the Ordinance was valid. At page 68, Viscount Simon, L.C who delivered the judgment of the Board ob served:
“Previous to 1995 the High Court had revisional jurisdiction over the magistrates' courts in the relevant area. The argument advanced was that this jurisdiction could not be taken away by an Ordinance made by the Governor-General under section 72, as the Governor-General's Ordinance was not an ‘Act of the appropriate legislature’. ‘Legislature’, it was said, means only the Central legislature consisting of the two Houses and the Governor-General, or the Provincial legislature consisting of the two Houses and the Governor and the Governor-General when making an ordinance in oases of emergency under section 72 was not either of these legislatures. The argument as Sir Harold Derbyshire pointed out in his judgment, overlooked the provision in section 311, sub-section (6) of the Act, which says: Any referenda in this Act to ……………….. Acts or laws of the Federal or Provincial Legislature Shall be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance made by the Governor-General ………………… There is, thus, no substance in this objection. Assuming that the condition as to emergency is fulfilled, the Governor-General acting under section 72 may repeal or alter the ordinary law as to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, just as the Indian Legislature itself might do.”
56. Sec. 311(6) provides that any reference to a Provincial Act or laws shall be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance made by a Governor. Sec. 88(2) also provides that an Ordinance promulgated under that section shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Provincial Legislature assented to by the Governor, and it appears to me that what the Provincial Legislature could do the Governor can do by Ordinance in a proper case. The Provincial Legislature could undoubtedly amend the existing Provincial law and that being so the Governor can do so by Ordinance if circumstances exist justifying the promulgation of such Ordinance.
57. It was, however, strenuously urged that legislation by Ordinance could only repeal or amend existing provincial law by repugnancy. An ordinance, it was contended, could not directly repeal or amend a Provincial Act. It might do so, however, in directly if its provisions were repugnant to existing Provincial legislation. It was only in such a case that existing Provincial legislation could be affected. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court, Sib Nath Banerjee v. King-Emperor(14) which does lay down this proposition. The decision was affirmed in the Federal Court [Sib Nath Banerjee v. King-Emperor(15)] but the majority in that Court left the matter open though the learned Judges appeared to incline to the view of this Court. The decision was reversed by the Privy Council on, other grounds and no reference is made to this point in the judgment of the Board. It was contended that there was nothing in Benoarilal's case which threw any doubt on the view of this Court as to how far an ordinance could repeal or amend existing legislation. Viscount Simon, L.C it was urged, must have been referring to repeal or amendment by repugnancy in the passage in his judgment to which I have just made reference. In my view, however, it is clear that Viscount Simon was referring to direct repeal and amendment in his judgment and, therefore, it is not now possible to contend that an ordinance cannot directly repeal or amend existing legislation.
58. It was then contended that even assuming the Governor could amend existing Provincial legislation by Ordinance, he could not give retrospective effect to the Ordinance. It was argued that cl. (2) of sec. 1 was clearly retrospective and so also was sec. 3. By cl. (2) of sec. 1 it is enacted that certain provisions in sec. 2 which amended sec. 16(I) of the Security Act are to be deemed to have taken effect on and from the date of the commencement of the Security Act, as if on that date the Ordinance promulgated had been in force.
59. In my view if a Governor can legislate in proper circumstances and such legislation is to have the same effect as if passed by the Legislature then it appears to me that the Governor is entitled to give retrospective effect to an Ordinance which he promulgates. It has been held by the Federal Court in the case of The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begam(16) that the right to legislate retrospectively is inherent in the right to legislate. That being so, if the Governor has a right to legislate and such legislation has the effect of legislation by the Provincial legislature then it appears to me that inherent in that right is a right to legislate retrospectively if such course were necessary. This was the view of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Prabhakar Kondaji Bhapkar…Applicant; v. Emperor(17) and it has been accepted by the Privy Council in Kumar Singh Chhagor v. King-Emperor(18).
60. However, it was contended that the effect of promulgating cl. (2) of sec. 1 of the Ordinance was to legislate during a period in which the legislature was in session. It was argued that the Governor has no right to promulgate an ordinance if the legislature was in session and that being so, he could not by promulgating an ordinance when the legislature was not in session give it effect as from a date when the legislature was actually in session. As I have already stated by cl. (2) of sec. 1 of the Ordinance the amendments made to sec. 16(7) of the Security Act were to be deemed to take effect as and from the date of the commencement of that Act. Admittedly the Act came into force when the Legislature was in session. Therefore, it is said that the ordinance amounts to legislation when the legislature was sitting. To hold such an Ordinance valid, it was contended, would amount to permitting a Governor to do indirectly what he could not do directly. Sec. 88(7) Government of India Act only empowers a Governor to legislate when the legislature is not in session. This limitation would, it is said, be defeated if an Ordinance such as the present was held to be valid. The Privy Council has laid down that a legislature cannot be permitted to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. [Board of Trustees of the Lethbridge Northern Irrigation District v. Independent Order of Foresters(19)]. This is really begging the question because the argument assumes that such retrospective legislation is invalid.
61. In my view if the Governor has power, as I hold he has, to legislate retrospectively, then it is immaterial whether the legislation is made to take effect from a time when the legislature was in session. The important point of time is the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance. If the legislature was not then in session then the Ordinance was valid, no matter what retrospective effect it had. It may be that the Governor should not, except in cases of grave emergency, legislate retrospectively, but such is a question of policy which this Court cannot take into consideration. Dealing with this question in King-Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma, Viscount Simon, L.C at page 70 observed:
“With the greatest respect to these eminent Judges, their Lordships feel bound to point out that the question whether the Ordinance is intra vires or ultra vires does not depend on considerations of jurisprudence or of policy. It depends simply on examining the language of the Government of India Act and of comparing the legislative authority conferred on the Governor-General with the provisions of the Ordinance by which he is purporting to exercise that authority. It may be that as a matter of wise and well-framed legislation it is better, if circumstances permit, to frame a statute in such a way that the offender may know in advance before what court he will be brought if he is charged with a given crime; but that is a question of policy, not of law……………………………………………. Again and again this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used.”
62. Whether such an ordinance should be passed or not is not a matter for this Court. We are merely concerned with the construction of the words used in the Ordinance and in the Security Act and I can see nothing in the Ordinance compelling me to hold that it is invalid by reason of the retrospective effect given to it.
63. Lastly, it was urged that as the Security Act had received the assent of the Governor-General, no Ordinance or legislation amending such Act could be valid without previous instructions of the Governor-General as required by sec. 88(I) of the Government of India Act. The contention was that the assent of the Governor-General was given after consideration of the provisions of the Act and it might well be that the assent would have been refused if the Act stood originally as now amended. As I understood, the contention was that any amendment of an Act which had received the Governor-General's assent would be wholly invalid if the amending legislation had not received the Governor-General's assent, or was promulgated without his instructions, no matter whether the amending Act dealt with matters wholly within the Provincial Legislative List and which in ordinary circum stances would not require the assent of the Governor-General.
64. It is to be observed that Provincial legislation on matters in the Concurrent List is not ultra vires. If there is no Dominion law or any existing law dealing with such matters then the provincial legislation is perfectly valid. The difficulty only arises if there is Dominion legislation or existing law in respect of the same matters. If there is, then the Provincial legislation where repugnant to such dominion law or existing law is void unless the provincial legislation has received the assent of the Governor-General in which case it prevails over the Dominion legislation or the existing law. This is clear from sub-secs. (I) and (2) of sec. 107 of the Government of India Act. It, therefore, cannot be said that the impugned Ordinance is ultra vires even if it dealt with matters in the Con current List. It might be void for repugnancy or a part of it might be so void, but nothing more. As I have already ex pressed my opinion that if the matters contained in the impugned ordinance relate to items in the Provincial List no question of repugnancy can arise and, therefore, it is immaterial whether the Governor had or had not received instructions from the Governor-General before this Ordinance was promulgated.
65. Holding as I do that this Ordinance is valid and intra vires the difficult question which arose in Jyoti Basu's case and which had been referred to this Full Bench does not arise. The question whether the Court could enquire into the sufficiency of the grounds upon which the Provincial Government could make an order of detention could only arise if the words “on reasonable grounds” appeared in sec. 16(1) of the Act. The amending Ordinance-strikes out those words and, therefore, an order under sec. 16(I) is now valid if the Provincial Government is satisfied that it necessary to make such an order. The respective orders detaining these two Petitioners recite that the Governor was satisfied that it was necessary to make such orders and this Court cannot substitute it self for the Governor and consider whether it would be satisfied that there were sufficient or good reasons for making the orders. That being so, it is unnecessary for this Full Bench to deal with the two questions referred to it as the questions no longer arise and are of no importance what so ever. The section in question having been amended the law now is that the existence of reasonable grounds in fact for an order is no longer necessary.
66. In both the petitions it is suggested that the orders of the Local Government were mala fide and not honestly made under the provisions of the Act. It is a well-known principle of law that abuse of power is no exercise of power and it has been repeatedly held with the approval of the Privy Council that an order made mala fide under powers given by an Act, Ordinance or rule is no exercise of such power. This was conceded by their Lordships of the House of Lords in the case of Liver-sidge v. Sir John Anderson. If I were satisfied that the orders in these cases were mala fide I should have no hesitation in holding the orders to be invalid. But there is no material upon which I could hold that the orders are mala fide. Both the Petitioners are communists and the communist party has been declared to be an illegal organization in this province. The Petitioners suggest that the Provincial Government are anxious to remove them from the political field mainly for two reasons. In the first place it is suggested that they take a prominent part in the All-India Trade Union Congress which is an organization opposed to the Indian National Trade Union Congress which is said to be sponsored by the Congress Party and by the Provincial Government which has of course the support of the Congress Party. In the second place it is said that a number of the present Ministers are without seats in the Provincial Assembly and it is suggested that the Petitioners have been detained in jail to prevent them taking part in possible bye-elections for the return of the Ministers at present without seats in the Legislative Assembly. Apart from these allegations in the petitions there is no material before us upon which we could hold that such were the reasons for these orders. Even if the Court were suspicious it could not hold the orders to be mala fide. Suspicion by itself will not do. Facts must be proved which establish that the orders were mala fide or made maliciously. I can see nothing in the facts alleged in the petitions which would compel me to infer that these orders were made in bad faith. The allegations are too general and vague and it would be highly dangerous to infer mala fides from them. That being so it is impossible to hold that these orders were dishonestly or maliciously made and, there fore, are invalid.
67. Lastly, it was urged that the form of the orders suggested that they were not made honestly and bond fide. The terms of the orders follow closely the words of the amended sec. 16(I) of the Security Act. Following slavishly the words of an Act or rule in an order made thereunder was severely criticized in Keshav Talpade v. King-Emperor(20) by their Lordships of the Federal Court. This case was held to be wrongly decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Shib Nath Banerjee(21). Their Lordships however, expressed no opinion upon the form of the order and there is nothing to indicate whether their Lordships approved or disapproved of the observations of the Federal Court in Keshav Talpade's case. The orders in the present case recite that they are made with a view to preventing the detained persons from doing any subversive act. The orders are similar to the order made by the Home Secretary in England which led to Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson. That order followed the wording of Regulation 18B under which it was made and their Lord ships in the House of Lords found nothing objectionable in the form of the order. In my view the observations of the Federal Court in Keshav Talpade's case even if they can still be regarded as laying down good law has no application to the pre sent cases. In Talpade's case all the grounds upon which an order could be made under the Defense of India Rules were inserted in the detention order. The order in the present cases resembles more closely the order in Liversidge's case and is, therefore, in my view unobjectionable and valid.
68. The petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed. The Rule in each case is discharged.
69. I should grant a certificate under sec. 205(I) of the Government of India Act.
Mitter, J.:— I agree with my Lord, the Chief Justice.
Sen, J.:— I concur in the views expressed by my Lord the Chief Justice, and cannot usefully add anything more.
Clough, J.:— I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice.
Chatterjee, J.:— The cases of two detunes detained under the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, were argued before the Full Bench.
70. The first detenu Mr. Hiren Mukherjee is a member of the English Bar and is an Advocate of this Court. He is a Professor of the Surendranath College and is a Lecturer in the University of Calcutta and is connected with journalism. Both the applicants allege that the two detenues Mukherjee and Das Gupta are members of the Communist Party and have been connected with the All-India Trade Union Congress, popularly known as “A.I.T.U.C” which has been in existence for several years. A rival organization has been recently started under the auspices of the Indian National Congress known as the Indian National Trade Union Congress, also called the “I.N.T.U.C” It is alleged that the latter organization is being con trolled by some of the Ministers of this province as well as by the leading members of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly belonging to the Congress Party. Finally the charge is made that the detentions have been improperly made with a view to weed out political rivals and to facilitate the elections of some Ministers who would lose their posts unless they were elected to the Legislature within six months of their appointment.
71. On the 31st May, 1948, my learned brothers G.N Das and Sinha, JJ., delivered their judgments in the case of Mr. Jyoti Basu. Both the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the principles of construction applied by the House of Lords in the case of Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson were applicable and they held that the detenu was not illegally or improperly detained and dismissed the ap plication which had been filed under sec. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
72. On the 24th and 25th June, 1948, his Lordship the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice S.R Das heard an application under sec. 491 presented by Sm. Kanaklata Bose on behalf of another detenu Mr. Arun Bose. By their judgment, dated the 30th June, 1948, the learned Chief Justice and S.R Das, J., differed from the views expressed by G.N Das and Sinha, JJ. The learned Chief Justice held that the wording of sec. 16 of the West Bengal Security Act was materially different from the wording of Regulation 18B of the Defense (General) Regulations, 1939, which had been interpreted by the House of Lords in the Liver- sidge's case. His Lordship held that there were no materials before the Court which would justify it in holding that the safety of the State of India was involved when the West Bengal Security Act was passed. The main ground for the decision in the Liver sidge's case, namely, the grave emergency facing the State, was absent in the case before them and thus there is a material difference between the two cases. S.R Das, J., set out seriatim the grounds for regarding the judgments of the Division Bench in Mr. Jyoti Basil's case as open to criticism. The learn ed Chief Justice and S.R Das, J., came to the conclusion that on a correct interpretation of sec. 16 the Court has the right to enquire into the grounds upon which an order under that section is made. They accordingly differed from the decision of the Division Bench in Jyoti Basil's case and referred the following questions for consideration by a Full Bench:—
(1) Can a Court consider and determine the question whether the satisfaction of the Provincial Government under sec. 16 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act III of 1948), is based on grounds which in themselves are reasonable or which appear reasonable to the Court?
(2) Is the case of Jyoti Basu v. The Province of West Bengal rightly decided?
73. In view of such important questions, involving as they do the liberty of the subjects, it was extremely desirable that the points of law formulated above should be authoritatively decided by this High Court and this could only be done by a Full Bench which was immediately constituted by the Chief Justice under the Rules of this Court and the Full Bench was to sit, as it did, on the 5th July, 1948.
74. On the 3rd July, 1948, the Governor of West Bengal promulgated an Ordinance, the West Bengal Ordinance No. VIII of 1948 It is called the West Bengal Security (Amendment) Ordinance, 1948. This Ordinance was promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred on the Governor of a Province by sub-sec. (I) of sec. 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under that section the Governor of a Province can promulgate an Ordinance when the Legislature of that Province is in recess, and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. There are two recitals in this Ordinance which are as follows:—
“Whereas it is expedient and necessary to amend the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, for the purpose of removing certain doubts which have arisen as to the interpretation of section 16 thereof and for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing;
And whereas the West Bengal Legislature is not in session and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action.”
75. The Ordinance purports to effect a very vital amendment in sec. 16(I) of the Act. The section as it originally stood empower ed the Provincial Government to make an order of detention “if it is satisfied on reasonable grounds with respect to any particular person that with a view to pre venting him from doing any subversive act it is necessary to do so.” The words “on reasonable grounds'” have been omitted from sec. 16(I) of the Act. Other amendments have been made in sec. 17 of the Act, and a new section called sec. 18A has been introduced. The amendment made in sec. 16(I) of the Act has been given retrospective effect. But what is even important is that the High Court's juristiction has been taken away. Under the pro visions of sec. 3 of the Ordinance no order for detention shall be impugned on the ground that the Provincial Government or the officer concerned had no reasonable ground for apprehending the detenu. This is effected by sec. 3 which runs as follows:—
“For the avoidance of doubt it la hereby declared that no order heretofore made against any person under sub-section (1) of section 16 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948, shall be deemed to be invalid or shall be called in question on the ground that at the time of mating the order the authority making it had no reasonable grounds.”
76. In substance the view of the Division Bench in Jyoti Basil's case has been given legislative sanction by virtue of executive legislation and the Full Bench is precluded from deciding the questions referred to it by the Division Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and S.R Das, J.
77. Various arguments have been advanced before us attacking the validity of this Ordinance. It is attacked, firstly, on the ground that the Security Act itself is ultra vires having encroached on the Federal Legislative List, i.e, List No. I, in the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act. Secondly, the Ordinance was not promulgated in good faith. Thirdly, no circumstances as contemplated by sec. 88 of the Government of India Act existed at the date of its promulgation. Fourthly, the Ordinance is repugnant to an existing law, the Criminal Procedure Code, and the previous instruction of the Governor-General was essential under the proviso to sec. 88(I) of the Constitution Act and in its absence the Ordinance is inoperative.
78. These were the arguments of Mr. Niren De, learned Counsel for Hiren Mukherjee.
79. For the other detenu Mr. Sadhan Gupta argued that an Ordinance cannot amend an Act of the Legislature and in any event the Ordinance is ultra vires because it alters the law and gives it retrospective effect to a date when the Provincial Legislature was actually in session and in such circumstances the Governor has no power to promulgate this Ordinance. Assuming that the Governor has power by an Ordinance to repeal or amend an Act passed by the Legislature, Mr. Gupta contends that the Governor cannot do it directly and can only do it by enacting a piece of repugnant legislation. Mr. Gupta referred to the judgments of Mitter and Sen, JJ, in the case of Shib Nath Banerjee v. A.E Porter. In that case the learned Judges held that when there are two legislative bodies both deriving their authority from the same paramount legislature and equally competent to legislate in the same field, one of such bodies cannot directly repeal or amend laws passed by the other, unless the power to do so has been expressly conferred by the authority which created the legislative bodies.
80. Unfortunately for the detents, practically all the points urged on their behalf are covered by a series of Privy Council judgments. In the case of King-Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma, Viscount Simon, L.C held that an Ordinance of the Governor-General promulgated under sec. 72 of Schedule IX to the Government of India Act may repeal or alter the ordinary law just as the Indian Legislature itself might do. Sec. 26 of Ordinance II of 1942 excluded the revisional powers of the High Court and as such it was repugnant to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet the Judicial Committee held that the Ordinance was neither ineffective nor ultra vires. On principle there is no difference between an Ordinance by the Governor-General and an Ordinance by the Governor. Under sec. 72 of the 9th Schedule of the Constitution Act the Governor-General's Ordinance was given the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian Legislature. Under sec. 88(2) of the same Act an Ordinance promulgated by a Provincial Governor shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Provincial Legislature assented to by the Governor.
81. Mr. Gupta points out with some cogency that the judgment of Lord Watson in the case of Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion(22) was not cited before the Judicial Committee in Benoarilal's case nor were the judgments of the Special (Bench of this Court in Shibnath's case considered by the Judicial Committee. It is for the framers of the Indian Constitution to decide whether the judgments of the Judicial Committee should be placed on the same footing as those of the House of Lords and whether they should be treated as merely persuasive authorities or as binding precedents. But this High Court to-day is bound by the pronouncements of the Judicial Committee and in view of the observations of the Judicial Committee even its obiter dicta are binding on the Courts in India. Having regard to Lord Simon's judgment there is no escape from the conclusion that an ordinance promulgated by the Governor can repeal or alter an Act of the Provincial Legislature.
82. In the case of Kumar Singh Chhajor v. King-Emperor the validity of Ordinance No XIX of 1943 which gave retrospective effect to the sentences passed by Special Courts under Ordinance No II of 1942 came up for consideration. Ordinance No. II had been declared ultra vires by the Federal Court. The Judicial Committee held that Ordinance No. XIX was valid and the Governor-General's Ordinance could take away the High Court's powers of revision under sec. 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
83. The other arguments advanced on behalf of the detenu Mukherjee are covered by two recent judgments of the Judicial Committee, Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia and Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, Ltd.. In the first case which dealt with the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Land Act, Lord Wright held that sec. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, had no application in a case where the Province was acting wholly with in its powers under List II, i.e, the Provincial List, without relying on any power conferred on it by the Concurrent List (List III) and in such a case there was no room for the exercise by the Governor-General of his residuary power under sec. 104. In the second case which dealt with the Bengal Money-Lenders' Act, Lord Porter held that the said Act dealt in pith and substance with “Money-lending” and was, therefore, wholly within the powers of the Provincial Legislature although it trenched upon matters in the Federal List. Lord Porter pointed out that it is not possible to make a clean cut between the powers of the various legislatures. They are bound to overlap from time to time. The rule as to “pith and substance” which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby an impugned statute is examined to ascertain its true nature and character for the purpose of determining in which particular list the legislation falls, applies equally to Indian as well as to Dominion legislation. The extent of the invasion by the Provincial Legislature into subjects enumerated in the Federal List is material for the purpose of determining what is the pith and substance of the impugned Act. Therefore, we have got to look into the pith and substance of the impugned legislation, and, if as a whole it falls within the power given to the province by any of the items in the Provincial List without any necessity to invoke any power from the Concurrent List then the legislation is intra vires the Provincial Legislature and no question of repugnancy under sec. 107 of the Constitution Act can arise.
84. Mr. Sadhan Gupta on behalf of the detenu Das Gupta advanced the argument that the Governor had really usurped the power of the Provincial Legislature and in fringed sec. 88 of the Constitution Act. Sec. 88 is in the following terms:—
(1) If at any time when the Legislature of a Province is not in session the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which lender it necessary for Mm to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinance as the circumstances appear to him to require:
Provided that the Governor shall not, without instructions from the Governor-General promulgate any such Ordinance if an Act of the Provincial Legislature containing the same provisions would under this Act have been in valid unless, having been reserved for the consideration of the Governor-General, it had received the assent of the Governor-General,
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this section shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Provincial Legislature assented to by the Governor.
85. Mr. Gupta's contention is that the Governor can only legislate when the Legislature is not in session. The present Ordinance has altered sec. 16 of the Security Act and has given it retrospective effect. The amendment made by the Ordinance is to be operative from the date of the commencement of the Act. On that date the Legislature was in session. That means that the Governor is in effect legislating at a time when the Legislature of the province was in session and, therefore, the Governor himself could not legislate at all.
86. The learned Advocate-General contends that sec. 88(I) prescribes the conditions under which the Governor can promulgate an Ordinance. The conditions are two fold; (a) the Legislature must not be in session and (6) the Governor must be satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action. The Advocate-General con tends that both the conditions prescribed by sec. 88(I) for the exercise of the legislative power of the Governor by means of an Ordinance have been complied with. The effect of the exercise of such power is contained in sec. 88(2) and when an Ordinance has been validly promulgated under sec. 88(I) it has the same force and effect as that of an Act of the Legislature.
87. It is now settled law that there is no prohibition against retrospective legislation and within their own sphere the powers of the Legislature are as large and ample as those of the Parliament itself. Queen v. Burah(23) and United Province v. Musst. Atiqa Begum. In my opinion the learned Advocate-General's contentions are correct and should be upheld. I agree with his Lordship the Chief Justice that the impugned Ordinance falls within items 1 and 2 of the Provincial List (List II). On the authority of the Privy Council in the Punjab case and The Bank of Commerce case this legislation could be enacted by the Provincial legislature. Hence, the Governor under sec. 68 of the Constitution Act was authorized to promulgate it by means of an Ordinance, and there is, therefore, no. question of taking the asent or the instruction of the Governor-General.
88. Mr. Gupta has contended that on principle an authority cannot do that indirectly which it is prohibited from doing directly and that this Ordinance was a colorable device to defeat the provisions of sec. 88(j). He referred to the judgment of the judicial Committee in Board of Trustees of the Lethbridge Northern Irrigation District v. Independent Order of Foresters. But the effect of sec. 88, sub-secs (I) and (2), is that the Governor is directly authorised to promulgate an Ordinance with retrospective effect and there is no qualification or limitation upon that authority.
89. In view of the recent pronouncements of the Judicial Committee in the cases cited before us we are constrained to hold that both the Security Act and the Ordinance are intra vires. Sec. 16 of the Security Act thus has been amended with retrospective effect. The words of that section, as it now stands, make it clear that mere satisfaction of the Provincial Government is sufficient and such satisfaction need not necessarily be founded on reasonable grounds before a valid order can be made, in any event by virtue of sec. 3 of the Ordinance this High Court is deprived of the jurisdiction to question the validity of any order of detention on the ground of absence of reasonable grounds. This practically makes proceedings under sec. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code illusory. It would be perhaps more satisfactory for all concerned to enact that no order of detention under the West Bengal Security Act can be questioned in any Court of law.
90. On the question of mala fides the materials placed before us create suspicion, but it is impossible to hold that there has been any colorable exercise of the power of detention. There is no evidence that any particular Minister had any animus against either of these two detunes or that they have been detained in jail because they were prospective rival candidates of any of the Ministers at an impending bye-election.
91. Learned Counsel appearing for the detunes strongly criticized the manner in which this High Court has been dealt with by the Executive. The Governor-General of India behaved in a different manner in the year 1943 when Ordinance No. II of 1942, namely, the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance, was called in question. In the case of Benoari Lal Sharma v. Emperor(24) a Special Bench of this Court consisting of Derbyshire, C.J, Khundkar and Sen, JJ., held the Ordinance to be ultra vires the Governor-General of India. An appeal was then taken to the Federal Court. The hearing lasted for some days and on the 4th June, 1943, the Court by a majority (Varadachariar, C.J and Zafrulla Khan, J., Rowland, J., dissenting) upheld the decision of the Special Bench of this Court and declared Ordinance II ultra vires.
92. In the place of the Ordinance thus pronounced invalid another Ordinance, namely, Ordinance XIX of 1943 was promulgated by the Governor-General on the 5th June, 1943. That Ordinance was enacted on the. Basis that the Government was bound by the decision of the Federal Court; and it accordingly strove to meet the situation thus created by fresh legislative effort in the shape of another Ordinance. There was no attempt to prevent the Court from pronouncing upon the important questions of law involved. It was recognized that the Court had seisin of these questions and must not be hindered in the discharge of its duty to decide them.
93. It could have accorded with the precedent I have just alluded to, had the ordinance which has been called in question before us was not promulgated so as to make it impossible for this Full Bench to decide the grave questions referred to it. The Ordinance begins by reciting that certain doubts had arisen as to the interpretation of sec. 16 of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948. Those doubts were created by the conflicting views taken by two Division Benches of this Court. The reference to this Full Bench cast upon us the duty of resolving these doubts. It is strange and perhaps without any precedent, that anything should be done to render the deliberations of the Full Bench in fructuous in that regard.
94. We cannot agree with the contention that authority so exercised constitutes a fraud upon the Statute. Yet it is a cogent comments that nothing should be done which may tend to bring the authority or the ad ministration of the law into disrespect. The Court has to discharge the function of deciding whether the statutory mandate had been exceeded and nothing should be done to make it difficult or impossible for the highest Court of the Province to act as the great umpire on constitutional issues or to undermine the authority of the Court as the protector of the rights which are guaranteed to the citizens by the law of the land.
95. The attitude to be expected of the Executive towards the law of the land and towards those who have the duty to ex pound it has more than once been referred to in the Supreme Courts in Great Britain during recent times. Two instances may suffice as illustrative of the principle for which I contend. On the 17th December, 1915, Lord Reading had to deal with two Rules nisi granted upon information in the nature of a quo warranto against two members of His Majesty's Privy Council. [The King v. Speyer(25)].
96. It had been suggested in argument that it would be easy, by executive action on the part of the Servants of the Crown, to circumvent the Court's judgment, should the Rules be made absolute. Lord Reading, Lord Chief Justice of England, dealt with that suggestion in a passage I think it well to quote: “Although it may be interesting and useful for the purpose of testing the propositions under consideration to assume the difficulties suggested by the Attorney-General, none of them would in truth occur. This is the King's Court; we sit here to administer justice and to interpret the laws of the realm in the King's name. It is respectful and proper to assume that once the law is declared by a competent judicial authority, it will be followed by the Crown.”
97. It so happened that but a few months earlier, the conduct of the Government of Nova Scotia came up for scrutiny in the case reported as The Eastern Trust Company v, McKenzie, Mann & Co., Ltd.(26). The case came up before a particularly strong Board of the Judicial Committee on appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada. From the judgment of their Lordships in that case I venture to quote the following passage which appears at page 759 of the Report:—
“It is the duty of the Crown and of every branch of the Executive to abide by and obey the law. If there is any difficulty in ascertaining it the Courts are open to the Crown to sue, and it is the duty of the Executive in cases of doubt to ascertain the law, in order to obey it, not to disregard it.”
98. The authorities responsible for framing and promulgating this impugned Ordinance should have waited until the final opinion of this Court had been pronounced and they could do what was done by the Governor-General of India in 1943, namely, to accept the decision of the Court and, if necessary, to enact suitable legislation in view of the correct legal position then authoritatively decided by the tribunal competent to determine the same.