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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 28 (2), Provincial Insolvency Act,
  • Bengal" Tenancy Amendment Act 1928;].
  • Section 3 (5), Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Section 88, Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Act VI B.C., of 1938.
  • Section 54, T.P. Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 28 (2), Provincial Insolvency Act,
  • Bengal" Tenancy Amendment Act 1928;].
  • Section 3 (5), Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • Section 88, Bengal Tenancy Act,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Act VI B.C., of 1938.
  • Section 54, T.P. Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision against Pre-emption Order)

Factual and Procedural Background

This rule challenges an order for pre-emption dated 25-6-1947 made by Mr. N.L. Shome, Subordinate Judge 2nd Court, Alipore, which affirmed an order of Maulvi S. Ali Munsif, 1st Court, Diamond Harbour (Misc. Judicial Case No. 271 of 1946). The dispute concerns an occupancy holding recorded in R.S. Khatian No. 54, Pargana Sunderbans, District 24-Parganas.

Key factual events (as stated in the opinion):

  • In 1910 the holding was purchased by three brothers: Murari Mohan Bera, Hari Narayan Bera and Kedarnath Bera.
  • By a deed of partition dated 25-1-1926 between Murari (referred to as Murari Basanta Kumari, widow of Harinarayan, in the deed) and Kedar Nath the holding was partitioned; the disputed holding was allotted to Murari and Kedar Nath in demarcated shares.
  • Kedarnath was adjudged insolvent in 1930 and his estate vested in the Official Receiver. On 5-7-1936 the Official Receiver sold the demarcated share of Kedarnath to the petitioner, Debendranath Sen; the petitioner is said to have taken possession although no formal deed was executed then.
  • In 1938 Murari instituted proceedings under Section 88, Bengal Tenancy Act (Misc. Judicial Case No. 613 of 1938) for distribution of rent; the Official Receiver was not made a party. By order dated 15-5-1939 rent was distributed (effective from 1346 B.S.).
  • On 16-7-1944 Murari sold his allotment to the opposite party, Jnanendra Nath Bera, by a registered kobala (Ex. 5) which recited the 1926 partition.
  • On 10-2-1946 the Official Receiver executed and registered a kobala in favour of the petitioner in respect of the 5-7-1936 sale (Ex. 5A).
  • On 6-5-1946 the opposite party commenced a proceeding under Section 26F, Bengal Tenancy Act, for pre-emption; the Munsif allowed the application and this decision was affirmed on appeal.
  • The purchaser (petitioner) sought revision in this Court and obtained the present rule.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a sale made by an Official Receiver in the course of administration is a voluntary transfer giving rise to a right of pre-emption under the Bengal Tenancy Act, or whether it is effectively a sale by the Court that would preclude pre-emption.
  2. Whether the 1926 deed of partition between co-tenants severed their jointness so that they ceased to be "co-sharer tenants" within the meaning of Section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
  3. Whether the order made under Section 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (distributing rent) had the effect of splitting up the holding and thereby removing the vendor's status as a co-sharer tenant, such that the vendor could not claim a right of pre-emption.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Lahiri)

  • The sale by the Official Receiver in the course of administration was effectively a sale by the Court and not a voluntary transfer; therefore a right of pre-emption does not lie.
  • The 1926 deed of partition severed the co-tenancy between Murari and Kedarnath, so that they (and their successors) were no longer co-sharer tenants under Section 26F.
  • The order under Section 88, Bengal Tenancy Act, distributing the rent had the effect of splitting up the holding and caused Murari (the vendor of the opposite party) to cease to be a co-sharer tenant, preventing him from applying for pre-emption.

Opposite Party's Arguments

  • The opposite party claimed that he was a co-sharer tenant of the holding on the material date (the date when title effectively passed by registration) and was therefore entitled to pre-empt.
  • It was argued on behalf of the opposite party that the internal partition among co-tenants did not affect the landlord's rights; implicitly this supports the view that partition does not necessarily defeat a co-tenant's right under Section 26F.
  • The lower Courts treated the Section 88 distribution order as ineffective (insofar as it might impact the Official Receiver) because the Official Receiver was not made a party to the Section 88 proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Golam Hossain v. Fatima Begum Distinction between a sale by the Court (where Court makes title and issues sale certificate) and a sale made by an authorized trustee/receiver out of Court (where the Court does not grant a sale certificate). Used to support the proposition that a sale by a Receiver/Official Receiver is not the same as a sale made by the Court and is therefore a voluntary act of the receiver.
Abdul Hashim v. Amar Krishna, 6 A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 193 Conveyance by the Official Receiver falls within the operation of Section 54, Transfer of Property Act; title of purchaser under sale by Official Receiver requires proper conveyance. Relied on to show that a Receiver's sale does not escape ordinary conveyancing/formalities and is not a special court-sale immune from pre-emption rules.
Basava Sankaram v. Narasimhalu, 14 A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1 Held (by majority) that a sale by an Official Receiver is a private/voluntary sale and not a sale by operation of law or a court sale; views of several judges to that effect are cited. Cited for the proposition that sales by an Official Receiver are voluntary transfers (acts of the receiver) and thus fall within the scope of the provisos of sections 26A, 26C and 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Jatindra Nath De v. Jetu Mahto, 33 A.I.R. 1946 Cal. 339 Rule that the right to pre-empt under Section 26F accrues on the transfer. Used to support the statement that the date of accrual of the right of pre-emption is the date when title effectively passes (i.e., upon registration).
Gobardhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar Authority for the proposition that the material date for accrual of pre-emption rights is when the deed is registered and title passes. Applied to identify 10-2-1946 (date of registration by Official Receiver) as the material date for determining who could pre-empt.
Dayamoyee v. Ananda Mohan, 2 A.I.R. 1915 Cal. 242; Chandra Benode v. Ala Bux, 8 A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 15 Partition among co-tenants is binding among the co-tenants who join in it and is effective against the whole world except the landlord. Relied on to hold that the 1926 partition severed the joint status between Murari and Kedarnath and therefore their successors were not co-tenants for purposes of Section 26F.
Amir Sardar v. Ismail Hossain Sardar Observation that the phrase "co-sharer tenant" in Section 26F means co-sharers in the tenancy. Quoted to support the interpretation that only those who remain co-sharers in the tenancy (i.e., against the landlord) fall within Section 26F.
Goas Ali v. Lalmia (Chakravarty and Ellis JJ.) Explanation that the terms "co-sharer in the tenancy" and "co-sharer tenant" refer to persons who could claim to be co-sharers against the tenants (i.e., in the tenancy as recognized vis-à-vis the landlord). Invoked to support the conclusion that an amicable partition which severs co-tenancy removes the right to claim as a co-sharer under Section 26F.
Dalil Bepari v. Radha Nath Concerned whether an unrecognized transferee of a share of a non-transferable occupancy holding has locus standi to make an application under Section 26P; not directly on point. Distinguished by the Court as not directly touching the present question; noted that there is divergence of opinion on the point decided in that case.
Nirmal Chandra Roy v. Jogendra Nath (Henderson J.) Held that distribution of rent under Section 88 disrupts the old tenancy and creates new tenancies. Accepted by the Court as supporting the legal effect of a Section 88 distribution (i.e., that it can terminate joint liability and create new tenancies), though factual questions about parties and recognition affected its application here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the contesting contentions in sequence and applied statutory provisions together with the cited authorities:

  1. On the nature of the Official Receiver's sale: The Court examined the Provincial Insolvency Act provisions (Section 28(2) vesting insolvent's property in the Court or Receiver; Section 57 permitting appointment of an Official Receiver; Section 59 empowering a Receiver to realize and sell property; and Section 68 providing appeal/superintendence). From these provisions the Court concluded that an Official Receiver's sale is the Receiver's voluntary act carried out in exercise of statutory powers but subject to the Court's supervisory jurisdiction on appeal. Relying on authorities distinguishing sales by the Court and sales by a Receiver (Golam Hossain and Basava Sankaram and Abdul Hashim), the Court held that a sale by an Official Receiver is a voluntary transfer (not a court sale) and therefore falls within the scope of the Bengal Tenancy Act's provisions on pre-emption.
  2. On the material date for pre-emption: The Court applied Jatindra Nath De and Gobardhan Bar to hold that the right to pre-empt accrues on the date when title effectively passes — i.e., on registration of the deed — not merely on execution, bidding date or possession. Consequently the registration by the Official Receiver on 10-2-1946 was the material date for determining who had the right to pre-empt.
  3. On whether partition (1926) severed co-tenancy so as to defeat the opposite party's claim: The Court examined definitions in the Bengal Tenancy Act (Section 3(5) "holding" and Section 3(17) "tenant"), observed that Section 26F (as amended by the Act of 1938) regulates rights of co-tenants inter se and does not directly bind the landlord, and relied on authorities (Dayamoyee, Chandra Benode, Amir Sardar, Goas Ali) to conclude that a partition among co-tenants is binding among them and (except as against the landlord) severs joint status. On this basis the Court concluded the 1926 partition severed the joint status of Murari and Kedarnath, so neither Murari nor Kedarnath's successors (i.e., the opposite party and the petitioner respectively) could be treated as co-sharer tenants vis-à-vis each other for purposes of Section 26F on the material date.
  4. On the effect of the Section 88 order distributing rent: The Court acknowledged that Section 88 by its terms ends joint and several liability of co-tenants from the date specified and cited Henderson J. in Nirmal Chandra Roy v. Jogendra Nath to the effect that such distribution disrupts the old tenancy and creates new tenancies. The Court noted, however, that the lower Courts had attempted to avoid this effect by pointing out that the Official Receiver was not a party to the Section 88 proceeding, and that the record was unclear on whether the Official Receiver had paid rent or obtained the landlord's recognition, or whether the petitioner had paid rent or obtained recognition after the 1936 sale. Given that Murari (the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party) had initiated the Section 88 proceeding, the Court held it must be assumed he made the proper persons parties; on that basis the contention based on the Section 88 order was rejected in favour of the petitioner.
  5. Conclusion of analysis: For the reasons above the Court determined that (a) the sale by the Official Receiver was a voluntary transfer capable of attracting pre-emption rights in principle; (b) the material date for accrual of any right to pre-empt was the registration date (10-2-1946); and (c) by reason of the 1926 partition (and the treatment of the Section 88 matter), the opposite party could not be regarded as a co-sharer tenant entitled to pre-empt on that material date.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court made the rule absolute and directed that the orders of the lower Courts be set aside. The Court dismissed the opposite party's application for pre-emption.

Core Ruling: The rule is made absolute; the pre-emption order of the Courts below is set aside and the application for pre-emption is dismissed.

Immediate consequences and costs:

  • The petitioner (Debendranath Sen) is entitled to costs in all the Courts.
  • The hearing fee in this Court was assessed at 2 gold mohurs.

Broader implication: The opinion applies existing statutory provisions and authorities to the facts and interprets the scope of Section 26F in light of partition and the nature of Official Receiver sales. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond the legal conclusions applied to the facts; the decision's direct effect is to dispose of the parties' dispute and order costs as stated.

    Debendra Nath Sen , v. Ganendra Nath Bera , Opposite Party.

    .

    1. This rule is directed against an order for pre-emption made by Mr. N.L. Shome, Subordinate Judge 2nd Court, Alipore, and dated 25-6-1947, passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 135 of 1947 affirming an order of Maulvi S. Ali Munsif, 1st Court, Diamond Harbour, passed in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 271 of 1946 (26F).

    2. The facts shortly stated are that an occupancy holding recorded in R.S. Khatian No. 54 of Pargana Sunderbans District 24-Parganas was purchased in 1910 by three brothers Murari Mohan Bera, Hari Narayan Bera and Kedarnath Bera.

    3. By a deed of partition dated 25-1-1926, between Murari Basanta Kumari, widow of Harinarayan, and Kedar Nath the said holding together with other lands was partitioned; the disputed holding was allotted only to Murari and Kedar Nath in demarcated shares.

    4. Kedarnath was later on adjudged an insolvent by the District Judge, 24-Parganas in Insolvency case No. 37 of 1930 and the estate of the insolvent became vested in the Official Receiver. On 5-7-1936, the Official Receiver in the course of administration sold the demareated. share of Kedarnath to the petitioner Debendranath Sen and the petitioner alleges to have got into possession. No formal deed of sale was executed at the time.

    5. In 1938, Murari instituted a proceeding Under Section 88, Bengal Tenancy Act being Misc. judicial case No. 613 of 1938 for distribution of the rent of the holding; in this application the Official Receiver was not made a party, only the landlord and the heirs of Kedarnath were made parties. By an order dated 15-5-1939, rent of the said holding was distributed the order coming into force on and from 1346 B.S.

    6. On 16-7-1944, Murari sold his allotment of the disputed holding to the opposite party Jnanendra Nath Bera under a registered kobala Ex. 5. The kobala recites the partition of 1926.

    7. On 10-2-1946, the Official Receiver executed and registered a kobala in favour of the petitioner in respect of the sale dated 5-7-1936. This was marked as Ex. 5A.

    8. On 6-5-1946, the opposite party staried a proceeding Under section 26f, bengal tenancy act, for pre-emption. The application was allowed by the Munsif and his decision was affirmed on appeal.

    9. The purchaser Debendranath Sen moved this Court in revision and obtained the present rule.

    10. Mr. Lahiri appearing for the petitioner has urged the following points: (1) That the application for pre-emption did not lie inasmuch as the sale which was made by an Official-Receiver in course of administration, was really a sale by the Court and could not be regarded as a voluntary transfer giving rise to a right of pre-emption. (2) That the effect of the deed of partition between Murari, Basanta Kumari and Kedarnath was to sever their jointness and they ceased to be co tenants under the meanissg of Section 26F of the Act. (3) That the effect of the order Under Section 88, Bengal Tenancy Act, distributing the rent was to split up the holding and Murari, the vendor of the pre-emptor opposite party, ceased to be a co-sharer tenant and could not apply for pre-emption.

    11. I shall now deal with the above contentions. The first point, in my opinion, does not bear examination. Under Section 28 (2), Provincial Insolvency Act, on the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a Receiver as provided in the Act. Under Section 57 of the Act the Local Government may appoint a person (to be called Official Receiver) to be Receiver under the Act with specific local limits and every such person shall be the Receiver for the purpose of every order of a Court in insolvency appointing a Receiver or an interim Receiver. Under Section 59 of the Act a Receiver shall, with all convenient speed, realize the property of the debtor and distribute dividends amongst creditors and for that purpose may, inter alia, sell all or any property of the insolvent. Any act or decision of the Receiver is, Under Section 68 of the Act, subject to an appeal to the Court. It would, therefore, follow that the sale by an Official Receiver is his own voluntary act subject to superintendence of the Court and is not a sale by the Court. The distinction., between a sale by a Receiver appointed by a Court and a sale by the Court was thus stated by Fletcher J. in Golam Hossain v. Fatima Begum. ('12) 16 C.W.N. 394 "Sales by the Court are cases in which the Court makes a title to the purchaser and the Court confirms the sale and issues a sale certificate. The second case is where the Court authorizes a trustee or a receiver or other person holding property to sell the property and the sale is made out of Court. The Court while authorizing or directing the sale does not make any title in the purchase and in such a sale the Court does not grant a sale certificate nor does it confirm the sale.

    12. In Abdul Hashim v. Amar Krishna. 6 A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 193 which dealt with the case of a sale by an Official Receiver, Fletcher and Cuming JJ. held that a conveyance by the receiver was not outside the operation of Section 54, T.P. Act and the title of a purchaser under a sale by the Official Receiver required to be perfected by a proper conveyance as required by the Transfer of Property Act.

    13. A Bench of five Judgea of the Madras High Court had to consider the question in Basava Sankaram v. Narasimhalu. 14 A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1 It was held by four of the learned Judges that a sale by an Official Receiver was really a private sale and not a sale by operation of law. Kumarswamy Shastri, Offg. C.J. at pp. 143-144 observed that no leave or sanction of the Court is required in case of a sale by an Official Receiver and such a sale is not a sale by operation of law. Ramesam J. stated that an Official Receiver is not an agent of the Court and a sale by him is not a sale by the Court. Venkatasubba Rao J. thus expressed himself at p. 156:

    When the property vesta in a receiver on insolvency there is a transfer by operation of law but when a receiver transfers the property to an alienee, the alienation is a voluntary transfer and is as such an act of parties as any transfer by a private individual.

    Curgenven J. at p. 159 observed that such a sale is frequently a matter of discretion and so a voluntary sale on the part of the receiver, as the purchase is on the part of the buyer and, although the receiver may be a public officer, the transaction is not the less an act of parties on that account.

    14. Krishnan J. who dissented, stated at p. 148 that a sale by an Official Receiver is in the nature of a court sale:

    In such sales there is no covenant for title. What the Official Receiver sells is merely the title of the insolvent, if any, and the purchaser takes what he can get. Compulsory sales in invitum by Court or by its officer stand on a very different footing from private sales.

    15. In my opinion, a sale by an Official Receiver acting under the powers conferred on him by Section 59 of the Act though subject to supervision by the Court on an appeal Under Section 68 of the Act is a voluntary act of the receiver resting on his sound discretion and he merely finds out the best purchaser by an auction who purchases on their own terms and volition. It is thus a voluntary transfer and is subject to the provisos of sections 26a, 26c and 26f, bengal tenancy act.

    16. The right to pre-empt Under Section 26F of the Act accrues on the transfer: Jatindra Nath De v. Jetu Mahto 33 A.I.R. 1946 Cal. 339 at p. 514. The date of accrual of the right is not the date of execution of the deed of sale or any earlier date but the date when the deed of sale is registered and title effectively passes: Gobardhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar. .

    17. The fact that the bid was held by the Official Receiver and the price was paid in July 1936 or that possession was made over to the purchaser (i.e. the petitioner) does not affect the liability of the petitioner to be pre-empted when the title of the property validly passed to the latter on the registration of the kobala by the Official Receiver on 10-2-1946, This is the material date for finding out the persons who are entitled to pre-empt. The opposite party claims that he was a co-sharer tenant of the holding on that date and hence entitled to preempt. To this the purchaser (petitioner) raises two rejoinders as stated in grounds (2) and (3). In the first place it is said that the effect of the partition in 1926 was to sever the joint status of the vendors of the petitioner and of the opposite party. In the second place it is said that the order passed in the proceedings Under Section 88, Bengal Tenancy Act, had the effect of severing the status as co-sharer tenants.

    18. The first rejoinder therefore raises the question viz. whether co-sharer tenants who have amicably partitioned their lands, cease to be co-sharers, irrespective of the fact whether or not the landlord recognizes the partition. This depends on the meaning to be put upon the words "one or more co-sharers in the holding.

    19. The word 'holding' is defined in Section 3 (5), Bengal Tenancy Act, to mean

    "a parcel or parcels of land or an undivided share thereof, held by a raiyat or an under-raiyat and forming the subject of a separate tenancy;[whether the raiyat or under-raiyat has held the land before or after the commencement of the Bengal"
    Tenancy Amendment Act 1928;].

    The words in square brackets were inserted by Act VI B.C., of 1938. The word 'tenant' is defined in Section 3(17) of the Act to mean a person who holds land under another person, and is or but for a special contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that person....

    20. Both these definitions are controlled by the opening words of section. unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context.

    21. It is argued on behalf of the opposite party that the partition amongst the co-tenants does not affect the landlord. This may be conceded. But Section 26F of the Act, as it stands after the Act of 1938, merely adjusts the rights of co-tenants inter se. It has no reference to the landlord. The landlord need not be made a party to the proceedings; the effect of an order for preemption is to substitute the pre-emptor in place of the old co-tenant, but the joint and several liability of the pre-emptor and the other co-tenants remain. Section 26F (2) and (7) merely adjust the rights of the co-tenants inter se. partition among co-tenants is binding among the co-tenants who join in the partition and is effective against the whole world except the landlord: see Dayamoyee v. Ananda Mohan 2 A.I.R. 1915 Cal. 242 Chandra Benode v. Ala Bux 8 A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 15 In my opinion, the partition of 1926 operated to sever the joint status of Murari and Kedar Nath. Hence their successors, viz., the petitioner and the opposite party could no longer be regarded as co-tenants, when the opposite party made the application for preemption. This view receives support from the following observation of Mitter A.C.J. in Amir Sardar v. Ismail Hossain Sardar .

    In my opinion the phrase 'co-sharer tenant' occurring in Section 26F means co-sharers in the tenancy.

    22. The view taken by me is also supported by the decision of Chakravarty and Ellis JJ. in Goas Ali v. Lalmia. . In the latter case, an unrecognized purchaser of a share in an occupancy holding before 1-4-1929 made a further purchase of another share of the holding whereupon an application for pre-emption was made by another co-sharer in the holding; this application was rejected by this Court on the ground that the purchaser was a co-sharer in the tenancy and was protected Under Section 26F (1)(a) of the Act. Chakravartti J. observed as follows at p. 94:

    In view of the scope of the section, it appears to us that by the terras 'co-sharer in the tenancy' and 'co-sharer tenant' the Legislature meant persons who could claim to be regarded as co-sharers against the tenants.

    23. The case in Dalil Bepari v. Radha Nath. . on which reliance is placed on behalf of the opposite party deals with the question whether an unrecognized transferee of a share of a non-transferable occupancy holding has locus standi to make an application Under Section 26P of the Act and does not directly touch on the question now in controversy. I may add that on the point decided in the case last cited there is a divergence of opinion in this Court.

    24. In the above views the second point must be answered in favour of the petitioner.

    25. The second rejoinder concerns the effect of distribution of rent Under Section 88 of the Act. The Sub-section by its terms puts an end to the joint and several liability of the co-tenants from the date specified in the order. I agree with the view taken by Henderson J. in Nirmal Chandra Roy v. Jogendra Nath ('44) 49 C.W.N. 161 Where it was held that the effect was to disrupt the old tenancy and to create new tenancies. The Courts below have got round the above difficulty by holding that as the Official Receiver in whom the interest of the co-tenant Kedarnath had become vested, was not made a party, the order Under Section 88 of the Act had no legal effect. It is not clear on the materials on record whether the Official Receiver had paid rent or the landlord's fee and got recognition from the landlord and whether the petitioner after the sale by the Official Receiver in 1936 had paid rent or got recognition. The contrary state of facts would appear from Ex. 1. It is to be noted, however, that it was Murari predecessor-in-interest of the opposite party, who made the application for distribution of rent and it must be assumed that he made the proper persons parties to the proceeding. This contention must also be answered in favour of the petitioner.

    26. The result, therefore, is that this rule must be made absolute, the orders of the Court below set aside and the application for preemption filed by the opposite party dismissed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs in all the Courts. Hearing fee in this Court being assessed at 2 gold mohurs.

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    Comments

    Debendra Nath Sen , v. Ganendra Nath Bera , Opposite Party.
    (May 12, 1948)