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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act and Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.2. Under S. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • provision of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • SECTION 23 A HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • Act, analogous to S. 23(1)(e) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • DIVORCE ACT 1869
  • Amendment Act of 1976, a new S. 13B
  • 3 of O. 23 of the Code, the Rule
  • Hindu Marriage Act, S. 23(1)(e)
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • Rent Control Acts
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act and Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.2. Under S. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • provision of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • SECTION 23 A HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • Act, analogous to S. 23(1)(e) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
  • DIVORCE ACT 1869
  • Amendment Act of 1976, a new S. 13B
  • 3 of O. 23 of the Code, the Rule
  • Hindu Marriage Act, S. 23(1)(e)
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • Rent Control Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against the wife on the ground of her alleged mental disorder, which was dismissed by the lower court. Subsequently, both parties filed a joint petition praying for divorce by compromise on agreed terms. The appeal challenges whether such a divorce by compromise is permissible under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree of divorce by compromise between the parties is permissible under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  2. Whether the Court can grant a divorce decree solely on the basis of mutual consent or compromise without being satisfied of the existence of any statutory grounds for divorce.
  3. The applicability and interpretation of Section 21 and Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act in relation to compromise decrees.
  4. The effect of the insertion of Section 13B (Divorce by mutual consent) in the Hindu Marriage Act on the permissibility of divorce by compromise.
  5. The relevance and applicability of precedents from Rent Control Acts and matrimonial law on the validity of consent decrees.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 Decrees passed solely on compromise without Court's satisfaction of statutory grounds under Rent Control Acts are nullities. Used to analogize that divorce decrees under Hindu Marriage Act must also be granted only on statutory grounds, not merely on compromise.
Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, AIR 1978 SC 22 Consent decrees for eviction can be challenged as nullities if statutory grounds are not satisfied. Supported the proposition that divorce decrees on compromise without statutory grounds are without jurisdiction and null.
Reynold Rajamani, AIR 1982 SC 1261 Courts have jurisdiction to grant divorce only on grounds specified by statute. Reinforced that divorce cannot be granted on any ground not specified in the statute, especially under Hindu Marriage Act Section 23(1)(e).
Joginder Singh v. Pushpa, AIR 1969 Punj and Har 397 Consent decrees under Hindu Marriage Act may be illegal but not nullities. Court rejected this view as no longer good law in light of Supreme Court decisions emphasizing jurisdictional limits.
Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan, AIR 1984 SC 1562 Consent decrees in matrimonial matters are not per se collusive. Approved the view that consent decrees are not inherently collusive but did not address jurisdictional requirements for divorce decrees.
K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini, AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167 Appellate Courts can exercise powers under Section 13B of Hindu Marriage Act for divorce by mutual consent. Noted as authority that appellate courts may grant divorce by mutual consent even in appeals from contested proceedings.
Ganga v. Santosh, (1985) 2 DMC 7 High Court granted decree for dissolution on mutual consent on appeal. Referenced as supporting the power of appellate courts to grant divorce by mutual consent.
Davinder v. Loveleen, (1982) 2 DMC 5 Consent decree for divorce recorded by Delhi (Punjab and Haryana) High Court. Cited as precedent where compromise divorce was recorded though without detailed reasons.
Sudhakar v. Sulabha, (1986) 1 DMC 336 Consent decree for divorce recorded by Bombay High Court with some reasoning. Used to illustrate judicial acceptance of divorce by compromise with reasoning considered inadequate by this Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining Section 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which incorporates the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) provisions, including Order 23, Rule 3, allowing compromise of suits only if the compromise is lawful. The Court emphasized that Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act expressly requires that a decree for divorce can only be granted if any of the statutory grounds exist and "but not otherwise," making a decree based solely on compromise without statutory grounds illegal and a nullity.

The Court drew parallels to Supreme Court decisions under Rent Control Acts, where eviction decrees on compromise without statutory grounds were held null and void, applying similar reasoning to matrimonial law due to its societal importance and public policy considerations.

The Court further analyzed the insertion of Section 13B (Divorce by mutual consent) in the Hindu Marriage Act, clarifying that even under this provision, the Court's satisfaction of specific conditions (living separately for one year, inability to live together, mutual agreement) is mandatory before granting divorce. Thus, mutual consent alone is insufficient.

The Court rejected the Punjab and Haryana High Court's earlier view that consent decrees may be illegal but not nullities, holding that such decrees without satisfaction of statutory grounds are without jurisdiction and null. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court's approval of consent decrees not being collusive from the jurisdictional requirement of statutory grounds for divorce.

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court found material on record indicating the parties' separation, animus deserendi, and inability to live together, constituting desertion, a recognized ground for divorce under the Act. Consequently, the Court was satisfied that a statutory ground existed and thus recorded the compromise and decreed the divorce accordingly.

Holding and Implications

The Court allowed the appeal and decreed the marriage dissolved by divorce on the basis of the recorded compromise.

The Court held that a divorce decree based solely on compromise or mutual consent without satisfaction of statutory grounds under the Hindu Marriage Act is without jurisdiction and a nullity. However, where material on record establishes a statutory ground for divorce, the Court may record the compromise and grant the decree. This decision clarifies the limits of compromise decrees under the Act, reinforcing the mandatory jurisdictional condition of statutory grounds for divorce, and aligns the matrimonial law jurisprudence with principles established in other areas of law such as Rent Control Acts. No new precedent was set beyond affirming existing Supreme Court authorities and applying them to the facts.

    Apurba Mohan Ghosh v. Manashi Ghosh .

    A.M Bhattacharjee, J.:— The appellant-husband petitioned against the wife respondent in court below for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of her alleged mental disorder and the petition having been dismissed, the husband has preferred this appeal to this Court. But both the parties have now filed a joint-petition before us praying that the marriage between them may be dissolved by a decree of divorce on compromise on the terms and conditions contained therein. The question that has accordingly arisen for our consideration is whether such a course is permissible under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

    2. Under S. 21 of the Hindu Marriage Act, “all proceedings under this Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Civil P.C”, which would accordingly include O. 23, R. 3 of the Code, providing for compromise of suit. But as indicated in S. 21 itself in its opening words, the Civil P.C would apply “subject to the other provisions contained in this Act”, and as provided in R. 3 of O. 23 of the Code, the Rule would apply only when the Court is satisfied that the “agreement or compromise”, on the basis of which the proceeding is sought to be decreed, is “lawful”. We would accordingly have to ascertain as to whether the “agreement or compromise” in question is lawful and whether there is anything in the Hindu Marriage Act, express or implied, to outweigh the operation of R. 3 of O. 23 of the Civil P.C to a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act.

    3. Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, providing for decree to be awarded thereunder, expressly provides that only when “any of the grounds for granting relief exists”, obviously meaning thereby any of the grounds specified in the Act, and the other relevant provisions in Cls. (a) to (e) are also satisfied, then only, “but not otherwise”, the Court can decree the reliefs prayed for. The expression “but not otherwise” is weighty enough to indicate with unmistakable clarity that a decree can be granted by the Court only when any of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act for the grant of relief is found to exist and not merely on the grounds that the parties have agreed to the grant of such a decree. If a special statute governs the grant of relief therein and affirmatively provides that decrees for such reliefs can be granted on those grounds and also negatively provides that decrees can be granted not otherwise, i.e, on no other grounds, then the decree on any ground not provided in the statute would not only be illegal but may amount to a nullity. This is the process of reasoning on which the Supreme Court has held, in a long catena of decisions since 1970 under the Rent Control Acts, that when such Act provides that no decree for eviction can be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned therein, a decree passed solely on the basis of compromise without the Court's satisfaction as to the existence of any of such grounds is a nullity. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 where all the earlier decisions on the point have been referred to and reviewed and it has been pointed out that even where a landlord and a tenant, in order to avoid protracted litigation or otherwise, agreed to a decree of eviction on compromise, the Court can pass an effective decree of compromise only when the Court is satisfied that the compromise indicates, either on its face or in the background of other materials on record, that a statutory ground of eviction has been made out. A later decision of the Supreme Court in Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, AIR 1978 SC 22 has also pointed out that while a decree for eviction can be passed on compromise, yet the same may be challenged as a nullity if the records do not indicate that the Court could be satisfied as to the existence of any grounds provided in the relevant law for eviction. Most of these decisions proceeded on the assumption of a public policy involved in relevant Rent Control Acts to give protection to the tenants.

    4. Since marriage is an institution around which our civilised society has germinated, the question of public policy involved in the matrimonial law providing for the maintenance as well as dissolution of marriage is no less important than the public policy involved in the Rent Control Laws seeking to provide protection to the tenants. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, it must be held that since the Hindu Marriage Act has in details provided for the grounds for dissolution and has further provided in S. 23(1)(e) that dissolution can be decreed on those grounds, “but not otherwise”, a decree of divorce on the basis of consent or compromise alone without the satisfaction of the Court as to the existence of any of the statutory grounds would be without jurisdiction. Our view appears to be fully fortified by the observations of the Supreme Court in Reynold Rajamani, AIR 1982 SC 1261 at 1263 to the effect that “when a legislative provision specifies the grounds on which divorce may be granted, they constitute the only conditions on which the court has jurisdiction to grant divorce”. That was a case under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, Section 10 whereof specifies the grounds of divorce, but there is no express provision anywhere in that Act, analogous to S. 23(1)(e) of the Hindu Marriage Act, providing specifically that a divorce can be granted only on the grounds specified in the Section, but not otherwise. If even in the absence of such negative prohibitory provisions, the Supreme Court has ruled in Reynold Rajamani (supra) that divorce on any ground not specified in the Act would be without jurisdiction, then the same would a fortiori apply all the more to cases under the Hindu Marriage Act, S. 23(1)(e) whereof contains such categorical prohibition.

    5. It is true that by the Amendment Act of 1976, a new S. 13B has been inserted in the Hindu Marriage Act with the marginal note “Divorce by mutual consent” and that has given rise to an impression, erroneous though, that the decree of divorce can now be granted on the basis of mutual consent alone. As the provisions of the Section itself would make it clear, a decree under S. 13B cannot be passed in favour of the parties solely on the ground of their mutual consent but on the satisfaction of the Court as to the existence of three conditions, namely, (a) “that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more”, (b) “that they have not been able to live together” and (c) “that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved”. So even after the introduction of this S. 13B, a compromise decree for divorce on the basis of mutual consent simpliciter would be a decree not on any of the grounds specified in the Act within the meaning of S. 23(1)(a), but one otherwise than on such grounds, which the Court is not empowered to grant under S. 23(1)(a).

    6. There are no doubt some observations in the majority judgments in the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Joginder Singh v. Pushpa, AIR 1969 Punj and Har 397 which might appear to be authority for the view that a consent decree under the Hindu Marriage Act, even though not in accordance with the provisions thereof, may be illegal but not a nullity and therefore is to be treated as validly operative until set aside in due course of law. We are afraid, and this we say with respect, that the attention of the learned Judges were not duly drawn to the provisions of S. 23(1)(a) and (e), whereunder decrees under the Act are to be passed only on the satisfaction of the Court as to the existence of any of the statutory grounds, “but not otherwise” and that in view of the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal (AIR 1975 SC 2130) (supra) and in Nai Bahu (AIR 1978 SC 22) (supra) and the earlier decisions since 1970 referred to and relied on therein, and more particularly, the observations of the Supreme Court in the context of the Divorce Act, 1869 in Reynold Rajamani (AIR 1982 SC 1261) (supra), extracted hereinbefore, this view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is no longer good law. But even going by the Punjab and Haryana view that consent decrees may be “illegal” but not “nullities”, no Court should lend its imprimatur to a decree even on compromise which, even though not a nullity, is nevertheless illegal. It would be trite to say, as is evident from the provision of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that a Court can record a compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith only when such a compromise is lawful. It is true that this Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana decision in Joginder Singh (AIR 1969 Punj and Har 397) (supra) has been referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan, AIR 1984 SC 1562 at P. 1565. But all that has been approved of the Punjab decision by the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani (supra) is the view that “all cases of consent decrees cannot be said to be collusive” and “consent decrees per se in matrimonial matters are not collusive”. We have not propunded any contrary view hereinbefore, but have only tried to point out that a divorce-decree merely on the basis of mutual consent or compromise without any material on the record on the basis of which the Court could be satisfied as to the existence of any statutory ground for divorce would be without jurisdiction and a nullity and we have found the Supreme Court decisions in Roshan Lal (supra) and in Nai Bahu (supra) and the series of earlier decisions referred to and relied on therein, and particularly the observations of the Supreme Court in Reynold Rajamani (supra) to be clear authorities for this proposition and we would only add that the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani (supra) has laid down nothing to the contrary and has not in fact considered the question arising before us even remotely.

    7. In the case at hand, therefore, before decreeing divorce on compromise, we must find some material on the record, whether in the pleadings, evidence or otherwise, which can be a ground of divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, for otherwise according to our reading of the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act and Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the series of decisions of the Supreme Court in Roshan Lal (AIR 1975 SC 2130) (supra) and Nai Bahu (AIR 1978 SC 22) (supra) and the other earlier decisions referred to and relied on therein and the observations in Reynold Rajamani (AIR 1982 SC 1261) (supra), a decree of divorce solely on the basis of compromise, without any advertence as to the existence of any of the permissible grounds is not permissible under the Law. As we have already indicated, even a decree for divorce under the newly added Section 13B, labelled as “Divorce by mutual consent”, cannot be granted by the Court on mutual consent alone, without being satisfied that the parties are living, and could not but live separately for one year or more and things have come to such a pass that they cannot cohabit together.

    8. There appears to be authorities, quite a number, for the view that even where a divorce proceeding on one or more of the grounds specified in Statute has been hotly contested in the trial Court and has been dismissed, the parties, in the appeal therefrom, may for the first time apply before the Appellate Court for “divorce by mutual consent” under Section 13B and may be granted such a decree. The contention that a joint application for relief of divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B can only be filed in the District Court and it is only that Court which can pass a decree on the motion of both the parties after 6 months and within 18 months of the presentation of the petition, and not by the Appellate Court while hearing an appeal from a contested divorce proceeding has been negatived. Reference may-be made, among others, to a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Omprakash… v. K. Nalini…., AIR 1986 Andh Pra 167 where it has been held that not only the powers under Section 13B can be exercised by the Appellate Court even while hearing an appeal from a contested divorce proceeding initiated on specified ground, but that the time limit of 6 months and 18 months and all that in Section 13B(2) would not apply to the Appellate Court, the procedure contained therein being directory. Reference may also be made to a single Judge decision of the Delhi High Court in Ganga v. Santosh, (1985) 2 DMC 7 where a decree for dissolution on mutual consent was granted by the High Court on an application before that Court in appeal.

    9. We do not propose to determine that question as we are of opinion that we can record the compromise and decree divorce on that basis under the general procedure provided in O. 23, R. 3 of the Civil P.C which applies to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act in view of S. 21 thereof. All that we have said hereinbefore is that we can not decree divorce solely on the basis of compromise unless we are also satisfied that a ground for divorce specified in the Statute can be traced on the record. In the case at hand it is on record that the parties have fought with severest bellicosity in the Courts below for about two years, the charge of the husband being mental disorder of the wife and that of the wife being cruelty and physical torture by the husband. Having lost at the first bout in the trial Court, the husband has filed this appeal and the parties were contesting the same with all severity for about two years in this Court. They are living separately during all these years and both of them have sworn in their joint-affidavit that they have not been nor would be able to live together. To the same effect is their statement before us when we directed them to appear before us in the Chamber to ascertain the truth of their averments made in the joint-application. If the spouses could not live together, do not live together and they swear that they would no longer live or able to live together, then we have no doubt that “desertion” by the one of the other is complete, whoever might have given the initial cause, because all the three elements that generally go to constitute “desertion” namely, the factum of separation, the animus deserendi, i.e, the intention to live apart and the animus non-revertendi, i.e, the intention not to revert to the matrimonial home stare at the face. Being thus satisfied as to the existence of a ground justifying divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, we should not and do not have any hesitation to direct recording of the compromise and to decree divorce in accordance with such compromise and we direct accordingly. We have noted that a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court (Punjab and Haryana High Court) in Davinder v. Loveleen, (1982) 2 DMC 5 and also a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Sudhakar v. Sulabha, (1986) 1 DMC 336 also adopted such a course; but while the learned Delhi (Punj and Har High Court) Judge has not given any reasons therefor the learned Bombay Judge, while spelling out some reasons, has not adverted to the various aspects which we have considered here.

    10. We accordingly in accordance with the terms of compromise recorded in the joint petition, allow the appeal and decree that the marriage between the appellant husband and the wife-respondent stands dissolved with effect from this date. As desired by the parties, we also record that the wife-respondent has acknowledged receipt of the entire amounts and also the ornaments receivable by her under the terms of compromise. The petition of compromise to form part of the decree. No costs.

    Ajit kumar nayak, J.:— 11. I agree.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Apurba Mohan Ghosh v. Manashi Ghosh .
    (Jun 10, 1988)