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  • Art. 311(2) of the Constitution prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.
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  • Art. 311(2) of the Constitution prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as a Store-Keeper, Grade II, under the West Bengal State Electricity Board at the Chanchal (O & M) Sub-division in Malda district. His duties included maintaining accounts of goods in the store and keeping registers for delivery of goods on the basis of orders or slips. In April 1979 a severe storm damaged electric poles and lines in the area; contractors were supplied materials on the basis of "Loan Slip" on the Assistant Engineer's instruction for restoration work. The Accountant of Internal Audit raised objections to the irregular procedure, and the Assistant Engineer sought regularisation by letter dated 31 July 1979.

On 11 April 1980 the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 24 March 1980 alleging, inter alia, misappropriation of Board property amounting to Rs. 64,786.14, manipulation of accounts, gross misconduct and discipline violations. The charge-sheet did not include particulars or imputations. The petitioner sought particulars and documents by letter dated 18 April 1980 but these were not supplied; he was later told by a letter of 19 May 1980 that the Enquiry Officer would permit inspection of documents. The disciplinary enquiry took place between April and December 1981. The Enquiry Officer found the charges established and, by a second show-cause notice dated 1 July 1982, recommended dismissal; a dismissal order dated 1 December 1982 was issued. The petitioner challenged the dismissal by filing the present Rule/application, contending vagueness of charges, denial of particulars and documents, and denial of reasonable opportunity and natural justice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the charge-sheet and notice furnished to the petitioner were so vague and devoid of particulars as to deny him a reasonable opportunity of defence and breach the rules of natural justice.
  2. Whether the disciplinary enquiry and dismissal could stand where key documents (notably File No. 32 and the Internal Audit Report) were not produced before the Enquiry Officer and only a limited sample of requisition notes was examined.
  3. Whether the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer established beyond doubt that the petitioner committed the alleged tampering/misappropriation such that dismissal was justified.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Counsel Mr. Banerji) Arguments

  • The charge-sheet was vague, indefinite and issued with a closed mind, lacking imputation and particulars necessary to enable a proper defence.
  • Essential documents—store ledger, Store Issue Vouchers, the Special Adjustment File (File No. 32) and the Internal Audit Report—were not produced for inspection or copying at any stage, preventing effective defence.
  • The production of a mere bunch of requisition slips (and not the ledger or adjustment file) and incomplete documentary evidence meant the petitioner could not fairly challenge the prosecution case.
  • Denial of inspection and copies of documents, and the absence of particularized imputations, vitiated the enquiry as being mala fide and contrary to natural justice; thus the disciplinary proceedings were void ab initio.
  • Although the petitioner participated physically in the enquiry, mere presence was insufficient where essential documents were withheld; several precedents were cited to support these contentions.

Respondents' (Counsel Mr. Roy) Arguments

  • The disciplinary proceedings were properly conducted; the petitioner participated throughout, was present and was given opportunities to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and examine documents.
  • The Enquiry Officer informed the petitioner he could inspect and take copies/notes of documents; the petitioner refused to obtain copies despite facilities being offered.
  • The charge-sheet was not vague or indefinite—the petitioner had sufficient notice of allegations and the imputation particulars were not necessary for him to know the case against him.
  • The alleged non-production of certain papers was not a denial of natural justice, and the petitioner’s plea of non-cooperation showed he had opportunity but did not avail himself of it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1958 S.C. 300 — Khemchand v. Union of India Sets out three criteria of reasonable opportunity (pre-42nd Amendment Art. 311(2)): (a) being told charges and allegations to deny guilt; (b) opportunity to cross-examine and produce witnesses; (c) opportunity to represent against proposed punishment. The Court applied these criteria and found that the second and third criteria were met in the present case, but the first criterion (adequate particulars/imputation) was not satisfied because the charge-sheet was truncated and did not furnish necessary particulars.
AIR 1961 S.C. 1623 — State of M.P. v. Chintamoni Sadashiba Waishampayan States that whether reasonable opportunity was given depends on facts; departmental enquiries must observe natural justice—right to adduce relevant evidence, cross-examine opponents' witnesses, and explanation of relied materials. The Court found that most procedural protections (inspection, cross-examination, adducing evidence) were observed here, but emphasized that withholding documents to prevent effective cross-examination would vitiate the enquiry; applied to conclude that, apart from lack of particulars, other protections were provided.
AIR 1971 S.C. 752 — Surat Chandra Chakraborty v. State of W.B. Deals with vague and indefinite charges and failure to supply statement of allegations amounting to denial of natural justice. The Court said this authority supports the petitioner's contention that vague charges and lack of particularisation can constitute denial of natural justice.
1979 (2) C.L.J. 127 — Manindra Nath Ghosh v. State of W.B. Addresses challenge to a show-cause notice on grounds of closed mind and breach of natural justice; appellate bench upheld the appellant's contention in that case. The Court found that the plea of issuing the charge-sheet with a closed mind in the present case had substantial merit and cited this decision as supporting that view.
AIR 1982 S.C. 937 — State of U.P. v. Md. Sharif Held that absence of necessary particulars (date/time) and failure to furnish copies of witness statements prejudiced defence and denied reasonable opportunity. The Court observed that Sharif goes greatly in favour of the petitioner here because the present charge-sheet also described periods vaguely, prejudicing the delinquent's ability to answer.
1983 Lab. I.C. 624 — Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani v. Union of India Refusal to supply documents to delinquent can result in violation of natural justice where no adequate reason for withholding is given. The Court noted this decision but distinguished it: in the present case the prosecution had produced documents before the delinquent and provided opportunities for copies/notes, so that Vaswani did not support the petitioner's contention here.
1985 (2) S.L.R. 576 — Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel Relates to different facts concerning dispensation of departmental enquiry under Article 311(2) and denial of fair play; not directly applicable to present facts. The Court expressly declined to rely on this case, finding it inapplicable to the facts at hand.
AIR 1953 Nag. 138 — Tribhuwan Nath Pandey v. Union of India; AIR 1954 Assam 18 — Bhugiram Hazarika v. Superintendent of Police, Sibsagar Authoritative statement that disciplinary authorities must frame specific charges with full particularity so that the delinquent can effectively show cause against them. The Court applied this principle to hold that the charge-sheet in the present case was defective, vague and lacking in particularity, rendering the disciplinary proceedings invalid.
AIR 1976 S.C. 1089 — M.L. Shende v. State of Mysore Clarifies that what constitutes a "reasonable opportunity" depends on facts and circumstances of each case. The Court cited this proposition to underscore that although many procedural steps were complied with, the absence of particulars in the charge-sheet meant the reasonable opportunity requirement was not met in this instance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first setting out the material factual matrix and the contents of the charge-sheet and enquiry. It identified four primary factual allegations in the charge-sheet: (A) tampering of original figures in Store Requisition Notes, S.I.V and Store Ledger by inserting extra figures; (B) overwriting in columns “quantity required” and “quantity supplied”; (C) fictitious issues through blank Store Requisition Notes; and (D) ledger entries reflecting issues in excess of actual supply. The Enquiry Officer examined a limited sample of ten requisition notes as exhibits; File No. 32 (Special Adjustment File) and the Internal Audit Report — which the charge-sheet relied upon — were not produced before the Enquiry Officer during the hearing.

The Court analysed the procedural and evidentiary record against the legal standards flowing from Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the cited authorities. Applying the three-fold criterion from Khemchand, the Court concluded that while the petitioner had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to make representations regarding punishment, he was denied the essential first requirement of being informed of specific imputations and particulars on which he was called to show cause. The Court noted that although certain original records produced before this Court showed tampering, it remained unestablished that the petitioner himself had committed the mischief.

Evaluating the probative process, the Court found defects: the Enquiry Officer could not scrutinise the "huge bulk" of relevant papers, only ten requisition notes were examined that went against the petitioner, and crucial items (File No. 32 and the Internal Audit Report) were not placed before the Enquiry Officer for reasons attributed to the prosecution. The Court observed that producing documents only at the hearing without accompanying a properly particularised charge-sheet does not cure the denial of natural justice at the initial stage. Drawing on settled authorities requiring particularisation of charges (Tribhuwan Nath Pandey and Bhugiram Hazarika and related jurisprudence), the Court concluded that the charge-sheet was vague, indefinite and issued with a closed mind, thereby prejudicing the petitioner’s ability to make an effective defence from the outset.

Although many procedural protections were later afforded during the enquiry (inspection opportunities, cross-examination, the right to produce documents), the Court held that these remedies could not cure the fundamental unfairness of issuing a charge-sheet that lacked particulars and manifested a pre-conceived notion of guilt. The Court therefore treated the enquiry and consequential dismissal as vitiated by denial of natural justice at the initial stage.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the dismissal order dated 1 December 1982 and quashed the entire disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner.

Direct Consequences and Remedies Ordered by the Court:

  • The petitioner is to be treated as on suspension with effect from 1 December 1982.
  • Liberty was granted to the respondents to commence fresh disciplinary proceedings, including issuing a new charge-sheet in accordance with law; any such fresh proceedings must be completed strictly within four months from the date of commencement.
  • The petitioner shall be paid suspension allowances and other admissible benefits from 1 December 1982 to date, within six weeks.
  • If the respondents issue a charge-sheet within thirty days from the date of this judgment, the petitioner will continue to receive suspension allowances during the fresh proceedings as stated; if no charge-sheet is served within the specified period, the suspension shall cease automatically and the petitioner shall be allowed to resume duties and be given all service benefits (salary, seniority, promotion, etc.) with effect from 1 December 1982.
  • Respondents were ordered to pay costs of Rs. 1,000 to the petitioner.

Broader implications: The opinion applied established principles on reasonable opportunity and particularisation of charges to the facts; it does not purport to create new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities. The decision's practical effect is limited to quashing the impugned dismissal and permitting a fresh, properly particularised disciplinary process within the time prescribed by the Court.

    Santosh Kumar Ghosh v. West Bengal State Electricity Board & Ors.

    K.M Yusuf, J.:— In this Rule the order of dismissal passed in the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner is under challenge. The facts of the case, inter alia, are as under : The petitioner was an employee under the West Bengal State Electricity Board as a Store-Keeper, Grade II, Chanchal (O & M) Sub-division in the district of Malda. As the Store-Keeper, the petitioner's functions included to keep accounts of the goods kept in the store and also to keep a register regarding delivery of goods from the store on the basis of order or slip issued by the authority. In April, 1979 there was a severe storm in various parts of Malda district including Chanchal Sub-division and as a result a large number of electric poles were broken and electric lines were damaged. Immediate action was taken and the contractors went at work for the restoration of supply and for this work the contractors were supplied materials on the basis of “Loan Slip” on the instruction of the Assistant Engineer, Chanchal. The Accountant of Internal Audit raised objection for the irregular procedure and the Assistant Engineer by a letter, dated 31st July, 1979 requested the Divisional Engineer, Malda to regularise the matter.

    2. On 11th April, 1980 the petitioner was served with a Charge-sheet, dated 24th March, 1980 directing him to show cause within a specified period of the charges made against him. The charges levelled against him included alleged misappropriation of the Board's property amounting to Rs. 64,786.14; manipulation of the records of various accounts, gross misconduct, violation of discipline, etc., but no imputation or particulars of the charges were provided. The petitioner by a letter, dated 18th April, 1980 addressed to the Chief Engineer (T & D) asked for several particulars and documents and the names of persons to be examined so that he could make out a defence otherwise the charges would be vague and indefinite. But neither particulars nor inspection nor any particulars of documents of the charges or the names of witnesses were supplied to the petitioner and he was intimated by a letter, dated 19th May, 1980 that the petitioner would be given an opportunity by the Enquiry Officer to inspect the documents and take extracts thereof. In the aforesaid circumstances the petitioner could not take any effective defence and by a letter, dated 24th December, 1981 the respondent No. 3 fixed the date of the disciplinary proceeding. By a second Show Cause Notice, dated 1st July, 1982 the Secretary of the West Bengal State Electricity Board forwarded the findings of the Enquiry Officer stating that the charges have been established at the enquiry which are of grave nature and the punishment called for is the dismissal of the petitioner from the service of the Board. As such the petitioner was given 15 days time for further opportunity of defence as regards the proposed punishment of dismissal. The petitioner challenges this dismissal Order as totally illegal and mala fide.

    3. The respondents Nos. 1 and 3 filed an Affidavit-in-Opposi-tion wherein the allegations of the petitioner were refuted and main instanced of manipulation were recorded as under :

    (i) Original figures under column “quantity required” and “quantity supplied” were tampered.

    (ii) New items were inserted in the Store Requisition Notes subsequently to the delivery of materials.

    (iii) Fictitious issues were made through blank Store Requisition Notes and a

    (iv) Issues were recorded in excess of actual supply.

    The respondents stated that the petitioner participated in the enquiry throughout from 24th April, 1981 to 16th December, 1981 and was given full opportunity to defend himself. He submitted his explanation against the Charge-sheet, all opportunities for obtaining the copies of the documents on the basis of charges were provided by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner's representative cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and examined the documents. The petitioner did not examine himself or any other witnesses but produced documents which were marked Exhibits. When the charges were established as of grave nature and the punishment called for was dismissal from service the petitioner was given an opportunity of defence before the final Order was passed and the second Show Cause Notice was found unsatisfactory and the dismissal Order, dated 1st December, 1982 was sent to the petitioner by Registered post which returned back with the remark “refused”. The respondents denied that the allegations made in the charge-sheets are indefinite, vague or without particulars. As such according to the respondents the disciplinary proceedings were properly conducted, full opportunity was given to the petitioner for defence and there is not irregularity. The Rule must accordingly be discharged.

    4. In his reply to the opposition the petitioner reiterated his case and further stated that to ascertain the goods deliver to the Store Keeper the Requisition Slips, the ledger and the Store Issue Vouchers are to be compared at the same time and after the delivery of goods if a person returns a portion of the same, those are entered into special Account Books named Special Adjustment File commonly known as File No. 32. The charges of manipulating the figures and changing the store records have been made but no particulars or imputation of charges were supplied. It is also contended by the petitioner that at the time of hearing neither the ledger nor the store issue voucher nor any other document was produced but only a bunch of Requisition Slips were produced and three witnesses were examined. The two Special Superintendents stated in the evidence that without the connected papers they were not in the position to say anything only on the basis of the Requisition Slips. The store issue vouchers containing the signature could not be produced as they had been sent for audit. It is further stated in the Affidavit-in-Reply that the petitioner did submit a reply to the second show cause notice on 5th July, 1982. It is once again repeated that no opportunity was given to him for proper defence and the entire disciplinary proceeding was mala fide as natural justice and reasonable opportunity were denied to the petitioner to defend himself.

    5. Mr. Banerji, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the Charge-sheet is vague and indefinite and issued with a closed mind. It also does not disclose the list of witnesses and the documents to be relied upon by the prosecution. There is no imputation of the charges given in the Charge-sheet and the absence of the particulars keeps the petitioner in dark as to the extent and nature of the charges. He further submitted that the ledger was not produced at any stage before the Enquiry Officer nor the adjustment file which is known as File No. 32. The Internal Audit Report also did not see the light of the day during the hearing of the disciplinary proceedings. The vouchers and papers were at random selected and produced during the proceedings. Mr. Banerji further submitted that the entire proceedings is ab initio void because the petitioner was not given any opportunity to defend himself properly. The denial of handing over the copies of the documents to the petitioner or even their inspection before the proceeding commenced debarred the petitioner from taking any effective defence which is absolutely contrary to the principle of natural justice. The charges were broadly divided under three heads: (i) gross mis-conduct/fraud; (ii) misappropriation of the West Bengal State Electricity Board's property; and (iii) violation of the Board's discipline, order and procedure. But no details of those charges in form of imputation was supplied. By his letter, dated 18th April, 1980 addressed to the Chief Engineer (T & D) the petitioner dealt with in details the particulars he required for his defence. Again on 11th May, 1981 he wrote to the concerned respondent for the supply of the copies of the papers as discussed on 24th April, 1981 in the presence of the Enquiry Officer at Chanchal (0 & M) Sub-division. But all his efforts went in vain. He was then assured by a letter, dated 24th September, 1981 by the Enquiry Officer that when on 16th October, 1981 the enquiry proceeding would take place, all reasonable opportunity would be afforded to him for defence and he would also be at liberty to adduce documents, evidence and witnesses for the purpose. But in spite of the assurances the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to properly, defend himself and the respondents did not forward to him the copies of the relevant documents and virtually the enquiry was a walk over so far the petitioner is concerned.

    6. Mr. Banerji in his argument has vehemently made emphasis on the vagueness of the charges and denial of opportunity to inspect the documents which virtually means that no opportunity was given for defence to the petitioner. He further submitted that the charges were issued with a closed mind and from the proceedings of the enquiry it appeared that the Enquiry Officer was not in a position to come to a definite conclusion about the guilt of the petitioner on the basis of the evidence before him. He admitted that the petitioner participated throughout during the proceedings but mere physical participation was not enough when the copies of the papers which were essential to put up an effective defence were not supplied. Mr. Banerji referred to a number of decisions in support of his contentions to justify that the proceedings are bad, illegal and vitiated by denial of natural justice and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. The following decisions were cited by the learned Counsel which I shall discuss afterwards :

    (1) AIR 1982 S.C 937 (State of U.P v. Md. Sharif)

    (2) 1985 (2) S.L.R 576 (Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel)

    (3) AIR 1958 S.C 300 (Khemchand v. Union of India)

    (4) 1983 L.I.C 624 (Anandram J. Baswani v. Union of India)

    (5) 1979 (2) C.L.J 127 (Manindra Nath Ghosh v. State of W.B)

    (6) AIR 1971 S.C 752 (Surat Chandra Chakraborty v. State of W.B)

    (7) AIR 1961 S.C 1623 (State of M.P v. Chintamoni Sadashiba Waishampayan)

    7. The very purpose of citation of above decisions is to bring home the point that natural justice and reasonable opportunity were totally denied and the petitioner was not given any opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the well laid principles of law.

    8. Mr. Roy, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were properly conducted in the presence of the petitioner who was given all opportunities during the hearing, of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and examining the documents proved against him. There was no denial of natural justice to him at all and the petitioner was throughout present during such proceedings and actively participated. He submitted that by a letter dated 2nd/4th April, 1.981 the Enquiry Officer intimated to the petitioner that full opportunity would be provided to him for obtaining the copies of the documents asked for so that he could put up a proper defence and for this purpose he fixed Chanchal (0 & M) Subdivision office as the venue on 24th August, 1981 at 11 a.m But by a subsequent letter, dated 13th April, 1981 the Enquiry Officer corrected the date as 24th April, 1981 instead of 24th August, 1981. Mr. Roy placed before this Court the entire memorandum of evidence containing the disciplinary proceedings and pointed out that the petitioner refused to obtain the copies of the initial records on the basis of the charges brought up against him. As such, he submitted that the petitioner throughout non-cooperation in inspecting the documents and taking the notes therefrom in spite of all opportunities and facilities offered to him and his plea that no opportunity was given to him to study the documents upon which the prosecution relied was not at all tenable. He further submitted that the Charge-sheet was neither vague nor indefinite and the petitioner got from the charges full idea of his misdeeds and for that purpose the imputation of charges were not at all necessary. In the circumstances Mr. Ray submitted that there is no denial of natural justice and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and, as such, this very plea which is the arch-defence of the petitioner must fall.

    9. Having heard both the sides I have given due consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and intricacies involved therein. It appears from the report of enquiry that four charges were brought against the petitioner, namely, (A) & (B) without consent of the related employees/persons the original figures in the Store Requisition Notes, S.I.V and Store Ledger have been changed by inserting extra figures and original figures under column “quantity required” and “quantity, supplied” in the Store Requisition Notes have been tampered through overwriting and inserting fresh digits at the left and right of the original figures. (C) Fictitious issues have been made through blank Store Requisition Notes. (D) Issues have been recorded in the Store Ledger in excess of the actual supply.

    10. On the above charges the accused was held responsible, as aforesaid, for: (a) mis-appropriation of Board's property, (b) gross misconduct/fraud, and (c) violation of Board's discipline, order and procedure. It appears that on 24th April, 1981 in response to the Enquiry Officer's letter, dated 2nd April, 1981 the enquiry started in the presence of the petitioner and Sri S.K Sarkar, D.E, Malda (O & M) Division and the prosecution officer. The Enquiry Officer pointed out that the purpose of this meeting was mainly to provide the petitioner with all information and details of the transactions on the basis of which the charges have been drawn. He asked the prosecution to place before the petitioner all such initial records in support of the transaction and the prosecution agreed. But before the prosecution could produce the records the petitioner left the room and returned after 45 minutes with a petition for allowing one Shri Manoj Kumar Singha, an employee of the Board, to be present during the enquiry for assisting him. This was allowed. Again the Enquiry Officer asked the prosecution to produce the records. The petitioner wanted to compare the copies of the Charge-sheet with him with that which was in the custody of the Enquiry Officer and this was allowed. Then the petitioner wanted the copies of enquiry reports placed by the prosecution instead of perusing the same. To this the Enquiry Officer told the petitioner that he might take notes of his own efforts of whichever records he liked. The Enquiry Officer made it clear that he was at liberty to take any copy or copies of the records he was interested with but the petitioner expressed his unwillingness and demanded copies of all of them. According to the Enquiry Officer the purpose for which the meeting was arranged could not be achieved and the meeting was dissolved.

    11. From the enquiry proceedings it further appears that instead of producing the entire bunch of Store Requisition Notes wherein the original figures for quantities have been changed by inserting extra figures, only ten such requisition Notes initiated by the Enquiry Officer as exhibits were produced which the petitioner inspected. At this the defence counsel on behalf of the petitioner wanted that the entire S.R Ns. should be produced along with Internal Audit Report, to which the Enquiry Officer held that such large volume of records could not be produced and should be done piecemeal. Those ten exhibits are mentioned in the enquiry proceedings. From the enquiry proceedings held on 26th August, 1981 it transpires that the Enquiry Officer wanted to know how the alleged misappropriation for Rs. 64,786.14 had been arrived at and asked for details. The prosecution produced three statements for alleged misappropriation of stores totalled to the aforesaid amount. The statements were shown to the petitioner for inspection and taking copies thereof which he did. It further appears that on 16th October, 1981 the Enquiry Officer gave opportunity to the petitioner for producing documents in defence and the petitioner did produce some documents which the Enquiry Officer examined that the documents produced were irrelevant to the charges. The petitioner accepted the contention of the E.O and withdrew the documents. On the following day when the enquiry resumed the E.O asked the delinquent to state the detailed procedure which was actually followed by him during the year 1978–79 and 1979–80 for issuing materials on the store to which he reopined “I used to follow the instruction of the Assistant Engineer in this regard”. When the E.O asked the petitioner to submit documentary evidence for his defence for the second time, his reply was that all documentary evidences were in the office and none in his possession at present. When the E.O failed to receive any positive reply from the petitioner as to the procedure of supply of materials then he turned towards the prosecution for the detailed procedure followed in store depot during the aforesaid period. One of the witnesses Shri Sudhir Kumar Adhikari, Chargeman, has proved Ext. No. 17 and confirmed that he had received 200 mts. A.C.S.R 0.05 sq. mm. under item No. 1 of relevant Store Receipts Notes and not 2000 mts. as had been overwritten in both copies thereof. He was cross-examined by the defence counsel and one of the questions and answers thereof is quoted below :

    Q.—It is fact what you had received A.C.S.R 0.05 sq. mm. without proper requisition from the Store Keeper earlier and the Store Keeper had adjusted the same in the S.R.N, described in Ext. 17?

    A.—No, I had not received any material from the Store Keeper without S.R.N and no adjustment in this regard is therefore called for.

    12. I need not dwell at length with the enquiry (proceedings to being home the points which are limited but the enquiry proceedings suffer from defects. It was not possible for the E.O to scrutinise the huge bulk of papers containing transactions and only ten Requisition Notes were scrutinised which went against the petitioner. Two important pieces of evidence, namely, File No. 32 and the Internal Audit Report were never produced before the E.O during the hearing which lasted for several days for reasons best known to the prosecution. The Internal Audit Report is the crux of the disciplinary proceeding as the entire charge-sheet is based on this report. Anyhow, the E.O held the petitioner responsible for the offence so far Items A and B are concerned and exonerated him of Items C and D which, in fact, were repetition of charges under A and B. Let it be stated here that the prosecution produced some original records for inspection in this Court and it was apparently clear that the papers were tampered with through overwriting and by inserting fresh digits. But the question is : By whom? It has not been established beyond doubt that the mischief was done by the petitioner.

    13. Now I deal with a number of decisions cited by Mr. Benerji in support of his contentions.

    14. The decision reported in AIR 1958 S.C 300 (Khemchand v. Union of India) is based on Art. 311(2) of the Constitution prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. In this case Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down three criteria of reasonable opportunity as envisaged by the Constitution vis-a-vis to a government employee, namely, (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and established his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him. Of the three criteria the last two have been fulfilled in this case but not the first one as the delinquent was not given an opportunity to deny his guilt on the basis of a truncated Charge-sheet served upon him.

    15. In the decision reported in AIR 1961 S.C 1623 (State of M.P v. Chintamon Sadashiva Waishampayan) the Supreme Court laid down that the principle whether or not the delinquent has had a reasonable opportunity must always depend on the facts in each case. The Supreme Court elucidate it further as follows : “The only general statement that can be safely made in this connection is that the departmental enquiries should observe rules of natural justice, and that if they are fairly and properly conducted the decision reached by the Enquiry Officer on the merits are not opened to be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not exactly in accordance with that which is observed in the Courts of Law…. The rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent, should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. The right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the Enquiry Officer by not giving to the officer documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would mean that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice.”

    16. The aforesaid elucidation has been complied with in the instant case because all opportunities were given to the petitioner during the disciplinary proceedings for the inspection of documents and to make notes or copies of the same save and except the first criterion of natural justice by not furnishing the imputation of the charges.

    17. The case of Surat Chandra Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1971 S.C 752 deals with vague and indefinite charges and failure to supply statement of allegations amounting to denial of natural justice. This case very much helps Mr. Banerji's client.

    18. In the Calcutta case of Manindra Nath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1979 (2) C.L.J 127 the second Show Cause Notice was under challenge, inter alia, on the ground that the Charge-sheet was issued with a closed mind and that the principle of natural justice had been violated. The Decision Bench upheld the Appellant's contention. In the instant case the plea of issuing the charge-sheet with a closed mind in my opinion has substantial merit.

    19. In AIR 1982 S.C 937 (State of U.P v. Md. Sharif) one head constable against whom the departmental enquiry started was not furnished the charge with necessary particulars, i.e, the date and time of the alleged misconduct was not mentioned; and secondly, the copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded were not furnished to the delinquent at the time of enquiry. In the circumstances he was naturally prejudiced in the matter of defence as reasonable opportunity was denied to him. But in the present case under consideration the period of alleged acts was vaguely described as to render the delinquent unable to properly answer the allegations. This decision goes in favour of the petitioner to great extent.

    20. In the case of Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani v. Union of India, reported in 1983 Lab. I.C 624 a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held that refusal to supply documents to delinquent resulted in violation of rules of natural justice. Here the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer did not give any reason for withholding the documents asked for by the delinquent except stating that they were irrelevant. But in the instant case not only all the documents were produced before the delinquent during the hearing but he was also given opportunities at every stage to take extracts or copies thereof, as such this decision does not support the contention of the petitioner.

    21. I do not find any justification to refer to the case reported in 1985 (2) S.L.R 576 (Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel) which relates to totally different facts wherein the holding of the departmental enquiry under Article 311(2) of the Constitution was dispensed with and, as such, fairplay and natural justice was denied. This particular case also has no bearing to the case under consideration.

    22. Article 311(2) of the Constitution runs as under: “No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges……” The expression ‘reasonable opportunity’ has not been defined in the Constitution but there can be little doubt that the expression means opportunity to present all the evidence and arguments which the delinquent deems important for the purpose of his case. It may safely be said that the requirements of reasonable opportunity are satisfied (i) when the person affected is being given personal notice of the charges he is called upon to answer; (ii) when he is informed of the place where and time when he shall so answer; (hi) when he is afforded an opportunity, if he so chooses, to cross-examine the witnesses produced against him, when he is afforded an opportunity after all the evidence is produced and known to him to produce evidence and witnesses to refute it; (iv) when the decision is governed by and based upon the evidence at the hearing; and (v) when the hearing is heard before unbiased and unprejudiced officer. When the inquiry is conducted in the presence of the government employee himself and he is fully Conversant of what transpired in the course of the enquiry and there is nothing which is kept secret from him, in that event he cannot complain that there was violation of the principle of natural justice. What is reasonable opportunity will depend entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case (vide AIR 1976 S.C 1089, M.L Shende v. State of Mysore). In this case we find that though the person affected is given personal notice of the charges he is called upon to answer but the principle of natural justice was given a go-bye by not supplying him the imputation or details of the charges and he, in fact, could not understand the true intent and import of the charges.

    23. It has been rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the charges framed are vague and indefinite and did not contain imputation and particulars of the charges. So far charges is concerned, disciplinary proceeding is not conducted with the rigidity of the judicial trial but the charges must not be so vague or so general as to make them impossible of being traversed. In this case the Charge-sheet being Annexure ‘B’ to the writ (petition, was issued to the petitioner containing particulars of the offences committed by him without being accompanied with imputation or particulars in detail. There is substantial force in the argument of Mr. Banerji that the petitioner was given Charge-sheet which was at once vague and indefinite and issued with a closed mind, appears that four allegations were made in the Charge-sheet without giving details thereof and without enabling the petitioner to effectively show cause against the charges. The allegation was made that without the consent of the related employees/persons the original figures in the Store Requisition Notes, S.I.V and Stock Ledger have been changed by inserting extra figures but no particular of such alleged changes were given with the Charge-sheet. It is alleged that the original figures under columns' quantity required’ and ‘quantity supplied’ in the Store Requisition Notes have been tampered through overwriting and by inserting fresh digits but no particulars have been given thereof. It is alleged that fictitious issues have been made through blank Requisition Token but no details thereof were provided. It is alleged that issues have been recorded in the Stock Ledger in excess of the actual supply but no particulars or data is thereof have been given. It is also specifically stated in the Charge-sheet that the petitioner did misappropriate the Board's property and he could not deny his responsibility in this regard. This pre-conceived notion was spelt out in the Charge-sheet before the enquiry proceeding started and on the basis of the aforesaid allegations three charges of gross misconduct/fraud, misappropriation and violation of Board's discipline were framed and all of them are totally vague and apparent to be the outcome of a biased and closed mind. How the petitioner is to defend himself against the charges of gross and culpable nature unless he is provided with all the particular which he asked for in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of his reply, dated 14th April, 1980? How it can be said that a delinquent is treated with natural justice to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him if he is not told in clearest possible terms and with full particularity as to what his alleged faults are? It is imperative on the part of disciplinary authority to frame specific charges with full particularity, intimate those charges to the delinquent concerned, giving opportunity to answer those charges and then take a decision. This basic principle is laid down in the case of. Tribhuwan Nath Pandey v. Union of India, (AIR 1953 Nag. 138) and Bhugiram Hazarika v. Superintendent of Police, Sibsagar, (AIR 1954 Assam 18) with clarity. Applying this principle it can safely be said that the charges framed against the petitioner were totally defective and suffered from vagueness and indenniteness.

    24. In view of the discussion made hereinbefore it can safely be concluded that the contention of Mr. Banerji that the Charge-sheet suffers with vagueness and indefiniteness and was issued with a closed mind have substantial force and I am inclined to accept the contention. Mr. Roy has failed to provide any answer to this particular submission to Mr. Banerji. Though the petitioner was provided with reasonable opportunity to defend himself through out the enquiry proceedings, but at the very outset the charges supplied to the petitioner was, in fact, the denial of natural justice and, as such, the entire Disciplinary Proceedings against the petitioner must be held bad and illegal. There is no sense in giving opportunity to a delinquent in defending himself by providing him with all the documents at the time of the hearing when the Charge-sheet does not disclose the particulars which he would be required to face in the proceedings. By denying natural justice at the very outset, reasonable opportunity given afterwards during trial is rather to put the cart before the horse. ‘Give a dog a bad name and hang him’ is what the respondents did in this case. The entire act of the respondents in issuing a vague Charge-sheet with closed mind smells foul and appears mala fide. The demonstration of fairness on the part of the E.O during the hearing of the disciplinary proceedings in no way cures the injury already done at the initial stage. In fact it appears a trap to enrope the petitioner without providing him even a semblance of natural justice and make him suffer for eight long years.

    25. In that view of the matter I set aside the order of dismissal, dated 1st December, 1982 passed against the petitioner and quash at the entire Disciplinary Proceedings. The petitioner will be treated on, suspension with effect from the date of dismissal, i.e, from 1st December, 1982 and liberty is given to the respondents to start a fresh Disciplinary Proceeding against him including the issuance of a Charge-sheet in accordance with law and to complete such Disciplinary Proceedings strictly within a period of four months from date. The petitioner should be given suspension allowances and other benefits as admissible in law with effect from 1st December, 1982 till date within a period of six weeks. If the respondents issue a charge-sheet within thirty days from date the petitioner will continue to receive the suspension allowance as stated above during the proceedings but if no Charge-sheet is served upon the petitioner within the aforesaid period then the suspension will automatically cease and the petitioner will be allowed by the respondents to join his duties and will be given all the service benefits including salary, seniority, promotion, etc., in accordance with law with effect from 1st December, 1982.

    26. The writ application succeeds and the Rule is disposed of on the aforesaid terms. The Respondents shall pay costs assessed at Rs. 1,000 to the petitioner.

    Rule disposed of
    A.R

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