Manoharan, J.:— This petition is to quash the proceedings in C.R No. 35 of 1992 taken under S. 51(1) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’). Petitioner contends that the charge is not maintainable as ‘sandalwood oil’ is not a ‘forest produce’. In support of the said contention, petitioner relied on the decision of the learned single Judge in Cri. M.C No. 832 of 1992 (AnnexureXV) wherein the learned single Judge held that sandalwood oil is not a forest produce.

2. When this matter came up for admission before another learned single Judge, his Lordship doubted the correctness of the decision in Cri. M.C No. 832 of 1992 (Mohammed Ali v. Forest Range Officer, (1992) 2 Ker LT 502) and expressed the view that the matter has to be considered by a Division Bench. That is how this came up before us. Brief facts required for the disposal of the petition are as follows:

Petitioner is a dealer in essential oils like Citronella Oil, Sandalwood Oil etc; Pursuant to an order received, from M/s. S.S Perfumers, Kanpur to supply 200 kgs. of Sandalwood Oil, petitioner despatched the same from Kozhikode Railway Station as per Invoice No. 16 dated 12-6-1992 (Annexure IX). When the consignment reached Palakkad Railway Station in the evening of the same day, first respondent seized the consignment on the ground that the petitioner has committed an offence under S. 51(1) of the Act. Petitioner alleges that the sandalwood oil is not a ‘wood oil’ and hence is not a ‘forest produce’ within the meaning of S. 2(f)(1) of the Act; consequently, the whole proceedings is vitiated. According to the petitioner, only natural produce can be ‘forest produce’, that since ‘sandalwood oil’ is extracted by distillation which is a manufacturing process, the same is not a ‘forest produce’, and that the only oil known as ‘wood oil’ is the oil collected by exudation from living Dipterocarpus trees.

3. On the other hand the learned Director General of Prosecution contended, sandalwood oil is ‘wood oil’ and hence is forest produce within the meaning of the Act and that simply because the same is extracted will not alter its character. So long as sandalwood oil is produced from sandalwood; and sandal trees grow only in the forest sandalwood oil also is wood oil. According to the learned Director General of Prosecution the scope of the definition is such that it is inescapable that the definition of ‘forest produce’ in S. 2(f) of the Act will take in sandalwood oil also. On the other hand the attempt of the learned counsel for the petitioner was to show that the wood oil is only the proper name of oleoresin collected from living Dipterocarpus trees. Consequently, the same is a forest produce, but not sandalwood oil. The rival contentions bring to the forefront the question as to the scope of definition ‘forest produce’ in S. 2(f) of the Act. For a proper appreciation of the contentions, it is necessary to read S. 2(f) of the Act. S. 2(f) of the Act reads:—

“2(f) “forest produce” includes—

(i) the following whether found in or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say,— timber, charcoal, wood-oil, gum, (resin, natural varnish), bark lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood; and

(ii) the following when found in, or brought from, a forest, that is to say,—

(a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees;

(b) plants not being trees (including grass, crepers, reeds and moss and all parts of produce of such plants; and

(c) silk cocoona, honey and wax;

(d) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including limestone, laterite), mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries),”

(emphasis supplied).

4. When a provision in the statute admits of no ambiguity the words therein have to be assigned their natural meaning.

5. At page 65 of Craies on Statute Law — Sixth Edition, it is stated:

““The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without, in the first place, reference to cases”.

6. In this context an observation of Pollock C.B in Att. General v. Sillem ((1864) 2 H & C 431, 508) quoted at page 68 of the same volume is of relevance. It is stated:

““If a status in terms reasonably plain and clear, makes what the defendants have done a punishable not the assistance which may be derived from what eminent statement have said or learnedjurists have written…….we want not the decision of American courts to see whether the case before us is within the statute””.

7. In the decision in Manmohan Das v. Bishnu Das, AIR 1967 SC 643 it is held (at p. 645, Para 6):

“The ordinary rule of construction is that a provision of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons, such as, where a literal construction would reduce the provision to absurdity or prevent the manifest intention of the legislature from being carried out”.

8. Admittedly sandalwood oil is produced from sandalwood. Sandalwood in whatever form is “timber” within the meaning of 2(f)(i) particularly in view of the definition of “timber” under S. 2(k) of the Act. Therefore, ‘sandalwood oil’ extracted from sandalwood which is a ‘forest produce’, ordinarily should partake the character of ‘wood oil’ which as per definition also is ‘forest produce’. But, the case of the petitioner in effect is, though sandalwood is a forest produce, sandalwood oil is not. Wood oil means, oil produced from wood. Usually, since the very name ‘wood oil’ suggests its meaning, that meaning has to be given effect unless the context otherwise requires. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, “wood oil” in S. 2(f)(i) of the Act should receive a meaning which is familiar among those who deal with the same and the whole attempt of the petitioner, as already noted, was to show, only oleoresin is ‘wood oil’. He relied on page 164 of Craies on Statute Law — Seventh Edition wherein it is stated:

“The second rule is that if the statute is one passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and, words are used therein which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows and understands to have a particular meaning in It, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning which may differ from the ordinary or popular meaning.”

9. Learned counsel maintained that oleoresin or gurjun balsam collected from trees belonging to Dipterocarpaceae family alone is known as wood oil and that whereas oleoresin is collected from a living Dipterocarpus tree by exudation, sandalwood oil is extracted by distillation which is a manufacturing process. Thus, according to the learned counsel the two substances in the name as well as the manner of production are different.

10. Reliance was made by the learned counsel at page 259 of the Essential Oils — Volume V, by Ernest Guenther wherein it is stated:

“Gurjun balsam is the pathological exudation, caused by incision or scorching with fire, of the wood of several species of Dipterocarpus (fem. Dipterocarpaceae). There are about fifty species of this genus, tall and beautiful trees which grow wild in the mountain forests of India, Burma and Indo-China. A fully grown tree yields as much as 180 litres of balsam during a summer. The balsam is obtained like gum turpentine. Large quantities are used in Indian varnishes. The trade often refers to gurjun balsam as “East Indian Copaiba, Balsam” but this is a misnomer. Other vernacular terms are “Wood Oil” (in India) and “Huilede Bois” (in French Indo-China).”

11. Learned counsel also relied on a statement in the head ‘wood oil’ in “Cyclopaedia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia” (Commercial, Industrial and Scientific) 2nd Edition, Volume V, by Edward Balfour, wherein it is stated that wood oil is term applied to the oils of several species of Dipterocarpus. The statements in this regard in “Materia Media of India and Their Therapeutics” by Rustom G. Naserwanjee Khory and K.N Katrak, and Pharmacographia India by William Dymock, Vol. I are relied on to support the contention that wood oil is the English name of the oil obtained from Dipterocarpus trees. Reference was also made to page 185 of the “Useful Plants of India” by Colonel Heber Drury, Second Edition, wherein it is stated that liquid balsam obtained from Diptero-carpus trees is commonly called as wood oil andalso as gurjun balam. Reliance was also made on the meaning of the word ‘Gurjun’ in Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 23rd Edition which gives the meaning of ‘Gurjun’ as wood oil and the meaning of ‘wood oil’ as Gurjan Balsam. From these, the learned counsel sought support to this contention that ‘wood oil’ is the oil collected from Dipterocarpus trees. One significant factor to be noted is that, the said books do not say that the oil obtained from Dipterocarpus trees alone are known as wood oil. All that could be said from the same is that oil obtained from Dipterocarpus trees is also known as wood oil.

12. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner whereas oil collected from other trees is identified by the name of the tree also, oil collected from Dipterocarpus trees is known as ‘wood oil’ only. This does not appear to be correct. As page 199 of the Cyclopaedia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia, 2nd Edition, Volume V referred to early it is stated: “The most curious property of the Dipterocarpus wood oil, is that of solidifying when heated in a closed vila to 266°F—………” Thus oil collected from Dipterocarpus trees also is identified with the name of the trees.

13. Apart from the same, there is authoritative publication which shows that sandalwood oil is as much wood oil as other oils produced from wood. At page 671 of Indian Forest Utilization, Volume II, Compiled and Written at the Editorial Board, Forest Research Institute & Colleges, Dehra Dun in the head of ‘Wood Oil’ it is stated: “Among the Indian wood oils of importance are (i) sandalwood oil from Santalum album, (ii) agar-wood oil from Aquilaria agallocha, (iii) deodar oil from Cedrus deodara,……” This certainly acquires probative value inasmuch as the same is an authoritative publication which reached its conclusion with due regard to the Indian conditions. In interpreting the scope, meaning and content of words ‘wood oil’ the said statement by such a source certainly should receive overriding value. Thus, whereas the oil collected from Dipterocarpus trees is known as wood oil, so too is the oil extracted from sandal tree. That interpretation certainly would do justice to the very words ‘woodoil’ used in S. 2(f) of the Act.

14. Now the question is, whether the process of collecting the oil should have relevance in considering the character of the oil so collected. As noticed, one of the contentions of the petitioner is whereas oleoresin is collected by exudation from living trees; sandalwood oil is extracted by distillation and that makes the difference. Of course, petitioner has no case that oleoresin is spontaneously exuded from Dipterocarpus trees. As a matter of fact active intervention of human agency is necessary to induce exudation of oleoresin. In the Indian Forest Utilisation, Volume II referred to early, as to the process of collecting oleoresin, it is stated at page 731: “A cone-shaped cavity is cut in the trunk of the tree 0.6 — 0.9 m. above the ground and fire lighted to char the cut surface. The oleoresin starts flowing out and is periodically removed.” In ‘The Essential Oils’ by Ernest Guenther referred to early also it is stated that the oleoresin is obtained by hacking triangular holes into the base of the live trees, scorching the opening with torches or with burning wood coal, and by collecting the exuding balsam. Thus it may not be correct to say that the exudation is spontaneous; but is induced by human interference. The extraction of sandalwood oil is by distilling sandalwood. In both processes the oil latent in the respective trees is collected; merely because the process is different that cannot normally alter the character of the oil so collected as a natural product.

15. But learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the decision in Fatesang Gimba v. State, AIR 1987 Guj 9 contended that only those produced by nature alone would be ‘forest produce’. He maintained since sandalwood oil is produced by distillation, the same is not natural produce. The assumption does not appear to be correct. What is collected from Dipterocarpus trees and sandal trees is oil — natural oil which is latent in the tree. The only difference is in the former oil is collected by exudation and in the latter the same is extracted; though the process is different in both cases the oil so collected is natural oil latent in the respective trees. (Fatesang Gimba's case, AIR 1987 Guj 9 is not applicable to the facts of this case. In that case the scope of ‘forest produce’ in S. 2(4) of the Forest Act, 1927 (Act 16 of 1927) was considered in relation to a question concerning the privilege conferred upon Advasis who are local inhabitants of reserved forest, in regard to exploitation of bamboos from forest. The Court held that all that is produced by nature alone would be forest produce and the same would not include man made products such as toplas, palas, supdas etc. from bamboo chips. First of all, the very definition of S. 2(f) of the Act when understood in the light of timber in S. 2(1) of the Act would make it clear that, such man made products satisfying the condition of S. 2(f)(i) also would be forest produce. Apart from the same a learned single Judge in C.R.P 2583 of 1990-G did not agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges in Fatesang Gimba's case, AIR 1987 Guj 9. The challenge against that decision before the Supreme Court did not succeed since S.L.P No. 8712 of 1991 was dismissed. We are unable to agree with the view in Fatesang Gimba's case, AIR 1987 Guj 9 to the effect that for being a forest produce the same should have been produced by nature. In interpreting ‘Agricultural Produce’ in S. 2 of U.P Krishi Uptadan Mandi Adhiniyaml in relation to ‘Dal’ Supreme Court in K.U.M Samithi, Kanpur v. Ganga Dal Mill & Co., (1984) 4 SCC 516 : AIR 1984 SC 1870 (at p. 1875) observed:

“Analysing the definition of the expression ‘agricultural produce’, it would mean not only those items! of prodiice of agriculture as are specified in the Schedule, but will also include the admixture of two or more of such items as also any such item in the processed form.”

(Emphasis supplied)

16. The words in a statutory provision will acquire meaning and content from the context in which they are used and the ame will have to be discovered with due regard to the intention and object of the legislation also. A restricted meaning as is maintained by the petitioner will not do justice either to context in which the words ‘wood oil’ are used or to the object of the legislation. Even a literal interpretation, in the circumstances, cannot justify assigning a narrow meaning to the words ‘wood oil’. There is absolutely nothing compelling in the section to read ‘wood oil’ to mean oil from Dipterocarpus trees only.

17. At page 83 of Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition it is stated: “But besides the fact that the language of statutes is not always that which a rigid grammarian would use, it must be borne in mind that a statute consists of two parts, the letter and the sense.” “It is not the word of the law,” said Plowden, “but the internal sense of it that makes the law, and our law (like all other) consists of two parts —viz., of body and soul; the letter of the law is the body of the law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law — quia ratio legis est anima legis.”

18. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater, Bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 18 : AIR 1991 SC 686 has dealt with the importance of purposive interpretation and observed (at p. 690, para 18):

“The language of a statutory provision is not static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to do in any country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian values and aggressive developmental strategies, so must the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. It is elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. It is not an antique to be taken down, dusted, admired and put back on the shelf, but rather it is a powerful instrument fashioned by society for the purpose of adjusting conflicts and tensions which arise by reason of clash between conflicting interests. It is, therefore, intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. It is here that a Judge is called upon the perform a creative function. He has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skelton provided by the Legislature and by a process of dynamic interpretation, invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivering justice.”

19. The purpose of the legislation cannot be foregotten. The Act evidently is a measure to conserve forest wealth a very dear thing to be preserved not only for the present but also for future generation an interpretation which would run counter to the said object, unless there are compelling reasons should not be adopted.

20. In the decision in Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 Supp SCC 742 : AIR 1990 SC 2269 the challenge was against the inclusion of sugar in the Schedule to the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961. The contention was, since sugar was a mill or factory produce the same cannot be deemed to be agricultural produce. Adverting to the same relying on the decision in Rathi Khandasari Udyog v. State of U.P, (1985) 2 SCC 485 : AIR 1985 SC 679 the Supreme Court observed:

“No distinction was made on method of production, namely, by modern plant and machinery. To say, therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States.”

21. The principle therein is applicable in interpreting forest produce in S. 2(f) of the Act. Thus, simply because the oil is produce by manufacturing process that cannot alter its character as forest produce.

22. We are also unable to agree with the view expressed in Kangundi Industrial Works, Kuppam v. Govt. of A.P, (1987) 2 APLJ (HC) 458 to the effect that the oil produced by manufacturing process or human labour would not be wood oil and therefore sandal wood oil will not be taken in by the definition of forest produce in S. 2(g) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967. Equally unacceptable is the argument that, since ‘sandalwood oil’ also is included in the definition of Forest Produce in S. 2(f) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963, the same would imply that ‘wood-oil’ by itself will not take in ‘sandal wood oil’. In the circumstance mention of ‘sandal wood oil’ in S. 2(g) of the Karnataka Forest Act can only have the effect of illustrating as to what all things would be taken in by ‘forest produce’.

23. Yet another aspect to be noted is, the definition of ‘forest produce’ in S. 2(f) of the Act is an inclusive definition. It is the settled position that, the word ‘includes’ is generally used as a word of extension. The word ‘includes’ is generally used in the interpretative clause to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute.

24. When one is dealing with an inclusive definition, it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation. (State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (1960) 2 SCR 866 : (AIR 1960 SC 610) and Ardeshir v. Bombay State, AIR 1962 SC 29 : (1962 (1) Cri LJ 99). But the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless Co., (1987) 1 SCC 424 : (AIR 1987 SC 1023) to contend that, the effect of ‘include’ in the circumstance could only mean “means and includes” and therefore the same is exhaustive and cannot attract any other than those enumerated therein. In that decision adverting to S. 2(a) of Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 it is observed (para 32 at p. 1041 of AIR):

“We do not think that by using the word ‘includes’, in the definition in S. 2(a) of the Act, the Parliament intended to so expand the meaning of prize chit as to take in every scheme involving subscribing and refunding of money. The word ‘includes’, the context shows, was intended not to expand the meaning of ‘prize chit’ but to cover all transactions or arrangements of the nature of prize chits but under different names.”

25. This would show that, though the transaction is of different names, if it is prize chit, the same would be taken in. Here also, though the name of the wood oil may be different, the same would be taken in by the words ‘wood oil’. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the decision in S.G.R Tiles Manufacturers v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 601 : AIR 1977 SC 90 to contend that in the context the word ‘include’ does not have extending effect. The learned counsel made a particular stress on the words ‘that is to say’. According to the learned counsel that would limit the scope of the word ‘includes’. In support of the said argument, the learned counsel relied on page 2753 of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 5, 4th Edition wherein it is stated: “‘That is to say’ is the commencement of an ancillary clause which explains the meaning of the principal clause. It has the following properties: (1) it must not be contrary to the principal clause; (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3) but where the principal clause is general in terms it may restrict it.’ (Emphasis supplied). But the words ‘that is to say’ in the presence of the word “includes”, in the circumstances cannot be said to have a restrictive meaning. Perhaps, in th absence of the word ‘includes’ words ‘that is to say’ could have depending on the context, a limiting effect. But that is not the position here. Apart from the same in Brij Bhukhan v. State*, AIR 1955 Pat 1 at page 15 a Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that, the words ‘that is to say’ are words of illustration indicating instances which may furnish guidance and clue in particular matters. Thus, the very words ‘wood oil’ in S. 2(f) of the Act on a literal interpretation itself will take in ‘sandal wood oil’ also and thus sandal wood oil is a forest produce within the meaning of S. 2(f) of the Act. At any rate S. 2(f) of the Act being an inclusive definition there can be no doubt that ‘wood oil’ certainly will take in sandal wood oil also. In view of the fact that wood oil is capable of taking in sandal wood oil also, it was unnecessary to mention it specifically in S. 2(f) of the Act. In Kishan Lal's case, 1990 Supp SCC 742 : AIR 1990 SC 2269 already referred to it is observed With reference to the question whether sugar is an agricultural produce (para 5 of AIR):

“The legislative power to add or taclude and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil.”

26. With due regard to the scope of S. 2(f). of the Act, it is idle for the petitioner to contend that, sandal wood oil which is admittedly extracted from sandal, wood is not a wood oil it is wood oil within the meaning of S. 2(f) of the Act and hence is a forest produce.

27. With respect we are unable to agree with the view of the learned single Judge in Crl. R.P No. 665 of 1991, Crl. R.P No. 666 of 1991 and Crl. M.C No. 832 of 1992 (Mohammad Ali v. Forest Range Officer, (1992) 2 Ker LT 502) that ‘sandalwood oil’ is not a ‘wood oil’ and hence is not a ‘forest produce’. The said decision does not lay down the correct law. We hold that sandalwood oil is a wood oil and hence is a forest produce within the meaning of S. 2(f) of the Act; the Cri. M.C is liable to be dismissed.

28. In the result the Crl. M.C is dismissed.