1. There are six petitioners in this Original Petition. Petitioners 1 to 5 are brothers of one Nohah Victor, who died on 31-1-1984. The 6th petitioner is the Advocate of petitioners 1 to 5. A petition was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Calicut (1st respondent) as M.A.C No. 174 of 1984, by the first five petitioners for the grant of compensation on account of the death of Sr. Nohah Victor due to injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident. Ext. P-1 is a copy of the petition filed before the Tribunal. There is a prayer to pay the compensation to petitioners 3 and 4. On 29-11-1984, the Tribunal ordered that the petitioners are entitled to compensation of Rs. 15,000/- under S. 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (1st respondent in the petition) was directed to pay Rs. 15,000/- within two weeks from the date of the order. Initially, it was not deposited. The said amount was collected and deposited in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Calicut, in pursuance to the directions of this Court in O.P No. 5223 of 1986. The petitioners filed I.A No. 2970/86 before the Tribunal for the issue of cheque for Rs. 15,000/- in the name of their Advocate (6th petitioner herein). Ext. P-2 affidavit dt. 8-8-1986 states so. By Ext. P-3 dt. 30-9-1986, the first respondent directed that five cheques for Rs. 3,000/- each shall be issued to the petitioners on production of separate payment schedule and receipts. The prayer for issuing the cheque to the Advocate was disallowed. The first respondent placed reliance on Circular No. 3 of 1986 dt. 25-1-1986, issued by the High Court. The Circular, aforesaid, is Ext. P-4. The petitioners pray for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Ext. P-3, and in the alternative, they also pray that if it is considered that Ext. P-4, Cl. (b) is a total bar against issuing cheques in the name of Advocates or to mean that the cheques should be issued only in the name of the claimant or claimants, Ext. P-4, Cl. (b) may also be quashed. The petitioners pray for a direction to the first respondent to issue the cheque for Rs. 15,000/- in the name of the 6th petitioner.

2. I heard counsel for the petitioners, Mr. P.K Musa. It was contended that the first respondent totally misunderstood and misconstrued Ext. P-4 Circular issued by the High Court, and in particular, Cl. (b) thereof. Reliance was placed on R. 10 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977 which envisages that a party can appear through a legal practitioner before the Claims Tribunal. As also in the Vakalath executed by the petitioners in M.A.C 174/84, the advocate was specifically authorised to receive all the amounts due to the petitioners. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that under R. 360 of the Civil Rules of Practice, payment of amount due to a party can be made over to the pleader, if the Vakalath authorises such payment. Apart from the above, in this case, the first respondent — K.S.R.T Corporation — did not object to the issue of cheque to the 6th petitioner-Advocate. Even then, the first respondent-Tribunal passed Ext. P-3 for issuing five cheques for Rs. 3000/- each to the petitioners on production of separate payment schedule and receipts, and rejected the prayer for the issue of cheque to the Advocate. The reliance place on Circular No. 3 of 1986, issued by the High Court, is unjustified. Cl. (b) of Ext. P-4 Circular, does not lay down that the cheques should be issued only in the name of the parties or that cheques should not be issued in the name of the advocate appearing for the parties. If it is so construed, it is unconstitutional and void. It is violative of S. 30 of the Advocates Act and S. 14 of the Bar Councils Act. The petitioners pray that Ext. P-3 may be quashed.

3. In Ext. P-3, the first respondent Tribunal, stated as follows:

“As a matter of fact the High Court had directed in circular No. 3/86 dt. 25-1-1986 that “compensation amount due to claimants other than minors or other persons suffering disability can be paid by issuing cheques to the claimant or one of the nominated claimants in the presence of the advocate concerned.” There is no substance in the contention that the above direction is not of a mandatory nature. The argument that ordinarily cheques are to be issued to the advocates and the High Court had only given the Tribunals the option to issue cheques to the parties direct, does not appeal to me. Therefore, five cheques for Rs. 3000/- each shall be issued to the petitioners on production of separate payment schedule and receipts. The prayer for issuing the cheque to the advocate is disallowed.”

The relevant portion of Circular No. 3/86 dt. 25-1-1986, issued by the High Court of Kerala, is to the following effect:

“(b) compensation amount due to claimants other than minors or other persons suffering disability can be paid by issuing cheques to the claimant or one of the nominated claimants in the presence of the advocate concerned.”

The background and context in which the above Circular was issued requires notice. I called for the relevant files from the Registrar of this Court. From the relevant files, the following facts are evident:

As early as 17-12-1984 the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Manjeri, by addressing a letter to the Registrar, brought to the notice of this Court suspected malpractices in the payment of compensation and requested for remedial measures and directions in that behalf. It was stated that fairly large amounts are awarded as compensation by the Tribunals but the claimants did not receive the whole amount. A majority of the claimants are thoroughly illiterate and poor. The Tribunal also brought to the notice of the Registrar the decision in Srisailam Devastanam v. Bhavani Pramilamma, 1983 Acc CJ 580 : (AIR 1983 Andh Pra 297) (Para 50), wherein stress was laid that the Tribunal should take care to see that the amount awarded is received in full by the legal representatives of the deceased or the victims of the accident. The subsequent decisions, Polavarapu Somarajyam v. A.P.R.T Corporation, 1984 Acc CJ 18 : (AIR 1983 Andh Pra 407) and Erukulapathi Lakshmisaraswati v. State Bank of India, 1984 Acc CJ 595, have approved the said view. A Committee of Hon'ble Judges of this Court was constituted to consider and recommend the procedure to be followed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals to make available to the victims of accidents the compensation awarded by the Tribunals in full measure.

In the meanwhile, the various Tribunals, functioning in this State, were addressed, inviting their suggestions for the improvement of the functioning of the Tribunals and for payment of compensation and the procedure to be followed in connection therewith. Notices were sent to various Insurance Companies also. The files disclose that the Bar Associations were also addressed in the matter. The files show that replies were received by the Registrar from the various Bar Associations. The Bus Operators Association had also filed their representations. After adverting to the replies received from various Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, Bar Associations, Insurance Companies etc., the Committee submitted its report on 7-10-1985. In para 4 of the Report, the Committee adverted to the complaint that when cheques are issued to counsel, a substantial portion of the amount is appropriated towards fee and unknowing and illiterate claimants consequently suffer. In para 11, the Committee recommended that compensation amount due to claimants, other than minors or other persons suffering disability, can be paid by issuing cheques to the claimant or one of the claimants to be nominated by the other claimants in the presence of the advocate concerned. It was directed that in the light of the summary of the recommendations, steps may be taken to issue instructions expeditiously. It is in pursuance thereto, the Registrar issued Ext. P. 4 Circular No. 3/86 to all the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in the State. Cl. (b) of Ext. P. 4 (Circular No. 3 of 1986) is in accord with the recommendations of the Committee, aforesaid.

4. From a perusal of the above, it is evident that, events that led to the issue of Circular No. 3 of 1986 stemmed from the concern voiced by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals to the effect that a big slice of the compensation amount is being knocked off and the victims or the claimants, who are illiterate and poor, are not in receipt of the full or proper amount of compensation. An expert Committee of Hon'ble Judges of this court was appointed to go into the matter. The Committee issued notices to various Tribunals, Bar Associations, Insurance Companies etc. After an exhaustive advertence to the various representations of all concerned persons, the Committee recommended that compensation amount due to claimants other than minors or other persons suffering disability can be paid by issuing cheques to the claimant or one of the nominated claimants in the presence of the advocate concerned. The cheques of the Circular is to ensure that the amount awarded by the Tribunals reach the victims or their legal representatives. The Circular is intended to achieve a laudable objective. It is to ensure that the persons who are entitled to receive the amount of compensation are not deprived of it or a substantial portion of it. The mischief sought to be avoided by the Circular was to see that the claimants before the Tribunals are not deprived of the legitimate amounts awarded to them.

5. Viewed in the background which resulted in the Circular and the purpose sought to be achieved by it, I have no doubt in my mind that Cl. (b) of Ext. P-4 is mandatory. The 1st respondent. Tribunal was justified in stating that the direction contained in Ext. P-4 Circular is mandatory in nature. It is true that the language used in Cl. (b) of Ext. P4 is prima facie permissive permissive. But, considering the historical background and the purpose of the Circular and the objects sought to be achieved, it is really mandatory. The object of Cl. (b) of Ext. P-4 is to effectuate a legal right of the claimants before the Tribunals and to safeguard their right and interest. It is for the sake of public good. It is accepted law that when a power is vested in a public officer or public authority for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out, that, power ought to be exercised and enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever that object of the power is to effectuate a public good or for the sake of justice. Long ago, in Re Neath and Brecon Ry., James, L.J stated that, “the use of the permissive words in such cases, is the usual courtesy of the Legislature in dealing with the judicature.” The enabling words will be construed as compulsive, and it means in substance that it shall not be lawful to do otherwise. [(1874) LR 9 Ch App 263, 264]. The word “may” might connote merely as enabling or permissive power but it will be construed as referring to a compellable duty, when it refers to a power conferred on a Court or other judicial authority. [See Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088 at p. 1092].

6. In the result, I hold that the order passed by the first respondent (Ext. P-3) is valid and justified in law. The interpretation placed on Cl. (b) of Ext. P-4, by the first respondent, is perfectly right. Clause (b) of Ext. P-4 is only regulatory in nature. It does not violate S. 30 of the Advocates Act or S. 14 of the Bar Councils Act. Indeed, counsel for the petitioner did not substantiate as to how and why it is stated that Cl. (b) of Ext. P-4 is said to be violative of S. 30 of the Advocates Act and S. 14 of the Bar Councils Act.

7. There is no merit in this original petition. It is dismissed, in limine.

Issue carbon copy of this judgment to counsel for the petitioners, on usual terms.

Petition dismissed.