Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: T.K. Lckshmana Iyer, T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: Government Pleader.
Judges
  • M.S Menon, J.
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: T.K. Lckshmana Iyer, T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: Government Pleader.
Judges
  • M.S Menon, J.
Acts
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner and her sister, Pathummabi, were co-owners of a property (T.S No. 92/6, Block 4, Ward 10, Calicut Municipality) which the State acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Pathummabi is said to have relinquished her share of compensation in favour of the petitioner and informed the Land Acquisition Officer (the respondent) that the entire compensation could be paid to the petitioner. The petitioner applied to the respondent to make a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The respondent rejected the application on the ground that it was filed out of time. Many factual matters relevant to limitation (dates of award, notice and applications) were in dispute; the court accepted the respondent's asserted dates for the purpose of the limitation question.

According to the respondent (and as assumed by the court for purposes of deciding the limitation issue): the award was made on 10-11-1956; notice under Section 12(2) was served on the petitioner on 23-11-1956; the petitioner's application for a reference under Section 18 was received on 5-1-1957. The petitioner had applied for a copy of the award on 17-12-1956 and received a copy on 22-12-1956. The determinative procedural question became whether the period 17-12-1956 to 22-12-1956 should be excluded when computing the statutory six-week limitation for an application under Section 18.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of computing the limitation period for an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award (17-12-1956 to 22-12-1956) is to be excluded under Section 12(4) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
  2. Whether an application to the Collector under Section 18(1) to refer matters to the civil court is to be treated as an "application to set aside an award" (and therefore within the scope of Section 12 of the Limitation Act for exclusion of time), or whether it is a distinct statutory procedure not attracting Section 12(4).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that the period spent in obtaining a copy of the Collector's award (from application on 17-12-1956 to issue on 22-12-1956) should be excluded from the computation of the limitation period under Section 12(4) of the Limitation Act — and if so the application for reference would have been within time.
  • The petitioner also advanced factual assertions (denied by the respondent) concerning receipt of notice and other dates relevant to limitation; many of these factual matters were in dispute.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent asserted the award date (10-11-1956), the date of notice under Section 12(2) (23-11-1956), and that the application for reference under Section 18 was received on 5-1-1957 — showing the application was filed after the six-week period and therefore barred by limitation.
  • The respondent opposed application of Section 12(4) of the Limitation Act to exclude the time spent obtaining a copy of the award and thus opposed deeming the Section 18 application equivalent to an application to set aside an award.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Bhagwan Das v. Collector, Lahore, 133 Pun LR 1904 p. 468 Held that an application under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is not an "application to set aside an award" within Section 12 of the Limitation Act; therefore time for obtaining a copy should not be excluded. The court regarded this decision as persuasive and expressed inclination to adopt its reasoning as the correct view; the opinion follows this line in dismissing the petition.
Umia Shankar Lakhmi Ram v. Chhotalal Vajeram, ILR 1 Bom 19 at p. 22 Recognised the general principle that statutes of limitation should, where ambiguous, be construed in favour of the right to proceed. The court noted this principle but observed it applies only in cases of doubt or ambiguity of language; used to explain limits of equitable construction for statutes of limitation.
Lallubhai v. Naran, ILR 6 Bom 719 at p. 724 (FB) Same general principle as above — that statutes of limitation can be construed in favour of the right to proceed in cases of ambiguity. Adopted as authority for the limited application of the "equitable construction" principle; the court held that where statutory language is plain, that principle cannot override the text.
Luchmee Buksh Roy v. Runjeet Ram, 20 Suth WR 375 (privy council citation) Expressed that statutes of limitation must receive construction according to their plain words and are strict and inflexible. Cited to support the proposition that plain statutory language controls and equitable constructions are not permissible where language is clear.
Collector of Akola v. Anand Rao, 11 Ind Cas 690 (Nag) Held that the grounds for setting aside an arbitrator's award differ from grounds for a Section 18 reference; the time required for obtaining a copy of the Collector's award should not be excluded. Relied on to support rejection of the argument that time to obtain copies should be excluded; court accepted the reasoning as aligning with decisions against exclusion.
Ezra v. Secretary of State, ILR 32 Cal 605 : 32 IA 93 (PC) Described the Collector's "award" as a decision binding only on him as to the sum to be tendered — distinguishing it from a court or arbitrator's award. Used to show conceptual difference between Collector's award and proceedings properly characterised as setting aside an award; supported conclusion that Section 12(4) should not be applied.
H. N. Burjorjee v. Special Collector of Rangoon, AIR 1926 Rang 135 Held that an application to the Collector to refer the matter to court should be treated as equivalent to an application to court; accordingly, time taken to obtain copies should be excluded. The court noted this decision as taking the contrary view; however, it ultimately declined to follow this authority and preferred the contrary line of decisions.
Leslie v. Collector of Mergul, 1 Low Bur Rul 132 Authority mentioned for the proposition that, on refusal by Collector, the petitioner has no remedy against the special Collector and must seek relief from the court. Referenced in discussion of H. N. Burjorjee to illustrate limitations of remedies; cited as part of the consideration but not adopted as supporting exclusion.
Secretary of State v. Karim Bux, AIR 1939 All 130 Discussed earlier conflicting authorities; noted that the President followed the Burma High Court decision (AIR 1926 Rang 135) but that the court had taken a contrary view in Kashi Prasad (AIR 1932 All 598). Referred to as part of survey of authorities: the court observed that before that bench it was not contended that time taken to obtain copies should be excluded; used to support the trend against exclusion.
Kashi Prasad (Applicant) v. Notified Area of Mahoba (Opposite Party), AIR 1932 All 598 Held that an application for reference under Section 18 cannot be read within Section 12 of the Limitation Act without materially modifying S.12; concluded the time could not be extended. Cited approvingly by the court as part of the line of authority that rejects exclusion of time; used as persuasive authority favoring dismissal.
Nasif-ud-din v. Secretary of State, AIR 1927 Lah 858 Followed Bhagwan Das (133 Pun LR 1904) in rejecting the exclusion of time for obtaining copies; provided an opinion against the Burma High Court view. Noted as following the Bhagwan Das line; the court regarded this as part of the cluster of authorities supporting non-exclusion and preferred them over the contrary decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Factual baseline: Many facts were disputed. For purposes of the limitation question the court accepted the respondent's dates (award 10-11-1956; notice 23-11-1956; Section 18 application received 5-1-1957). On those dates the application would be barred by limitation unless the petitioner could exclude the time spent obtaining a copy of the award.
  2. Statutory framework: The court identified the relevant statutory provisions — Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (right of a person interested who has not accepted the award to apply to the Collector for a reference to the court) and the Limitation Act, 1908 — in particular Section 29(2) (incorporation of certain Limitation Act provisions) and Section 12(4) which mandates exclusion of "the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award" when computing limitation for an application to set aside an award.
  3. Core legal question: Whether an application under Section 18 to the Collector is to be treated, for purposes of Section 12(4) of the Limitation Act, as an "application to set aside an award" so as to permit exclusion of the time taken to obtain a copy of the award.
  4. Analysis of precedent and statutory language: The court reviewed conflicting authorities. It noted decisions (e.g., Bhagwan Das, Nasif-ud-din, Kashi Prasad, Collector of Akola v. Anand Rao) that held an application under Section 18 is not an application to set aside an award for the purposes of Section 12, and that the time for obtaining copies should not be excluded. It contrasted these with the Burma High Court decision (H. N. Burjorjee) which viewed the Section 18 application as equivalent to an application to court and therefore eligible for exclusion of time.
  5. Principle of statutory construction: The court emphasised the settled principle that statutes of limitation are to be construed according to their plain words and are strict and inflexible; equitable constructions in favour of the right to proceed apply only where the language is ambiguous. The court cited authorities (e.g., Luchmee Buksh Roy) to underscore that principle.
  6. Conclusion from authorities and text: Applying the plain language of the statutes and following the line of decisions that treat Section 18 applications as distinct from applications to set aside awards, the court found the correct view to be that Section 12(4) does not apply to Section 18 applications. On that basis, the period 17-12-1956 to 22-12-1956 could not be excluded and the Section 18 application was out of time.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to exclude the time spent in obtaining a copy of the award (17-12-1956 to 22-12-1956) for the purpose of computing the limitation period for an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Consequently, on the accepted dates the application was time-barred and the petition was dismissed. The dismissal was made "though the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs" (i.e., no order as to costs).

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the petitioner’s Section 18 application (as late filed on the assumed dates) fails on limitation grounds and the petition is dismissed without costs.
  • The court followed the established line of authority (e.g., Bhagwan Das and authorities adopting its reasoning) that declines to treat a Section 18 application as an "application to set aside an award" for the purpose of Section 12(4) of the Limitation Act. The opinion therefore aligns with those precedents rather than creating a new or divergent rule.
IC/R.G.D

Note: This summary is confined to the matters and citations expressly contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond the opinion's text.

Show full summary ...

    Kunhibi v. Land Acquisition Officer, Kozhikode .

    1. The petitioner and her sister, Pathummabi, owned an item of property, T.S No. 92/6, Block 4, Ward 10, within the Calicut Municipality. The said item has been acquired by the State under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Pathummabi, it is alleged has relinquished her share of the compensation in favour of the petitioner and informed the respondent, the Land Acquisition Officer, Kozhikode, that the entire compensation may be paid to the petitioner. The petitioner moved the respondent to make a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; but he rejected the application on the ground that it was filed out of time. Many of the facts relevant to the consideration of the question of limitation are in dispute and it is impossible for me to evaluate the truth or otherwise of the statements made by the petitioner and denied by the respondent.

    2. According to the respondent the award was made on 10-11-1956, notice thereof under Section 12(2) of the Act was served on the petitioner on 23-11-1956 and the application for a reference under Section 18 of the Act was received only on 5-1-1957. If these dates are correct—and I have to assume that they are correct — the petition, it is agreed, is barred by limitation unless the petitioner is entitled to exclude the time spent for obtaining a copy of the award.

    3. It is also agreed that the petitioner's application for a copy of the award was received on 17-12-1956, that a copy was issued only on 22-12-1956, and that if she is entitled to an exclusion of the time spent in obtaining the copy, the application for a reference was within time and should have been allowed. The short question, therefore, that arises for decision is whether the petitioner is entitled to an exclusion of the period from 17-12-1956 to 22-12-56.

    4. S. 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, states:

    “Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector, for the determination of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.”

    5. Sub-section (2) of that section provides that “the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken” and the proviso to that sub-section deals with the time within which the application should be made. It is agreed that the period within which the application should have been filed in this case was “within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under S. 12, sub-sec. (2)” of the Act.

    6. Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, provides that suits, appeals and applications filed after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule to the Act shall be dismissed. Sec. 29(2) says:

    “Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribing therefor by the first schedule the provisions of S. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—

    (a) The provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18, and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and

    (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply”;

    7. and S. 12(4) — the provision on which the petitioner relies:

    “In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award, shall be excluded.”

    8. Apart from arguments based on disputed questions of fact the only contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that S. 12(4) is attracted. A similar contention was urged and negatived in Bhagwan Das v. Collector, Lahore, 133 Pun LR 1904 p. 468.

    9. The court said:

    “There remains for consideration the fourth paragraph of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. Here again we find it impossible to hold that an application under S. 18(1) of Act I of 1894 falls under Section 12 of the Limitation Act as an application to set aside an award. It is according to the plain language of the sub-section, nothing of the sort. The person who has not accepted the award, no doubt, wishes to have it set aside, but he is compelled for this purpose to adopt the procedure laid down by law and to apply to the Collector not to set aside the award, for this is a power which the, provisions of the Act do not confer noon the Collector but to refer the matter to the Civil Court.

    Mr. Grey ingeniously argued that inasmuch as the very object of the application is to have the award set aside and as in such cases the application is in reality one made to the court, the Collector having no option but to refer the matter as prayed, the application is in all but letter an application to set aside an award, and that we should be justified in so holding upon the principle that statutes of Limitation being restrictive of ordinary legal rights should as far as possible be construed in favour of the right to proceed.

    10. This principle is well recognised (See Umia Shankar Lakhmi Ram v. Chhotalal Vajeram. ILR 1 Bom 19 at p. 22, and Lallubhai v. Naran, ILR 6 Bom 719 at p. 724 (FB)) but it can be applied only in cases of doubt and of ambiguity of language. When however as here, the words of the Statute are perfectly plain, we have the highest authority for holding that a so-called “equitable construction” is not permissible, no matter what the apparent hardship may be.

    ‘The Statute’ — i.e of limitation — say their Lordships of the Privy Council in Luchmee Buksh Roy v. Runjeet Ram, 20 Suth WR 375 at pages 376-377 “must receive a construction according to its plain words — It has been said that this case ought to be decided upon an equitable construction, and) not upon the strict words of the Statute; but their Lordships think Statutes of Limitation, like all others, ought to receive such a construction as the language in its plain meaning imports. Statutes of Limitation are in their nature strict and inflexible enactments.”

    11. In Collector of Akola v. Anand Rao, 11 Ind Cas 690 (Nag) the contention was negatived in the following words:

    “The grounds on which an award of arbitrator can be set aside are very different from these on which a reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act can be demanded, and beyond the fact that the word ‘award’ comes into both there is no similarity between the two proceedings. Indeed, as their Lordships of the Privy Council point out in Ezra v. Secy of State, ILR 32 Cal 605 : 32 IA 93 (PC), the so-called award of the Collector is ‘merely’ a decision binding only on him as to what sum shall be tendered to the owner of the lands'. I am unable therefore, to accept the contention that the time required for obtaining a copy of the Collector's award should be excluded.”

    12. H.N Burjorjee v. Special Collector of Rangoon, AIR 1926 Rang 135 is a case in which the contention was accepted:

    “It may be argued that an application to the Collector to refer the matter to the court is not an application to Court.

    The Land Acquisition Act does not lay down any direction by which the party interested in the land acquired can apply direct to the court. And once the application is made to the Collector to refer the matter to Court, he has no discretion in the matter and must make the reference. To me it appears that this is only a round about way of enabling the party interested to make application to the Court; and that the Collector for the purposes of the Act is only a conduit pine. An application to the Collector to refer to Court must be taken as equivalent to an application to Court.

    I do not think it was the intention of the Legislature to deprive any owner of land or party interested in it which has been acquired, or his right to apply to the Court against the award of an Administrative Officer, the Land Acquisition Collector. On the Collector refusing to make the reference, the petitioner has no right of action against the special Collector and no other remedy (Leslie v. Collector of Mergul, 1 Low Bur Rul 132) and the reliet given by this court will be adequate find complete. If my view is correct, then it follows that the time taken in applying for copies must be added to the six weeks statutory period.”

    13. In Secy. of State v. Karim Bux, AIR 1939 All 130 the court said:

    “The President following a case in the Burma High Court held that such time should be excluded. This court has taken a contrary view in Kashi Prasad…(Applicant); v. Notified Area Of Mahoba…(Opposite Party).*, Mahoba, AIR 1932 All 598, which followed the case in Nasif-ud-din v. Secy. of State, AIR 1927 Lah 858. Before us it was not contended that the time taken to obtain copies of the order should be excluded in computing the time within which a reference must be made.”

    14. The decision of the Burma High Court followed by the President must be AIR 1926 Rang 135;

    15. AIR 1927 Lah 858 followed 133 Pun LR 1904 p. 468 and dealt with the AIR 1926 Rang 135 as follows:

    “This to some extent supports the learned Advocate. But after a careful consideration and with all respect to the learned Judge who was responsible for that decision, I am unable to accept it as an authority against the Division Bench decisions of the Chief Court that have already been cited.”

    16. In AIR 1932 All 598 the court said:

    “We can read an application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, as coming within the purview of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, only by materially modifying the language of S. 12.”

    And:

    “On this point, again, there is some conflict of opinion; but the later opinion entertained by the Lahore High Court in AIR 1927 Lahore 858 is at better opinion than the decision of the Burma High Court in AIR 1926 Rangoon 135. I agree with the decision of the Lahore High Court and hold that the time could not be extended.”

    17. Apparently the provision invoked in this case was S. 12(2) and not S. 12(4) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

    18. I am inclined to hold that the correct view is the one expressed in 133 Pun LR 1904 p. 468 and the judgments that adopt the reasoning embodied therein. It follows that this petition has to be dismissed. The petition is hereby dismissed though an the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.

    IC/R.G.D

    19. Petition dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Kunhibi v. Land Acquisition Officer, Kozhikode .
    (Feb 25, 1959)