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  • sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939)
  • Sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section (omitting the provisions thereto) read as follows:(1)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 11939 (Central Act, IV of 1939)
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (Central Act IV of 1939)
  • provisions of sub-section (2).
  • sub-section (1) of Sec. 44,
  • Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • sub-section (2) of Sec. 44.
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  • sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939)
  • Sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section (omitting the provisions thereto) read as follows:(1)
  • sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 11939 (Central Act, IV of 1939)
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (Central Act IV of 1939)
  • provisions of sub-section (2).
  • sub-section (1) of Sec. 44,
  • Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • sub-section (2) of Sec. 44.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by M.S. Menon, J. (Appeal arising out of O.P. No. 132 of 1959)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal originating from O.P. No. 132 of 1959. The principal factual matrix is:

  • On 13-11-1958 a stage carriage permit was granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Kozhikode (the second respondent), to the person who is the appellant in this appeal.
  • The petitioner (referred to in the opinion as the third respondent in the original proceedings, and a party in this appeal) contended that on that date there was no properly constituted Regional Transport Authority (RTA) in existence and therefore the permit could not be sustained.
  • The decision under appeal upheld that contention and held the permit to be invalid; the present appeal challenges that result.
  • The statutory framework central to the dispute is Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Chapter IV), particularly sub-sections (1) and (2), and the notifications issued by the Government of Kerala on 7-5-1957, 23-8-1957 (published 27-8-1957), and 23-12-1958 (published 28-12-1958).
  • The Kerala notifications (7-5-1957 and 23-8-1957 / published 27-8-1957) constituted Transport Authorities and appointed members for a period of one year from publication (the 23-8-1957 appointment being for one year from 27-8-1957 in the Schedule, including the Kozhikode RTA and named members).
  • The Government later issued (on 23-12-1958) a notification purporting to sanction the continuance of the State and Regional Transport Authorities (except Eranakulam) "from the dates of expiry of their term till their successors are appointed".

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Regional Transport Authority (Kozhikode) was properly constituted on the relevant date (13-11-1958) and therefore whether the permit granted on that date was valid.
  2. Whether the Government of Kerala's notification of 23-12-1958 (sanctioning continuance of Authorities after expiry) could have retroactive effect and validate acts done after the expiry of the appointed members' term.
  3. Whether sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 operate as distinct sources of power such that appointments or continuance could be treated as an exercise of executive power allowing retroactivity.
  4. Whether the doctrine validating acts of officers de facto applies where the authority (the office) itself had ceased to exist — i.e., whether there could be de facto members when there was no existing office.
  5. Whether the petitioner was precluded from raising the jurisdictional question in the High Court because the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority and had not raised the jurisdiction issue before that Authority.
  6. Whether the pendency of an appeal filed by the petitioner against the impugned order ousted the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 or otherwise precluded the petition.
  7. Whether certiorari (or the particular writ sought) was an inappropriate remedy because the impugned order was totally void.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 44 deal with distinct matters; the appointment of members of a Transport Authority is an exercise of executive power under the Constitution rather than a mere delegated statutory power.
  • Because the appointments involve executive power, the Government's notification of 23-12-1958 validating continuance retrospectively is valid and should be sustained.
  • The members of the Regional Transport Authority were officers de facto on the relevant date (13-11-1958), and therefore their acts (including the grant of the permit) should be respected under the doctrine of officers de facto.
  • Reliance on authorities and secondary sources (Cooley, Parameswaran Pillai v. State Prosecutor AIR 1951 Trav-Co 45, and (1919) 46 D.L.R. 547) where the de facto officer principle has been discussed.
  • The petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTA and did not raise the jurisdictional objection before that Authority; therefore the petitioner should not be permitted to raise that complaint in the High Court.
  • The petitioner had filed an appeal against the impugned order and that appeal was pending; as a result the High Court should not have entertained the petition challenging jurisdiction.
  • When an order is totally void certiorari is not the appropriate remedy and the petition should have been dismissed on that ground.

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner maintained that there was no properly constituted Regional Transport Authority in existence on the date the permit was granted (13-11-1958), because the one-year term of the appointed members (from the notification published 27-8-1957) had expired, and therefore the permit could not be sustained.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent / Authority Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (treatise) (Vol. II, 8th Ed., p.1357) Statement of the doctrine that acts of officers de facto are generally valid for protection of the public and third parties, and that such acts cannot be questioned collaterally except in specified circumstances. The appellant relied on this statement, but the Court observed that the de facto doctrine presupposes the existence of an office; because the Court concluded no RTA existed on the relevant date, the de facto principle could not be attracted in this case.
Parameswaran Pillai v. State Prosecutor, AIR 1951 Trav-Co 45 Discussed the application of the de facto officer principle (as cited by the appellant). The appellant cited this decision in support of the de facto argument. The Court noted the citation but considered it unnecessary to decide the broader applicability of the de facto principle under Article 226 because, on the facts, there was no RTA in existence and therefore no de facto officeholders.
(1919) 46 D.L.R. 547 Cited as another authority where the de facto officer principle has been discussed. Referenced by the appellant; the Court did not rely on it to sustain the appellant's case and, for the same reason as above, found the de facto principle inapplicable because there was no office to support a de facto officer.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 Holds that where there is no legal office to fill, there can be neither an officer de jure nor an officer de facto (i.e., the de facto doctrine cannot validate acts if no office exists). The Court quoted this authority to support the proposition that the de facto officer doctrine cannot operate where there is no office; the quotation was used to reinforce the conclusion that where the RTA had ceased to exist there could be no de facto members and their acts could not be validated.
Ananthanarayanan v. General Manager, Southern Rly. P.T Madras (S), AIR 1956 Mad 220 Explains that Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue directions/orders or writs and permits the court to mould remedies to the circumstances of the case. The Court relied on this decision to reject the submission that certiorari was an inappropriate remedy when an order was totally void; the Court held that Article 226's broad remedial scope allows the High Court to mould the remedy and not to be trammelled by strict procedural forms derived from English law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along the following steps (expressed as presented in the opinion):

  1. Statutory framework: Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (sub-sections (1) and (2)) was identified as the source of authority for constituting State and Regional Transport Authorities and prescribing their composition. Sub-section (1) is the power to constitute Authorities by notification; sub-section (2) prescribes the composition of Authorities.
  2. Government notifications: The Government of Kerala issued a notification on 7-5-1957 under sub-section (1) constituting a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities (for revenue districts). A subsequent notification under sub-section (2) dated 23-8-1957 (published 27-8-1957) appointed the members of each Regional Transport Authority for a period of one year from publication; the Schedule included named members for Kozhikode.
  3. Expiry and attempted retroactivity: The appointment by the notification published 27-8-1957 had a one-year term; when the Government failed to act before expiry it later issued a notification on 23-12-1958 purporting to "sanction the continuance" of the Authorities from the dates of expiry till successors were appointed, thus attempting to validate acts performed after the expiry.
  4. Legal character of powers under sub-sections (1) and (2): The Court rejected the appellant's contention that sub-sections (1) and (2) operate in fundamentally distinct constitutional domains such that appointments could be treated as an exercise of executive power allowing retroactivity. The Court held that the power to constitute Authorities is derived from sub-section (1) and is a delegated statutory power; sub-section (2) merely prescribes composition.
  5. Retroactivity not authorised: Because the power to constitute and to appoint is delegated statutory power, retroactive action is not permissible in the absence of express legislative authorization or necessary intendment. No such authorization was shown; therefore the December 1958 notification attempting retroactive effect was of no effect.
  6. Existence of Authorities depends on membership: The Court emphasised that Transport Authorities cannot exist apart from their membership; since the membership term appointed by the notification of 27-8-1957 expired one year after publication, the Authorities must be deemed to have ceased to exist when that membership terminated.
  7. De facto officer doctrine inapplicable: Although the appellant relied on the general doctrine that acts of officers de facto are valid to protect the public and third parties (quoting Cooley and cited cases), the Court held that the doctrine presupposes the existence of an office. Where there is no legal office, there can be neither an officer de jure nor an officer de facto. Because there was no RTA in existence on 12-11-1958 (and thus no office to be held), there could be no de facto members and the de facto doctrine could not be attracted.
  8. Reliance on Norton v. Shelby County: The Court quoted Norton v. Shelby County (118 U.S. 425) to demonstrate the point that the de facto doctrine cannot validate acts when there is no office to fill.
  9. Procedural/contentions regarding jurisdiction and pending appeal: The Court admitted that the petitioner had not raised the jurisdiction issue before the RTA and had even applied for and obtained another permit from the same Authority, and that the petitioner had also filed an appeal under the Act which was pending. The Court held that these facts do not oust or limit the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226; they are only factors that might induce a judge to refuse relief, but they do not automatically preclude the petition. The Court noted that Justice Iyengar did not consider such factors sufficient to refuse interference, and the present Court would not interfere unless the decision was perverse (which was not contended).
  10. Remedy/form of relief: Addressing the argument that certiorari was not available where an order is totally void, the Court held that Article 226 confers broad remedial powers on the High Courts and permits the molding of remedies to fit the circumstances. The Court relied on Ananthanarayanan v. General Manager to support that principle.
  11. Conclusion of analysis: Given that the RTA did not exist at the relevant time and the retroactive notification was ineffective, the permit could not be sustained; the Court therefore dismissed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Additional orders: Costs were awarded — advocate's fee Rs. 100 to the third respondent and a like amount to respondents 1 and 2 together. The opinion concludes with "Appeal dismissed."

Consequences and Implications (as stated in the opinion)

  • Direct effect: The Court upheld the view that the Regional Transport Authority for Kozhikode was not in existence on the relevant date because the membership appointed for one year from the publication of the notification had expired; consequently, acts performed after expiry (including the grant of the permit) could not be validated by the later notification of 23-12-1958 purporting to have retroactive effect.
  • The de facto officer doctrine could not be invoked to validate the impugned acts because that doctrine requires the prior existence of a legal office; where there is no office there can be no officer de jure or de facto.
  • The Court did not assert the creation of any new general precedent beyond applying established principles (Norton and the statutory interpretation of Section 44). The opinion does not discuss broader policy implications beyond the case-specific consequences.

Disposition

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The decision under appeal holding the permit invalid was thereby sustained.

Summary prepared from the opinion authored by M.S. Menon, J., as provided. No information beyond the text of the opinion was added.

    Rajalekshmi Motor Service, Kozhikode v. Govt. Of Kerala And Others

    M.S Menon, J.:— This is an appeal by the third respondent in O.P No. 132 of 1959. The appellant was granted a stage carriage permit by the second respondent, the Regional Transport Authority, Kozhikode, on 13-11-1958. The petitioner, the third respondent in this appeal, contended that there was no properly constituted Regional Transport Authority in existence on that date, and that the permit cannot hence be sustained. The contention was upheld, and the permit was held to be invalid by the decision under appeal.

    2. Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 relates to the control of transport vehicles, and S. 44 which occurs in that Chapter deals with the Transport Authorities. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section (omitting the provisions thereto) read as follows:

    (1) “The State Government shall, by notification in the official Gazette, constitute for the State a State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in sub-section (3), and shall in like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout such area (in this Chapter referred to as regions) as may be specified in the notification in respect of each Regional Transport Authority, the powers and functions conferred by or under this Chapter on such Authorities.”

    (2) “A State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority shall consist of a Chairman who has had judicial experience and such other officials and non-officials, not being less than two, as the State Government may think fit to appoint; but no person who has any financial interest whether as proprietor, employee or otherwise in any transport undertaking shall be appointed as or continue as a member of a State or Regional Transport Authority and, if any person being a member of any such Authority acquires a financial interest in any transport undertaking, he shall, within four weeks of so doing, give notice in writing to the State Government of the acquisition of such interest and shall vacate office.”

    3. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) the Government of Kerala issued the following notification on 7-5-1957:

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (Central Act IV of 1939) and in supersession of all notifications constituting the State Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authorities, the Government of Kerala hereby constitute;

    (a) a State Transport Authority for the whole State; and

    (b) a Regional Transport Authority for each of the Revenue Districts of the State,”

    4. (Kerala Gazette dated 14-5-1957, Part I, Page 1103).

    5. The Government also issued a separate notification on the same day under sub-section (2) of Sec. 44. That notification was replaced by another notification under sub-section (2) dated 23-8-1957 and published in the Kerala Gazette dated 27-8-11957 (Part I, Page 1880). The relevant portion of that notification reads as follows:

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 11939 (Central Act, IV of 1939) and in supersession of all previous notifications making appointments to the Regional Transport Authorities, the Government of Kerala hereby direct that the Regional Transport Authorities for each of the Revenue Districts shown in Column (1) of the Schedule hereto appended shall consist of the persons mentioned in column (2) thereof being Chairman and members as shown against their names for a period of one year from the date of publication of the notification.

    SCHEDULE

    [1] [2] Regional Transport Authority Names of Members 2. Kozhikode 1. District Collector [Chairman] [Official Member] 2. District Superintendent of Police [Official Member] 3. Executive Engineer, Buildings and Roads [Official Member] 4. Shri Kallat Krishnan, Trade Union Office, Puthiyara [Non official Member] 5. Sri Edakkot Mohammad, Kondotti [Non-official Member]”

    6. The State Government apparently forgot the time limit embodied in the last mentioned notification, and nothing was done till 23-12-1958. On that date it issued the following notification under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 44:

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) the Government of Kerala hereby sanction the continuance of the State Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authorities (except the Regional Transport Authority, Eranakulam) as on 1-8-1958 from the dates of expiry of their term till their successors are appointed.” (Kerala Gazette dated 28-12-1958. Part I, Page 3788).

    7. The contention of the appellant is that sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 44 deal with distinct matters that the appointment of the members of a Transport Authority constituted under sub-section (1) is not in pursuance of a power conferred by the legislature but in pursuance of the executive power of the State under the Constitution, and that as a result the retroactive operation granted by the notification of 23-12-1958 is valid and should be sustained. We find it impossible to accept this contention. All that sub-section (2) does is to stipulate that the Transport Authorities constituted under sub-section (1) shall have a composition in conformity with the provisions of sub-section (2). There can be no doubt that the power to constitute the Transport Authorities is derived from sub-section (1), that we are solely in the realms of a delegated statutory power, and that in such cases there is no right to retroactive action unless the legislature by express words or necessary intendment had authorised the same. It is not contended that any such authorisation can be found or inferred, and it must follow that the retroactive operation attempted by the notification of 23-12-1958 was of no effect.

    8. It is true that there is no time limit in the notification under sub-section (1) of Sec. 44, and that the time limit occurs only in the notification under sub-section (2) of that section. But that does not save the situation. The Transport Authorities cannot exist apart from their membership and they must be deemed to have disappeared when the membership terminated on the expiry of the period of one year from 27-8-1957.

    9. Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the following passage in Cooley's treatise on “Constitutional Limitations”:

    “No one is under obligation to recognise or respect the acts of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they are absolutely void. But for the sake of order and regularity, and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and insecurity of private rights, the acts of officers de fact are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose by the State or by some one claiming the office de jure, or except when the person himself attempts, to build up some right, or claim some privilege or emolument, by reason of being the officer which he claims to be. In all other cases the acts of an officer de facto are as valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of third parties. This is an important principle, which finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of officers de facto cannot be questioned collaterally.” (Vol. II, 8th Edition, Page 1357);

    10. and to (1919) 46 D.L.R 547 and Parameswaran Pillai v. State Prosecutor AIR 1951 Trav-Co 45 where the principle has been discussed. According to him the members of the Regional Authority were de facto though not de jure functionaries on 13-10-1928, the proceedings in this Court are collateral in character, and the petition should have been dismissed.

    11. We consider it unnecessary to decide how far, if at all the principle is applicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the light of what we have said in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above, there was no Regional Transport Authority in existence on 12-11-1958, and if the Authority was non-existent, there could have been no de facts members of that Authority, and the principle can in no sense be attracted.

    12. A de facto office is not a concept known to law. There can be de facto officers, nut there can be no de facto office. There must be a legal office in existence in order to protect the acts of the incumbent. Where there is no such office there can be no officer de facto for the simple reason that there can be no officer de jure. The pretender in such cases is a mere usurper, and his acts cannot be supported.

    13. The question directly arose for consideration in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S 425. The following passages from that decision will make the position clear:

    “But it is contended that if the Act creating the board was void, and the commissioners were not officers de jure, they were nevertheless officers de facto, and that the acts of the board as a de facto court are binding upon the county. This contention is met by the fact that there can be no officer, either de jure or de facto; if there be no office to fill.

    14. The doctrine which gives validity to acts of officers de facto, whatever defects there may be in the legality of their appointment or election, is founded upon considerations of policy and necessity, for the protection of the public and individuals whose interests may be affected thereby. Offices are created for the benefit of the public, and private parties are not permitted to inquire into the title of persons clothed with the evidence of such offices, and in apparent possession of their powers and functions. For the good order and peace of society their authority is to be respected and obeyed until, in some regular mode prescribed by law, their tide is investigated and determined. It is manifest that endless confusion would result if in every proceeding before such officers their title could be called in question. But the idea of an officer implies the existence of an office which he holds. It would be a misapplication of terms to call one an ‘officer’ who holds no office.”

    15. Two further contentions of the appellant can he dealt with together. They are:

    (1) that the petitioner should not have been allowed to raise the question of jurisdiction in this Court because the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority and did not deliberately raise the question of jurisdiction before that Authority; and

    (2) that the petition should not have been entertained, as the petitioner had filed an appeal against the order impugned and that appeal is pending disposal.

    16. That the petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction before the Regional Transport Authority is admitted. As a matter of fact the petitioner appears even to have sought and obtained a stage carriage permit for another route from the same Authority. It is also admitted that the petitioner has filed on appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and that it is pending disposal.

    17. These are circumstances, however, which Cannot be considered as ousting or limiting the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. They are only factors which may induce a Judge to refuse a remedy under that article.

    18. Iyengar, J. did not consider these factors as sufficient to decline interference, and in such a case whatever may have been our own reactions in similar circumstances we should not interfere unless we are satisfied that the decision is perverse. It is not contended that such is the case. The last contention of the appellant relates to the nature of the remedy sought by the petitioner. According to the appellant when an order is totally void certiorari is not the remedy and the petition should have been dismissed on that ground. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution is not trammelled by the procedural niceties of English law. As stated in Ananthanarayanan v. General Manager, Southern Rly. P.T Madras, (S) AIR 1956 Mad 220:

    “Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Courts to issue ‘directions, orders’ or writs including ‘writs in the nature of’ habeas corpus, mandamus, etc. It will not do to ignore the significance of the words underlined (here into ???). The circumstance, therefore, that the petitioner has applied for a particular form of writ whereas he should have asked for a different kind of writ or order does not preclude the Court from moulding the remedy to the circumstances of the case.”

    19. In the light of what is stated above this appeal has to be dismissed and we do so with costs, advocate's fee Rs. 100/- to the third respondent and a like amount to respondents 1 and 2 together.

    DD/R.G.D

    20. Appeal dismissed.

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    Rajalekshmi Motor Service, Kozhikode v. Govt. Of Kerala And Others
    (Dec 1, 1959)