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  • Criminal Procedure Code, Indian penal code and the Evidence Act,
  • Section 24(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C12.
  • Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Criminal Procedure Code, Indian penal code and the Evidence Act,
  • Section 24(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C12.
  • Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ of certiorari seeking to quash Notification dated 12-04-2007 (No. OE 167 PPE 2007; Annexure-A) which appointed the 2nd respondent as Special Public Prosecutor. The appointment was made at the request of the 3rd respondent. The Principal JMFC, Chikkodi had earlier, by order dated 13-02-2007, committed C.C. No. 613/2006 to the Sessions Judge, Belgaum, where it was numbered Sessions Case No. 52/2007. Trial proceedings continued, and the Special Public Prosecutor had taken charge of the case. The writ petition was filed on 11-08-2008, more than 14 months after the impugned appointment. The petitioner, through his counsel, challenged the appointment as contrary to law and contended it was made for political reasons, without adequate reasons, and in violation of Section 24(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Notification dated 12-04-2007 appointing a Special Public Prosecutor under Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C. is liable to be quashed.
  2. Whether an appointment under Section 24(8) must be made only in the public interest (suo motu by the State) and cannot be made at the request of the complainant/victim.
  3. Whether an accused has locus standi to challenge an appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor made at the request of the complainant/victim.
  4. Whether the delay of over 14 months in challenging the impugned order affects the maintainability of the writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The impugned Notification dated 12-04-2007 appointing the 2nd respondent as Special Public Prosecutor is contrary to the decision in K.V. Shiva Reddy v. State of Karnataka (2005 (4) Crimes 518 Kar.), because it contains no reasons justifying the appointment and was passed mechanically upon the request of the 3rd respondent.
  • The appointment was motivated by political considerations since one of the injured persons is politically influential; thus the appointment lacks public interest and violates Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C.
  • The Director of Prosecution is the appropriate authority to decide who should conduct trial proceedings, implying that the impugned appointment improperly casts aspersions on the regular Public Prosecutor attached to the Court.
  • The petitioner asserted that appointments under Section 24(8) should be in the public interest and cannot be made merely because the complainant or injured person requests them.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.V. Shiva Reddy v. State of Karnataka, 2005 (4) Crimes 518 (Kar.) Authority for quashing appointments of Special Public Prosecutors made at the behest of persons not concerned with the crime (example given: appointment at instance of an MLA who had nothing to do with the crime); such appointments may be opposed to public interest. The Court distinguished the present facts from K.V. Shiva Reddy, noting that in that case the appointment was made at the instance of an unrelated third party (an MLA). The Court held the citation does not assist the petitioner because the present appointment arose from a request by the complainant/victim and the facts are different.
Maung Pu v. Emperor, 1916 (17) Criminal Law Journal Reports 48 Principle that the complainant prima facie has the strongest claim to conduct the prosecution privately and should be allowed to do so unless adequate reasons are given to refuse. The Court cited Maung Pu to support the proposition that a complainant/victim has a legitimate claim to conduct or to be represented in the prosecution and that such claims should be accepted unless adequate grounds exist to refuse.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in several interrelated stages, each based on facts and legal principles stated in the opinion:

  1. Delay and Laches: The Court emphasized that the writ petition was filed on 11-08-2008, over 14 months after the impugned order of 12-04-2007. The petitioner was aware of the appointment yet chose not to challenge it promptly and could not satisfactorily explain the delay. On this ground alone, the Court held the writ petition deserved rejection.
  2. Legal interpretation of Section 24(8) Cr.P.C.: The Court explained that appointments under Section 24(8) are twofold:
    • Appointments made suo motu by the Central or State Government (subject to qualification that the Advocate has been in practice not less than ten years).
    • Appointments made at the request of the complainant or victim; such appointments are not an exercise of the State's suo motu power but arise from the complainant's or victim's invocation of rights, including Article 14 of the Constitution.
    The Court held that when the appointment follows a complainant/victim's request, the accused generally lacks locus standi to challenge the appointment on grounds of absence of public interest or arbitrariness.
  3. Article 14 and the Victim's Rights: The Court accepted that a complainant/victim may have a right under Article 14 to seek engagement of counsel of his choice and that, in the Court's view, the State is obliged to consider such a request. The Court observed that fairness of trial extends to the victim as well as to the accused.
  4. Precedent and Policy Support: The Court relied on Maung Pu (1916) and on recommendations of the Malimath Committee (Government of India, Committee to Review the Criminal Justice System, report March 2003) to underscore the principle that the criminal justice system must protect victims' rights, including representation by counsel of their choice (with State-funded counsel where the victim cannot afford one).
  5. Apprehension of Unfair Trial: The petitioner argued the appointment would deny him a fair trial. The Court treated this as a mere apprehension unsupported by adequate justification, noting the trial judge/presiding officer has the duty and power to control the proceedings and protect both parties. The Court found no basis to conclude that the appointment would make the trial unfair.
  6. Final synthesis: Because of the unexplained delay, the legal position that the accused lacks locus to challenge an appointment made at the complainant/victim's request, and the Court's view that the victim's right to counsel must be respected, the Court declined to interfere with the impugned Notification.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is rejected (the Court found no ground to interfere with the Notification dated 12-04-2007 appointing the 2nd respondent as Special Public Prosecutor).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The impugned appointment stands and the Special Public Prosecutor remains validly appointed; the petitioner's challenge is dismissed.
  • On locus standi: The Court held that an accused does not have locus standi to challenge an appointment under Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C. when such appointment is made at the behest of the complainant/victim.
  • State obligation: The Court stated that the State is obliged to consider and, subject to statutory qualifications, accede to a complainant/victim's request to engage counsel of his choice, as part of protecting the victim's rights and in furtherance of Article 14.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion distinguishes earlier authority relied upon by the petitioner (K.V. Shiva Reddy) on the facts and applies principles from Maung Pu and policy recommendations (Malimath Committee) to support victims' participation. The Court did not indicate it was laying down a novel legal principle beyond its interpretation and application in the present facts; its ruling was based on delay, statutory interpretation of Section 24(8), and the protection of victim rights.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what the opinion itself contains.

    Sri. Jagadish Chidanand Kore v. The State Of Karnataka, Department Of Law, Rep. By Its Secretary And Others

    2. 1916 (17) Criminal Law Journal Reports 486, Maung PU v. Emperor (Ref) 7

    M/s. S.B Patted & A.K Kotrashetty, Advocates for Petitioner
    Sri. Dinesh Rao, Government Advocate for R1 & 2

    Ravi Malimath, J

    The petitioner seeks for a writ of certiorari to quash the Notification dated 12-4-2007 bearing No. OE 167 PPE 2007 vide Annexure-A.

    2. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri. A.K Kotrashetty, submits that at the request of the 3 respondent, the 2 respondent has been appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor vide the impugned Notification dated 12-4-2007 vide Annexure-A. He contends that the impugned Notification is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of K.V Shiva Reddy v. State of Karnataka . 2005 4 Crimes 518 Kar. that there are no reasons in the impugned order to justify the said appointment; that the impugned order has been passed mechanically on the mere asking by respondent No. 3 and that the appointment is not a suo motu appointment, but due to the fact that the injured person is politically influential; that the Director of Prosecution is the best Judge as to who should conduct the trial and that by virtue of the impugned order aspersions would be cast on the regular Public Prosecutor who is attached to the Court.

    3. To substantiate his grounds, the petitioner has vehemently contended that the impugned order has been passed due to political reasons since one of the injured person is a politically influential. He submits that there is no public interest involved which warrants the appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor. Therefore, the violation of Section 24(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code being writ large, the impugned order requires to be quashed. He also contended that any appointment under Section 24(8) should be made only in public interest and cannot be made only because the complainant or the injured seeks for an appointment.

    4. I have heard Sri. A.K Kotrashetty, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner.

    5. The impugned order appointing the 2 respondent has been issued on 12-4-2007. The Learned Principal JMFC, Chikkodi, by the order dated 13-2-2007 has committed C.C 613/2006 to the Court of Sessions Judge, Belgaum, which has been numbered as Sessions Case No. 52/2007. The proceedings have continued thereon. However, this writ petition has been filed on 11th August, 2008 that is after more than 14 months since the date of the impugned order. Even though the petitioner was aware of the impugned order he has chosen to remain quiet and has not challenged the same at the earliest point of time. The proceedings before the Trial Court are in progress and it is only after 14 months have lapsed since passing of the impugned order and the Special Public Prosecutor having taken charge of the — case, that the present petition is filed. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner is unable to explain the delay in preferring this petition. Hence on this ground alone the writ petition deserves to be rejected.

    6. The petitioner contends that the impugned order is contrary to the decision reported in 2005 (4) Crimes 518 (Kar.)

    The impugned order therein challenging the appointment of the Special Public Prosecutor was quashed primarily on the ground that the Special Public Prosecutor was appointed at the instance of a M.L.A, who had absolutely nothing to do with the Crime in question. The Court was therefore of the view that it is the complainant or the victim who has a right to seek for an appointment of the Special Public Prosecutor and since such a request being made by a person who is not concerned, the appointment being opposed to public interest was quashed. However, the facts in the present case are totally different and therefore the quashing of an order of appointment in the said case is in no way concerned with the present case. Moreover, the Learned Single Judge has rightly come to the conclusion that the Courts cannot ignore the rights and apprehension in the matter of an effective trial so far as complainant/victim is concerned. A fair trial does not necessarily mean the fairness only to the accused, but fairness even to the victim. The Learned Single Judge however held that if the complainant or the victim approaches the State to engage a Counsel of his choice the State is bound to consider such a request. Therefore, the citation relied on by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner would not come to his aid, on the contrary, the findings recorded therein run contrary to his contentions.

    7. The argument of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that an appointment of a Public Prosecutor under Section 24(8) has to be made only in public interest is ill-founded and unsustainable.

    The appointment under Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C are two fold. The Central Government or the State Government can appoint an Advocate who has been in practice for not less than 10 years as a Special Public Prosecutor in exercise of the suo motu power so vested. Secondly, an appointment under Section 24(8) can be made at the request of the complainant or the victim. Such an appointment would therefore be made, not in exercise of the suo motu power of the State or Central Government, but in view of the invocation of the fundamental right of the complainant/victim in terms of Article 14. Therefore, whenever any suo motu power is exercised by the State or the Central Government the same can be questioned if there is arbitrariness or absence of public interest. However, when the complainant/victim makes an application for an appointment under Section 24(8) and the same is granted, the accused would not have a locus-standi to question the said appointment. The appointment having been made at the request of the complainant/victim cannot be questioned by the accused on the ground of absence of a public interest or otherwise. The appointment made under Section 24(8) at the behest of the complainant or the victim, is alien to public interest. It is the interest of the complainant/victim that needs to be addressed when an appointment is made. The petitioner accused therefore would have no locus-standi to maintain a petition for questioning the appointment made under Section 24(8) when made at the behest of the complainant/victim. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of law. When the complainant therefore apprehends that the accused are represented by leading lawyers and therefore his rights need to be adequately protected by appointment of an Advocate of his choice, the same cannot be denied to him. The State therefore, cannot trust itself onto the victim by denying him the choice of his Advocate. In the scheme of the Criminal Justice System, the State that assures the victim that it would take charge of his case and that justice would be done in view of the feet that, the victim has suffered, the victim need not be burdened with, by engaging his lawyer to defend his rights. Since the offence is not only against the victim but also against the Society at large the State assumes itself the responsibility of ensuring justice to the complainant or victim.

    Being a welfare State the citizens have an assurance as enumerated in the preamble to the Constitution of India, that there shall be

    “justice, social, economic and political;

    xxx xxx xxx

    Equality of status and of opportunity;

    xxx xxx xxx.”

    Hence, justice to all and equality of status being assured to the citizens cannot therefore be negated under any circumstance.

    Therefore, when the complainant/victim exercises his right under Article 14 to engage a counsel of his choice the same needs to be acknowledged and accepted and cannot be denied to him. The State is duty bound under law to accept the request of the complainant or the victim by appointing a lawyer of his choice. Failure to do so, on the contrary would lead to violation of Article 14 resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. A fair and just trial is not only to the accused but also to the complainant and the society. It is the complainant/victim who has suffered because of the accused. Therefore, the complainant or the victim is fully entitled to defend the violation of his rights by engaging a counsel of his choice. As far back as the decision rendered in the case of Maung Pu v. Emperor . 1916 17 Criminal Law Journal Reports 48 it was held as follows:—

    “The case itself is not a very important one, but it raises I think, an important question of principle. Prima facie the complainant in a case is the person who has the strongest claim to be allowed to conduct the prosecution privately and, in my opinion he should be allowed to do so unless there are adequate reasons for refusing to allow him to do so. To my mind no adequate ground for refusing permission has been put forward.

    I, therefore, submit the proceedings to the Chief Court with a recommendation that the Magistrate's order be set aside and that he be directed to allow the petitioner, Maung pu, to conduct the prosecution hereafeter.”

    The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs by its order dated 24-11-2000 constituted the Committee to revise the Criminal Justice System headed by its Chairman Dr. Justice V.S Malimath where in the terms of reference included the examination of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and to see if any modifications or amendments are required thereof; whether there is need to re-do the Criminal Procedure Code, Indian penal code and the Evidence Act, to bring them in tune with the demand of the times and in harmony with the aspirations of the people of India; to make specific recommendations on simplifying adequate procedures and practices to make the delivery of justice to the common man closer, faster, uncomplicated and inexpensive and to restore the confidence of the common man in the Criminal Justice System by protecting the innocent and the victim etc., The Committee submitted its report in two volumes in March 2003 to the Government of India. The Committee has suggested many recommendations. With specific reference to the issue involved in this case, the Committee has stated and suggested thus:—

    “Justice to Victims

    An important object of the Criminal Justice System is to ensure justice to the victims, yet he has not been given any substantial right, not even to participate in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, the Committee feels that the system must focus on justice to victims and has, thus, made the following recommendations, which include the right of the victim to participate in cases involving serious crimes and to adequate compensation.

    xxxx xxxx xxxx

    The victim has a right to be represented by an advocate of his choice, provided that an advocate shall be provided at the cost of the State if the victim is not in a position to afford a lawyer.

    iv. The victim's right to participate in criminal trial shall, inter alia, include:

    a. To produce evidence, oral or documentary with leave of the Courts and or to seek directions for production of such evidence.

    b. To ask questions to the witnesses or to suggest to the Court questions, which may be put to witnesses.

    c. To know the status of investigation and to move the Court to issue dictions for further investigation on certain matters or to a supervisory officer to ensure effective and proper investigation to assist in the search for truth.

    d. To be heard in respect of the grant or cancellation of bail.

    e. To be heard whenever Prosecution seeks to withdraw and to offer to continue the prosecution.

    f. To advance arguments after the Prosecutor has submitted arguments.

    g. To participate in negotiations leading to settlement of compoundable offences.

    v. The victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any adverse order passed by the court acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, imposing inadequate sentence, or granting inadequate compensation. Such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court

    xxxx xxxx xxxx

    8. Much water has flown between (1916) Maung Pu, and the 2003 Recommendations made by Dr. Justice V.S Malimath. The need of the hour is to provide the required attention to the victim. The victim cannot be kept out of the proceedings, especially when the same has commenced by him and for him. Even though the rights of the accused are well addressed based on sound legal principles, the victim however has been completely ignored. Section 24(8) therefore comes to the aid of the complainant/victim to protect his rights. This right is the individual right of the victim. The victim's rights therefore, should not only be enforced but is also a State obligation to do so.

    9. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that by virtue of the impugned order he would not get a fair trial, is only a mere apprehension and there is no basis for such an apprehension. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner pleads apprehension but the same would have to be adequately supported and should be reasonably justified. Only because the complainant has chosen to engage a lawyer of his choice, it cannot be presumed that the trial would not be just or fair. The accused does not have a right to question an appointment of an Advocate of the choice of the complainant. The right to a fair trial is a fundamental right and it cannot be restricted to the accused alone. The right to a fair trial is the fundamental right of every citizen of this Country and more so in the case of a complainant or a victim who has suffered. Therefore, the apprehension of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is ill-founded.

    10. Moreover, it is to be seen that the Presiding Officer is there to protect both the parties, to control the proceedings, and also to check the omissions and commissions of both the counsels. The Court is not a mute spectator in a criminal trial but an effective participant therein. The aim of a trial is ultimately the quest for truth. In the pursuit of the quest for truth nothing should come in the way. Therefore, the apprehension of the petitioner being ill-founded deserves to be rejected.

    11. Delay has not been satisfactorily explained. The accused has no locus standi to question the appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor, made at the behest of the complainant/victim. On an application made by the complainant/victim, the State is bound to accede to such a request subject to restrictions of qualification vide Section 24(8) of the Cr.P.C

    12. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere. The writ petition is accordingly rejected.

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