Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Criminal Petition No. 2229/1999

Attorney(S)

Sri C.V Nagesh and B.R Patil, Advocates for Petitionee
Sri Taranath Shetty, CGSC for Respondent

Judges

B.K Sangalad, J.

Acts

SECTION 17 PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
Sections 161, 165 or 165A of Indian Penal Code
Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13
sub-section (1) of Section 3
Clause (e) of Section 5(1)
basis.10. Sub-section 2
Section 13(1)(e)

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.K. Sangalad, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an order dated 9.8.1999 which directed framing of a charge and continuation of trial under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The charge-sheet alleged that between 9.8.1988 and 31.10.1997 the petitioner, while holding public offices (Legislator, Minister, Chief Minister and Member of Parliament), acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. The items relied upon by the prosecution are enumerated in Schedule B (Statement B) attached to the order.

The petitioner filed the present petition seeking quashing of further proceedings on several grounds (summarised below). The trial court had framed charge and the Special Judge for CBI cases at Bangalore had been trying the matter; the present court was called upon to examine whether there was sufficient material and whether procedures and statutory mandates were complied with.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether there was material to legally and properly frame a charge under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 based on the record before the court.
Whether the investigation was validly conducted in view of Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (i.e., whether investigators who actually conducted the probe were authorised and whether authorisations complied with the mandatory requirement).
Whether statements and material obtained by officers who lacked the statutory authorisation under Section 17 could be relied upon for framing of charge.
Whether registered partition deeds (notably the deed dated 25.5.1986 and another dated 26.7.1974) operate to exclude certain properties from the check period and from being treated as petitioner’s disproportionate assets.
Whether allegations of benami transactions were supported by admissible material and legal proof sufficient to justify framing of charge.
Whether there was valid appointment/notification empowering the specific Special Judge (the XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge) to try the case, and if not, whether trial would be without jurisdiction.
Whether Section 13(1)(e) (and the opportunity to explain under that provision) is mandatory so as to vitiate proceedings if opportunity was not afforded.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

The prosecution has incorrectly taken into account assets and liabilities of the petitioner's wife and two sons and business establishments attached to them to show disproportionate assets.
The investigation was conducted by persons who were not designated or authorised as investigating officers under the statute (Section 17) and therefore such investigation (and material obtained) is invalid.
Joint family properties and family assets (including properties covered by partition deeds) ought not to have been used to show the petitioner's disproportionate assets; specifically, there is a registered Partition Deed dated 25.5.1986 that was not noticed by the prosecution.
There was no notification empowering the XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge to try this case as a Special Judge, and thus trial may be without jurisdiction.
Specific items (notably items 14–18 and 77 in Statement B) relate to the petitioner but other items belong to family members; many items have been accounted for in income tax returns and therefore explained.
Statements relied upon (for benami allegations), notably of CW 36 and CW 37, were recorded by an Inspector who lacked statutory authorisation and therefore cannot be looked into.

Respondent (CBI) Arguments (as recorded)

The Special Court appointed to try such cases has jurisdiction over cases investigated by the CBI.
The assets held in the name of the Education Society (Sharavathi Education Trust), Varalakshmi Finance Company and in the names of the sons were, in reality, assets of the petitioner — mere devices to show them in others’ names (i.e., the petitioner was "the brain" behind those assets).
There was prior authorisation to investigate (authorisations dated 21.10.1997 and 3.2.1998) and other officers who participated were assisting the authorised investigation.
Even a strong suspicion may be sufficient at the stage of framing charge to proceed to trial; reliance on precedents to that effect was argued.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bhajan Lal's case (1992 Crl. L.J 527)	Permission authorising an officer of lower rank to conduct an investigation is not to be treated as a routine matter; the order granting permission should disclose reasons and be a judicial/exercised discretion (principle cited regarding strict compliance with statutory authorisation provisions).	The court relied on the principle to hold that Section 17 (mandatory authorisation for investigation by certain ranks) must be strictly complied with and that the prosecution's lacuna in not showing specific authorisation for lower-ranking officers is fatal to reliance on material they obtained.
A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973 Cri LJ 902) (SC) — cited in Bhajan Lal	Authority cited in connection with the requirement that designated ranks investigate certain offences and that exceptions require reasons and disclosure.	Referenced as supporting authority in the exposition of the Bhajan Lal principle; used to support the view that strict compliance is necessary (as per the Bhajan Lal conspectus cited in the order).
Jayalalitha's case (1999 AIR SCW 1579)	Addresses appointment of Special Judge to try cases and considerations such as speedy disposal; precedent concerning appointment of Special Judge to try cases against a public figure.	The respondent relied on it to justify the appointment of a Special Judge. The court distinguished it on facts and observed that the present case required a specific notification empowering the particular Special Judge; thus the Jayalalitha decision was not directly applicable absent such notification.
State of Maharashtra v. Ramkrishna Dorkar (1995 3 Crl. L.J 2521)	Relied upon by petitioner concerning procedural fairness/opportunity to explain (as invoked by petitioner counsel).	Petitioner relied on this decision for the argument that opportunity was not given; court considered it but, on balance with other authorities, concluded that Section 13(1)(e) is not mandatory in the sense asserted and rejected the submission based on this precedent alone.
Supdt. & Remembrancer Legal Affairs W.B. v. Anil Kumar (1979 Crl. L.J 1390)	Relied upon by respondent on the question of procedural requirements and opportunity; used in the contest on whether Section 13(1)(e) is mandatory.	The respondent relied on it; the court reviewed both competing authorities and concluded that Section 13(1)(e) is not mandatory such that absence of opportunity in the manner claimed would vitiate the proceedings.
Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P. (AIR 1977 SC 796)	The burden of proving a transaction is benami rests strictly on the person asserting it; benami is essentially a question of intention and requires definite legal evidence not conjecture or surmise.	The court cited the principle to emphasize that benami allegations demand strict proof and should not be sustained merely on suspicion or weak inferences; this supported the court's reluctance to rely on the challenged statements as sufficient to frame a charge for benami transactions.
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (ILR 1998 KAR 3599 SC)	Recognizes that although suspicion can sometimes justify framing of charge, it is futile to proceed on material which would render a trial foregone and where invoking inherent jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) may be appropriate.	The court invoked this authority to justify the use of Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings when material before the court did not permit reasonable reliance to frame charges that would survive closer scrutiny at trial.
Ramappa Basappa Palled v. Smt. Basava (ILR 1993 3 KAR 1865)	Principles concerning presumption of joint family property and the effect of partition (relied upon by petitioner counsel).	The court considered this authority as part of the materials on joint-family/partition issues and treated registered partition deeds as significant evidence of severance of joint-family status in evaluating whether properties belonged to the petitioner.
M.N. Arya Murthi v. M.L. Subbaraya (AIR 1972 SC 1279)	Authority cited concerning joint family property and presumptions about the nucleus of family property.	Relied upon by petitioner counsel and considered by the court in assessing whether presumption that petitioner formed the nucleus of joint family property could be drawn; the court found such presumption unjustified on the materials.
S.A. Quddus v. Veerappa (AIR 1994 KAR 20)	Another authority on joint-family property and related presumptions (cited by petitioner counsel).	Considered alongside other decisions on partition and joint-family assets; supported the court's approach to give weight to registered partition deeds and separate income-tax assessments of adult sons.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequential examination of statutory compliance, the quality of the investigation, the nature of the alleged benami transactions, the effect of registered partition deeds and whether the material before the court sufficed for framing of charge.

Statutory authorisation under Section 17 (mandatory requirement):
The court reproduced Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (providing rank thresholds for officers who may investigate offences under the Act) and held that for offences within Section 13, investigation cannot proceed without authorisation as required. The record showed two authorisations (21.10.1997 to Mr. Parameshwarappa and 3.2.1998 to Mr. Chopra), but material indicated that other officers (Mr. Ramakrishna, Mr. Chaka, Mr. Ramachandran and an Inspector Ramakrishnaiah) actually recorded statements and investigated. The court held that Section 17 is mandatory and the prosecution could not rely on a post-factum ratification or deeming that non-authorised officers were merely "assisting" without formal authorisation. This lacuna in authorisation was a "patent lacuna."
Effect of unauthorised investigation on admissibility and sufficiency of evidence:
The court emphasised practical difficulties: with 298 witnesses and 2048 documents, piecemeal investigation by unauthorised officers makes it difficult to rely on any material which they collected, because authorised officer-collected material may not advance the prosecution whereas material gathered by unauthorised officers (if treated as important) cannot be the legal basis for framing charge. The court rejected the proposition that investigation could be ratified subsequently and observed that allowing such a practice would prejudice the defence.
Reliance on precedents about authorisation:
The court discussed the Bhajan Lal principle (that granting permission to lower-ranked officers to investigate must disclose reasons and is not routine). The court found the petitioner's reliance on Bhajan Lal persuasive and concluded that the lacuna of not showing proper authorisation could not be remedied by prosecution's assertions.
Special Judge appointment/notification (Section 4):
The court examined Section 4 of the Act concerning cases triable by Special Judges and noted that there was no notification showing that the XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge had been empowered to try this case. The respondent's reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Jayalalitha's case was found inapplicable on the facts because that decision involved different questions and did not negate the requirement of appropriate notification in the present circumstances. The court indicated that absent the notification, trial might be without jurisdiction and gave weight to the petitioner's submission on this point.
Opportunity and Section 13(1)(e):
The petitioner contended that no opportunity was given to explain satisfactorily; competing precedents were cited. The court concluded that Section 13(1)(e) is not mandatory in the sense contended by the petitioner and therefore rejected that specific submission (i.e., lack of opportunity under that provision did not by itself invalidate proceedings).
Partition deeds and assessment of assets:
The court carefully examined the registered partition deeds dated 26.7.1974 and 25.5.1986. These deeds had been acted upon (mutations in revenue records) and were not disputed by the prosecution. The court held that properties covered under these registered partition deeds did not fall within the check period and therefore could not be included as disproportionate assets for the check period under consideration. The court treated registered partition deeds as significant evidence of severance of joint-family status for those properties.
Benami allegations and witness statements (CW 36 and CW 37):
The trial court had relied on statements of CW 36 and CW 37 to regard certain agricultural land transactions as benami. However, those statements were recorded by Inspector Ramakrishnaiah (on 16.1.1998 and 13.3.1998) without evidence of authorisation under Section 17; therefore the court held such statements could not be looked into. The court also noted that some of the properties allegedly acquired were not included in Schedule B (the items forming the basis for disproportionate assets) and hence could not be grounds for framing charge.
Burden of proof on benami and surrounding material:
The court invoked the Krishnanand Agnihotri principle that the burden to show a transaction is benami rests heavily on the party asserting it and requires definite legal evidence; conjecture and surmise are inadequate. The court found that the prosecution had not discharged that burden with respect to the contested properties and that income-tax returns and disclosures produced by the investigating agency further weakened the benami case.
Specific items and Statement B evaluation:
The court examined Statement B and noted that, of 79 items, the petitioner was concerned with items 14–18 and 77. The valuation of those items was set out in the order. The court observed that many other items in Statement B related to the sons or the wife, and that adult sons were capable of earning and were income-tax assessees. Given the partition deeds, tax disclosures and lack of convincing material tying those family-owned assets to the petitioner alone, the court found it difficult to draw an inference that the petitioner alone amassed those properties.
Use of inherent jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) and overall assessment:
The court recognized that a charge can sometimes be framed on suspicion, but invoked Pepsi Foods and similar reasoning to conclude that it would be futile to go to trial on the present material which, on scrutiny, did not permit a sustainable case. The court emphasized the need for a "solid foundation" for allegations; lacking such foundation and given statutory non-compliance and weak evidentiary basis, the court concluded that proceedings should be quashed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed; the further proceedings pending before the 21st Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore, stand quashed and the accused is discharged.

Implications:

Direct effect: The trial court's order framing charge was quashed, further proceedings in the Special Court were quashed, and the accused was discharged.
Procedural message: The decision underscores strict compliance with statutory authorisation provisions (Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act) before investigative acts and statements are treated as valid; material gathered by unauthorised officers cannot be automatically relied upon or retrospectively ratified.
On evidentiary standards: The court reiterated that allegations of benami require strict proof and cannot rest on conjecture or surmise; registered partition deeds and income-tax disclosures carry significant weight in assessing ownership/possession for disproportionate-asset inquiries.
Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying existing authorities; the decision is driven by the specific combination of statutory non-compliance, the nature of the evidentiary record and the presence of registered partition deeds. No sweeping new legal doctrine is announced in the text beyond the application of established principles.

End of summary — all content above is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

S. Bangarappa v. State - By Central Bureau Of Investigation

B.K Sangalad, J.:—

Being aggrieved by the order dated 9.8.1999 ordering for framing of the charge for the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and to proceed with the trial, the petitioner has filed this petition challenging the correctness and legality of the same with a prayer to quash the further proceedings.

2. The allegation as disclosed in the charge sheet filed against the petitioner is that between 9.8.1988 and 31.10.1997, the petitioner, in his capacity as Legislator, Minister, Chief Minister and as the Member of the Parliament acquired the assets disproportionate to the known source of his income. The whole basis for framing of the charge depends upon the number of items enumerated in Schedule B II.

3. Mr. B.R Patil, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the allegation is baseless as the investigating agency has taken into account the assets and liabilities of the wife and two sons of the petitioner and of their business establishments to which they are attached to in different capacities. It is also further submitted that the investigation is made by the persons who were not designated as Investigating Officers and the Joint family properties ought not to have been taken to show that his assets are disproportionate to the known source of income. Lastly the contention of the petitioner is that the prosecution has omitted to notice the Partition Deed dated 25.5.1986 On the otherhand, Mr. Taranath Shetty, learned Counsel for CBI has vehemently opposed these submissions stating that the Court which has been appointed as Special Court to try such nature of cases, has got the jurisdiction to try the cases investigated by the C.B.I He also contended that the Education Society running in Shimoga by name Sharavathi Education Trust and the Finance company by name Varalakshmi Finance Company and the assests standing in the name of their sons were the assets of the petitioner. It is only a make believe affair to show that they are the assets of his sons and wife. In all the transactions it is only the petitioner who is brain behind all these assests.

4. In view of these rival contentions now it is to be seen whether there is any material to frame the charge.

5. It is pertinent to note that Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) empowers the persons to authorise to investigate. For quick reference, the Section itself is reproduced.

“17. Persons authorised to investigate:— Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank-

(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;

(b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) of an Assistant Commissioner of Police;

shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without a warrant.

Provided that if a police Officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order; he may also investigate any such offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefor without a warrant;

Provided further that an offence referred to in Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall not be investigated without the order of a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.”

6. According to this Section, as the charge will be within ambit of Section 13 of the Act, the offence shall not be investigated without the order of the Police Officer not below the rank of the Superintendent of Police. The first authorisation has seen the light of the day on 21.10.1997 One Mr. Parameshwarappa was authorised to investigate the case. The second authorisation has seen the light of the day on 3.2.1998 It was given to Mr. Chopra. But the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that unfortunately it was not Mr. Chopra who investigated the case but the other Police Officers namely Mr. Ramakrishna, Mr. Chaka, and Mr. Ramachandran have investigated the case. According to him, their investigation is without any authorisation. Mr. Tharanath opposed this submission stating that since there is already authorisation to investigate the case, it is only deemed that they have assisted the further investigation. Although his submission may appear to have some force, there is no compliance of the mandate of law by the prosecution authority. One can understand, if there is no mandatory provision, it is left to the discretion of the Superintendent of Police to assign his work provided the statute permits. But to investigate, Section 17 of the Act is mandatory in nature. No Officer below the rank of Dy. Superintendent of Police shall investigate the case. In case if he has not carried on the investigation, there must be some order authorising the other person to go on with the investigation in the case on hand. This is the patent lacuna.

7. It is also pertinent to note that in all 298 witnesses are cited and there are in all 2048 documents. If the investigation has proceeded in piece meal, it is difficult to draw any kind of inference in favour of the prosecution because such of the material which has been investigated by the Authorised Officer may not advance the case of the prosecution and if such matter by the unauthorised officer assumes importance, then naturally it becomes difficult to make it as basis for framing the charge as there is lacuna in the investigation. In my opinion when there is mandatory provision, the prosecution cannot say that the investigation could be ratified subsequently at any stage. If such things are allowed to take place, practically the defence would be in a precarious condition.

8. Mr. Taranath, learned Counsel for the respondent tried to make distinction with regard to the principles enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case, reported in 1992 Crl. L.J 527. His submission for the reasons stated therein cannot be accepted. The learned Counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon this decision. It stated in paras 134 and 135 as follows:—

“134. The conspectus of the above decisions clearly that the granting of permission under Section 5A authoring an officer of lower rank to conduct the investigation is not to be treated by a Magistrate as mere matter of routine, but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying and the order giving the permission should, on the fact of it, disclose the reasons for grating such permission. It is therefore, clear in the light of the above principle of law that the Superintendent of Police or any Police Officer of above rank while granting permission to a non-designated Police Officer in exercise of his power under the second proviso to Section 5A(1), should satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons to entrust the investigation with such Police Officer of a lower rank and record his reasons for doing do; because the very object of the legislature in enacting Section 5A is to see that the investigation of offences punishable under Sections 161, 165 or 165A of Indian Penal Code as well as those under Section 5 of the Act should be done ordinarily by the officers designated in Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 5A(1). The exception should be for adequate reasons which should be disclosed on the face of the order. In this connection, it is worthy to note that the strict compliance with Section 5A(1) becomes absolutely necessary, because Section 5A(1) expressly prohibits Police Officers, below certain ranks, from investigating into offences under Sections 161, 165 and 165-A, IPC and under Section 5 of the Act without orders of the Magistrates specified therein or without authorisation of the State Government in this behalf and from effecting arrests for those offences without a warrant. See also A.C Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973 Cri LJ 902)(SC) (supra).

135. In the present case, there is absolutely no reason, given by the S.P in directing the SHO to investigate and as such the order of the SP is directly in violation of the dictum laid down by the Court in several decisions which we have referred to above. Resultantly, we hold that the third appellant, SHO is not clothed with the requisite legal authority within the meaning of the second proviso of Section 5A(1) of the Act to investigate the offence under Clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act.”

The case on hand cannot be treated lightly and the lacuna of the prosecution cannot be filled in by the whims and fancies of the prosecution.

9. The another contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is no notification to try the cases in compliance of Section 4 of the Act which reads as follows:—

4. Cases triable by Special Judges - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law for the time being in force, the offences specified in sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be tried by Special Judges only.

2) Every offence specified in sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be tried by the Special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or, as the case may be, by the Special Judge appointed for the case, or where there are more Special Judges than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government.

3) When trying any case, a Special Judge may also try any offence, other than an offence specified in Section 3, with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial.

4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974), a Special Judge shall, as far as practicable, hold the trial of an offence on day-to-day basis.

10. Sub-section 2 clearly enumerates that every offences specified in sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be tried by the Special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or, as the case may be, by the Special Judge appointed for the case, or where there are more special Judges than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government.

11. There is no notification in this case that the XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge was empowered to try this Case. Mr. Tharanath, learned Counsel for respondent relied upon the decision popularly known as Jayalalitha'a case reported in 1999 AIR SCW 1579. The points involved in that case are entirely different from the facts of this case. The very question of appointing the Special Judge was challenged to try all cases against her. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is nothing wrong for the appointment of Special Judge to try all the cases as the speedy disposal is one of the criteria. Hence in my opinion, by close scrutiny of the Judgment cited by Tharanath, learned Counsel for respondent, is not applicable unless there is notification if any, to try such case, otherwise it will, be a trial without jurisdiction. In view of these facts and circumstances, I feel that there is some force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to explain satisfactorily and relied upon the decision in the case of State Of Maharashtra…Applicant; v. Ramkrishna Dorkar…Non-Applicant. . 1995 3 Crl. L.J 2521.. As against this, Mr. Taranath relied upon the decision in the case of Supdt. and Remembrancer Lecgal Affairs W.B v. Anil Kumar . 1979 Crl. L.J 1390.. Their Lordships are of the opinion that Section 13(1)(e) is not mandatory. In view of this finding, I am constrained to reject the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

13. What remains in this case is that whether the registered Partition dated 25.5.86 has to be taken into consideration so as to assess the assets of the petitioner.

13. No doubt the petitioner has been in politics as MLA, MP, Minister, Chief Minister since long. But now the prosecution has fixed the period between 9.9.1988 and 31.10.1997 The burden is heavily on the prosecution machinery to show that the petitioner is the brain behind Varalakshmi Finance and Sharavathi Education Trust.

14. At this Juncture only it has to be mentioned that the petitioner has got two sons. Of the two, one is a film actor and another one is running the business in the name of Akash Audio. Out of 79 items according to the petitioner, he is concerned with only items 14 to 18 and 77. Assuming for the moment that it is true, what would be the assets standing in the name of this petitioner? The valuation is as follows as shown in Statement ‘B’.

Item No. 14 1,30,740-00 Item No. 15 8,91,250-00 Item No. 16 13,840-00 Item No. 17 1,44,700-00 Item No. 18 1,21,600-00 Item No. 77 4,50,000-00

For quick reference, Statement ‘B’ is annexed to this order.

15. The rest of the items either belongs to the sons or to the wife. This is the material collected by the Investigating agency. There is already partition deed. At this stage, there is no material to rebut the presumption of the partition. One can understand if it is an oral partition or unregistered partition. So partition deed assumes lot of importance. For a moment, if other items are takeh into consideration whether there is any material to show that it is benami transaction or it is only the petitioner who has amassed the wealth in the guise of his sons and wife. The investigating authority itself collected even income tax returns for the said period. All the members of the family are parties to the partition and have paid the income tax. It is the investigating agency which has produced all these materials. When such is the case, it is difficult to assume that it is only the petitioner who has amassed this wealth using his brain. No doubt when all these items namely 1 to 19 are checked out, they appear to be more lucrative. But this is not sufficient. There must be some material on record to show that it is only the petitioner and none else acquired these properties in the name of the members of his family. He has got adult sons who are capable of, themselves, earning. This inference is drawn because they are income tax assesses. The petitioner has nothing to do either with Sharavathi Education Trust or with Varalakshmi Finance Company. Merely his sons have borrowed the money for the purpose of their business, there cannot be any imputation against the petitioner.

16. The next question is whether the properties belonging to his sons and wife can be part and parcel of the petitioner as they are living jointly. As far as presumption of joint family property and the nucleus of the joint family property are concerned the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the various decisions viz., in the case of Ramappa Basappa Palled v. Smt. Basava* . ILR 1993 3 KAR 1865 relevant 1866., in the case of M.N Arya Murthi v. M.L Subbaraya . AIR 1972 SC 1279 1280 Head Note B Para 17., in the case of S.A Quddus v. Veerappa . AIR 1994 KAR 20.. In fitness of things, it is better to deal in detail regarding the factum of partition.

17. Inview of the statements of Annappa and Puttappa, CW 36 and CW 3, the properties relating to the agricultural lands purchased by Puttappa and Annappa and thereafter it was transferred in favour of Sridhar B. Naik, Premachandsagar and Ningappa, which has been discussed at length from paragraphs 53 to 58 is a benami transaction. Therefore, relying on the statements of CW 36 and CW 37, the Court has formed an opinion to frame a charge against the petitioner/accused. Since there are two partition deeds which are registered and dated 26.7.1974 and dated 25.5.1986 these two documents have been acted upon by the parties by mutating entries in the revenue records of the allotted properties and therefore is also no dispute about the partition deeds and the counsel appearing for the respondent also conceded that the prosecution has not disputed the said partition deeds. In view of these circumstances, the properties which have been covered under the deeds do not include in the check period. It is, therefore, the properties covered under the partition deeds since it is not covered under the check period, the question of looking into these properties does not arise at all.

18. It is also submitted by the Petitioner-accused, that once there is registered partition deed by metes and bounds, there is a presumption that there is a severance of status of the joint family is supported by the recital in the registered partition deed which is a conclusive proof to show that there is severance of status. It is, therefore, the finding recorded by the Trial Court that there is no partition at all is contrary to the records.

19. In so far as the benami transaction is concerned, the Trial Court concentrated only on agricultural properties acquired by the petitioner-accused, based on the statement of CW 36 and CW 37. The statement of these two witnesses have been recorded by one Inspector, Ramakrishnaiah on 16.1.1998 and 13.3.1998 There is no authorisation by the Superintendent of Police as provided under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, so far as this Inspector is concerned as such it cannot be looked into.

20. Further the so called agricultural lands said to have been acquired by the petitioner/accused, based on the statement of CW 36 and CW 37 cannot be looked into because these are not the properties included in the disproportionate assets under Schedule B. There is no charge sheet against these items. Therefore, the Court cannot go into these items.

21. The petitioner accused submits that CW 36 has clearly stated that the purchase sale consideration has been paid by him only. Further if the statement of CW 37 is contrary to the recital in the sale deed, in view of the decision in the case of Krishnanand Agnihotri v. State of M.P . AIR 1977 SC 796., the case has to be seen on suspicion and surmises. The relevant portion of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited supra reads as follows:—

“It is well settled that the burden of showing that a particular transaction is benami and the owner is not the real owner always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an interference of that fact. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick well which cannot be easily piereced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of the serious onus that rests on his nor justify the acceptance of more conjectures or surmises as a substitute for proof.”

21. And it is not safe to rely on the statement of the CW 37 as these properties are not included in the Schedule B stated to have been acquired disproportionately.

22. The Lokayuktha in its report dated 21.11.1989 which has been communicated to the Petitioner/accused, by an office endorsement on 25.11.1989, took decision that the allegation that the accused holding properties as benami transaction was rejected by the Lokayuktha. Further the properties which have been subsequently purchased by the petitioner-accused have been disclosed in the income tax returns, which have been collected by the investigating agency and produced before the Court. For ready reference, the counsel for the petitioner-accused, also produced before the Court to show that the agricultural land which has been purchased during the check period has been properly accounted and disclosed. Therefore, so far as the items 14 to 18 are concerned, the same have been explained satisfactorily and there is no basis to proceed against the petitioner-accused. Therefore, the findings of the Trial Court in paragraphs 53 to 58 against the petitioner accused cannot be sustainable in view of the above circumstances.

23. It is clearly admitted by the petitioner that they are living under the one roof. Inspite of this state of affairs and in view of these decisions, it cannot be stated that it is the petitioner who formed the nucleus of the joint family property alone and it is only due to this nucleus, he amassed the wealth. This presumption is not at all available for the simple reason that the adult sons are on their own. They either sink or sail along with their assets and liabilities. At one stage, the arguments by Mr. Taranath went to the extent of stating that the first son of the petitioner is a film actor who took acting for the sake of unearthing the hidden money. The counsel for the petitioner vehemently opposed this submission sating that if the film flops, it is the misfortune of the producer and if the film hits the box office, it is Midas touch for the producer. Art is long but life is short. No artist can venture to dig his own grave instead of exhibiting his talents. Every artist will have an ardent desire to make his name immortal.

24. The prosecution cannot be swayed away by the personalities involved in the case. It has to be very cautious about the floating rumours. Rumours always murmer. It is human tendency to lend ears for rumours. But it is the duty of the prosecution to collect such material as to ward off all conjectures and surmises. It should be the real fact and not a make believe affair.

25. Mr. Tharanath, vehemently contended that even a strong suspicion is sufficient to frame the charge. Nodoubt it may be the position of law. Nevertheless in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate . ILR 1998 KAR 3599 SC. it is held that it is futile exercise to go with such material which warrants same results at this stage itself which would be after the trial. In view of this, there is nothing wrong in invoking Section 482 of Cr. P.C

26. Although it may not be relevant, before parting with this case, I am inclined to mention the following few lines.

27. The aim of the prosecution cannot be only to break the bones but punish the guilty to the hilt. The weight of the paper spent in recording the statement is not the criteria. An ounce of evidence is worth more than the tin of allegation. The edifice of allegation should not crumble down by its own weight. A solid foundation is a must to support the edifice. The investigation must ward off all surmises and conjectures. The quality of investigation must not create ripples of suspicion. The accused should feel that he is left with no option otherwise than yielding himself to the tightening noose around the neck. The strength of the defence depends upon the strength of the weakest link of the chain of prosecution.

28. No doubt corruption affects the moral fabric of the society. The citizens loose their faith in the political leaders who shout that they are for the people. No doubt many people go unpunished although corruption causes considerable damage to the economy of the nation. The roots of corruption are so deep that it is an uphill task to eradicate them. It is only possible if and only if each citizen in our country follows the philosophy of contentment. To quench the thirst of greed and lust one must be drenched in shower of honesty and the fountain of sublime love should sprinkle the magical drops on the eyes of everyone who has shut his eyes for the reality of the life. Unless one tries to find a golden key to open the gates of wisdom, the heavenly life remains as a myth and we are all making the futile effort to attain divinity in our life. The public man should have crystal clear and transferent personality. Ceaser's wife must be above suspicion.

29. At the cost of repetition, after the close scrutiny of the materials, I am left with no option otherwise than quashing the proceedings.

In the result, the petition is allowed. The further proceedings pending on the file of the 21st Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore, stands quashed, Consequently the accused stands discharged.

STATEMENT - B

ASSETS ACQUIRED DURING THE CHECK

PERIOD FROM 09.09.1988 TO 31.10.1997

(MOVABLE & IMMOVABLE)

Sl. No. Description of assets Amount 1. Site No. CTS-2922, Ward-I, Koppikar Road, Hubli in the name of Akash Audio, dated 28.2.94 a) Cost of Land - 1,67,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 20,050-00 c) Registration fees - 3,386-00 1,90,436-00

2. Site No. CTS-2922, Ward-I, Koppikar Road, Hubli in the name of Akash Audio, dated 28.2.94 a) Cost of Land - 1,60,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 19,200-00 c) Registration fees - 3,246-00 1,82,446-00 3. House No. 59, Malleshwaram, 18th Cross, Bangalore to Renukamba Combines vide Sale deed registered at No. 284/97, dated 31.3.1997 a) Cost of House - 31,00,000-00 b) Stamp duty paid on 24.3.97 through RBI - 3,87,500-00 c) Registration fees paid on 31.3.1997 to Sub Registrar, Bangalore vide receipt No. 89050 - 62,060-00 35,49,560-00 4. House No. 36, East Park, Bangalore purchased by Sri Kumar Bangarappa during 1997 (Second floor). a) Cost of II Floor - 17,75,000-00 b) Stamp duty paid on 15.3.97 through RBI - 1,47,500-00 c) Registration fees paid on 15.3.1997 to Sub Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore. - 35,540-00 19,58,040-00 5. House No. 36, East Park, Bangalore to Renukamba Associates. a) Cost of GROUND FLOOR - 14,51,000-00 b) Stamp duty paid on 12.2.97 through RBI challan by Renukamba Associates. - 1,20,450-00 c) Registration fees paid on 11.3.1997 to Sub Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore. - 62,060-00 a) Cost of FIRST FLOOR - 17,75,000-00 b) Stamp duty paid on 12.3.97 through RBI challan by Renukamba Associates. - 1,47,500-00 c) Registration fees paid on 13.3.1997 to Sub Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore. - 35,560-00 a) Cost of THIRD FLOOR - 17,75,000-00 b) Stamp duty paid on 15.3.97 through RBI challan by Renukamba Associates. - 1,47,500-00 c) Registration fees paid on 18.3.1997 to Sub Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore. - 35,540-00 55,16,620-00

6. Purchase of land at Sy. No. 203/2, Hale Soraba by Sri Kumar Bangarappa in the name of Renukamba Associates on 7.11.96 a) Cost of Land - 5,99,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 77,990-00 c) Registration fees - 6,520-00 6,83,510-00 7. Purchase of land at Sy. No. 5, Anavatti village, Soraba in the name of Renukamba Associates on 20.07.95 a) Cost of Land - 70,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 9,500-00 c) Registration fees - 7,972-00 87,472-00 8. Purchase of land at Sy. No. 46, Khatha No. 83, Soraba in the name of Renukamba Associates on 28.07.95 a) Cost of Land - 1,43,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 19,300-00 c) Registration fees - 4,432-00 1,66,732-00 9. Purchase of land at Sy. No. 56, Hireshakuna village, Soraba in the name of Renukamba Associates on 4.11.96 a) Cost of Land - 3,59,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 46,800-00 c) Registration fees - 7,206-00 4,13,006-00

10. Purchase of land at Sy. No. 203/2, Hale Soraba by Sri Kumar Bangarappa in the name of Manjunatha Enterprises on 7.11.96 a) Cost of Land - 5,99,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 77,990-00 c) Registration fees - 6,520-00 6,83,510-00 11. Purchase of land at No. CTS 118, Hubli in the name of M.G Enterprises. a) Cost of Land - 1,80,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 40,500-00 c) Registration fees - 9,566-00 2,30,066-00 12. House at No. 340, IV Main, Sadhashivnagar, Bangalore. a) Cost of House paid to Canara Bank, ARM, M.G Road, Bangalore upto 16.10.97 - 1,01,00,000-00 b) Amount paid to Sri Prakash M. Shinde during 1992-1995. - 40,00,000-00 c) Stamp fees on 2.5.97 through RBI. - 12,25,000-00 d) Registration fees paid on 26.6.97 to Sub Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore. - 1,96,050-00 e) Tax paid to Bangalore City Corporation. - 24,500-00 f) Valuation done by CPWD, Bangalore for alteration and addition made after 1992 to 31.10.97 - 44,74,200-00 2,00,19,750-00 13. Purchase land at Sy. No. 12/2, Arjunabettahalli, Nelamangala by Sri S.B Madhuchandra from Sri Linganna as per deed No. 2664/94-95, dated 8.6.95 with Sub Registrar, Nelamangala. a) Cost of Land - 4,15,000-00 b) Stamp fees on 9.3.95 - 54,000-00 c) Registration fees in 1995 - 8,360-00 4,77,360-00

14. BDA Site at HSR Layout, Bangalore purchased by Sri S. Bangarappa allotted by BDA in 1996. a) Cost of Site - 1,11,900-00 b) Registration fees - 2,260-00 c) Stamp fees - 12,080-00 d) Slum charges - 2,500-00 e) Registration fees - 2,000-00 1,30,740-00 15. Land at Sy. No. 114, 116, Lakkavally purchased by Sri S. Bangarappa on 9.5.94 a) Cost of Site - 7,75,000-00 b) Registration fees - 15,500-00 c) Stamp fees - 1,00,750-00 8,91,250-00 16. Land at Sy. No. 114.p, Lakkavally purchased by Sri S. Bangarappa on 9.5.94 a) Cost of Site - 12,000-00 b) Registration fees - 240-00 c) Stamp fees - 1,600-00 13,840-00 17. Land at Sy. No. 115, Lakkavally purchased by Sri S. Bangarappa on 28.7.95 a) Cost of Site - 1,25,000-00 b) Registration fees - 2,500-00 c) Stamp fees - 17,200-00 1,44,700-00 18. Land at Sy. No. 4, Kodikoppa was purchased by Sri S. Bangarappa on 25.4.97 a) Cost of Site - 1,05,000-00 b) Registration fees - 2,100-00 c) Stamp fees - 14,500-00 1,21,600-00 19. Purchased Land at Sy. No. 115.p, Lakkavally on 8.5.95 by Sri S.B Madhuchandra. a) Cost of Site - 1,10,000-00 b) Registration fees - 2,200-00 c) Stamp fees - 14,800-00 1,26,500-00

20. Purchased Land at Sy. No. 10, and 11 by Sri S.B Madhuchandra entered at Sy. No. 42/95 on 17.3.95 a) Cost of Land - 60,000-00 b) Stamp fees - 7,800-00 c) Registration fees - 1,200-00 69,000-00 21. Movable assets purchased by Akash Offest Printers out of loan taken from Prakash Leasing Ltd., as per the I.T Returns of the period ending 31.3.1997 51,25,859-00 22. Cash in hand with the firm Akash Audio as per the I.T Returns for the period ending 31.3.1997 11,43,454-08 23. Advances and Deposits made by Akash Audio as per the I.T Returns for the Period ending 31.3.1997 19,94,299-00 24. Assets of Akash Audio as per the I.T Returns for the period ending 31.3.1997 (After depreciation) a) Auto - 20,000-00 b) Computer - 1,81,400-00 c) Cycle - 3,986-00 d) Pager - 6,350-00 e) Voltage Stabilizer - 21,83,700-00 23,95,436-00 25. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 1970 in the Vysya Bank, Hubli in the name of Akash Audio as on 31.10.1997 88,421-00 26. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 651 in the name of Akash Audio as on 31.10.1997 1,313-50 27. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 475 in the name of Akash Audio as on 28.3.1997 13,551-52

28. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 11319 in Vysya Bank, Vijayawada in the name of Akash Audio. 18,435-75 29. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 476 in the name of Akash Offset Printers as on 31.3.1997 5,610-84 30. Plant and Machinery and other assets of Akash Audio Video (P) Ltd., as per the I.T Returns for the period ending 31.3.1997 1,18,44,390-62 31. Closing balance in the A/c No. 5452 in Caniara Bank, Madhava Nagar, Bangalore in the name of Akash Audio Video (P) Ltd., as on 31.10.1997 30,278-75 32. Current A/c No. 1923 in Vysya Bank, K.G Road, Bangalore in the name of Akash Audio Video (P) Ltd., (A/c closed on 28.7.97) NIL 33. Current A/c No. 2492 in Vysya Bank, K.G Road, Bangalore in the name of Akash Audio Video (P) Ltd., (A/c closed on 28.7.97) NIL 34. Assets of Renukamba Distributors as on 31.3.1993 as per I.T Returns. 13,64,494-20 35. Camera purchased in 1994 by Renukamba Combines. 34,62,701-50 36. Assets of Renukamba Combines: Plant and Machinery and Vehicles. 9,24,621-00 37. Closing balance in A/c No. 546 in the name of Renukamba Combines (Unit) as on 10.05.95 220-90 38. Closing balance in A/c No. 434 in the name of Renukamba Combines (Edit) as on 12.02.95 1,222-99 39. Closing balance in A/c No. 365 in the name of Renukamba Combines as on 12.3.95 4,831-00

40. Closing balance in A/c No. 1817 in the name of Renukamba Combines in Vysya Bank, Devaraj Urs Road, Mysore as on 31.10.97 15,510-49 41. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 789 in the name of Renukamba Combines on 31.10.97 in Syndicate Bank. 654-00 42. Vehicle No. KA-04.M.6464 purchased by Renukamba Combines on 21.4.1993 from Ragavendra Enterprises. 3,78,658-00 43. FDR No. 49/94 in Vysya Bank, Sadashiv Nagar, Bangalore on 28.3.1994 for sanction of loan of Rs. 26,25,000/- to Renukamba Combines. 49,119-00 44. Advances given by Renukamba Associates for purchase of TATA Sumo as per the I.T Returns for the period ending 31.3.1997 50,000-00 45. Assets of Renukamba Associates as per the Income Tax Returns as on 31.3.1997 a) Plant and Machinery - 7,45,100-00 b) Hero Puch - 33,364-00 c) Bajaj Scooter - 24,512-00 8,02,976-00 46. Cash in hand with Renukamba Associates as per I.T Returns as on 31.3.1997 12,57,534-34 47. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 250 in the name of Renukamba Associates in Vijaya Bank, Mysore upto 31.10.97 6,317-00 48. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 366 in the name of Renukamba Associates (Closed on 20.5.94). NIL 49. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 639 the name of Renukamba Associates in Vijaya Bank, Bangalore upto 31.10.97 25,657-50

50. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 640 in the name of Renukamba Associates (Edit) in Vijaya Bank, Bangalore upto 31.10.97 21,561-00 51. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 641 in the name of Renukamba Associates (Unit) in Vijaya Bank, Bangalore upto 31.10.97 8,482-00 52. Cash in hand with Akash International as per the I.T Returns as on 31.3.97 6,61,630-87 53. Closing balance in A/c No. 2243, in Vysya Bank, Hubli in the name of Akash International. 1,43,403-50 54. Closing balance in A/c No. 494, in the name of Akash Ads. as on 31.10.97 17,559-80 55. Closing balance in A/c No. 735, in the name of Akash International as on 31.10.97 5,24,803-00 56. Assets of Akash International as per I.T Returns as on 31.3.1997 a) TATA Mobile - 40,960-00 b) Mini Bus - 7,74,393-60 c) Colour Printer - 28,500-00 d) Electric Installation - 2,50,000-00 e) Pager - 1,34,986-75 f) Furniture & Fixtures - 3,78,563-76 16,07,404-11 57. Closing balance in A/c No. 762, in the name of Akash International as on 24.03.97 311-00 58. Cash in hand with Akash Ads. as per the I.T Returns as on 31.3.1996 1,57,390-39 59. Assets of Akash Ads as per I.T Returns as on 31.3.1996 a) Computer - 2,67,200-00 b) Multiplayer Plotter - 1,98,133-00 c) Projector - 14,742-00 d) Cycle - 5,276-95 4,85,351-95

60. Closing balance in Current A/c No. 935, in the name of M.G Enterprises. 810-00 61. Closing balance in A/c No. 150, in Sri Sudha Co-operative Bank, Sheshadripuram, Bangalore in the name of Sri S. Bangarappa as on 31.10.1997 639-00 62. Closing balance in SB A/c No. 3266, as on 7.3.97 in the name of Sri S. Bangarappa. 1,681-00 63. Closing balance in A/c No. 7, in Apex Bank, Vidhana Soudha Bangalore in the name of Sri S. Bangarappa as on 31.10.1997 10,669-43 64. Closing balance in A/c No. 4184, in Vijaya Bank, P.O Branch, Bangalore in the name of Sri S. Bangarappa as on 31.10.1997 3,228-00 65. Closing balance in Jt. A/c No. 9750, in Apex Bank, Vidhana Soudha Bangalore in the name of Sri S. Bangarappa and Smt. Shakunthalamma as on 31.10.1997 11,107-77 66. Closing balance in A/c No. 10782 as on 31.10.97 in Apex Bank, Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore. 14,561-00 67. Closing balance in SB A/c No. 3267 upto October 1997 in the name of Smt. Shakunthalamma. 1,206-19 68. Closing balance in PPF A/c No. 776 in State Bank of India, K.P West as on 31.10.97 in the name of Sri S.B Vasanth Kumar. 98,688-00 69. Closing balance in A/c No. 15101 in Canara Bank, Bangalore as on 31.10.1997 12,805-70 70. Closing balance in A/c No. 2190 in the name of Sri S.B Vasanth Kumar as on 31.10.97 6,972-90 71. Closing balance in A/c No. 11371 in the name of Sri S.B Vasanth Kumar in Canara Bank, Madhavanagar, Bangalore as on 27.06.95 12,040-00

72. Closing balance in A/c No. 4927 in the name of Sri S.B Vasanth Kumar in State Bank of Mysore, S.C Road, Bangalore as on 26.05.90 98,896-30 73. Closing balance in A/c No. 4385 in the name of Sri S.B Kumar Bangarappa in Vijaya Bank, P.O Branch, Bangalore as on 31.10.97 4,10,790-00 74. Closing balance in A/c No. 2189 in the name of Sri S.B Madhuchandra as on 8.11.93 2,395-27 75. Closing balance in A/c No. 2085 in the name of Sri S.B Madhuchandra in Vysya Bank, Frazer Town, Bangalore as on 31.10.97 157-50 76. Closing balance in A/c No. 3929 in the name of Kum. Tej Kumar Bangarappa S/o. S. Kumar Bangarappa in Vijaya Bank, P.O Branch, Bangalore as on 31.10.97 5,710-00 77. Sri S. Bangarappa, HUF Assets as on 31.3.1997 4,50,000-00 78. Gold Jewellary, Diamond, Stones and Silver declared by S/Sri S.B Vasanth Kumar, S.B Madhuchandra and Smt. Shakunthalamma as per Income Tax returns as on 31.3.1997 Rs. 28,49,409-00 was assessed but margin is given to the extent of Rs. 16,94,892-00 since the same has been declared in the I.T Returns. 11,54,517-00 79. Amount received by S/Sri S.B Vasanth Kumar and S.B Madhuchandra as out going partner of SLN Builders. 53,05,708-00 TOTAL 7,78,92,187-46

S. Bangarappa v. State - By Central Bureau Of Investigation

Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.K. Sangalad, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

Respondent (CBI) Arguments (as recorded)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

S. Bangarappa v. State - By Central Bureau Of Investigation

Comments