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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • clauses of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Rule 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules, 1965
  • Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
  • Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • provisions of the Evidence Act (2) PW-1
  • S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • Mysore Registration Rules 1965; (4)
  • SECTION 68 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Mysore Registration Rules 1965
  • S. 63 of Indian Succession Act
  • S. 63, Indian Succession Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • clauses of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • Rule 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules, 1965
  • Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
  • Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • provisions of the Evidence Act (2) PW-1
  • S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act
  • Mysore Registration Rules 1965; (4)
  • SECTION 68 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Mysore Registration Rules 1965
  • S. 63 of Indian Succession Act
  • S. 63, Indian Succession Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal (by S.A. Quddus, the first defendant in the trial) arises under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 31-3-1992 in O.S. No. 326/83, in which the Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City, decreed a suit for declaration of title and perpetual injunction in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents Veerappa (respondent‑1) and his wife Bhagirathamma (respondent‑2, who died during the suit and whose legal representatives were brought on record).

The factual matrix as pleaded and found by the trial Court: Gurunanajaiah and his wife Rudramma had sons Anubasappa (senior) and Nanjappa (junior), and daughters Bhagirathamma (plaintiff No. 2) and Gangamma. Nanjappa, an Ayurvedic practitioner, allegedly acquired the plaint schedule property as his self-acquired property. He died in 1965 intestate and issueless, and his mother Rudramma inherited his properties. Rudramma purportedly executed a will dated 29-3-1970 bequeathing the plaint schedule property to her daughter Bhagirathamma and son‑in‑law Veerappa. Subsequently, Anubasappa's wife Eramma (also spelled Eramma in the record) purportedly sold the same property to the present appellant by sale deed dated 16-1-1975, leading to competing claims and earlier litigation.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs had earlier filed O.S. 106/75 (for injunction) and lost in the trial and first appellate courts; in a second appeal this Court allowed withdrawal of that suit and directed filing of a comprehensive suit, which resulted in O.S. 326/83. The trial Court framed issues, tried oral and documentary evidence, found for the plaintiffs (holding the property to be Nanjappa’s self-acquisition, succeeded by Rudramma, who executed the will in favour of the plaintiffs) and decreed the suit. The present appeal challenges those findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint schedule property was the self-acquired property of Dr. Nanjappa (as found by the trial Court) or joint-family property of Nanjappa and his brother Anubasappa?
  2. Whether Rudramma executed a valid will dated 29-3-1970 bequeathing the plaint schedule property to respondents 1 and 2 (and whether the will satisfies the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act)?
  3. If the will is invalid, whether the appellant (purchaser under sale deed dated 16-1-1975 from Eramma) is entitled to relief as absolute owner under that sale deed?
  4. Whether the suit is defective for non-joinder of certain persons (specifically Gangamma and Channabasavaraju) and whether that affects the decree?
  5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to perpetual injunction in respect of the suit property?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (S.A. Quddus)

  • Challenged the trial Court's findings that the property was self-acquired by Nanjappa and that Rudramma executed a valid will in favour of the plaintiffs.
  • Contended that the property was joint family property of Nanjappa and his brother (the family had a nucleus and properties) and that there was material indicating Nanjappa lacked independent means to acquire the property.
  • Asserted the will (29-3-1970) was not duly executed/attested under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act; relied upon defects including non-production of original will, alleged inadmissibility of certified copies of certain depositions (Exs. P-10 and P-14) under the Evidence Act, and lack of identification endorsement under Rule 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules, 1965.
  • Contended the will was a got-up document and challenged the sufficiency of attesting witness evidence (noting discrepancies in names of attestors).
  • Argued the suit was bad for non‑joinder of Eramma's heirs, Channabasavaraju and Gangamma.

Respondents' Arguments (Veerappa and representatives of Bhagirathamma)

  • Supported the trial Court's findings and urged no interference: maintained the plaint schedule property was Nanjappa’s self-acquisition and that Rudramma validly executed the will in favour of the plaintiffs.
  • Maintained that the appellant is not an heir-at-law and had no locus standi to challenge the will; alternatively, even if he stood in the shoes of Eramma (from whom he purchased), the will had been properly proved.
  • Asserted that the evidence of PW-3 and other documentary material complied with Section 63 and sufficed to prove execution and attestation of the will; urged that non-production of original will in this proceeding was not fatal given prior production in earlier proceedings and admission of certified copy in evidence without objection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh, AIR 1955 SC 346 Explains Section 63, Indian Succession Act: to prove due attestation propounder must show the two witnesses saw the testator sign and signed in the testator's presence. The Court invoked this authority to state the formal requirement and then examined whether PW-3's deposition and sequence of events satisfied that standard (concluding that the evidence did satisfy the requirements in substance).
Ram Lal v. Hari Kishan…, AIR 1988 Delhi 73 (Delhi High Court) Holds that attesting witnesses need not state the attestation in the precise statutory language; a narration of events permitting inference of compliance with Section 63 is sufficient. The Court relied on this reasoning to accept that PW‑3's narrative sequence permitted an inference of due attestation even though the witness did not recite the precise statutory formulation.
Smt. Ladhi Bai v. Thakur Shriji Beespanthiya Digambar Jain Temple, AIR 1968 Raj 41 Affirms that compliance with Section 63 is a question of fact; a witness's narration of the sequence of events can justify an inference that attestation occurred in the presence of the testator. The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that omission by a witness to use precise statutory language does not invalidate a will when the sequence of events described necessarily implies compliance with Section 63.
A. Venkatachalapathy Setty v. K.R. Setty, 1989 (3) Kant LJ 47 Addressed compliance with a registration-rule provision (R.71(d) in that case) and held such procedural endorsement to be directory, not mandatory. The Court relied on this view to hold that non-compliance with Rule 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules (lack of endorsement identifying who identified the executant) did not invalidate the will or its registration, reasoning that Rule 81 was not made punishable and hence non-compliance was not fatal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds on the issues raised at the trial and on appeal, closely following the evidence and the statutory requirements cited in the record.

Point No. 1 — Self-acquisition of Nanjappa

  • The Court noted admitted facts: Nanjappa was a junior son, not Karta, and property was acquired in his name. The defence argued joint-family acquisition; the plaintiffs asserted self-acquisition.
  • The Court examined the material on record and found limited joint family assets (a cycle shop and some dry land). There was no evidence of sufficient family income to establish that Nanjappa had used a joint-family nucleus to acquire the plaint schedule property.
  • Evidence relied on included testimony of PW‑1, PW‑2 and PW‑4 that Nanjappa practised as an Ayurvedic pundit at Tumkur and Bangalore; documentary adverts (Exs. P‑3 to P‑5) showing practice in Bangalore from August 1962 and a loan/mortgage document Ex. P‑6 evidencing earnings; and the recital in the sale deed Ex. D‑1 (on which appellant relied) reciting that the property was Nanjappa’s self-acquisition.
  • From this combination of admissions, witness testimony and an admission in Ex. D‑1, the Court held the plaint schedule property to be the self-acquisition of Nanjappa and affirmed the trial Court's finding on this point.

Point No. 2 — Validity and execution of the Will dated 29-3-1970

  • The appellant's principal contention was that the will was not duly executed/attested under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and that supporting materials (certified copies of depositions Ex. P‑10 and Ex. P‑14) were inadmissible under the Evidence Act.
  • The Court set out Section 63 and noted that the statutory requirements are that the testator sign or affix mark and that two or more witnesses must attest, each having seen the testator sign or having received personal acknowledgment, and that each witness sign in the presence of the testator.
  • The Court closely examined PW‑3 (one attesting witness) whose deposition described the sequence: the will was written near the Sub-Registrar's office; the scribe Lakshminarayana Shastry, Narasimhamurthy and PW‑3 were present; PW‑3 attested the will and said Rudramma signed in his presence; PW‑3 also stated Narasimhamurthy attested in PW‑3's presence.
  • The Court addressed alleged discrepancies in the attestors' names (Ex. P‑1 shows attestors as S. Nagappa and Narasimhappa, whereas PW‑3 referred to Narasimhamurthy). The Court found there had been no pointed suggestion or cross-examination establishing that Narasimhamurthy was a different person from Narasimhappa and therefore accepted PW‑3's evidence that the two attesting witnesses were present and attested in Rudramma's presence.
  • The Court applied the principle in Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh (AIR 1955 SC 346) to require proof that the attesting witnesses saw the testator sign and signed in the testator's presence, but also relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Ram Lal and the Rajasthan decision in Smt. Ladhi Bai to accept that an attestor's narration of the sequence of events can suffice even if the exact statutory wording is not recited.
  • The Court rejected objections that (a) certified copies Ex. P‑10 and Ex. P‑14 were inadmissible for all purposes: Ex. P‑14 (earlier deposition of PW‑3) was not available for proof except for cross‑examination as PW‑3 was examined in the present suit; Ex. P‑10 (scribe's deposition) did not fall under clauses of Section 33 of the Evidence Act and thus could not be relied upon. Nevertheless, the live testimony of PW‑3 was accepted.
  • The Court considered non‑compliance with Rule 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules (no endorsement by the Sub-Registrar identifying who identified Rudramma) and held that Rule 81's non-compliance was not made punishable and therefore was directory rather than mandatory for invalidating the will or its registration; reliance was placed on A. Venkatachalapathy Setty for the directory/mandatory distinction.
  • The Court also dealt with non-production of the original will, noting material indicating production in an earlier suit (O.S. 524/70) and that the certified copy Ex. P‑1 was admitted in evidence without objection; non-production at the current stage was not fatal.
  • Overall, weighing these matters, the Court concluded that the will had been duly proved, and that execution and attestation as required by Section 63 were established.

Other points — Locus standi and non-joinder

  • The Court noted the contention that appellant lacked locus standi to challenge the will because he was not an heir-at-law; the appellant countered that by purchasing from Eramma he stepped into her shoes and acquired her rights, including the right to challenge the will.
  • The Court declined to decide the locus-standi point because it had already held the will valid; since the will prevailed, non-joinder of Channabasavaraju and Gangamma did not render the suit bad and they were not necessary parties for purposes of the decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The trial Court's judgment and decree (dated 31-3-1992) in O.S. No. 326/83, decreeing the suit for declaration of title and perpetual injunction in favour of the plaintiffs (Veerappa and the representatives of Bhagirathamma), is affirmed.
  • The Court held that the plaint schedule property was the self-acquisition of Nanjappa, succeeded by Rudramma, who validly executed the will dated 29-3-1970 in favour of the plaintiffs; the appellant’s claim under the sale deed dated 16-1-1975 was negatived.
  • The appellant’s contention of fatal non-joinder (Gangamma and Channabasavaraju) failed because the will was held valid and they were not necessary parties; the appeal was dismissed and parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Broader implications / precedent:

The Court applied established authority on proof of attestation under Section 63 (including the Supreme Court decision and High Court precedents cited) to hold that a witness's narrated sequence of events may suffice to infer compliance with statutory attestation requirements. The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond those applications; its practical consequence is to uphold the trial Court's fact findings and to reject the appellant's challenges to the will and title.

Appeal dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.

    S.A Quddus v. S. Veerappa And Others

    1. This appeal has been filed by the first defendant under Section 96 CPC against the judgment and decree dated 31-3-92 passed in O.S 326/83 by the Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City decreeing the suit for declaration of title and injunction.

    2. The suit was filed by respondent-1 Veerappa and his wife respondent-2 Smt. Bhagirathamma who died during the pendency of the suit and her legal representatives are brought on record. According to respondents 1 & 2 and as per the findings of the trial Court, Shri. Gurunanajaiah and his wife Rudramma had two sons name Anubasappa and Nanjappa, Anubasappa being the older son. They had also two more daughters named Bhagirathamma (plaintiff No. 2) and Gangamma. According to plaint averments, Nanjappa was an Ayurvedic Pundit and he was having ayurvedic practice both at Tumkur and Bangalore. He also owned a cycle shop at Tumkur. He had earned enough to acquire properties and plaint schedule property was one of his self acquired properties. Nanjappa had a wife and she predeceased him without issues. Nanjappa died in the year 1965. On his death, his properties were inherited by his mother Rudramma as his sole heir. Rudramma in turn left a will dated 29-3-70 bequeathing the plaint schedule property on the plaintiffs viz., Bhagirathamma and her husband Veerappa. It appears subsequent to the death of Rudramma, Anupassappa's wife Ramma sold the plaint scheduled property in favour of defendant-1 under sale deed dated 16-1-1975. On interference by purchaser Quddus, Veerappa and his wife filed a suit for injunction in O.S 106/75. In that suit they were unsuccessful in the trial Court as also in the First Appellate Court. In the second appeal, this Court permitted them to withdraw their suit and to file a comprehensive suit for declaration of title and other reliefs. In pursuance of that, Veerappa and his wife Bhagirathamma filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises for the reliefs of declaration of title and injunction.

    3. The present appellant as defendant-1 filed contesting written statement urging that he had become absolute owner of the property having purchased the same from Anubasappa's wife Ramma and her son as heirs of Rudramma. He defended the suit on the basis of sale deed dated 16-1-75 and he contended that he was in possession of the property eversince he purchased it. He denied the will dated 29-3-70 under which the rights were claimed by Veerappa and his wife. According to him Rudramma had no disposing capacity and the will pleaded by Veerappa and his wife was contended to be a got-up document. Though Eramma was impleaded as defendant No. 2, she did not appear and contest the suit by filing written statement. He also contended that the suit property was not the self acquired property of Nanjappa and according to him it was the property earned by the joint family of Nanjappa and his brother, and that family possessed sufficient nucleus to acquire properties.

    4. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues—

    1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit property was the self acquired property of Dr. Nanjappa?

    2. Whether the defendants prove that the suit property was the joint family property of Dr. Nanjappa and his brothers?

    3. Whether Rudramma became the absolute owner of the suit property after the death of Dr. Nanjappa?

    4. Whether Rudramma had bequeathed the suit property in favour of plaintiffs under a will dated 29-3-1970 when she was in a sound disposing state of mind?

    5. Whether the plaintiffs have become the absolute owners of the suit property under the said will?

    6. Whether the first defendant has become the absolute owner of the suit property under the sale deed dated 16-1-75 executed in his favour by the 2nd defendant?

    7. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Smt. Gangamma and Channabavaraju as defendants as contended by first defendant?

    8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of perpetual injunction against the defendants in view of the averments made in paragraph 13 of the plaint?

    9. To what reliefs or order the parties are entitled?

    5. In support of their case the plaintiffs examined four witnesses of whom first plaintiff gave evidence as PW-1 Veerappa and PW-2 Krishna Murthy and PW-4 Rangegowda gave evidence to support the plea that Nanjappa was an ayurvedic pundit and was practising ayurvedic medicine at Tumkur and Bangalore and he was having a good practice and the plaint schedule property was his self-acquired property. P.W 3 was examined as an attestor of will executed by Rudramma. On behalf of appellant-defendant, he examined himself as DW-1 and relied on the sale deed Ex. D-1 with certified copy of the deposition of first defendant in the earlier suit OS 106/75 being marked as Ex. D-2.

    Assessing the evidence, the learned Trial Judge found that the plaint schedule property was the self acquired property of Nanjappa and Nanjappa having died issueless, his properties were succeeded to by his mother Rudramma and she had become the absolute owner of that property and that she executed the will dated 29-3-70 bequeathing the plaint schedule property on the plaintiffs. The contention of the appellant that he had become the absolute owner of the property having purchased the same from Eramma and her minor son under sale deed dated 16-1-75 was negatived. Accordingly the suit came to be decreed. Aggrieved by that judgment and decree, defendant-1 S.A Quddus has preferred this appeal.

    6. The grounds urged on behalf of the appellant in this Court are that the findings with regard to the property being the self-acquisition of Nanjappa and that Rudramma having executed the will bequeathing the property in favour of respondents 1 and 2 are contended to be unsustainable. It is submitted that the evidence on record has not been properly appreciated and that there is material to indicate that the property was the joint family property of Nanjappa and his brother and the will was not duly executed and the evidence of attesting witness PW-3 was not sufficient to establish the execution of the will as required by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. It is therefore prayed to invalidate the will and to hold that the plaintiffs were not the owners of the property as claimed by them. It was also contended that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties viz., Veerappa's son Chennabasavaraju and Gangamma another daughter of Rudramma who were alive but had not been impleaded. The learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 supported the judgment and contended that the appellant was not an heir under law and as such he had no lucus standi to contest the will. It was also submitted that the evidence of PW-3 sufficiently proved due execution and attestation and there was sufficient compliance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and the will had accordingly been proved and therefore it was urged that the judgment and decree of the trial Court called for no interference.

    7. The points that arise for consideration are—

    (1) Whether the finding of the trial Court that the plaint schedule property was the self-acquisition of Nanjappa is correct?

    (2) Whether Rudramma executed the will dt. 29-3-70 bequeathing the plaint schedule property in favour of respondents 1 and 2 and respondents 1 and 2 are therefore entitled to the relief as held by the trial Court? If not, whether the appellant is entitled to relief under the Sale Deed dated 16-1-75 as claimed by him?

    (3) What Order?

    8. Point No. 1:— That Nanjappa and Ahubasappa were the sons of Gurunanjappa and Rudramma and that Nanjappa was an Ayurvedic Pandit are admitted facts. It is also admitted that Bhagirathamma plaintiff-2 and Gahgamma are the other two daughters of Rudramma and Gurunanjappa. Plaintiff-2 Bhagirathamma is married to plaintiff-1-respondent-1 before this Court. Nanjappa and Anubasappa were living jointly and that there was no partition between them during the life time of Nanjappa is admitted to the parties. The contention of the plaintiffs has been that plaint schedule property was the self-acquired property of Nanjappa but the defence has been that Nanjappa was not having enough income to acquire property andithat joint family of Nanjappa and his elder brother Anubasappa owned properties and that provided nucleus to acquire properties and therefore the plaint schedule property was an acquisition from out of the joint family property and therefore it was the joint family property of Nanjappa and Anubasappa. This contention of the appellant is not acceptable for the following reasons:—

    Nanjappa is admittely a junior member of the family and the property has been acquired in his name. It is admitted that Nanjappa was not the Karta of the family of himself and Anubasappa. Anubasappa was the senior member and there is no evidence to show that he was not the karta of the family. Therefore, it is a case of junior member acquiring property in his own name. Therefore, it is to be seen whether this junior member Najappa had availed of the nucleus of the joint family property and acquired the property. The material on record shows that except the cycle shop and some dry land of one acre 36 guntas, the joint family owned no other properties. There is no material placed on record to show what was the income from the dry land of one acre and 30 odd guntas. The cycle shop also is not shown to yield such income as to enable Nanjappa to avail that income to acquire properties. On the other hand, evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 4 goes to show that Nanjappa was practising as an Ayurvedic Pundit both at Tumkur and Bangalore and that he had inserted advertisement in Kannada newspaper claiming his speciality in treating different diseases like liver trouble, asthma, diabetes etc. These advertisements at Exs. P-3 to P-5 show that from August 1962 onwards Nanjappa was practising in Bangalore for 3 days in a week. These advertisements do not mean that he was not practising earlier either at Bangalore or at Tumkur. Oral evidence in that behalf shows that he was having practice at Tumkur earlier also. There is also material to show that Nanjappa had advanced loans on mortgage out of his own earnings. That document is at Ex. P-6. Even in the sale deed Ex. D-1 on which the appellant relies, it is recited that the plaint schedule property is the self-acquisition of Nanjappa. This admission itself is sufficient to clinch the issue. Therefore, relying on the evidence of plaintiffs and the admission contained in Ex. D-1, it is held that the plaint schedule property is the self-acquisition of Nanjappa. The trial Court's finding in that behalf therefore is affirmed.

    9. Point No. 2:— The main contention submitted on behalf of the appellant is that due execution and attestation of the will are not established and thus the will relied on by the plaintiffs is not available to them. The learned Counsel pointed out that the original will had not been produced and the circumstances available in the case are sufficient to place no reliance on that will. Those circumstances relied on are — (1) Certified copies of depositions of the scribe at Ex. P-10 and of the attesting witness at Ex. P-14 are to be ignored as they are not admissible under any of the provisions of the Evidence Act (2) PW-1 plaintiff-1 did not state that the original will was lost and as such he was entitled to produce the copy; (3) There was no identification of Rudramma the executant of the will at the time of registration as required under R. 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules 1965; (4) Active participation of plaintiff-1 in getting the will executed in his favour and depriving the heirs of Anubasappa from inheriting the properties; (5) If the will was in accordance with the direction of Nanjappa as mentioned therein, the same should have taken place at an earlier date when Ex. P-7 Gift Deed dated 26-11-65 came to be executed by Rudramma which document also purported to be in compliance with the direction of Nanjappa.

    10. Along with the above circumstances, it was submitted that the respondents 1 and 2 had failed to prove due execution of the will as required by S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act deals with the execution of unprivileged wills and it reads as follows:—

    “Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare (or an airman so employed or engaged) or a mariner at sea, shall execute his will according to the following rules:—

    (a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction.

    (b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will.

    (c) The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has receive from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.”

    The above section makes it clear that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will and the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will in the presence and by the direction of the testator or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator.

    11. Para 14 in Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh, AIR 1955 SC 346 is relied on by the appellant, Paragraph 14 reads as follows:—

    “In order to prove the due attestation of the will the propounder of will has to prove that ‘A’ and ‘B’ the two witnesses saw the testator sign the will and they themselves signed the same in the presence of the testator.”

    In order to prove the due attestation of the will, plaintiffs had to prove that the two attesting witnesses saw the testator sign the will and they themselves signed in the presence of the testator. In this behalf the evidence relied upon is that of PW-3 Nagappa one of the attestors. The relevant deposition of PW-3 reads as under—

    “Rudramma executed a will bequeathing the properties to the plaintiffs. Probably she executed the will in 1970. Ex. P-1 is the certified copy of the will and it was executed by Rudramma. The will was written near the Sub-Registrar's office. When the will was written the persons present were Lakeshminarayana Shastry the scribe, Narasimhamurthy, myself and Rudramma. I have attested the will. Narasimhamurthy had also attested the will. When I attested Narasimhamurthy was present and when Narasimhamurthy attested I was present. Rudramma has singed the will in my presence. I do not know whether Lakshminarayana Shastry is alive…………. At the time of execution of will, Rudramma was having sound health and sound state of mind. Apart from the persons whom I have stated earlier, there was nobody else at the time of writing the will.”

    In cross-examination, PW-3 has stated among other things as under—

    “In my presence she has executed the will in the office of the Sub-Registrar. It is not correct to suggest that myself and plaintiffs have created a false will………I do not remember whether Rudramma signed the will or affixed her LTM to the will. The will was written at about 1-30 p.m by Lakshminarayana Shastry and myself and Narasimhamurthy attested the same. I do not remember whether Rudramma was capable of signing. Lakshminarayana Shastry was a stamp vendor and I do not know whether he was a resident of Tumkur. It is not correct to suggest that Rudramma was not present when the will was written, executed and when we attested.”

    12. In addition to the above deposition of PW-3, respondents 1 and 2 relied upon the earlier deposition of PW-3 in OS No. 524/70 at Ex. P-14 and Ex. P-10 the deposition of scribe in OS 524/70. Since PW-3 Nagappa is alive and is available for examination and is examined as PW-3, his earlier deposition at Ex. P-14 is not relevant except for the purpose of cross-examination and for that purpose Ex. P-14 is not made use of. Therefore, Ex. P-14 is not available for being looked into by respondents 1 and 2. Also the deposition of the scribe at Ex. P-10 does not fall under any of the clauses of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act and as such, it is not admissible and is not available for being looked into on behalf of respondents 1 and 2.

    13. It is to be seen whether the deposition of PW-3 extracted above fulfils the requirements of S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act read with its interpretation found in Bhaiya Girja Datt Singh v. Gangotri Datt Singh, AIR 1955 SC 346. This decision explaining Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act has laid down that in order to prove the due attestation of the will the propounder of the will has to prove that the two attesting witnesses saw the testator sign the will and they themselves signed that will in the presence of the testator. Copy of the will produced at Ex. P-1 shows the names of attestors as (1) S. Nagappa (2) Narasimhappa. The name of the scribe is shown as B. Laxminarayana Sastry of Tumkur. According to PW-3, the attesting witnesses are Narasimhamurthy and himself. It is therefore contended that Narasimhamurthy referred to by PW-3 is not the same as Narasimhappa who is said to have attested the will. PW-3 has also stated that Narayanappa the other attester is not alive. According to this version in addition to himself and Narsimhamurthy, Narayanappa was the third attesting witness. But the copy of the will at Ex. P-1 does not show the signature of the attesting witness by name Narayanappa. PW-1 has also not referred to Narayanappa as an attestor. Therefore, the possibility of there being a third attesting witness by name Narayanappa cannot be accepted. What all is required to be proved is whether two attesting witnesses have seen the testator sign and they signed in presence of the testator. The evidence PW-3 shows that he and Narasimhamurthy were present when Rudramma signed the will, and according to PW-3, Rudramma signed the will in his presence. That means that other witness by name Narasimhamurthy was also present. PW-3 has further stated that when he attested after Rudramma signed, the other attesting witness was present and at the time of attestation by the other witness; Narasimhamurthy, he too was present. The sequence of facts stated by PW-3 shows that both himself and Narasimhamurthy were present when Rudramma signed the will and when Narasimhamurthy attested, he was present and in his presence Rudramma singed the will. Therefore, there is no scope for inferring that at the time when Rudramma singed the will, the second attesting witness Narasimhamurthy was not present and only he i.e, PW-3 was present. Such interpretation or inference is not permissible from the sequence of events narrated by PW 3. Now the question is whether this Narasimhamurthy and Narasimhappa are two different persons. There is no question put to PW-3 to suggest that Narasimhamurty is different from Narasimhappa the person who is shown as attestor of will dated 29-3-70. Throughout his deposition PW-3 has referred to the other attesting witness by name Narasimhamurthy. PW-3 identifies the attestor along with him as Narasimhamurthy. In the absence of suggestion to PW-3 that Narasimhappa is different from Narasimhamurthy, it is to be held relying on the evidence of PW-3 that the attestor along with PW-3 is Narasimhappa and this Narasimhappa is not different from Narasimhamurthy referred to by PW-3. Narasimhamurthy and Narasimhappa are one and the same person who has attested the will. If questions had been put and definite answers had been taken from PW-3 establishing identity of Narasimhamurthy as different from Narasimhappa the attestor found on the will, then the submission of appellant would have been accepted to find that Narasimhamurthy referred to by PW-3 is different from Narasimhappa the attestor of will dated 29-3-70. Therefore, having regard to the deposition of PW-3 recorded nearly about two decades after the execution of the will dated 29-3-70. PW-3 referring to the second attestor as Narasimhamurthy cannot be held as absence of proof of the attestation by second attestor more so when no pointed questions have been put to PW-3. Therefore, the submission made with regard to the discrepancy in the names viz., Narasimhappa and Narasimhamurthy cannot be made much of and evidence of PW-3 is to be accepted as referring to the second attestor Narasimhappa' Narasimhamurthy and accepting the evidence of PW-3 in the sequence of narration in the deposition recorded in Court, it is held the two witnesses PW-3 and Narasimhamurthy alias Narasimhappa attested the will executed by Rudramma in her presence in the office of the Sub-Registrar at Tumkur. Further, according to the evidence of PW-3, Rudramma was in a sound disposing state of mind. Rudramma survived for two years after making the will.

    The decision of Delhi High Court in Ram Lal… v. Hari Kishan…, AIR 1988 Delhi 73 dealing with the mode of proof of attestation under S. 63 of Indian Succession Act has taken the view that it is not necessary for the attesting witness to give evidence in the way S. 63, Indian Succession Act, is worded and it is sufficient if the witness narrates events admitting inference of the compliance of requirement of Section 63. After narrating the relevant facts, the Court in paragraph 6 observed as under—

    “The signatures of the two witnesses were identified by the respondent. Ghanshyam Dass attesting witness deposed about his signatures and the execution of the Will. The Will is dt. 12th April, 1971. The testator and the witnesses as is apparent from the Will had also put their signatures on 12th April 1971. The two attesting witnesses Ghanshyam Dass and Lal Chand appeared before the Sub-Registrar also and identified her on 12th April 1971. The Will was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Sonepat on 16th April, 1971. From these facts it can be said confidently that the two witnesses attested the Will in the presence of the testator and the testator executed the Will in the presence of the two witnesses at the same sitting. When the Will appears to have been executed and attested at the same sitting it would not be necessary for the attesting witness to state in his deposition that he had signed as witness in the presence of the testator. Under Section 68 of the Evidence Act a document required by law to be attested is not to be used as evidence until one attesting witness has been called for proving its execution. In the present case, Ghanshyam Dass one of the attesting witness has been examined as A.W 3.”

    In Smt. Ladhi Bai v. Thakur Shriji Beespanthiya Digambar Jain Temple, AIR 1968 Raj 41 in paragraph 9 at page 43 the Court observed as under—

    “This is purely is question of fact whether the attesting witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act simply lays down that the testator shall sign the will in the presence of the attestor and vice versa but it does not say how the compliance of the requirements of the provisions of Section 63 shall be established. Where the witnesses come before the court and narrate the sequence of events showing that after the testator had put her thumb impression on the document they attested the document the court can easily draw an inference that the witnesses had appended their signatures to the document in the presence of the testator.”

    If a witness owing to inadvertence omits to say that he had attested the document in the presence of the testator and narrates the sequence which lead to no other inference but the one that he had put his signatures in the presence of the testator then this omission on the part of the, witness would not invalidate the will and it shall not preclude this Court to infer this fact from other evidence on the record that the attestor had signed the document in the presence of the testator. The law does not emphasise that the witness must use the language of the Section to prove the requisite merits thereof. If it is clear from the sequence of events described by a witness, that the witness has attested the document in the presence of the testator, then this technicality that he did not say so in the language used in Section 63 would not be of any avail to the opposite party, I do not find any weight in this contention of learned Counsel for the appellant and it is therefore repelled.”

    The view taken in two decisions referred to above is similar to the view I have taken on a consideration of all the facts found in the evidence of PW-3 in the case on hand. It is true that PW-1 in his deposition at one stage stated that he was very much present when the will was scribed and executed and at a subsequent stage he came out with a version that he was not present when the will was executed and he came to know about the said will at a later date. This circumstance by itself does not suffice to record a finding against respondents 1 and 2 with regard to the due execution of the will by Rudramma. It might be that respondent-1 as the son-in-law of the executant Rudramma took part in helping Rudramma in executing the will. The evidence discloses that Rudramma was residing with PW-1 and his wife plaintiff-2, the daughter of Rudramma. It is but natural that Rudramma availed the assistance of her son-in-law and PW-1 helped Rudramma in executing the will. PW-1's version that he came to know about the will subsequently does not appear to be acceptable and as pointed above even if PW-1 was present at the time of Rudramma executing the will, that by itself does not suffice to invalidate the will. According to PW-1, original will was produced in OS 106/75 but in further cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that he did not produce the original will in that suit. He so admitted after his earlier deposition was confronted to him. But material is produced to show that the original will was produced in O.S 524 of 1970. That is apparent from Ex. P-8 the copy of the judgment which contains an appendix referring to production of the original will. The respondents 1 and 2 have taken the copy of the will from the Court and have produced the same in this proceeding and when the certified copy was admitted in evidence, no objection was raised and therefore, non-production of the original will at this stage cannot be urged as a ground to invalidate the will.

    14. The next circumstance pressed into service is the absence of endorsement by the Sub-Registrar as to who identified executant Rudramma before him at the time of registration of the will executed by Rudramma on 29-3-70. In this behalf, it is to be remembered that the will does not require compulsory registration. Rule 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules, 1965 requires the registering authority to endorse as to who identified the executant of the will before him and in case the executant of the will was personally known to him, he was required to make an endorsement that the executant was personally known to him. In the copy of the will produced at Ex. P-1, there is no endorsement by the registering authority that Rudramma was either known to him or that some person known to him identified Rudramma as the executant of the will. Thus the registering authority proceeded to register the will of Rudramma without making an endorsement as to who actually identified Rudramma to him. Non-compliance of R. 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules 1965 is not made punishable. No other material is brought to the notice of the Court to show that this rule is mandatory and its non-compliance would invalidate the registration of the document registered under that endorsement. Any omission or inadvertent act on the part of the registering authority cannot affect the validity of the document duly executed by a person.

    The learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 relied on A Venkatachalapathy Setty v. K.R Setty, 1989 (3) Kant LJ 47 (sic) in which this Court has held that the compliance of R. 71(d) dealing with the persons who are to be understood as executants of a document is only directory and not mandatory. That decision does not deal with non-compliance of Rule 81 of the Mysore Registration Rules. 1965 since the breach of this Rule by the Sub-Registrar is not made punishable, there appears to be no reason to hold that this rule is mandatory and, therefore, non-compliance of this rule would affect the validity of the document and its registration. Therefore, non-compliance of Rule 81 cannot affect the validity of the Will.

    15. One more circumstance pressed into service on behalf of the appellant is the gift-deed Ex. P-7 by Smt. Rudramma gifting the properties in favour of the present respondents 1 and 2. Ex. P-7 is in respect of agricultural land and Cyle shop of the share of Nanjappa inherited by her on his death. That gift is stated to be as desired by Nanjappa. It is submitted that if the suit property is bequeathed as desired by Nanjappa, then Rudramma should hace done so in the gift deed. Ex. P-7 executed on 26-11-65 soon after the death of Nanjappa. Reading of the gift-deed and Will would indicate that Rudramma has made dispositions of the properties of Nanjappa as desired by Nanjappa, but, with time gap between the two transactions. This time gap, I think is not sufficient to tilt the validity of Will against the respondents 1 and 2. Having regard to the circumstances discussed above, absence of original Will does not affect the merits of the claim of respondents 1 and 2. Original Will as seen from the totality of circumstances and evidence on record was produced in the earlier suit between respondents 1 and 2 and one Shivanand against whom suit for specific performance was filed by Smt. Rudramma in respect of the site agreed to be sold by Sri Shivananda in favour of Sri Nanjappa and the certified copy of the Will produced at Ex. P-1 is taken from the Court proceedings. When the certified copy of the Will was produced at Ex. P-1 in evideence, no objections were taken to admit it in evidence. Therefore, weighing the circumstances, it has to be held that Will has been duly proved. Its execution and attestation as required under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are proved. The contentions therefore raised with regard to the validity of the Will stand rejected. Validity of the Will is held in favour of respondents 1 and 2 by affirming the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court.

    16. It was submitted on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 that appellant has no locus standi to challenge the validity of the Will. It was contended that a person who is not an heir-at-law is not entitled to challenge the Will. It was pointed out that appellant being a stranger to the family of Nanjappa, Rudramma and Anubasappa are not entitled to challenge the Will made by Rudramma. The reply in this behalf is that appellant having purchased the property from Smt. Eramma, wife of Anubasappa, steps into the shoes of Eramma and as such is entitled to challenge the Will of Rudramma. It is pointed out that Eramma is an heir and appellant having stepped into her shoes is contended to possess all the rights of Eramma including the right of challenging the Will. It is not necessary to go into this aspect because the Will is already held to have been duly established by respondents 1 and 2. The question of locus standi of appellant to challenge therefore recedes into the back-ground and there is no need to give a finding to dispose of the appeal. It is brought in evidence that Channabasavaraju is the son of Anubasappa. Since the Will is held to have been established, the said Channabasavaraju and Gangamma are no more necessary parties to the suit. Therefore, the contention that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties does not survive. The finding on that contention goes against the appellant. The appeal needs to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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