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  • Section 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act (hereinafter referred
  • Section for original Section 7 of the Principal Act by the Amendment Act.
  • sub-section (1) of original Section 7 of the Principal Act.
  • Section 5 or 6 of the Principal Act,
  • provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7
  • sub-section (1) of Section 5).
  • Amendment Act 13/78
  • Section 5(4) or 7(1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act (hereinafter referred
  • Section for original Section 7 of the Principal Act by the Amendment Act.
  • sub-section (1) of original Section 7 of the Principal Act.
  • Section 5 or 6 of the Principal Act,
  • provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7
  • sub-section (1) of Section 5).
  • Amendment Act 13/78
  • Section 5(4) or 7(1)
  • Section 4(2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order of the Additional Tahsildar, Bangalore South Taluk (Annexure 'C' dated 20.2.1993), made under Section 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act ("the Act"), directing summary eviction of the writ petitioner from 1 acre and 10 guntas in Sy. No. 36 of Saneguruvanahalli Village.

Material facts (undisputed in the opinion): the original haqdar of the relevant village office was Alladappa whose estate included 1 acre 37 guntas in Sy. No. 36. The family split into two branches (Kombamma and Bylayellamma). The writ petitioner entered into possession by a lease of 1962 (disputed in other proceedings) and by a Sale Deed dated 29.10.1972 from Bylayellamma's branch.

The State made a re-grant under the Act in favour of the two branches by order dated 13.9.1979. A partition deed dated 9.2.1981 allocated 1 acre 10 guntas of Sy. No. 36 to Kombamma's branch and the remaining 27 guntas to Bylayellamma's branch.

Earlier resumption/eviction proceedings (notice dated 28.2.1979) against the writ petitioner were challenged in W.P. No. 18164/82 and quashed by this Court on 17.12.1984 (Annexure 'A')—the Court following Lakshmana Gowda v. State of Karnataka held the 1972 sale valid. Separately, members of Kombamma's branch moved in W.P. No. 7137/86 for clarification/review; by judgment dated 3.8.1987 (Annexure 'B') the Court clarified that the writ petitioner only acquired valid title to the portion allotted to Bylayellamma's branch (27 guntas) and not to the 1 acre 10 guntas that fell to Kombamma's branch.

On the basis of the clarification (Annexure 'B'), respondents representing Kombamma's branch sought eviction; the Tahsildar issued notices and, by order dated 20.2.1993 (Annexure 'C'), held the writ petitioner to be in unauthorised occupation of 1 acre 10 guntas and ordered summary eviction under Section 7(1) of the Act read with Section 104 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964.

The writ petitioner challenged Annexure 'C' before the Single Judge, who affirmed the Tahsildar's order and dismissed the writ petition. The present appeal challenges that Single Judge judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tahsildar had jurisdiction to pass an eviction order under Section 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act in respect of 1 acre and 10 guntas in Sy. No. 36 (i.e., whether the writ petitioner was an "unauthorised holder" as defined under the Act such that Section 7 could be invoked).
  2. Whether Section 7 of the Act can be invoked against persons who came into possession of land after the appointed date (1.2.1963).
  3. Whether a prior re-grant under Section 5 of the Act (here dated 13.9.1979) divests the State of title so as to preclude the use of Section 7 or any ancillary statutory power to resume land from a person in possession after re-grant.
  4. Whether, even if Section 7 does not apply, the authorities may exercise implied ancillary statutory powers to evict a person (who has no title) post-regrant so as to give full effect to the object of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Writ Petitioner) — Principal Contentions

  • The writ petitioner is not an "unauthorised holder" as defined in the Act; therefore Section 7 proceedings could not be validly initiated against him.
  • The Tahsildar had no jurisdiction under Section 7 because the re-grant order of 13.9.1979 divested the State of title; once re-grant is made, the State cannot resume land merely because the current possessor lacks title.
  • If respondents have any claim, they must seek relief in an ordinary Civil Court rather than through summary proceedings under Section 7 of the Act.

Respondents (Kombamma's Branch) — Principal Contentions

  • Following the clarification in W.P. No. 7137/86, the writ petitioner was declared to have no title to the 1 acre 10 guntas that fell to Kombamma's branch; he is therefore in unauthorised occupation and the Tahsildar has jurisdiction to evict under Section 7.
  • Alternatively, even if Section 7 is not strictly applicable, the Act is beneficial and the authorities must be deemed to possess necessary ancillary powers (by implication) to resume or evict to give effect to the objects of the Act—relying on authorities that an express statutory power carries with it necessary implied powers to make it effective (citing Income Tax Officer v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lakshmana Gowda v. State of Karnataka (1981 1 Kar. L.J. 1) Held that a sale in 1972 (before Amendment Act 13/78) was valid; supports that re-grant can divest State and prevent subsequent resumption. The Court relied on this decision to note that the 1972 sale was treated as valid in earlier proceedings and to support the proposition that where re-grant under Section 5 or 6 has been made, the State is divested of title and cannot thereafter maintain eviction proceedings under the Act.
Syed Bhasheer Ahamed & Others v. State of Karnataka (ILR 1994 KAR 159) — Full Bench Interpreted definitions of 'holder', 'authorised holder' and 'unauthorised holder' as referring to status with reference to the appointed date (1.2.1963); held an alienee between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978 is not an 'unauthorised holder'. The Court treated this Full Bench decision as controlling on the question whether Section 7 can be invoked against persons who came into possession after 1.2.1963; it applied the Full Bench reasoning to hold Section 7 applies only to unauthorised holders in possession as on 1.2.1963.
Hanumaiah v. State of Karnataka (ILR 1987 KAR 550) Earlier decisions had assumed (without specific consideration) that an alienee with imperfect title could be treated as an unauthorised holder for purposes of Section 7. The Court noted this case as one of several earlier decisions where that assumption was made; it distinguished and declined to follow those assumptions in light of the Full Bench decision.
Chikkanarasaiah v. Tirupataiah (ILR 1989 KAR 1520) As above: earlier assumption that Section 7 could apply to alienee with imperfect title. Referenced as part of a set of earlier decisions whose assumptions were reconsidered and rejected for present purposes.
Adiveppa Shivappa Mattur v. Tahsildar (ILR 1990 KAR 879) Another earlier decision where the applicability of Section 7 to alienee-with-imperfect-title situations was assumed. Noted by the Court as part of the authorities which had not specifically considered the question and therefore were not followed where they conflicted with the Full Bench reasoning.
Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi (AIR 1969 SC 430) Principle: an express grant of statutory power carries by necessary implication authority to use reasonable means to make such grant effective (ancillary/implied powers). The respondents relied on this to argue for implied powers to evict to give effect to the Act. The Court considered the authority but rejected the extension of implied powers here, holding that the Act's enumerated powers are limited and cannot be expanded by implication to affect private rights once re-grant is made.
S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman (1985 1 SCC 591) Principle of construction: the court must not rewrite statutory language to serve judicial notions of public policy. The Court invoked this as authority for limiting construction: it refused to read into the Act broader powers than expressly provided to achieve policy aims.
Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar (1988 2 SCC 513) On statutory construction: interpret provisions harmoniously and avoid reading in words not expressly enacted, except to make the provision meaningful in context. The Court cited this authority to support its view that it should not read ancillary powers into the Act beyond what the statute expressly permits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the central question: whether Section 7 of the Act could be invoked to evict the writ petitioner from 1 acre and 10 guntas. The analysis proceeded in discrete steps grounded in the text and scheme of the Act.

  1. Temporal focus of the Act: The Court emphasized the appointed date (1.2.1963) as central. Sections 4 to 7 — which abolish village offices, resume lands and provide for re-grant or eviction — must be applied with reference to the state of possession as on the appointed date. The definitions in Section 2 (including "authorised holder" and "unauthorised holder") are to be read with reference to that date.
  2. Statutory definitions: The Court examined the statutory definitions. "Authorised holder" refers to someone to whom land had been validly and permanently alienated under existing law prior to the appointed date; "unauthorised holder" refers to someone in possession without right or under an alienation that is null and void under existing law prior to the appointed date. These definitions point to eviction under Section 7 being aimed at persons who were in unauthorised possession as on 1.2.1963.
  3. Application to post-1963 possessors: Applying the statutory scheme and definitions, and following the Full Bench authority in Syed Bhasheer Ahamed (ILR 1994 KAR 159), the Court held that an alienee who came into possession after the appointed date (i.e., post-1.2.1963) is not an "unauthorised holder" within the Act's meaning and therefore Section 7 cannot be invoked against such a person. The Court reiterated that an alienee between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978 (an "alienee with imperfect title") is a distinct category and not covered by the definition of "unauthorised holder".
  4. Effect of re-grant under Section 5: The Court observed that a re-grant under Section 5 (as happened on 13.9.1979 here in favour of the two branches) divests the State of title. Once the State is divested of title by a re-grant, it cannot resume the land under Section 7 or rely on the Karnataka Land Revenue Act to evict the possessor; any such attempt would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and prior authorities (including Lakshmana Gowda). Thus, where a re-grant has already been made, the revenue authority does not have the jurisdiction to resume land from a possessor even if that possessor's possession is unlawful.
  5. Ancillary/implied powers argument: The respondents' contention that authorities must have implied powers to effectuate the object of the Act (relying on Income Tax Officer v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi) was considered and rejected. The Court reasoned that when a statute fully and completely provides for a matter (as Sections 4–7 do here), the powers conferred are confined to those expressly enumerated and cannot be enlarged by implication so as to affect private rights post-regrant; disputes after regrant must be resolved by ordinary civil remedies.
  6. Precedent treatment and consistency: The Court discussed earlier judgments (e.g., Hanumaiah, Chikkanarasaiah, Adiveppa) where assumptions were made that Section 7 applied to alienees with imperfect title; it distinguished those assumptions from the Full Bench analysis and followed the Full Bench's principled construction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Appeal is allowed. The Court reversed the Single Judge's finding and held that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to invoke Section 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act against the writ petitioner.

The Court specifically concluded:

  • The provisions of Section 7 can be invoked only against 'unauthorised holders' as defined under Section 2(m) of the Act—i.e., those in possession as on the appointed date (1.2.1963). Section 7 does not apply to persons who came into possession after 1.2.1963 even if their possession is later held to be unlawful.
  • Because a re-grant under Section 5 was made on 13.9.1979, the State was divested of title and the Tahsildar lacked jurisdiction to resume the land from the writ petitioner; consequently, Annexure 'C' (order dated 20.2.1993) is quashed.

Direct consequences and practical implications:

  • Annexure 'C' (the Additional Tahsildar's eviction order dated 20.2.1993) is quashed.
  • The Single Judge's judgment confirming the Tahsildar's order is set aside.
  • Respondents 2 and 3 (Kombamma's branch) are left to pursue their remedies before the appropriate civil forum (i.e., ordinary civil courts) to obtain possession or other reliefs—revenue summary proceedings under Section 7 are not available for this purpose.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Note: The Court also articulated a substantive interpretive rule: Section 7 is confined to unauthorised holders in possession as at the appointed date, and the State cannot resume land under Section 7 after making a re-grant that divests it of title. The Court rejected the respondent's plea to read broader ancillary eviction powers into the Act.

    V. Channanarasimhaiah v. Additional Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk & Others

    P. Krishna Moorthy, J.:— This Appeal is by the Writ Petitioner challenging the order of the Addl. Tahsildar, Bangalore South Taluk, produced as Annexure ‘C’ dated 20.2.1993 This order was passed under Section 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

    2. The subject matter of this Writ Petition is 1 acre and 10 guntas of land which is ordered to be resumed from the petitioner by the order of the Tahsildar evidenced by Annexure ‘C’.

    3. The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

    One Alladappa was the original haqdar of Tnotti Office of Shivanahalli and Saneguruvanahalli Villages and 1 acre and 37 cents of land in Sy. No. 36 of Saneguruvanahalli Village was one of the properties attached to the said Office. Alladappa had two sons viz., Malla and Linga. Malla was succeeded by one Kombamma and the other branch was succeeded by Bylayellamma. Respondents 2 and 3 represent the branch of Kombamma. According to the writ petitioner, he is in possession of 1 acre and 37 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36 as per the lease of the year 1962 executed by Bylayellamma. Thereafter, by a Sale Deed dated 29.10.1972, the branch of Bylayellamma sold the property to the writ petitioner. Thereafter, among other lands, this land was re-granted under the Act in favour of two branches of Kombamma and Bylayellamma by an order dated 13.9.1979 Thereafter, there was a partion on 9.2.1981 between the two branches represented by Kombamma and Bylayellamma, in which, 1 acre and 10 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36 fell to the share of the branch of Kombamma and the rest of the properties in that Survey Number were allotted to the branch of Bylayellamma.

    4. In the meantime, a Notice of eviction dated 28.2.1979 was served on the writ petitioner for resuming the land from him under Section 7 of the Act, on the ground that, he is in unauthorised occupation of the same. That notice was challenged before this Court in W.P No. 18164/82, to which, the State and the Revenue authorities were alone the parties. This Court, following a decision of this Court in Lakshmana Gowda v. State of Karnataka . 1981 1 Kar. L.J 1., held that the sale in favour of the petitioner was on 20.10.1972 which was before the Amendment Act 13/78 and accordingly it is valid. Consequently, the eviction notice was quashed by this Court by a Judgment in the above Writ Petition dated 17.12.1984 and produced as Annexure ‘A’.

    5. As stated earlier, members of the branch of Kombamma were not parties to the above Writ Petition and accordingly, they filed a Writ Petition in W.P No. 7137/86 to review the Judgment in W.P No. 18164/82 on the ground that by the said order, their right in lands situated in Sy. No. 36 had adversely affected and that they were not made parties to the said Writ Petition. In that Writ Petition, the present Writ Petitioner was the 6th Respondent. After hearing the parties, by a Judgment dated 3.8.1987 which is produced as Annexure ‘B’, this Court clarified that the Writ Petitioner has acquired valid title only to the items of land which fell to the share of Bylayellamma and not the portion of the land to which Kombamma and her children became entitled to under the order of re-grant, and the partition deed dated 9.2.1981 executed between the branch of Kombamma and the branch of Bylayellamma. This Court further held that the present Writ Petitioner who was the 6th respondent in that Writ Petition cannot claim that he had acquired valid title to 1 acre and 10 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36 which fell to the share of Kombamma's branch in that partition. Ultimately, that Writ Petition was disposed of with the clarification that the order in Writ Petition No. 18164/82 does not in any way affect the rights of Kombamma or her legal representatives in respect of the ownership of the land which she has acquired pursuant to the re-grant order and in pursuance to the partition deed between her and Bylayellamma. From the aforesaid two Judgments, it is now settled that the writ Petitioner obtained valid title only in respect of 27 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36 which fell to the share of Bylayellamma and that he has no valid title to 1 acre and 10 guntas of land which fell to the share of Kombamma's Branch.

    6. On the basis of the above Judgment, Respondents 2 and 3 in the Writ Petition who represent Kombamma's Branch, moved the Tahsildar to evict the Writ Petitioner from Sy. No. 36 on the ground that he is in unauthorised occupation of the same. Notices were issued to the Writ Petitioners who filed objections to the same and ultiamtely, Tahsildar by his order dated 20.2.1993 evidenced by Anenxure ‘C’ held that the Writ Petitioner is in unauthorised occupation of 1 acre and 10 guntas of land in S.No 36 which belonged to the branch of Kombamma and accordingly, ordered to summarily evict the writ petitioner from the portion of the land which fell to the share of late Kombamma as per the partition deed i.e, to an extent of 1 acre and 10 guntas of land in S.No 36 of Saneguruvanahalli as per the powers vested in him under Section 7(1) of the Act read with Section 104 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964.

    7. It is this order that was challenged in the Writ Petition, mainly on the ground that, the Writ Petitioner is not an ‘unauthorised Holder’ as defined under the Act and that the Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 7 of the Act. It is further contended by the Writ Petitioner that if at all respondents 2 and 3 have any claim as against the Writ Petitioner, they have to get the relief through an ordinary Civil Court and that the Writ Petitioner being not an ‘unauthorisd holder’, as defined under the Act and especially, after the order of re-grant in favour of Respondents 2 and 3, the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 7 of the Act to evict the Writ Petitioner from the land.

    8. On an elaborate consideration of the question, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Writ Petition is in unauthorised possession of 1 acre and 10 guntas of land and accordingly, confirmed the order of the Tahsildar and dismissed the Writ Petition. The Writ Appeal is against the above Judgment.

    9. In this Appeal, the learned Counsel for the Appellant-Writ Petitioner contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction under Section 7 of the Act as the Writ Petitioner is not an “unauthorised holder” as defined under the Act against whom alone, proceedings under Section 7 of the Act could be initiated. It is also contended by him, that, by the re-grant order passed in favour of Kombamma and Bylayellamma on 13.9.1979, the State divested of its title and thereafter, no power is vested in them to resume the land from him even assuming that he has no title to the propery. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that, by virtue of the finding in the Writ Petition in W.P No. 7137/86, it was declared that the Writ Petitioner has no title in respect of 1 acre and 10 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36 which was allotted to the branch of Kombamma and accordingly, he is in unauthorised occupation of the same and that the Tahsildar has got the jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction under Section 7 of the Act. It is also contended by him that even if Section 7 of the Act does not apply to such a situation, the Act being a beneficial legislation, the authorities have the necessary power to evict a person who is in unauthorised occupation of the land, to give effect to the provision of the Act and the order of eviction has to be sustained on that ground at least.

    10. In the light of the above contentions, the first question that is to be considered is as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tahsildar had the jurisdiction or power to pass an order of eviction under Section 7 of the Act, in respect of 1 acre and 10 guntas of land from out of the land in the possession of the Writ Petitioner. The facts of this case are not in dispute. The erstwhile holder of the Office was represented by two branches of Bylayellamma and Kombamma and one of the lands attached to the Office was 1 acre and 37 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36. On 20.10.1972, the Branch of Bylayellamma executed a Sale Deed in respect, of this land and the Writ Petitioner was put in possession of the same. Thereafter, a joint re-grant was made under the provisions of the Act in favour of both the branches together by an order dated 13.9.1979 In the meantime, eviction proceedings were also initiated against the Writ Petitioner by issuing a notice in February, 1979. That was challenged in W.P No. 18164/82, wherein, eviction proceedings were quashed, holding that, the alienation in favour of the petitioner is valid. Thereafter, on the application of the members of Kombamma's branch, the above judgment was clarified in Annexure ‘B’ Judgment, in W.P No. 7137/86. By that Judgment, it was clarified that the Judgment in the earlier Writ Petition will not affect the rights of Kombamma's branch in the land and that they have title to 1 acre and 10 guntas of land which fell to their share under a Partition in their family on 8.2.1981 and that the Writ Petitioner did not acquire any valid title to the said item of land. It is clear from Annexure ‘B’ Judgment that this Court rightly declared that the Writ Petitioner did not get any right over 1 acre and 10 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36 which fell to the share of Kombamma under the Partition, in their family executed on 8.2.1981 From that Judgment, it is absolutely clear that the Writ Petition did not get any title to 1 acre and 10 guntas of land, in respect of which, the present order of eviction is passed and that he is in unauthorised occupation of the same. But the question to be decided is to whether he is an “unauthorised holder” as defined under the Act, to be proceeded against under Section 7 of the Act.

    11. It is to be noted that the Act came into force on 1.2.1963 The alienation in favour of the Writ Petitioner was only on 21.10.1972, long after the coming into force of the Act. For the purpose of this case, it has to be taken that the Writ Petitioner was not in possession of the land on the date of coming into the force of the Act, viz., 1.2.1963 No doubt, his case is that, he was a lessee from 1962, but it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to decide that question as it is pending in some other proceedings and for the purpose of this case, we are assuming that he came into possession of the land only by virtue of the Sale Deed of the year 1972. The question to be decided is as to whether Section 7 would be applicable to the persons who came into possession of the land after the coming into force of the Act.

    12. In order to determine that question, it would be relevant to consider the provisions of the Act. The Act was intended to abolish the Village Offices which were held hereditarily, before the commencement of the Constitution. Section 2 of the Act is the definition Section. Section 4 of the Act provides that, all village offices shall be and are hereby abolished. Under Section 4(3) of the Act, subject to the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7, all lands granted or continued in respect or annexed to a village office by the State shall be resumed and shall be subject to the payment of land revenue under the provisions of the Act. In other words all such lands shall stand resumed to the Government from the date of the commencement of the Act. Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act provides for the re-grant of the land resumed under Section 4 of the Act, to the holders of Village Offices. Section 5 provides that, all lands resumed under Section 4(3) except lands coming under Sections 6 and 7 be granted to the person who was the holder of the Village Office immediately prior to the appointed date. It is to be noted that this Section would apply only to cases not falling under Sections 6 and 7 and re-grant is to be made on certain conditions which are not very relevant. Section 6 of the Act provides for re-grant of land resumed under Section 4 to authorised holders. That Section provides that if the land resumed under Section 4(3) is held by an authorised holder, it shall be re-granted to him on certain conditions. Section 7 of the Act deals with eviction of unauthorised holders and the re-grant of such lands, after resuming the same, from unauthorised holders. Section 7 provides that, if any land resumed under Section 4(2) is in possession of unauthorised holder, he shall be summararily evicted therefrom and the lands shall be taken possession of by the Deputy Commissioner, in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity to the person in possession to make a representation. Section 7(3) provides that the land which is resumed from an unauthorised holder, shall be granted to holder of such Office if it was granted or continued in respect of or annexed to an inferior Village Office. In other cases, the land must be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the disposal of unoccupied unalienated lands.

    13. ‘Authorised Holder’ and ‘unauthorised holder’ are defined under the Act under Section 2(b) and 2(m) of the Act, which reads:

    “2(b) ‘authorised holder’ means a person in whose favour a land granted or continued in respect of, or annexed to a village office by the State or a part thereof has been validly alienated permanently, whether by sale, gift, partition or otherwise under the existing law relating to such village Offices:”

    “2(m) ‘unauthorised holder’ means a person in possession of a land granted or continued in respect of or annexed in a village office by the State without any right, or under any lease, mortgage sale, gift or any other kind of alienation thereof, which is null and void under the existing law relating such village office:”

    14. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the object of enactment is to abolish the Village Offices and to resume the lands in possession of such holders, to whom lands were granted as inam for the service. After resuming the land, provision is also made under Sections 5 to 7 to re-grant the land practically in favour of the original holders or in some cases to the authorised holders. A reading of Sections 5, 6 and 7 would make it clear that those provisions are to be applied taking into account the situation as existed as on the date of commencement of the Act viz., 1.2.1963 Section 5 of the Act provides for re-grant of the land to holders of the Office and it specifically makes a provision that it shall not apply to cases falling under Sections 6 and 7. So, if a land is in the occupation of an unauthorised holder as on the date of the commencement of the Act, no re-grant shall be made under Section 5 of the Act. If the land is in possession of authorised holder, re-grant shall be made to him under Section 6 of the Act. It is clear from a reading of Section 7 itself that it would apply only if a person is an ‘unauthorised holder’ as defined under the Act, on the date of coming into force of the Act. The definition of ‘unauthorised holder’ itself makes it clear that, he is a person in possession of land without any right or under an alienation which is null and void under the existing law relating to such Village. The existing law relating to a Village Office, can refer only to a law, Rule, Notification etc., which may be in force immediately before the appointed date, viz., 1.2.1963 The scheme of the Act makes it clear that the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 have to be applied taking into account the possession of the land as on the date of commencement of the Act, viz. 1.2.1963

    15. That is more evident from the fact that, no re-grant order can be made under section 5 of the Act, if provisions of Section 7 are applicable. The fact that the re-grant order was made in this case under Section 5 itself makes it clear that Section 7 cannot have any application. For otherwise, there could not have been Regrant under Section 5 of the Act. Moreover, Section 7(3) of the Act provides for regrant of the land after getting possession of the land from the unauthorised holder. Section 7 is also one of the modes of re-grant along with Sections 5 and 6 in respect of lands in possession of ‘unauthorised holders’ as on the date of coming into force of the Act. After resuming the land from the unauthorised holders, it shall be re-granted either to the holder of the Office if the land was annexed to inferior Village Office or it has to be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the disposal of the unoccupied land. This provision contained in Section 7 of the Act is one of the modes of regrant after resuming the land from the unauthorised holder and that it cannot be pressed into service for resuming the land from the possession of a person who comes into possession of the land after 1.2.1963, whether under a valid alienation or an invalid alienation. On a plain reading of the provisions contained in the Act, we have no hesitation to hold that the provision of Section 7 can be invoked only as against ‘unauthorised holders’ who are in possession of the land as on 1.2.1963 and that it cannot be invoked in respect of persons even though they are in unauthorised occupation who come into possession of the land only after 1.2.1963 If the land is to be resumed from any such persons, it is not to be done under the power vested under Section 7 but under any other provisions of law, by which, the authorities may be entitled to resume such lands.

    16. But even that may not be possible in this case, for, before the proceedings were initiated, there was an order of regrant in favour of the branches of Kombamma and Bylayellamma by an order dated 13.9.1979 under Section 5 of the Act. The fact that there was a regrant under Section 5 of the Act, itself, would clearly indicate that, Section 7 of the Act is not applicable to the present case, for, if Section 7 were to apply, then no re-grant could be made under Section 5 of the Act, Consequently when once the order of re-grant is made, in favour of the two branches in 1979, the State is divested of its title and it is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act or the Karnataka Land Revenue Act to resume the land from the possession of the Writ Petitioner. The State can resume the land from any person under any provision of Law only so long it has title to the land and not after it is divested of the same. We are fortified in this view by a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Lakshmana Gowda v. State of Karnataka, wherein, it is held:

    “70. Our answer to Question No. 4 raises a subsidiary question as to whether it is open to the State to evict an alienee or an intending alienee who has continued to be in possession of a Service Inam Land having been put in such possession by the Holder or the authorised holder of such land if the latter had subsequently obtained regrant thereof under Section 5 or 6 of the Principal Act, we shall now examine this subsidiary question.

    71. If a Service Inam land was in the possession of an unauthorised alienee or an unauthorised intending alienee thereof at the time of coming into force of the Principal Act, it was open to him to obtain regrant of such land under the proviso to sub-section (1) of original Section 7 of the Principal Act. But, that proviso stood repealed by reason of substitution of a new Section for original Section 7 of the Principal Act by the Amendment Act. After such repeal, it would be open to the State to take proceedings against the unauthorised alienee or the unauthorised intending alienee for evicting him from such Service inam Land. If in the meanwhile such land had been regranted to his alienor, who was its holder or authorised holder, the title to that land no longer remains with the State and it follows that the State cannot take any proceedings for evicting from such land the unauthorised alienee or intended alienee. In other words, if the State regranted under Section 5 or 6 a former Service Inam Land to its holder or authorised holder, the State can no longer take eviction proceedings in respect of that land on the ground that it is in possession of a person who had purchased it un-authorisedly prior to the coming into force of the Principal Act, or had been put in possession of such land in pursuance of an agreement to sell such land entered into prior to the coming into force of the Principal Act, or had been put in possession of such land in pursuance of an agreement to sell such land entered into prior to the coming into force of the Principal Act.”

    17. In this case, the proceedings have been initiated after the regrant in favour of Kombamma and Bylayellamma. The Tahsildar, consequently, will have no jurisdiction to resume the land from the possession of the Writ Petitioner.

    18. We have held that Section 7 of the Act cannot have any application in respect of persons, who, comes into possession of land after 1.2.1963 after considering the scope and effect of Sections 4 to 7 of the Act.

    19. Now, we shall consider the decisions of this Court on this aspect. The question came up before this Court and in some cases, it was assumed that an alienee with an imperfect title (during the period 1.2.1963 to 7.8.1978) is an unauthorised holder who could be evicted under Section 7. This assumption was made in the case of Hanumaiah v. State Of Karnataka* . ILR 1987 KAR 550., Chikkanarasaiah v. Tirupataiah* . ILR 1989 KAR 1520., Adiveppa Shivappa Mattur v. Tahsildar* . ILR 1990 KAR 879.. This question was not specifically considered in those decisions but it was assumed that Section 7 would apply even to such cases but it has to be stated that this question was specifically considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Syed Bhasheer Ahamed & Others v. State Of Karnataka* . ILR 1994 KAR 159.. In paragraphs 18 and 19, it has been held:

    “18. The definitions of the terms ‘holder’, ‘authorised holder’ and ‘unauthorised holder’ in the Act have one thing in common. They are all with refrence to the appointed date, namely, 1.2.1963 While ‘holder’ refers to holder of a village office, the terms ‘authorised holder’ and ‘unauthorised holder’ do not refer to holders of Village Office, but alienees from holders of Village Office or persons in possession of Service Inam Land. A ‘holder’ is a person having an interest in a Village Office, under an existing law relating to such village office.

    An ‘authorised holder’ is a person in whose favour, a land granted or continued in respect of or annexed to a Village Office had been validly and permanently alienated, under the existing law relating to such Village Office. An ‘unauthorised holder’ is a person in possession of a land granted or continued in respect of or annexed to a Village Office, without any right, or under an-alienation, which is null and void under the existing law, relating to such Village Office. The term ‘existing law relating to a village office’ refers to a law, Rule, Notification etc., which may be in force immediately before the appointed date, that is immediately prior to 1.2.1963 or upto the expiry of 31.1.1963 A holder has a right to re-grant of his Service Inam Land in his holding or possession as at the end of 31.1.1963 (under sub-section (1) of Section 5). This is evident from the words ‘land resumed under Section 4(3), not falling under Section 6 and 7’. An authorised holder is a person having the right to re-grant of the Service Inam Land validly alienated to him before 1.2.1963 (under Section 6). An alienee in possession of a service inam land ??? pursuance of an aleination between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978, is not a person without any right, but a person who gets an imperfect title with possession on the date of alienation and whose title gets perfected on re-grant of in favour of the alienor. Further an alienation of a Service Inam Land between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978, is not an alienation which is null and void under the existing law relating to the village office, that is, laws in force immediately before 1.2.1963 It therefore follows that a person in whose favour, a Service Inam Land is alienated during the period 1.2.1963 to 7.8.1978 by a ‘holder’ or an ‘authorised holder’, before re-grant to such holder or authorised holder under Section 5(1) or 6, will neither be a ‘holder’ or an ‘authorised holder’ or an ‘unauthorised holder’. Such a person will be an ‘alienee from a holder authorised holder with imperfect title (hereinafter referred to as ‘Alienee’ with Imperfect Title or ‘Alienee between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978’).

    19. The Act contemplated eviction by the State only in the following four situations:

    (a) Where a holder or an authorised holder to whom the land is re-granted under Section 5(1) fails to pay the occupancy price - (vide Sections 5(2) and 6 of the Act).

    (b) Where a holder or an authorised holder to whom the land is re-granted under Section 5(1) or 6 transfers the land within 15 years from 7.8.1978 (vide Section 5(3) and 6 read with Section 5(4) of the Act).

    (c) Where an unauthorised holder is in possession of a land resumed under Section 4(3) (vide Section 7(1) of the Act).

    (d) Where a grantee of a land re-granted under Section 5(4) or Section 7(3) of the Act after summary eviction of the unauthorised holder or occupant under Section 5(4) or 7(1) transfers the land within 15 years from 7.8.1978 - (vide Section 7A of the Act).

    There is no provision in the Act for summary eviction of an alienee with imperfect title, that is an alienee between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978 In the cases of Hanumaiah and Chikkanarasiah (ILR 1987 KAR 550 and ILR 1989 KAR 1520 respectively) it has been assumed, without basis, that an alienee with imperfect title (that is alienee during the period 1.2.1963 to 7.8.1978) is an ‘unauthorised holder’ who could be evicted under Section 7. We have already seen that under Section 7, only an ‘unauthorised holder’ could be evicted and not an alienee between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978 as he is not an ‘unauthorised holder’.

    20. On a plain reading of Section 7 and on the basis of the aforesaid Full Bench Decision, we hold that the provisions of Section 7 for summary eviction of the persons in possession of the lands, can be invoked only as against ‘unauthorised holders’ as defined under Section 2(m) of the Act and it cannot be invoked as against persons who come into possession of the land after the coming into force of the Act, even though their possession may not be lawful, for which, other legal remedies will have to be invoked. We also hold that the provisions of Section 7, at any rate, cannot be invoked after an order of re-grant is made, for, by the re-grant, the State is divested of its title and thereafter, it cannot resume the land from any person even though his possession may be unlawful.

    21. It is also relevant to note the Judgment of this Court passed in Review in W.P No. 7137/86 which was filed by the Branch of Kombamma. Originally, by the order in W.P No. 18164/82 dated 17.12.1984, this Court quashed the resumption proceedings on the ground that, so long as the Sale Deed stood in favour of the Writ Petitioner and the land was re-granted in favour of the vendor of the petitioner, he could not be evicted from the land. But while reviewing that Judgment in W.P No. 7137/86, this Court clarified that the order in W.P No. 18164/82 did not in any way affect the rights of Kombamma or her legal representatives in respect of the ownership of the land which she acquired pursuant to the re-grant order and pursuant to the partition deed between her and Bylayellamma. This Court also held in that Judgment that the present Writ Petitioner (Respondent No. 6 in the Writ Petition) cannot claim that he had acquired valid title to 1 acre and 10 guntas of land in Sy. No. 36 which fell to the share of Kombamma in the partition deed dated 9.2.1981 In-spite of the above finding that the Writ Petitioner obtained no title to the above land, this Court did not review the earlier Judgment and restore the original order of resumption atleast to that extent. If Section 7 of the Act were applicable, in such circumstances, this Court would have definitely upheld the order of resumption atleast in respect of 1 acre and 10 guntas of land over which this Court held that the Writ Petitioner had no title. But this Court sustained the original order of quashing the entire resumption proceedings without even allowing resumption of this portion of the land, over which, the Writ Petitioner was held to have no title. That would also indicate that this Court was of the view that, proceedings could not be initiated under Section 7 of the Act, even in respect of that portion of the land, though the Writ Petitioner had no title to the same. This Court only declared the right of Kombamma's Branch over that land, thereby, implying that they will have to seek appropriate remedy elsewhere for getting possession of that land.

    22. The learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that, even if this Court holds that Section 7 of the Act will not apply, proceedings for eviction can be initiated as against the Writ Petitioner in order to give effect to the provisions of the Act. The authorities must be deemed to be vested with necessary power to resume the lands from persons who have no title, to give effect to the object of the Act. It is his contention that the Writ Petitioner is in possession of 1 acre and 10 guntas of land without any title and the power must be assumed in favour of the authorities to resume the land and to give it to the grantees to give effect to the provisions of the Act. It is a beneficial legislation. In support of the same, he relied on a large number of decisions of the Supreme Court including the decision of the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore. v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi . AIR 1969 SC 430., wherein it is held:

    “An express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective.”

    In other words, it is contended that a power must be implied with the authorities to do what is necessary in order to give full effect to the Act.

    23. We are not inclined to agree with this contention. The Act provides for abolition of village Offices and to re-grant the lands to them in certain circumstances. It makes provision for restoration of lands in the possession of unauthorised holders and to make a regrant to the original holders or to grant as if it is other Government lands. Necessary provisions have been made in the Act itself which are contained in Sections 4 to 7 to give effect to the provisions of the Act. When powers are enumerated, the power vested in the authority is restricted by the terms of the Sections and they cannot be allowed to exercise jurisdiction outside the same under the guise of ancillary power. The Act makes full and complete provision for dealing with the land as per the situation as exists on the date of the Act. Thereafter, the possession of the land may change hands and various inter se disputes between the parties may arise which will have to be determined independently on the basis of the rights of parties. That power can be exercised only by ordinary Civil Courts and such vide powers cannot be assumed by Revenue authorities under the guise of an anciliary power, especially, when it affects private rights of the parties. The Act makes provision for resumption of land from the holders of Village Office and thereafter to make a regrant in accordance with Sections 5 to 7. It provides a complete machinery for dealing with lands coming under the Act. The purpose of the Act is achieved by regrant of the land to eligible persons. Thereafter, it becomes the property of the grantee and the ordinary remedy should be resorted to, if there is any invasion of that right. After the land is re-granted, the purpose is accomplished and thereafter the authorities under the Act have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings to put the grantee in possession of the same which has to be obtained through the ordinary Civil Court. In S. Sundaram Pillai etc. v. V.R Pattabiraman . 1985 1 SCC 591, the Supreme Court observed:

    “Ironing out the creases is possible but not re-writing the language to serve a notion of public policy held by the Judges.

    In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar . 1988 2 SCC 513, the Supreme Court stated as follows at p. 1067:

    “It is no doubt true that the Court while construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the Court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful.”

    24. As stated earlier, the object of the Act is fully achieved by the re-grant order in favour of eligible persons. The State is divested of its title by the re-grant and the provisions of the Act cannot thereafter be invoked to settle the rights of parties for all times to come in the guise of an ancilliary power. By the re-grant the authorities under the Act becomes functus-officio and the settlement of rights between the parties thereafter has to be done in the ordinary manner by the ordinary Civil Courts. In that view of the matter, we do not find our way to agree with the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent that dehors the power under Section 7 the authorities can resume the land from persons who are in possession of the land without any title even after re-grant of the land is ordered.

    25. In the light of the above conclusions, we hold that the Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 7 of the Act as the Writ Petitioner is not an ‘unauthorised holder’ as defined under Section 2(m) of the Act. Moreover, the re-grant order was passed in 1979 itself and the State is divested of its title. Thereafter, at any rate, the Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to resume the land from the possession of the Writ Petitioner even if his possession is unlawful. It is for the title holder to seek appropriate remedies before the Civil Court to get possession of the land which he is entitled to. Accordingly, we reverse the finding of the learned Single Judge and hold that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to invoke Section 7 and pass an order of eviction as against the Writ Petitioner.

    In the result, we allow this Appeal, set aside the Judgment of the learned Single Judge and quash Annexure ‘C’ order dated 20.2.1993 passed by the Additional Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore, leaving Respondents 2 and 3 to seek their remedies before the appropriate Forum.

    There will be no order as to costs.

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    V. Channanarasimhaiah v. Additional Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk & Others
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