AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 6(4) of the Karnataka Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Bill, 1996 (Act 5 of 1996),
  • rule 22A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957 (the Rules, for short)
  • section 6-D of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (in short, the Act)
  • Houses) Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1979):3A. Levy of cess.(1)
  • Employment Act, 1976 (in short, the Profession Tax Act)
  • SECTION 4 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Houses) Act, 1979 (for short, the Luxury Tax Act)
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 3A(1) of the Profession Tax Act,
  • 1, 1995.2. Sub-section (1) of section 6-D
  • Employment Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 35
  • section 3A(1) of the Luxury Tax Act,
  • rupees.(ii) Section 3A(1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 6(4) of the Karnataka Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Bill, 1996 (Act 5 of 1996),
  • rule 22A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957 (the Rules, for short)
  • section 6-D of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (in short, the Act)
  • Houses) Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1979):3A. Levy of cess.(1)
  • Employment Act, 1976 (in short, the Profession Tax Act)
  • SECTION 4 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Houses) Act, 1979 (for short, the Luxury Tax Act)
  • ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • section 3A(1) of the Profession Tax Act,
  • 1, 1995.2. Sub-section (1) of section 6-D
  • Employment Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 35
  • section 3A(1) of the Luxury Tax Act,
  • rupees.(ii) Section 3A(1)
Smart Summary

Court Opinion Summary: Interpretation of Section 6-D, Karnataka Sales Tax Act (G.C. Bharuka, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of writ petitions arises from a dispute over the interpretation of section 6-D of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (inserted by Karnataka Act 6 of 1995), which provided for a cess to fund the Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System (BMRT) with effect from April 1, 1995. After section 6-D was enacted, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued Circular No. 3/949-95 dated 21 April 1995 interpreting the provision to require all assessees whose principal place of business is within the Bangalore City Planning Area to pay the cess on sales or purchases effected by them even at branches or places of business located outside the Bangalore area.

Pursuant to that circular, assessing authorities issued notices to dealers (including the petitioners) demanding cess at the rate of five per cent of the tax payable under specified sections for all sales or purchases (including those effected outside the Bangalore area). The petitioners challenged this demand by filing writ petitions in this Court seeking a declaration as to the correct interpretation of section 6-D and quashing of the circular. The Government later introduced and passed an amendment (Karnataka Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1996 — Act 5 of 1996) altering the wording of section 6-D to read that the cess is on "sales or purchases effected within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area by any dealer".

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 6-D(1) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, cess is leviable only on sales or purchases effected within the Bangalore City Planning Area or on the dealer's aggregate/global sales or purchases effected through all branches in the State (including those outside Bangalore area).
  2. Whether the Commissioner's Circular No. 3/949-95 (21 April 1995), which required levy of cess on sales/purchases effected outside the Bangalore area for dealers having principal place of business in Bangalore, is authorized by section 6-D and therefore lawful and enforceable.
  3. Whether the later amendment (Karnataka Act 5 of 1996) is declaratory such that it can be applied retrospectively to clarify the original legislative intent.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Sarangan and Mr. Natarajan, Senior Counsel)

  • Section 6-D is capable of more than one interpretation; on a proper construction the cess is leviable only on sales or purchases effected within the Bangalore City Planning Area and not on transactions effected outside that area by the same dealer.
  • The Commissioner’s circular taking a contrary view is unauthorized, illegal or unenforceable and should be quashed.
  • Applying internal and external aids of interpretation (including the budget speech and related legislative history) supports the conclusion that the levy was meant to be limited to taxable events within the Bangalore area.
  • A contrary construction would produce uncertainty, irrational application by executive fiat and would be violative of Article 14 (equality) and Article 265 (taxes to be levied and collected under law) of the Constitution of India.
  • The proviso dealing with petrol and diesel (levy by paise per litre only for sales within Bangalore area) supports the inference that the whole levy was intended for sales effected within the Bangalore area.
  • The Legislature would have used the express phrase "total turnover" if it intended to tax global transactions; its omission is significant.

Respondent / Revenue Arguments (as reflected in the Commissioner's circular and submissions)

  • The Circular held that cess is payable by all assessees having places of business within the Bangalore City Planning Area in respect of all sales/purchases made by them in the State (i.e., on global turnover of dealers carrying on business in Bangalore).
  • Where a corporate body's principal place of business is within Bangalore and branches elsewhere have separate registrations, such branches are also liable to pay cess in addition to tax payable by them.
  • With reference to the amendment, the Government contended that because the amendment was not expressly retrospective it cannot affect liabilities already accrued under the pre-amendment provision (i.e., those liabilities would remain if legally borne prior to amendment).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
B.K. Industries v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 621; AIR 1993 SC 2123 Authority for the proposition that a Finance Minister's speech is not law and cannot be relied upon if the parliamentary proposal was not accepted; caution against treating speech as determinative of legal effect where the legislature did not enact the speech's proposal. The Court recorded the Revenue's reliance on this decision to object to using the Budget Speech as an aid. The Court considered this authority but proceeded to reconcile it with later points about accepted proposals being part of legislative history; ultimately the Court held that speeches that are carried into law by Legislature may be used as an aid in interpretation.
Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. CIT, Mysore, [1975] 101 ITR 234 Permits use of a Finance Minister's speech (or mover's speech) as an aid to interpretation where it elucidates the object and where the mover was in best position to explain the defect remedied; distinguishes between taking judicial notice of the fact a speech was made and proving the truth of disputable facts stated therein. The Court relied on this decision to justify using the Finance Minister's Budget Speech as an external aid to ascertain legislative intent because the speech clarified the purpose of the amendment and harmonised with the words used in the statute.
Jerold Lord Strickland v. Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, AIR 1935 PC 34 Referenced (within the discussion of Sole Trustee) as authority for distinction between judicial notice of parliamentary proceedings and proof of disputable facts stated therein. Used, via the quotation in Sole Trustee, to support the proposition that courts may take judicial notice of the fact that a particular statement was made in parliamentary proceedings (as an aid), without treating it as proof of all factual assertions in that speech.
The "Englishman" Limited v. Lala Lajpat Rai…, (1910) ILR 37 Cal. 760 Also referenced (within the discussion of Sole Trustee) as part of authorities distinguishing judicial notice of parliamentary proceedings from the proof of disputed facts. Served as supporting authority (via Sole Trustee) for the Court's acceptance that parliamentary speeches may be taken into account as an interpretative aid when appropriate.
Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1968 SC 1336 Explains the nature of explanatory Acts (amendments) — that an explanatory Act is generally passed to supply obvious omission and to clear doubts as to meaning of a previous Act; used to justify treating an amendment as declaratory. The Court invoked this authority to support the conclusion that the Karnataka amendment (Act 5 of 1996) was declaratory of the original legislative intent and therefore could be treated as retrospective in nature to clear doubts arising from earlier wording.
Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, [1978] 41 STC 409 Rule of interpretation: where two expressions might be used but one would convey intention more clearly, the Legislature is taken to have intended that clearer expression if it used it; conversely, if it used the less clear expression where a clearer one was available, the clearer intention is unlikely to have been intended. The Court applied this canon to observe that the Legislature used "sales or purchases effected within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area by any dealer" rather than the broader term "total turnover"; thus the omission of "total turnover" indicates no intention to tax global transactions outside the Bangalore area.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured sequence grounded in textual interpretation, legislative history, statutory scheme, and established interpretative principles:

  1. Text and Scheme: The Court began by focusing on the wording of section 6-D(1) as originally enacted (cess "on sales or purchases effected by any dealer who is carrying on business within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area, at the rate of five per cent of tax payable...") and the policy objective stated in the Budget Speech to raise funds for the Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System.
  2. Administrative Action and Litigation: The Commissioner’s circular interpreted the provision to levy cess on all sales or purchases by dealers having places of business within the Bangalore area, including transactions effected outside that area; notices were issued accordingly, prompting litigation.
  3. Use of External Aids (Budget Speech): The Court examined the Budget Speech of the Finance Minister (explicitly paragraphs 95–96, 152, 155–156) which both announced the purpose of the cess and expressly stated the intention that the levy be limited to activities in the Bangalore Planning Area. The Court considered the objection (relying on B.K. Industries) that a budget speech is not law, but relied on the Sole Trustee line of authority to conclude that where a mover's speech explains the reason for an enactment and the legislative proposals are accepted and crystallised into law, such speech can assist in interpretation.
  4. Amendment and Declaratory Character: The Legislature subsequently amended the wording by Karnataka Act 5 of 1996 substituting the phrase so that section 6-D(1) would read as applying to "sales or purchases effected within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area by any dealer." The Court held that the Finance Minister's clear statement that the earlier language had led to litigation and that the amendment would make the levy applicable only to sales or purchases effected within the Bangalore area rendered the amendment declaratory. Relying on principles about explanatory Acts (citing Keshavlal Jethalal Shah), the Court held the amendment could be treated as declaratory and retrospective in nature where the substance supported that classification.
  5. Comparison with Pari Materia Provisions: The Court noted similar cess provisions inserted into two other Karnataka statutes (Profession Tax Act and Luxury Tax Act) which expressly limited the cess to activities within the Bangalore area. This consistency in parallel statutes reinforced the interpretation that the Legislature intended local taxable events only to bear the cess.
  6. Proviso and Specificity: The proviso explicitly applied the petrol/diesel levy by paise per litre "within the limits of Bangalore area," which the Court treated as a textual cue that the lease of clarity in the main text should be read consistently to confine liability to sales/purchases effected within the Bangalore area rather than to the dealer's global transactions.
  7. Definition and Omission of "Total Turnover": The Court referred to statutory definitions of "turnover" and "total turnover" in the Act. It observed that where the Legislature intended to tax aggregate/statewide transactions it had in other provisions used the term "total turnover." The omission of that term in section 6-D was taken as significant: if the Legislature intended to encompass global transactions, it could and would have used "total turnover."
  8. Canon of Clear Expression (Polestar): The Court applied the interpretative maxim cited in Polestar Electronic that if the Legislature intended the broader meaning it would have used the clear and unambiguous term; its failure to do so indicates it did not intend that broader meaning. On this basis the Court concluded the impugned provision should be construed to apply only to sales/purchases effected within the Bangalore City Planning Area by the dealer.
  9. Conclusion on Circular: Because the Commissioner’s circular interpreted section 6-D to reach global transactions effected outside the Bangalore area, the Court found the circular misread the statute and was therefore quashed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISPOSITION: The writ petitions are allowed. The Court declared that dealers carrying on business within the limits of the Bangalore City Planning Area are liable to pay the BMRT cess only on sales or purchases effected by them within the Bangalore area. The Commissioner's Circular No. 3/949-95 dated 21 April 1995 is quashed as having misread the impugned provisions. The petitioners are entitled to such reliefs that logically flow from this declaration. The writ petitions were allowed without costs.

Implications and Direct Effects:

  • The direct legal consequence for the parties is that cess cannot be demanded (under section 6-D as interpreted by this Court) on sales or purchases effected by dealers at places of business located outside the Bangalore City Planning Area even if their principal place of business or one branch is within Bangalore area.
  • The Commissioner's circular interpreting the section to apply to global transactions has been quashed and cannot be enforced as stated in that circular.
  • The Court treated the subsequent legislative amendment (Karnataka Act 5 of 1996) as clarifying and declaratory of the original legislative intent; the amendment reinforced and supported the Court's interpretative conclusion.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a broader constitutional or jurisprudential precedent beyond the interpretation of section 6-D and the quashing of the specific administrative circular; the decision's immediate effect is to determine the liabilities of the petitioners and similarly placed dealers under the statute as interpreted in this judgment.

This summary is confined strictly to matters and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce or infer information beyond that text.

    Mrf Limited v. Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes And Another (And Other Cases)

    G.C Bharuka, J.:— The question involved in the present batch of writ petitions pertains to interpretation of section 6-D of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (in short, “the Act”) which was inserted by Karnataka Act 6 of 1995 providing for levy of cess on certain transactions of sale and/or purchase with effect from April 1, 1995.

    2. Sub-section (1) of section 6-D which is relevant for the present purpose reads as under:

    “6-D. Levy of cess.—(1) In addition to the tax payable under sections 5, 5B, 5C and 6, there shall be levied and collected by way of cess for the purpose of Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System a tax, on sales or purchases effected by any dealer who is carrying on business within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area, at the rate of five per cent of tax payable under the said sections:

    Provided that where a dealer is selling to any person goods specified in serial number 12 of Part ‘M’ of the Second Schedule within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area, such dealer shall pay the cess on the sale of,—

    (i) petrol at the rate of twenty-five paise per litre; and

    (ii) diesel at the rate of ten paise per litre.”

    3. It appears that subsequent to the insertion of the said provision, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, pursuant to certain queries, issued a Circular No. 3/949-95 dated 21st April, 1995 giving his own interpretation of the said provision, the relevant part whereof is to the following effect:

    “The cess is payable by all the assessees having their places of business within the Bangalore City Planning Area and who are registered with the assessing authorities having jurisdiction over such area and paying taxes to such authorities in respect of all sales/purchases made by them in the State.

    Where the principal place of business of a corporate body is within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area and is having branches in other places in the State and where such corporate body has obtained separate registration under section 12E for the purpose of assessment, such branches shall also be liable to pay cess in addition to the tax payable by them in respect of sales or purchases as the case may be effected by them.”

    4. Pursuant to the said circular, the assessing authorities under the Act have issued notices to all the dealers like the petitioners herein, demanding cess at the rate of 5 per cent of tax payable by such dealers under sections 5, 5-B, 5-C and 6 of the Act in respect of all their sales or purchases effected by them even at their places of business/branches located outside the Bangalore City Planning Area (“Bangalore area”, for short). These actions as emanated from the above referred Commissioner's circular has triggered off the present spate of litigations. The controversy which needs to be resolved is as to whether the petitioners having more than one place of business in the Karnataka State including the ones within the limits of Bangalore area are liable to pay cess in terms of section 6-D of the Act only on the tax payable by them in respect of sales or purchases effected within the Bangalore area or even in respect of sales or purchases effected by them outside the said area.

    5. Section 2(k) of the Act defines the term “dealer”, inter alia, to mean “any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods”. Clause (q) of this section gives an inclusive definition of “place of business”.

    6. Section 10 of the Act provides for registration of dealers and section 10A lays down the procedure for the same. Section 10A(3) directs that where a dealer has more than one place of business, the registration certificate shall cover all such places of business. But rule 22A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957 (“the Rules”, for short) gives an option to bodies corporate having more than one place of business to make an application to the Commissioner to seek a special order based on the hardships likely to be faced by them, to permit each branch to be assessed separately by the assessing authority of the area in which such branch is situated as a separate business and grant of such permission has to be subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules relating to registration, filing of monthly statements, returns, assessments, payment and recovery of taxes, and other conditions embodied in the Rules.

    7. By referring to the scheme of the Act, it has been submitted by Mr. Sarangan and Mr. Natarajan learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that section 6-D of the Act is capable of more than one interpretation; and keeping in view the object with which the impugned section 6D was inserted, the sales or purchases effected by a dealer within the Bangalore area can only be subjected to levy of cess and not the transactions which have been effected by such dealers outside that area; and the circular issued by the Commissioner expressing a contrary view should be held to be unauthorised, illegal or unenforceable.

    8. According to the petitioners, on a fair and rational construction arrived at by employing internal and external aids as judicially evolved for the purpose, the irresistable conclusion could only be the one which has been placed on their behalf, since, according to them, any contrary construction will not only be opposed to the object of the impugned legislative exercise but will also be violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India as it may lead to uncertainties and ambiguities and above all irrational application of law under the executive fiat, which again is impermissible under the mandate of article 265 of the Constitution.

    9. To fortify the said submissions, it has been illustrated that if a person, like the petitioners herein, has three branches—one within the Bangalore area and the other two at Mangalore and Dharwad, the impugned section 6D of the Act, even on its plain reading, does not indicate that such a person will be deemed to be a dealer carrying on business in Bangalore area even in respect of its outside transaction, thus making him liable for paying cess even in respect of its such sales or purchases; or if he is taken to be a dealer carrying on business at Mangalore or at Dharwad, then whether still he can be held liable for payment of cess. Similarly, it has further been submitted that in the same illustration even on a fair reading of the section, persons having more than one branches, out of which one being in Bangalore area, can claim complete exemption from levy of cess under the Act on the ground that under the impugned provisions only such dealer has been made liable to pay cess who carries on business only within Bangalore area meaning thereby at no other place in the State of Karnataka.

    10. The acceptance of either of the rival contentions invites for judicial construction of the impugned provision. Therefore, employment of the rules of interpretation has become incumbent.

    11. Accordingly, to seek the first aid, let me overview the enacting history of the impugned provisions. As has been made clear in the body of section 6D by the Legislature, the cess in question has been levied for the purpose of Bangalore mass rapid transit system (for short, “the transit system”). The necessity of having this new transit system has been explained in paragraphs 95 and 96 of the Budget Speech for the year 1995-96 made by the Minister of Finance and Planning which read as follows:

    “95. The number of vehicles registered in Bangalore have increased from 3.19 lakhs to 7.81 lakhs in the past one decade. It is hardly possible to widen the roads to make space for the ever increasing traffic. Further, the carrying capacity of conventional modes of transport is also limited. The only way out is a mass rapid transit system. The Government has initiated steps to set up an elevated light rail transit system by the private sector with necessary support from the Government. Global tenders inviting Requests for Proposal (RFP), for this project has already been floated. The Government expects to finalise the agency by June, 1996 which will ultimately execute the project on build, own and operate/build own and transfer basis.

    96. It will be a huge project with an estimated cost of Rs. 4,000 crores at current prices. While most of the funds will be brought by the private sector, the Government will have to provide some financial support either as a one time support or as a recurring support. The honourable members will agree that the other commitments of the State Government will not leave resources for supporting this massive project. It will be in order if the potential users of the system are asked to contribute. The Government proposes to set up mass rapid transit system fund. The receipts for this fund will be generated out of cess to be levied on various taxes collected in the city of Bangalore alone. During 1995-96, it is proposed to raise Rs. 55 crores through this cess………………”

    12. Accordingly, in paragraphs 155 and 156 of the said speech, it was proposed to make provisions for levy of cess for the said purpose. The proposals were to the following effect—

    “155. In order to meet the cost of Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System, I propose to impose a cess which would be limited to the activities in Bangalore Planning Area Limits. The details of levy furnished in annexure XII.

    156. The above measures will necessitate amendments to the provisions of various tax enactments. These amendments, together with certain other changes by way of rationalisation will be brought to the House in due course for consideration and approval.”

    13. Since as noticed above, the incorporation of section 6D of the Act was capable of more than one interpretation, it led to spate of litigations in this Court, like filing of the present batch of writ petitions, the Government taking note of this fact felt in desirable to make necessary amendment in the impugned provision to remedy the misgivings as is apparent from paragraph 152 of the Budget Speech for the year 1995-96 made by the Minister of Finance and Planning. Paragraph 152 of the said Budget Speech reads thus:

    “152. Honourable Members are aware that the BMRT cess was introduced from April 1, 1995 on sales or purchases taking place in Bangalore City Planning Area, in order to partly meet the cost of Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System. The language employed in section 6D, unfortunately has led to litigation in the High Court. We have also received representations from the trade. I, therefore, propose to suitably amend the relevant section, so that the levy of BMRT cess is made applicable only to sales or purchases effected within the Bangalore City Planning Area.”

    14. Accordingly, by section 6(4) of the Karnataka Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Bill, 1996 (Act 5 of 1996), it has been provided that—

    “in section 6-D, for the words ‘by any dealer who is carrying on business within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area’, the words, ‘within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area by any dealer’ shall be substituted;”

    15. On incorporation of the said amendment, section 6D(1) of the Act now reads as under:

    “6-D. Levy of cess.—(1) In addition to the tax payable under sections 5, 5B, 5C and 6, there shall be levied and collected by way of cess for the purpose of Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System a tax, on sales or purchases effected within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area by any dealer, at the rate of five per cent of tax payable under the said sections:

    Provided that…………”

    16. It may also be noticed here that in order to give effect to the budget proposals noticed above, provisions for levy of cess were made by incorporating the provisions similar to the impugned section 6D of the Act in other two State taxing statutes. Those are as follows:

    (i) 3A(1) of the Karnataka Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employment Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 35 of 1976):

    “In addition to the profession tax payable under the Act, there shall be levied and collected by way of a cess for the purpose of Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System a tax from every person engaged in profession, trade, calling or employment within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area, at the rate of five per cent of the profession tax:

    Provided that the profession tax together with the cess payable under this sub-section shall not exceed two thousand five hundred rupees.”

    (ii) Section 3A(1) of the Karnataka Tax on Luxuries (Hotels and Lodging Houses) Act, 1979 (Karnataka Act 22 of 1979):

    “3A. Levy of cess.—(1) In addition to the tax payable under section 3 there shall be levied and collected by way of cess for the purpose of Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit System a tax at the rate of five per cent of the tax payable under the said section on the luxury provided in a hotel within the limits of the Bangalore City Planning Area, where the charges for lodging per room per day are not less than seven hundred and fifty rupees.”

    17. Now to ascertain as to whether under the provisions of section 6D of the Act, the intention of the Legislature was to levy cess on the transactions of sales or purchases of a dealer effected in Bangalore area only or on its global transactions effected through all the branches in the State, it may be relevant to refer to the budget speech of the Finance Minister noticed above who was the mover of the Bill leading to incorporation of the said provision. But, Mr. H.G Ramesh, learned Additional Government Advocate, takes objection to the use of the said speech as an external aid for discovery of the legislative intent. He refers to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B.K Industries v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 621 : AIR 1993 SC 2123, wherein it has been held that—

    “9. We find it difficult to agree. It is not brought to our notice that the budget proposals contained in the Finance Minister's speech were accepted by the Parliament. The cess having been imposed by a Parliamentary enactment could be rendered inoperative only by a Parliamentary enactment. Such repealing enactment came only in the year 1987 with effect from April 1, 1987. Not only that, the repealing Act expressly provided in section 13 that the cess due before the date of said repeal, but not collected, shall be collected according to law as if the Cess Act is not repealed. This provision amounts to a positive affirmation of the intention of the Parliament to keep the said imposition alive and effective till the date of the repeal of the Cess Act. In the face of the said statutory provisions, no rights can be founded, nor can the levy of the cess be said to have been dispensed with by virtue of the alleged decision referred to in the Finance Minister's speech or on account of the letter dated August 11, 1986. The Finance Minister's speech is not law. The Parliament may or may not accept his proposal. Indeed, in this case, it did not accept the said proposal immediately but only a year later. It is only from the date of the repeal that the said levy becomes inoperative.”

    18. On the other hand, Mr. Sarangan relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sole Trustee, Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. Cit, Mysore, [1975] 101 ITR 234 in support of his contention that there is no bar on placing reliance on a budget speech made by the Minister. At page 252 of the Report, it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that:

    “It is true that it is dangerous and may be misleading to gather the meaning of the words used in an enactment merely from what was said by any speaker in the course of a debate in Parliament on the subject. Such a speech cannot be used to defeat or detract from a meaning which clearly emerges from a consideration of the enacting words actually used. But, in the case before us, the real meaning and purpose of the words used cannot be understood at all satisfactorily without referring to the past history of legislation on the subject and the speech of the mover of the amendment who was, undoubtedly, in the best position to explain what defect in the law the amendment had sought to remove. It was not just the speech of any member in Parliament. It was the considered statement of the Finance Minister who was proposing the amendment for a particular reason which he clearly indicated. If the reason given by him only elucidates what is also deducible from the words used in the amended provision, we do not see why we should refuse to take it into consideration as an aid to a correct interpretation. It harmonises with and clarifies the real intent of the words used. Must we, in such circumstances, ignore it?

    We find that section 57, sub-section (4), of the Evidence Act, not only enables but enjoins courts to take judicial notice of the course of proceedings in Parliament assuming, of course, that it is relevant. It is true that the correctness of what is stated, on a question of fact, in the course of Parliamentary proceedings, can only be proved by somebody who had direct knowledge of the fact stated. There is, however, a distinction between the fact that a particular statement giving the purpose of an enactment was made in Parliament, of which judicial notice can be taken as part of the proceedings, and the truth of a disputable matter of fact stated in the course of proceedings, which has to be proved aliunde, that is to say, apart from the fact that a statement about it was made in the course of proceedings in Parliament [See Jerold Lord Strickland v. Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, AIR 1935 PC 34 and The “Englishman” Limited… v. Lala Lajpat Rai…., (1910) ILR 37 Cal. 760].

    In the case before us, a reference was made merely to the fact that a certain reason was given by the Finance Minister, who proposed an amendment, for making the amendment. What we can take judicial notice of is the fact that such a statement of the reason was given in the course of such a speech. The question whether the object stated was properly expressed by the language of section 2(15) of the Act is a matter which we have to decide for ourselves as a question of law. Interpretation of a statutory provision is always a question of law on which the reasons stated by the mover of the amendment can only be used as an aid in interpretation if we think, as I do in the instant case, that it helps us considerably in understanding the meaning of the amended law. We find no bar against such a use of the speech.”

    (Emphasis* supplied)

    19. Therefore, keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it can unhesitantly be held that if the proposals made by the mover of the Bill like those of the Finance Minister in the present case are accepted by the Legislature without any demur crystalising the proposals into a legislative exercise, then such speeches and proposals can be made use of as an aid in the interpretation of the statutory provisions so made. In the present case, the two Budget speeches referred to above, are clearly indicative of the fact that the intention of incorporating the impugned section 6D in the Act was to levy cess only on the sales and purchases effected by a dealer in the Bangalore area.

    20. The said intention is amply fortified by the amendments subsequently made by the Karnataka Act 5 of 1996 which was apparently done to remedy the ambiguity and to make the provisions consistent with the intention with which it was incorporated. Learned Government Advocate submits that since the said amendment has not been made retrospective in nature, it cannot affect the liabilities already accrued if the impugned provision before its amendment could have read as imposing such liability. In this connection, it is suffice to state that the presumption against the retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes, provided there is an intrinsic evidence to hold the statute to be declaratory in nature, and for determining its nature regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. “A declaratory Act” as observed in Craies on Statute Law “is an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute”.

    21. In the case of Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1968 SC 1336 (at page 1339), the Supreme Court has held that an explanatory Act is generally passed to supply obvious omission and to clear out the doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. In the present case, as noticed above, it was clearly stated by the Finance Minister on the floor of the Legislature that the language employed in section 6D of the Act had led to unfortunate litigations and therefore it was found essential to suitably amend it so that the levy of cess could be made applicable only to sales or purchases effected within the Bangalore City Planning Area. This unequivocal statement of the mover of the amending Bill by itself is sufficient to hold the amendment as declaratory, and, therefore, retrospective in nature.

    22. Further a reading of pari materia provisions incorporated under the Karnataka Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employment Act, 1976 (in short, “the Profession Tax Act”) and the Karnataka Tax on Luxuries (Hotel and Lodging Houses) Act, 1979 (for short, “the Luxury Tax Act”) providing for levy of cess for the very Mass Rapid Transit System, as a consequence of the same budgetary proposals indicate that the Legislature had intended to levy cess only on the taxable events taking place in the Bangalore area. Under section 3A(1) of the Profession Tax Act, the liability of the cess has been levied on persons engaged in professions, etc., in Bangalore area only. Similarly in section 3A(1) of the Luxury Tax Act, cess has been sought to be levied on the luxuries provided in hotels within the limits of Bangalore area only. This gives another strong cue in support of the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the cess under section 6D of the Act has to be confined only on the taxable events, i.e, sales and purchases effected within the Bangalore area.

    23. Then, much stress has been laid by both sides on the proviso to section 6D(1) of the Act to sustain their points of view on the interpretation of the main part of the said sub-section. The proviso very clearly tells that the cess on sale of petrol and diesel by a dealer will be levied only on the sales effected by him within the limits of Bangalore area. According to the petitioners, liability to pay cess on other goods as well should take its colour from the proviso since any other construction may lead to discrimination without any rational basis thus offending article 14 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, on behalf of the Revenue it has been contended that in respect of petrol and diesel the intention of the Legislature was to levy the cess only on the sales effected within the Bangalore area, whereas it has not been so specified in respect of sale of other goods; and, therefore, in respect of such other goods the global sales of the dealer has to bear the burden of cess.

    24. In my opinion, there being over-weighing evidence about the intention of the Legislature to levy cess only in respect of sales and purchases effected by a dealer within the Bangalore area. The main part of section 6D(1) has to be read in the light of the provisions made under the proviso.

    25. If the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents as are precisely contained in the impugned circular of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes are accepted, then the expression “sale or purchase effected by any dealer who is carrying on business within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area” as used in section 6D of the Act should be construed and read as “the aggregate of the sales or purchases effected by any dealer carrying on business within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area at all its places of business in the State”.

    26. For properly appreciating the fallacy involved in the said arguments, I may refer to the definition of the words “turnover” and “total turnover” as devised and defined under section 2(1)(v) and 2(1)(u-2) of the Act. For the present, I will refer to only that part of the said definitions which are material for the purpose. “Turnover” means the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold. “Total turnover” means the aggregate turnover in all goods of a dealer at all places of business in the State.

    27. If the Legislature at all intended, as Sri Indra Kumar, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners rightly pointed out, it could have conveniently conveyed its said intention of roping in the global transactions of a dealer carrying on business in Bangalore area for levying cess by using the expression “on the total turnover effected by a dealer carrying on business within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area”, which would have automatically embraced all transactions of sales and purchases of a dealer effected within the State of Karnataka. As a matter of fact, when the Legislature so intended, it has used the word “total turnover” in different charging sections, for example, sections 5-B and 6-C of the Act.

    28. In the case of Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, [1978] 41 STC 409 at 422, it has been held by the Supreme Court that:

    “The Legislature was enacting a piece of legislation intended to levy tax on dealers who are laymen and we have no doubt that if the legislative intent was that ‘resale’ should be within the territory of Delhi and not outside, the Legislature would have said so in plain unambiguous language which no layman could possibly misunderstand. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that where there are two expressions which might have been used to convey a certain intention, but one of those expressions will convey that intention more clearly than the other, it is proper to conclude that, if the Legislature used that one of the two expressions which would convey the intention less clearly, it does not intend to convey that intention at all.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    29. Applying the aforesaid cannons of interpretation in the present settings, it can well be said that the Legislature could have conveniently made its intention beyond the pale of any controversy by using the comprehensive expression “total turnover” in the impugned provision if it at all intended to levy cess on the aggregate transactions of the dealer concerned effected through all its branches in the State. But it has not done so. Therefore, it has to be inferred that the Legislature had no intention to levy cess on sales and purchases effected by a dealer through its branches lying outside the Bangalore area. For the aforesaid reasons, it is declared that the dealers carrying on business within the limits of Bangalore City Planning Area are liable to pay cess on sales or purchases effected by them in the said area only. The circular of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dated April 21, 1995 in No. 3/949-95 is accordingly quashed as having misread the impugned provisions. Accordingly, it is held that the petitioners will be entitled to all such reliefs which logically flows from the said declaration.

    30. Consequently, the writ petitions are allowed but without awarding any costs.

    31. Writ petitions allowed.

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    Mrf Limited v. Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes And Another (And Other Cases)
    (Apr 2, 1996)