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Case Number

R.S.A No. 737 of 1977 & Mis Appeal No. 24 of 1991

Attorney(S)

Mr. K.I Bhatta for Appellants
Mr. K.S Savanur for R-1; Mr. F.S Dabali for R-4

Judges

K.A Swami
A.C.J
N.D.V Bhat, J.

Acts

provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (Hereinafter referred to as the Act)
provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act.6.
Watans Abolition Act,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.A. Swami, A.C.J.) — RSA No. 737/1977

Factual and Procedural Background

This Second Appeal (R.S.A. No. 737/1977) challenges the decree dated 23.4.1977 passed in R.A. No. 243/1972 and R.A. No. 253/1972 by the IV Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum, which had partly affirmed and partly reversed the decree dated 31.8.1972 passed by the Principal Munsiff, Athani in O.S. No. 94/1969.

The plaintiffs (respondents-1 to 3) instituted the original suit seeking partition and separate possession of shares in properties located at Shegunshi village, Athani Taluk — specifically:

S. No. 119.A/2 measuring 14 acres (assessed at Rs. 37.24);
S. No. 156.A/2-3 measuring 2 acres 21 guntas (assessed at Rs. 6.72);
S. No. 119 measuring 1 acre 26 guntas (assessed at Rs. 4.39);
The house bearing V.P.C. No. 378.

The appeal was referred to a Division Bench because an earlier Division Bench decision (Chandrabai v. Laxmibai — R.F.A. No. 42 of 1972) on the question of whether a partition suit in respect of lands governed by the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (the "Act") is premature pending regrant, required reconsideration.

During the hearing this Court (in a prior judgment dated 8.8.1990) postponed final disposal to allow regrant proceedings to be completed. The Tahsildar, Athani thereafter decided the regrant proceedings, but the plaintiffs preferred an appeal against the Tahsildar’s order (M.A. No. 24/1991) to the District Judge, Belgaum; that appeal was withdrawn from the District Judge and directed to be heard along with this Second Appeal. Both matters were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together are entitled to a half share in the lands bearing Survey No. 156.A/2-3 (old No. 187) and Survey No. 119.A-2 (old No. 300) of Shegunshi village?
What is the effect of the order of regrant made by the Tahsildar (the subject matter of M.A. No. 24 of 1991) on the right of the plaintiffs to claim a half share in the lands mentioned in issue (i)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (defendants-1 to 3)

It was contended by learned Counsel K.I. Bhatta for the appellants that the two inam lands (S. No. 119.A/2 and S. No. 156.A/2-3) had been granted in favour of Ramappa Bhimappa Ghasti (defendant No. 2), and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to any share in those properties.
As to the land bearing S. No. 119 and the house bearing V.P.C. No. 378, it was contended that these were self-acquired properties of Ramappa and thus the plaintiffs had no right to share in them.
Counsel for the appellants relied on a Supreme Court decision (Shiddappa Satappa Murugude v. Ramappa Shivalingappa Murugude — C.A. No. 944 of 1973) in support of their position (the Court records the reliance but distinguishes the contexts of the cited decisions).

Respondents' Arguments (plaintiffs and defendant No. 4)

Learned Counsel K.S. Savanur for the respondents submitted that the two contested lands are Shet-sanadi lands appurtenant to the village office of Shet-sanadi and that the office had been originally granted to the common ancestor of both plaintiffs and defendants.
It was argued that as long as the village office continued the lands were not divisible, but after abolition of the office (and upon regrant) the lands would become ryotwari and available for partition and that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together (representing one branch) and defendants 1 to 3 together (representing the other branch) should share equally (one-half each) in those lands.
The respondents relied on precedents and on the legal effect of the regrant proceedings to support their entitlement to a half share once the lands ceased to be impartible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Chandrabai v. Laxmibai (R.F.A. No. 42 of 1972 D.D. 19-6-1974)	Held that a suit for partition in respect of properties governed by the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act is premature until regrant is made; until regrant the holder has only a right to obtain regrant and no full title.	The Court treated this decision as a controlling precedent on prematurity of partition suits pending regrant and referred the Second Appeal to a Division Bench for reconsideration; it also relied on the principle to justify pausing the appeal pending completion of regrant proceedings.
Hiregouda Yallappagouda Hiregoudar v. Venkatesh Kallo Kulkarni (R.F.A. No. 92/62 D.D. 9.7.1968)	Supported the proposition that a partition suit is premature in respect of lands governed by the Act until regrant.	The Court noted this authority as supporting the contention that partition is premature prior to regrant; it formed part of the jurisprudential background the Court considered in directing regrant proceedings to be completed.
Shivappa Fakirappa Shetsanadi v. Kannappa Mallappa Shetsanadi (ILR 1987 KAR 3155)	Explained in detail that abolition of an inam under the Act does not affect the personal law (Hindu law of succession) of parties; junior members retain interest and the right of survivorship is not excluded by the Act; regrant converts resumed land into ryotwari land, releasing it from impartibility and making it available for partition.	The Court followed this Division Bench decision as directly on point, used its principles to hold that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 are entitled to an equal share, and to hold that a regrant enures to the benefit of all entitled family members rather than giving exclusive title to the regrantee.
Shiddappa Satappa Murugude v. Ramappa Shivalingappa Murugude (C.A. No. 944 of 1973 D.D. 25.11.1986)	Referenced by appellants; the case concerned lands governed by the Kolhapur Vat-hukum (as cited in the opinion).	The Court noted the appellants' reliance on this Supreme Court decision but distinguished the factual and legal context (Kolhapur Vat-hukum) from the present case governed by legislation and precedents the Court found applicable; it did not allow that reliance to alter its conclusion following S.F. Shetsanadi and related authorities.
Kalgonda Balgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil (AIR 1989 SC 1042)	Reiterated the law laid down in Nagesh Bisto Desai v. Khando Tirmal Desai (AIR 1982 SC 887) regarding succession/rights applicable to the relevant category of lands (as cited in the opinion).	The Court treated the Kalgonda decision as confirming the principles in Nagesh Bisto Desai and relied on the chain of authority (Nagesh → Kalgonda → S.F. Shetsanadi) to support its conclusion that regrant does not extinguish junior members' succession rights and that regrant makes the lands available for partition.
Nagesh Bisto Desai v. Khando Tirmal Desai (AIR 1982 SC 887)	Established principles concerning rights/succession that were relied upon and reiterated in subsequent decisions (as described in the opinion).	The Court noted that the law as laid down in Nagesh Bisto Desai was followed and reiterated in subsequent cases (including Kalgonda) and was applied by the Division Bench in S.F. Shetsanadi; the present Court accepted and applied those principles in reaching its conclusions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's legal analysis proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying statutory and precedent-based principles to the facts before it:

Characterisation of properties and family relationships: The Court began by recording the genealogical facts and the status of the properties: S. No. 119A/2 is a Ghasti inam and S. No. 156A/2-3 is a Sanadi inam; these two lands fall under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act. It was not disputed that the lands had not been divided among members of the joint family.
Treatment of the two other properties (S. No. 119 and V.P.C. No. 378): The two courts below had found those to be joint family properties; the Court found no scope to interfere with that concurrent factual finding.
On the question of entitlement to share in the inam lands (Point (i)): The Court relied principally on the Division Bench decision in Shivappa Fakirappa Shetsanadi v. Kannappa Mallappa Shetsanadi, which held that the Act's abolition of the inam did not alter the personal law (Hindu succession law) or the junior members' succession rights. The Act does not exclude the right of survivorship or the junior members' interest in the village office. When regrant occurs, the land becomes ryotwari and is released from impartibility, thereby becoming available for partition. Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together are entitled to an equal share in the two inam lands.
On the effect of the Tahsildar's regrant order (Point (ii)): The Tahsildar's regrant (26.11.1990) in favour of Ramappa Bhimappa Ghasti converted the Shet-sanadi lands into ryotwari lands and thus made them available for partition. The Court held that the regrant did not vest exclusive title in the regrantee; instead, the regrant enured to the benefit of all entitled persons (the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 as well as defendants 1 to 3). Therefore the Tahsildar’s order did not deprive the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 of their right to claim one-half share.
Procedural management and consolidation: Because regrant proceedings had commenced and the Tahsildar had decided them (with an appeal filed as M.A. No. 24/1991), the Court directed that M.A. No. 24/1991 be heard along with the Second Appeal and disposed of both together, applying the legal conclusions above.

The Court explicitly refused to treat a regrant as giving exclusive title to the regrantee and followed the chain of authority culminating in S.F. Shetsanadi which preserves junior members' succession rights and treats regrant as making previously impartible land available for partition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Second Appeal is dismissed. The Court held that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together are entitled to a half share in the lands bearing Sy. No. 156.A/2-3 (Old No. 187) and Sy. No. 119.A-2 (Old No. 300) of Shegunshi village. The Tahsildar’s regrant order (the subject of M.A. No. 24 of 1991) enures to the benefit of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 as well as defendants 1 to 3; it does not confer exclusive title on the regrantee (defendant No. 2). Miscellaneous Appeal No. 24 of 1991 is disposed of in terms of this decree.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The immediate consequence is that plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 have a judicially recognized entitlement to one-half share in the two contested inam/Shetsanadi lands; defendant No. 2 cannot claim exclusive right to those lands.
Effect of regrant: A regrant under the Act converts the resumed inam/Shetsanadi land into ryotwari land, thereby removing impartibility and making the land available for partition among those entitled under personal law.
Precedential effect: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle of law; it follows and applies prior Division Bench and Supreme Court authorities (notably the S.F. Shetsanadi line of authority and the Nagesh/Kalgonda authorities) to the facts. No broader novel precedent is asserted by this opinion beyond applying those established authorities.
Costs: The Court ordered that, in the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

End of summary — this document contains only information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce external facts or inferences.

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Bhimappa Ramappa Ghasti v. Arjan Laxman Ghasti

K.A Swami, A.C.J:— R.S.A No. 737/1977 is preferred against the decree dated 23.4.1977 passed in R.A No. 243/1972 and R.A.No 253/1972 by the IV Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum partly affirming and partly reversing the decree dated 31.8.1972 passed by the Principal Munsiff, Athani, in O.S No. 94/1969.

2. The appellants are defendants-1 to 3 and respondents-1 to 3 are plaintiffs-1 to 3, and respondent-4 is defendant No. 4.

3. Respondent-1 to 3 instituted the aforesaid suit for partition and separate possession of their share in the suit properties bearing S. No. 119.A/2 measuring 14 acres assessed at Rs. 37.24, S. No. 156.A/2-3 measuring 2 acres 21 guntas assessed at Rs. 6.72 and S.No 119 measuring 1 acre 26 guntas assessed at Rs. 4.39 and the house bearing V.P.C No. 378 situated at Shegunshi village, Athani Taluk.

4. This Second Appeal is referred to a Division Bench on the ground that the Decision in Chandrabai v. Laxmibai . R.F.A No. 42 of 1972 DD 19-6-1974. rendered by a Division Bench of this Court requires to be reconsidered.

5. In Smt. Chandra Bai's case, a Division Bench of this Court has held that a suit for partition in respect of the properties governed by the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) before the regrant is premature. The Division Bench has observed thus:

“It is common case of the parties that the suit lands have not been regranted under Section 5 of the Act. The Village Office to which the Watan appertains has been abolished. The lands have been resumed and vested in the Government under sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act. When regrant is made under Section 5 of the Act to the holder of the village office, the lands will be held on ryotwari tenure. Until the regrant is made, the holder of the village office has merely a right to obtain regrant subject to the conditions specified in Section 5. We asked the learned Counsel for the appellants as to how the plaintiffs can seek the relief of partition of the suit properties before regrant is obtained from the Government. The learned Counsel was unable to give any satisfactory reply in this regard. He, however, submitted that the plaintiffs may be granted a declaration that they are members of a joint family and are entitled to regrant of the suit properties….. Since the Scheme of the Act is also the same as the Watans Abolition Act, a regrant of the land resumed under Section 4 to the holder of the village office has to be regarded as compensation to the holder of the village office. Until the lands are regranted to the holder of the village office, the plaintiffs derive no title, assuming that the watan was family property which was impartible until its abolition. It is too premature for the plaintiffs to institute a suit for partition before regrant is obtained by the holder of the village office….”

6. When this Appeal came up for hearing before this Bench, on 8.8.1990, we took a view that it was not necessary to decide the correctness of the view taken in Chandra Bai's case because the regrant proceedings were at a final stage. Therefore, we postponed the hearing of the Appeal for a period of six months and directed the Registry of this Court to despatch all the records pertaining to regrant proceedings which were submitted by the Tahsildar, Athani to the Court of the Munsiff, to enable the Tahsildar, Athani to decide the regrant proceedings within 4 months from 24.9.1990 and submit the records along with his order to this Court within two weeks thereafter. The parties were directed to appear before the Tahsildar, Athani on 24.9.1990

7. Accordingly, the Tahsildar decided the regrant proceedings. However, an appeal against the order of the Tahsildar was preferred by the plaintiffs in the suit out of which the Regular Second Appeal in question arises, before the District Judge, Belgaum, under Section 3(2) of the Act. The said appeal was numbered as M.A No. 24/1991.

8. When this was brought to our notice, on hearing both sides, we passed an order on 6.9.1991 withdrawing M.A No. 24/1991 from the file of the District Judge, Belgaum, and directed it to be posted for hearing along with this Second Appeal. Accordingly, M.A No. 24/1991 came to be posted along with this appeal.

9. Both the Appeals are heard together.

10. While directing the Tahsildar to decide the regrant proceedings, we also decided the other points involved in the appeal leaving aside the points relating to lands bearing Sy. No. 119.A/2 measuring 14 acres assessed at Rs. 73.24 and Sy. No. 156.A/2-3 measuring 2 acres 21 guntas assessed at Rs. 6.72 situated in Shegunshi village of Athani Taluk as these two lands were the subject matter of the regrant proceedings. In our Judgment dated 8.8.1990 we have held as follows:

“4. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. One Yellappa was the original propositus. He had three sons by name Ramappa, Shiddappa and Satteppa. Ramappa and Satteppa died unmarried and without issues. Shiddappa had three sons viz., Ramappa, Yallappa and Laxman. On the date of the suit, Siddappa was no more. Yallappa son of Siddappa was also not alive on the date of the suit. The plaintiffs and the defendant-4 are the sons of Laxman and defendant No. 1 is the son of Ramappa and defendant-2 is the son of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 is the wife of defendant No. 1. We may also point out here that on the date of the suit, Ramappa and Laxman, sons of Siddappa were also not alive.

5. It is also not in dispute that out of the aforesaid three lands, the land bearing S. No. 119A/2 is a Ghasti inam and S. No. 156A/2-3 is a Sanadi inam. Both lands are governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act.

6. As far as land bearing S.No 119 and the house bearing V.P.C No. 378 are concerned, it was contended by defendants-1 to 3 that the same were the self-acquired properties of Ramappa, as such, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any share in them. Both the courts below have concurrently held that these two properties were also the joint family properties. That finding is a finding of fact.

7. Even though it is contended on behalf of the appellants that these two properties are the self-acquired properties of Ramappa, in the light of the evidence on record and the finding recorded by the two courts below, we are of the view that there is no scope for interference with this finding in this second appeal.

8. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a share in the other two lands bearing S. No. 119A/2 and 156.A/2-3.

9. There is no regrant made. These two lands come under the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), it is not in dispute that the applications for regrant have been filed in time. The records of the case reveal that entire records pertaining to regrant proceedings were called for by the trial Court by issuing summons to the Tahsildar, Athani. In obedience to the summons the Tahsildar, Athani had by the communication dated 22.7.1970 bearing No. WTN-R-SR-5138 and 6088 (found at page 373 of the records of the Trial Court) submitted all the records pertaining to regrant proceedings. Consequently, the regrant proceedings could not be proceeded with.

10. One of the contentions of the defendants is that as the regrant had not taken place, the suit for partition is premature. The contention is fully supported by two Division Bench Decisions of this Court in Hiregouda Yallappagouda Hiregoudar v. Venkatesh Kallo Kulkarni - R.F.A No. 92/62 D.D 9.7.1968; and Chandra Bai v. Laxmibai - R.F.A No. 42/1972 D.D 19.6.1974 It is a disagreement with these two decisions, the second appeal has been referred to a Division bench by the order dated 23rd August 1977. We do not consider it necessary to go into the correctness of the view expressed in the referal order. The controversy between the parties in this appeal can very well be settled if the regrant proceedings are allowed to go on and are completed within a specified period. Under these circumstances and in the light of the fact that the suit is of the year 1969 and the appeal is pending for the least 13 years, instead of driving the parties to the necessity of filing another suit after the regrant takes place, we consider it necessary to postpone the hearing of this appeal for a period of six months and direct the Registrar of this Court to despatch all the records pertaining to regrant proceedings which were submitted by the Tahsildar, Athani to the Court of the Munsiff with his letter dated 22.7.1970 found at page 373 of the records of the trial Court. Accordingly, hearing of this appeal is adjourned by six months. The records relating to regrant proceedings of the office of the Tahsildar, Athani, be despatched to the Tahsildar, Athani within a fortnight. We also further direct the parties to appear before the Tahsildar, Athani on 24.9.1990 to avoid further delay in service of notice by the Tahsildar.

11. In view of the facts stated above, the Tahsildar, shall see that the proceedings relating to regrant are completed within a period of four months from 24.9.1990 and the order is submitted to this Court within two weeks.

12. We also make it clear that this order shall not be construed as a direction to the Tahsildar to regrant or not to regrant. He shall have to consider the regrant proceedings in accordance with law.”

11. In the light of the findings recorded by the lower appellate Court and also by us, in our Judgment dated 8.8.1990, relevant portions of which have already been extracted above, and in the light of the arguments advanced before us, the following further Points arise for our consideration in both these appeals:—

(i) Whether the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together are entitled to a half share in the lands bearing Survey No. 156.A/2-3 (old No. 187) and Survey No. 119.A-2 (old No. 300) of Shegunshi village? and

(ii) What is the effect of the order of regrant made by the Tahsildar, which is the subject matter of M.A No. 24 of 1991 on the right of the plaintiffs to claim half share in the lands mentioned in Point No. (i)?

Point No. (i):—

12. It is contended by Sri K.I Bhatta, learned Counsel for the appellants, that the aforesaid two lands have been granted in favour of Ramappa Bhimappa Ghasti (defendant No. 2 - the son of defendant No. 1); therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in these properties. On the contrary, it is contended by Sri K.S Savanur, learned Counsel for respondents (plaintiffs and defendant No. 4) that these lands are Shet-sanadi lands appurtenant to the village office of Shet-sanadi, that the office of Shet-sanadi was granted to the common ancestor of the plaintiffs and the defendants; that as long as the village office continued, the lands were to be enjoyed by the holders of the Village Office, that after the abolition of the village office, as the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together and defendants 1 to 3 representing the two branches of the joint family, are entitled to half share in the lands in question.

12.1) It is not in dispute that these lands were not divided among the members of the joint - family. The village office came to be abolished on the coming into force of the Act. The holder of the village office was entitled to the regrant of the lands appertaining to the village office. The expression “Holder of a Village Office” as per the definition of the said expression contained in the Act, includes all those persons who are entitled to succeed to the office in the absence of the senior members of the family. As such, every one who was entitled to succeed to the village office in the absence of the senior members of the family became entitled to claim a share in the land as per the personal law governing the parties as to inheritance and succession. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court, in detail, in Shivappa Fakirappa Shetsanadi v. Kannappa Mallappa Shetsanadi* . ILR 1987 KAR 3155.. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to deal with this question in detail. In paras 9, 12, 13 and 14 of the said Decision, it has been held that the abolition of the inam did not affect and could not be said to have affected the personal law of the parties i.e, the Hindu Law of the Succession. There is nothing in Section 4 of the Act, which can be held to affect the personal law of the parties so as to deprive the Junior members of the family of their right to claim partition of the land on the abolition of the village office and resumption and regrant of the land. It is also further held in that Decision that the expression ‘holder of a village office’ and ‘holder’ are defined as meaning a person having an interest in a village office under an existing law relating to such office. Again the expression ‘interest in the village office’ is also considered and it has been held that it includes the right of survivorship of a member of a joint family. In other words, a member of a joint family even though, he may belong to a junior branch has a right to succeed to the office in the event none is available in senior branch to succeed to the office. It has also been further held that the right of survivorship is one of the four rights of the members of a Hindu Joint Family, in respect of a joint family property. It is this right which is not excluded by the Act. Therefore, the junior members of the family have an interest in the village office and as such, they may also be considered as the holders of the village office. It is this right which indicates the interest of the junior members of the family in a village office under an existing law relating to such office. In that Decision, it is however held that until the abolition of the village office and resumption of the land annexed to the village office, the land has to go with the village office and as such, it is not available for partition and that after the abolition of the village office and resumption of the land, it becomes a ryotwari land only on regrant and as such, it would be released from the nature of its impartibility and becomes available for partition.

12.2) In the light of the aforesaid Decision with which we agree, we see no reason to hold that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together are not entitled to equal share in the aforesaid two inam lands.

12.3) Shri K.I Bhatta, learned Counsel for the appellants, placed reliance on a Decision of the Supreme Court in Shiddappa Satappa Murugude v. Ramappa Shivalingappa Murugude . C.A No. 944 of 1973 DD 25.11.1986. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the lands governed by the Kolhapur Vat-hukum, whereas, the case on hand is governed by a Decision of the Supreme Court in Kalgonda Balgonda Patil v. Balgonda Kalgonda Patil . AIR 1989 SC 1042.. In Kalgonda's case, the law laid down by the Supreme Court, in Nagesh Bisto Desai etc. v. Khando Tirmal Desai etc. . AIR 1982 SC 887., has been reiterated. A Division Bench of this Court in S.F Shetsandi's case has followed the Decision in Nagesh Bisto Desai's case. Therefore, we are of the view that the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court do not call for modification.

12.4) For the reasons stated above, Point No. (i) is answered in the affirmative.

POINT NO (ii):

13. The order dated 26th November 1990 passed by the Tahsildar, Athani, in No. VTN/R/SR/5138-6088 regranting the lands bearing Sy. No. 119.A and Sy. No. 156.A/2+3 of Shegunshi village, in favour of Ramappa Bhimappa Ghasti enures to the benefit of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4, and defendants Nos 1 to 3. The regrant does not give the exclusive title to the regrantee as held in the aforesaid Decision in S.F Shetsandi's case. Accordingly, Point No. (ii) is answered as follows:

The order of the Tahsildar which is the subject-matter of the appeal in M.A No. 24 of 1991 on the file of the District Judge, Belgaum, has made the Shet-sanadi lands as raitwari lands as such, the lands have ceased to be impartible and have become available for partition. The order does not affect the right of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together to claim their one half share in the said lands, and it enures to their benefits also.

14. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Second Appeal is dismissed. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 24 of 1991, is also disposed of, in terms of the decree passed in this Second Appeal, as the regrant enures to the benefit of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 4. Accordingly, it is held that defendant No. 2 cannot and is not entitled to claim exclusive right to hold the lands bearing Sy. No. 156.A/2-3 (Old No. 187) and Sy. No. 119.A-2 (Old No. 300) of Shegunshi village. The plaintiffs and defendant No. 4 together are entitled to one half share in them.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

Bhimappa Ramappa Ghasti v. Arjan Laxman Ghasti

Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.A. Swami, A.C.J.) — RSA No. 737/1977

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (defendants-1 to 3)

Respondents' Arguments (plaintiffs and defendant No. 4)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Bhimappa Ramappa Ghasti v. Arjan Laxman Ghasti

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