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  • Section 108(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure;(v) Action under Section 107 Cr. P.C(vi) Action under Section 110(f) Cr. P.C(vii) Action
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  • Section 46(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, referred
  • Section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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  • Section 21 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963.
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  • provisions of Karnataka Police Act, 1963
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
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citation codes
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  • Section 108(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure;(v) Action under Section 107 Cr. P.C(vi) Action under Section 110(f) Cr. P.C(vii) Action
  • Sections 55 and 56 of the Mysore Police Act, 1963; and(ix) Action under Section 509 IPC
  • Sections 92(o), (p), (q) and (r) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963,
  • Section 46(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, referred
  • Section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 23 of the Punjab Police Act referred
  • Section 21 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963.
  • Punjab Police Rules themselves. Rule 23.7
  • provisions of Karnataka Police Act, 1963
  • ARTICLE 21 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 21(g) of the Police Act
  • Section 54, 55, 56
  • Police Act, 1965,
Smart Summary

Analytical Summary of the Judgment Concerning Order No. 1059 and Entries in the "Rowdy Register"

Factual and Procedural Background

These writ petitions were filed by persons challenging their inclusion in the “Rowdy List” maintained under Order No. 1059 of the Mysore/Karnataka Police Manual (Volume II). The petitions raise the constitutional validity of Order No. 1059 and challenge specific entries made against petitioners. The matter came before the Division Bench on a reference occasioned by one Judge expressing doubt about the correctness of an earlier single-judge decision in Venkatachalapathy v. State of Karnataka (ILR 1988 KAR 1261).

The State filed detailed statements of objections, tracing the power to make Order No. 1059 to provisions of the Karnataka Police Act and asserting that the register is confidential and maintained to aid police prevention and investigation functions. The petitioners (including Muniswamy Reddy and his brother Ramachandra alias Ganesh) alleged publicity of their entries (discovery during opposition to bail), harassment and illegal demand by police, and sought deletion of their names. A legal notice dated 15.6.1988 had been served without response. The Court perused the relevant Rowdy Register and decided the petitions individually, directing deletion of some entries, dismissing one petition as unnecessary, dismissing another for non-prosecution, and awarding limited costs in one case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether entry in the "Rowdy Register" under Order No. 1059 infringes Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 21 and Articles 19(1)(c) & (d) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether Order No. 1059 constitutes "law" (i.e., has statutory source or authority) and if it can be enforced against citizens.
  3. Whether Order No. 1059 (or entries under it) requires publication or other formalities to become enforceable.
  4. Whether entries in the Rowdy Register must be made only after giving affected persons an opportunity to show cause (audi alteram partem), and whether entries are amenable to judicial review.
  5. Whether particular entries in the present petitions were ultra vires, arbitrary, malicious or otherwise illegal and what relief is appropriate in each petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Inclusion in the Rowdy List affects the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21) because it violates privacy, injures reputation and subjects persons to police surveillance that curbs movement and association (Articles 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(c)).
  • Order No. 1059 is not a "law" and therefore cannot be enforced if it curtails fundamental rights.
  • If Order No. 1059 has statutory force, it has still not become "law" for want of publication; hence it cannot be enforced against petitioners.
  • The particular police action of opening a rowdy sheet against each petitioner was ultra vires and illegal.

Respondents' (State/Police) Arguments

  • The power to make Order No. 1059 is traceable to the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (particularly Section 21) and other statutory duties of the police; thus Order No. 1059 has a statutory source/authorisation.
  • The Rowdy Register is confidential and maintained for internal police use to facilitate prevention of crime and aid investigations; entries are administrative and do not per se infringe Fundamental Rights.
  • Inclusion in the register is governed by procedure (including prior orders of senior officers) and used only for police vigilance and identification in the course of lawful duties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 Distinction between permissible police surveillance and impermissible intrusions: majority held close police watch/history sheets does not offend Fundamental Rights, but domiciliary night visits and certain intrusive domiciliary regulations were unconstitutional; majority also held right to privacy not an explicit guaranteed right. The Court considered itself bound by the majority view. It relied on Kharak Singh to hold that Order No. 1059's provisions for intra-departmental surveillance/records do not by themselves violate Articles 19 or 21, while recognising that certain intrusive powers would be unconstitutional.
Govind v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1378 Surveillance regulations were upheld subject to being read narrowly; discussion of privacy as a possible penumbral right but not absolute; surveillance must be channelled and limited to prevent undue invasion of privacy and other rights. The Court used Govind to support the proposition that surveillance may affect rights but is permissible if limited and channelled; the decision guided the Court to interpret Order No. 1059 in a non-expansive, constitutionally compatible manner.
Malak Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 760 Surveillance/registers may be confidential and administrative; entries in surveillance registers can be made without prior notice (no audi alteram partem) where necessary for public interest; judicial review remains available where entries are arbitrary, excessive or beyond the purpose of preventing crime. The Court drew on Malak Singh to treat Order No. 1059 as administrative/confidential in character yet subject to judicial review in appropriate cases; it also relied on the statutory framework in Malak Singh to justify that orders governing intelligence/communication by police are within police duties.
Venkatachalapathy v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1988 KAR 1261 (single-judge) (As reported in the opinion) single-judge decision had held Order No. 1059 invalid because it lacked statutory source and violated Article 21. The Division Bench overruled that single-judge view on the ground that it did not notice the substitution/amendment of Order No. 1059 (IGP's order of 8-4-1970) and did not consider controlling Supreme Court decisions. The present Court found that Order No. 1059 had statutory authorization under Section 21 and therefore declined to follow Venkatachalapathy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps:

  1. Textual and procedural examination of Order No. 1059: The Court reproduced Order No. 1059 in full and analysed its terms — definitions, classifications (Parts A, B, C of the Register), the requirement for prior orders of senior officers for entries, the confidentiality of registers, the periodicity and grounds for striking off names, and permissible police actions listed in the order.
  2. Functional analysis of effects on rights: The Court scrutinised whether the Order by itself authorises any intrusion into domiciliary privacy or movement. It found that the order contemplates intra-departmental confidential records and surveillance limited to watching movements and gathering information to prevent crime. Paragraphs in the Order (e.g., on photographs, warnings to proprietors) were read narrowly — photographs only for intra-departmental identification if available, warnings to proprietors to be general and not naming persons — and the Court emphasised that Order No. 1059 nowhere expressly authorises restrictions on movement or public disclosure of entries.
  3. Precedent-based constitutional analysis: The Court considered three leading Supreme Court decisions (Kharak Singh, Govind, Malak Singh) which address the constitutional limits of police surveillance and registers. It accepted the majority rulings in those authorities that surveillance/registers, if confined and non-intrusive, do not automatically violate Articles 19 or 21; but recognised that excessive, intrusive or unlawful surveillance would be unconstitutional.
  4. Statutory source inquiry: The Court examined the Karnataka Police Act and concluded that Section 21 empowers the Inspector General of Police to make orders "regulating the collection and communication by the Police of intelligence and information." The Court held that Order No. 1059 falls within that power and is therefore authorised by Section 21. The Court also referred to the Act's objects (preamble) and other provisions (Sections 54, 55, 56, 65) to show the police's duty to maintain peace and prevent offences, making such intelligence collection part of legitimate police administration.
  5. Application of the legal standard to facts: After concluding that Order No. 1059 is authorised and not per se violative, the Court examined the individual petitions. It inspected the Rowdy Register entries and records. In the case of Muniswamy Reddy, earlier entries existed from July 1977 to 20.1.1982 and then again an entry dated 18.3.1988; the Court found no material justifying continuation of the name after 1988 and ordered deletion. For Ramachandra (second petitioner), the record showed his name was not entered; his petition was dismissed as unnecessary and he was awarded costs for having been misled. For another petitioner (W.P. No. 17064/88) the Court found the allegations vague and quashed the entry. One petition was dismissed for non-prosecution.
  6. Protection against misuse and confidentiality: The Court admonished the police for disclosing an entry in a criminal proceeding while opposing bail and emphasised that entries should be kept confidential and used only for administrative police purposes. The Court reiterated that surveillance must be unobtrusive and confined to statutory and rule-prescribed limits, and that judicial scrutiny remains available where surveillance exceeds permissible bounds or is arbitrary.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

1. The Court held that an entry in the Rowdy List under Order No. 1059 does not, by itself, affect the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1) and 21 of the Constitution.

2. The Court held that Order No. 1059 is authorised by Section 21 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963; accordingly the Order has a statutory source and is not violative of the Fundamental Rights as applied in these cases.

3. The Court held that Order No. 1059 has been published in the Karnataka Police Gazette and formed part of the Police Manual; the question of formal publication was not material where no rights were affected by actions lawfully taken under the Order.

Direct consequences / case-specific relief:

  • The continuation of the name of the petitioner in W.P. No. 10394/88 (Muniswamy Reddy) in the Rowdy List was set aside and his name ordered deleted forthwith.
  • The entry of the petitioner in W.P. No. 17064/88 was quashed.
  • Writ Petition No. 10395/88 (second petitioner, who was not in the Register) was dismissed as unnecessary; that petitioner was awarded costs of Rs. 750/- payable by Respondents 1 and 2.
  • Writ Petition No. 561/89 was dismissed for non-prosecution.
  • The Court declined to award compensation, finding the initial entries not shown to be malicious though continuation in some cases was unwarranted.

Broader implications noted by the Court:

  • The Court overruled the earlier single-judge decision in Venkatachalapathy (ILR 1988 KAR 1261) to the extent it held Order No. 1059 invalid for lack of statutory basis, observing that the single-judge did not account for the substituted Order No. 33/MPM/70 and had not considered controlling Supreme Court decisions.
  • The Court reiterated that surveillance and registers are administrative tools that must be read narrowly and confined to preventing crime; where surveillance exceeds lawful bounds or becomes intrusive it remains open to challenge and judicial review.

In sum, the Court sustained the constitutional validity and statutory basis of Order No. 1059 as a limited, confidential police measure while granting case-specific relief where entries were continued without justification or were improperly disclosed; it emphasised limits on surveillance and preserved judicial oversight for abuses.

    K.M Muniswamy Reddy v. State Of Karnataka

    2. AIR 1963 SC 1295 - Kharak Singh v. State of U.P (Foll) 3. AIR 1975 SC 1378 - Govind v. State of M.P (do) 4. AIR 1981 SC 960 - Malak Singh v. State of Punjab (do)

    Mr. Ravivarma Kumar, Mr. M. Shivappa Mr. H.K Thimme Gowda for Petitioners
    Mr. Y.R Jagadeesh, HCGP for Respondents
    Mr. H.G Ramesh, with permission of Hon'ble Court, for Petitioners

    Shivashankar Bhat, J.:—

    In these Writ Petitions, petitioners challenge their inclusion in the ‘Rowdy List’ by the police, and the basic contention pertains to the Constitutional validity of the order No. 1059 in the Mysore Police Manual (Volume - II). These have come up before us on a Reference made by one of us expressing doubt about the correctness of an earlier view taken by another Judge in the case reported in Venkatachalapathy v. State Of Karnataka* . ILR 1988 KAR 1261..

    2. In Venkatachalapathy's case, the learned Judge referred to Order No. 1059 as it stood prior to the year 1970, without noticing its substitution by the Inspector General of Police's order No. 33.MPM/70 dated 8-4-1970 (Published in Mysore Police Gazette dated 2-5-1970). While the earlier order No. 1059 had only four clauses (a) to (d), the substituted order has 19 paragraphs containing elaborate procedure as to the various registers and the action to be taken to watch and prevent a rowdy from committing any offence or disturb public peace. Present Order No. 1059 is quoted below exhaustively, which reads:

    “ORDER No. 1059”

    (1) A rowdy may be defined as a goonda and includes a hooligan, rough, vagabond or any person who is dangerous to the public peace and tranquility:

    (2) The main forms of rowdyism are;

    (a) Passing indecent remarks to ladies and school and college girls;

    (b) Intimidation of law abiding people by acts of violence or by show of force or by abusive language;

    (c) Forcible collection of subscriptions;

    (d) Taking sides in petty quarrels between landlords and tenants or between co-tenants and threatening people of the opposite party;

    (e) Disorderly conduct;

    (f) Rioting; and

    (g) Snatching and robbery.

    (3) In every Police Station, a ‘Register of Rowdies’ should be maintained in Form No. 100 in three parts viz., Part-A, Part-B and Part-C which should be in separate volumes. All the volumes are treated as confidential records.

    (4)(a) Names and particulars of ‘Confirmed Rowdies’ who are residents in the Police Station concerned should be entered in the register Part A, a few pages being allotted for each person.

    (b) Names and particulars of ‘Confirmed Rowdies’ who are not residents in the Police Station limits but operate within its jurisdiction and names of Homeless ‘Confirmed Rowdies’ should be entered in Part-B a few pages being allotted for every person.

    (c) Names and particulars of ‘Novices’ who are budding goondas should be entered in Part-C. They may be either residents or non-residents of the Police Station concerned.

    (5) Prior orders of the Superintendent of Police or the Sub-Divisional Police Officer should be obtained for entering the name of every rowdy in the register of rowdies.

    (6) Names of persons against whom there are ample instances of rowdyism should be entered in the register Part A or Part B after the records are checked by the Circle Inspector.

    (7) When there are one or more instances of rowdyism against any person or if he has a very bad reputation in the locality as a bully, his name should be entered in Part ‘C’. When a name is entered in Part ‘C’ on the ground of very bad reputation, a thorough enquiry should be made by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station before the entry is made.

    (8) In the running history, all the criminal activities of the rowdy including reasonable suspicion of his complicity in cases and/or complaints against him with case numbers, if any, and results of cases, etc., should be mentioned in separate paragraphs which should be numbered chronologically. Against each entry in the running history, there should be reference to Station House Diary entries, source reports, mass petitions, petty cases etc., as the case may be.

    (9) Officers-in-charge of Police Stations should in the course of their daily scrutiny of the entries in the Station House Diary and the petty case register, satisfy themselves that relevant notes therefrom have been made and embodied in the ‘Rowdy Register’ against the rowdies concerned. Before despatching the copy of the Station House Diary to the Circle Inspector, a note of having emobided the information in the rowdy register against the relevant entries, should be made.

    (10) Supervisory Officers, during their inspections of Police Stations, should satisfy themselves that the entries have been properly made.

    (11) When the activities of a non-resident rowdy come to notice, the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station concerned should not only make necessary entries in Part-B of the Rowdy Register but also promptly transmit information to the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station in the limits of which the rowdy resides, to enable the latter to make necessary entries in Part-A of the Rowdy Register of his Police Station.

    (12) When the Part ‘C’ rowdies indulge frequently in rowdy and the anti-social, acts, their names should be transferred from Part ‘C’ to Part ‘A’ or Part ‘B’ as the case may be, of the Rowdy Register. When there is no entry against a Part ‘C’ rowdy during the period of one year from the date of entry of his name in the register, his name may be struck off from the register by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station concerned in consultation with the Circle Inspector.

    (13) No name should be struck off from Part ‘A’ or Part ‘B’ of the Rowdy Register without the order in writing of the Superintendent of Police. In such cases, Circle Inspectors should send their recommendations to Superintendents of Police through the Sub-Divisional Police Officers.

    (14) The Circle Inspectors should maintain in their offices, the entire lists of the names of rowdies with their addresses which are on record in the Rowdy Register of the Police Station under their charge. The list should be maintained Police Station wise and maintained separately for each type of rowdies. The Circle Inspectors should, once in a quarter, check up their own lists with the Rowdy Registers of the Police Stations under them.

    (15) Under the existing laws, a rowdy can be dealt with in the following ways:—

    (i) Prosecution in specific cases, like robbery, rioting, grievous hurt etc.

    (ii) Prosecution in appropriate cases for obscene acts and songs under Section 291 IPC (This is a cognizable offence);

    (iii) Prosecution for riotous and indecent behaviour, drunkenness etc., under Sections 92(o), (p), (q) and (r) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963, in the areas to which the provisions of that Section have been extended;

    (iv) Action under Section 108(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

    (v) Action under Section 107 Cr. P.C

    (vi) Action under Section 110(f) Cr. P.C

    (vii) Action under the preventive detention laws;

    (viii) Externment proceedings under Sections 55 and 56 of the Mysore Police Act, 1963; and

    (ix) Action under Section 509 IPC for eve teasing.

    (16) Every information that any particular Tea-stall, Restaurant, Eating House or Bar is the resort of rowdies and other types of anti-social elements, when received should promptly be verified and if found correct, the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station should suitably warn the proprietor/keeper of the Tea-stall, Restaurant etc.

    (17) With a view to facilitating identification of the rowdies by face, the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station should, during the roll call, show to the Station staff recent photographs of the rowdies. He should instruct them to watch their movements and collect information about their activities.

    (18) List of persons bound down under Section 106 or under Section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be maintained in the Police Station with the names and addresses of the sureties in the following columns:

    (1) Sl. No.

    (2) Name and address of the complainant.

    (3) List of complaint with date and place of occurrence.

    (4) Names and addresses of persons with aliases bound down

    (5) Period for which bound down

    (6) Order of the Magistrate with date

    (7) Names and addresses of the sureties

    (8) Remarks

    (19) If, during the period a person is bound over, there are complaints against him, as immediate enquiry should be made and if the complaints are found to be true, the Court should be moved for taking action against the person and the sureties.”

    9. In Venkatachalapathy's case, it was held that entry in the Rowdy List offends the Fundamental Right of a person guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and hence invalid; it was also held that the earlier Order No. 1059 had no statutory source and was merely Departmental instructions. Since no Fundamental Right can be abridged or taken away without the authority of law, the said order was held as illegal.

    10. In the present cases, there is a lengthy Statement of Objections filed by the State, but the essence of the defence is to trace the power to make Order No. 1059 to the provisions of Karnataka Police Act, 1963 and other powers and duties of the Police under the various laws. There is an assertion that the entry in a Rowdy List is kept confidential and that it is being maintained for the information of the Police Department to facilitate the prevention of and aid any investigation of a Crime.

    11. The learned Counsel for the petitioners advanced the following contentions:

    I. Being rowdy listed affects the right to life and personal liberty of a person, because it results in the violation of the right to privacy, affects his reputation and curbs his personal liberties of movements in view of the police surveillance. For the same reason, it affects the fundamental rights to free movements and of association guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d) and (c) of the Constitution.

    II. Order No. 1059 is not a ‘law’ and therefore, it cannot be enforced because, it curtails the fundamental rights of the petitioners.

    III. If the impugned order has statutory force, then, still, it has not become ‘law’ for want of publication; therefore it cannot be enforced.

    IV. In each of these cases, the particular action of the police in opening a rowdy sheet regarding each of the petitioners, is ultravires and illegal.

    12. Before proceeding further, the effect of the Order No. 1059 has to be examined. The detailed provisions of the order indicate that the entry in the ‘Register of Rowdies’ is to be made based on relevant material/information available with the Police and prior orders of the Superintendent of Police or the Sub-Divisional Police should be obtained for entering the name of the rowdy in the Register. The entry is to be current during the Calender year and the further continuance of a person's name in the entry depends upon the behaviour of the said person as watched by the Police. Nowhere Order No. 1059 provides for the disclosure of the name entered in the Register of Rowdies and the Register is used as an information to the Police Department; the person whose name is entered is liable to be watched, but such a vigil be concealed. Though paragraph 16 contemplates warning of the Proprietor/Keeper of the Tea Stall, Restaurant etc., which becomes the resort of rowdies and other types of anti-social elements, it has to be understood that, such a warning is not to be accompanied by any disclosure that the person or persons resorting the Restaurant/Tea Stall etc., is a rowdy-sheeted person. This warning has to be in general terms to prevent the Proprietor of such a place from allowing it to be a resort of suspicious characters. In fact, even without entering the name of a person in the Register, a Police Officer may warn about the person in case the Officer suspects the behavioural pattern of such a person which is likely to affect the public place. Similarly, Para 17 has to be understood, as not authorising the Police to take Photograph of the person whose name is entered in the Rowdy Register. Only because of such an entry, if a photograph is available with the Police of such a person, it may be used to identify him and it is to be used intra-departmentally, only. These is also nothing to indicate that entry of a person's name in the Register of Rowdies, would expose him to any restriction as to his movements. Order No. 1059 by itself, nowhere provides for intrusion into the privacy of the rowdy-sheeted person. Even assuming that a close watch would be kept of his movements by the Police, it will be to locate him and gather information as to his activities and of his associates, having a direct bearing on the maintenance of public peace and tranquility.

    13. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P . AIR 1963 SC 1295., majority of the Judges held that by the Police keeping a close watch over the movements of the suspected person (whose name is entered in “history sheets”) does not offend any of the Fundamental Rights. But an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to him thereby would violate Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, the provision regarding domiciliary visits at night was held as unconstitutional. Other provisions providing for (i) secret picketing of the house or approaches to the houses of suspects; (ii) periodical inquiries by the Officers into repute, habits, associations, income, expenses and occupation; (iii) the reporting by constables and Chaukidars of movements and absence from home; (iv) verification of movements and absences by means of inquiry slips; (v) the collection and recording on a history-sheet of all information bearing on conduct; were upheld by the Court. For those Regulations, neither specific law nor authority of law, was necessary, because, those provisions would not affect the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. It was also held that the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution. The minority view stated in the Judgment of Subba Rao, J., upholds the right to privacy; entire Regulations were declared as unconstitutional for violating Articles 19(1) and 21 of the Constitution.

    14. Though Mr. Ravivarma Kumar pressed for our acceptance, the view of Subba Rao K., we express our inability to do so. We are bound by the majority view, unless any of the subsequent Decisions of the Supreme Court support the petitioners' contentions.

    15. In Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh . AIR 1975 SC 1378., the Regulations providing for the surveillance were, again upheld. There was no challenge to the provisions on the ground that, they were not statutory and the Court proceeded on the assumption that the Regulations were ‘law’. The attack against them under Articles 19(1) and 21, however, failed. As to the right of privacy, it was observed at page 1384:

    “Individual autonomy, perhaps the central concern of any system of limited government, is protected in part under our Constitution by explicit constitutional guarantees. In the application of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has been but what may be”. Time works changes and brings into existence new conditions. Subtler and far-reaching means of invading privacy will make it possible to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a definition of privacy raises serious questions about the propriety of judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. Of course, privacy primarily concerns the individual. It therefore relates to and overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of other rights and values.”

    Again in Para 28, it was observed:

    “The right to privacy in any event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute.”

    The Court further said:

    “Having reached this conclusion, we are satisfied that drastic in roads directly into the privacy and indirectly into the fundamental rights, of a citizen will be made if Regulations 855 and 856 were to be read widely. To interpret the rule in harmony with the Constitution is therefore necessary and canalisation of the powers vested in the police by the two Regulations earlier read becomes necessary, if they are to be saved at all. Our founding fathers were thoroughly opposed to a Police Raj even as our history of the struggle for freedom has borne eloquent testimony to it. The relevant Articles of the Constitution we have adverted to earlier, behove us therefore to narrow down the scope for play of the two Regulations. We proceed to give direction and restriction to the application of the said regulations with the caveat that if any action were taken beyond the boundaries so set, the citizen will be entitled to attack such action as unconstitutional and void.”

    “Depending on the character and antecedents of the person subjected to surveillance as also the objects and the limitation under which surveillance is made, it cannot be said surveillance by domiciliary visits would always be unreasonable restriction upon the right of privacy. Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest.”

    16. From this, it was contended for the petitioner, that, surveillance would affect the Fundamental Right and therefore, provisions governing the surveillance could be made only by a law or under the authority of law.

    17. There can be no doubt that if any of the Fundamental Right is to be affected by the State action, it has to be authorised by law, in the sense of a law enacted by the Legislature or to be authorised by a subordinate/delegated legislation, like Rules and Regulations. However, if no Fundamental Right is adversely affected by the enforcement of Order No. 1059, State is entitled to act upon it, even in case, the said order has no statutory source. On facts, we found that, a reading of Order No. 1059 nowhere suggests vesting of an intruding power in the Police Department, enabling the latter to invade any of the Fundamental Rights of the rowdy-sheeted person. The maintenance of rowdy sheet in respect of a suspected person having tendency to commit criminal offence or disturb public peace, is to enable the police to speedy action in cases of breach of public peace; it provides the information of the persons to be watched by the law enforcing agency of the State and nothing more.

    18. Malak Singh v. State of Punjab . AIR 1981 SC 760. involved a similar question. The relevant Police Act prescribed it as a duty of police officers “to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace, to prevent the commission of offence and public nuisances”. Ruies were framed to effectuate this provision under which in every police station Surveillance Registers had to be maintained in the prescribed form. Para-4 of the Decision extracts the relevant Rule. The Rule required all records connected with police surveillance to be confidential and nothing contained in them to be communicated to any person and that inspection may not be allowed or copies be given to them. Vires of the Regulations was not questioned before the Supreme Court. The questions raised were, whether, a person was entitled to be given an opportunity to show cause before his name was included in the Register and whether the names included in the Register, were, in fact without any grounds for reasonably believing them to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property and whether the name of a person not previously convicted or placed in good behaviour could be included in the Register. The contentions of the appellants were not accepted by the Supreme Court. It was held:

    “Section 23 of the Police Act prescribes it as the duty of police officers ‘to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace, to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisances’. In connection with these duties it will be necessary to keep discreet surveillance over reputed bad characters, habitual offenders and other potential offenders. Organised crime cannot be successfully fought without close watch of suspects. But, surveillance may be intrusive and it may be so seriously encroach on the privacy of a citizen as to infringe his fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and the freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d). That cannot be permitted. This is recognised by the Punjab Police Rules themselves. Rule 23.7 which prescribes the mode of surveillance, permits the close watch over the movements of the person under surveillance but without any illegal interference. Permissible surveillance is only to the extent of a close watch over the movements of the person under surveillance and no more. So long as surveillance is for the purpose of the purpose of preventing crime and is confined to the limits prescribed by Rule 23.7 we do not think a person whose name is included in the surveillance register can have a genuine cause for complaint. We may notice here that interference in accordance with law and for the prevention of disorder and crime in an exception recognised even by European Convention of Human Rights to the right to respect for a person's private and family life.”

    Again at para-8:—

    “The entry in the surveillance register is to be made on the basis of the material provided by the history sheet whose contents, by their very nature have to be confidential. It would be contrary to the public interest, to reveal the information in the history sheet, particularly the course of information. Revelation of the source of information may put the informant in jeopardy. The observance of the principle of natural justice, apart from not serving the ends of justice may thus lead to undesirable results. We accordingly hold that the rule audi alteram partem is not attracted.”

    However, the Supreme Court permitted Judicial review of this administrative action, in appropriate cases:—

    “But all this does not mean that the police have a licence to enter the names of whoever they like (dislike?) in the surveillance register; nor can the surveillance be such as to squeeze the fundamental freedom guaranteed to all citizens or to obstruct the free exercise and enjoyment of those freedoms; nor can the surveillance so intrude as to offend the dignity of the individual. Surveillance of persons who do not fall within the categories mentioned in Rule 23.4 or for reasons un-connected with the prevention of crime, or excessive surveillance falling beyond the limits prescribed by the Rules, will entitle a citizen to the Court's protection which the Court will not hesitate to give. The very rules which prescribe the conditions for making entries in the surveillance register and the mode of surveillance appear to recognise the caution and care with which the police officers are required to proceed. The note following R. 23.4 is instructive. It enjoins a duty upon the police officer to construe the rule strictly and confine the entries in the surveillance register to the class of persons mentioned in the rule. Similarly R. 23.7 demands that there should be no illegal interference in the guise of surveillance. Surveillance, therefore, has to be unobtrusive and within bounds.”

    Further discussion shows that, the Punjab Rules provided for the entries in the Register, of only those who:

    “must be proclaimed, offenders, previous convicts, or persons who have already been placed on security for good behaviour. In addition, names of persons who are reasonably believed to be habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been convicted or not may be entered. It is only in the case of this category or persons that there may be occasion for abuse of the power of the police officer to make entries in the surveillance register. But, here the entry can only be made by the order of the Superintendent of Police who is prohibited from delegating his authority under Rule 23.5 Further, it is necessary that the Superintendent of Police must entertain a reasonable belief that persons whose names are to be entered in Part II are habitual offenders or receivers of stolen property. While it may not be necessary to supply the grounds of belief to the person whose names are entered in the surveillance register it may become necessary in some cases to satisfy the Court when an entry is challenged that there are grounds to entertain such reasonable belief. In fact in the present case we sent for the relevant records and we have satisfied ourselves that there were sufficient grounds for the Superintendent of Police to entertain a reasonable belief.”

    Thus, the Surveillance Register was held to be of administrative character, without any extrovert effect, it being confidential in nature; but the entries are subject to Judicial scrutiny in appropriate cases. The same reasons equally govern Order No. 1059. However, a perusal of the Karnataka Police Act, 1965, would show that Order No. 1059 has a statutory source. Section 21(g) of the Police Act empowers the Inspector General of Police to make Rules or Orders “regulating the collection and communication by the Police of intelligence and information”, “Intelligence” and “information” referred here can only be intelligence or information necessary to discharge the duties by Police Officers effectively. There cannot be two opinions about the functions and responsibilities of Police Officers, - to maintain public peace and to prevent the commission of offence and public nuisance. A reading of provisions like Section 54, 55, 56 and 65 show the vast responsibilities of the police force in this regard. Preamble to the Police Act expresses in clear terms that the object of the Act is:

    “to provide for a uniform law for the regulation of the Police Force, the maintenance of public order and other matters in the State of Karnataka.

    Whereas it is expedient to provide for a uniform law for the regulation of the Police Force in the State of Karnataka for the exercise of powers and performance of functions by the State Government and by the members of the said force, for the maintenance of public order, for the prevention of gaming, and for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing.”

    Therefore, when Section 21 says that the Inspector General of Police may make orders not inconsistent with the Act or any other enactment, and empowers him to make an order regulating the collection and communication by the Police of intelligence and information, the said power should include, a power to provide for such information or intelligence as would aid the police force to discharge its duties with utmost expedition. Collection and maintenance of information pertaining to persons who are susceptible to criminal propensities cannot thus be outside the purpose of the Police Act. The position is similar to Section 23 of the Punjab Police Act referred at page 763 of Malak Singh's case and Section 46(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, referred in Govind's case.

    Order No. 1059 was made by the Inspector General of Police and it is clearly authorised by Section 21.

    19. It was argued that Section 21 provides for Rules or Orders to be made regarding administration of police force in the State and it has nothing to do with the making of an order affecting third parties. This contention overlooks the basic functions of the Police Department. The maintenance of law and order and prevention of entries require information regarding suspicious characters and persons with criminal propensities. In the discharge of their duties, as to how the police personnel should function and be ready with the requisite materials to act speedily, is a matter intimately connected with the administration of Police force.

    20. If a more drastic power of intrusion into the private lives of people has to be created, certainly the State Government may have to make appropriate Rules under the aforesaid Police Act. But here we are not concerned with such a situation. In the view, we have taken as above, it becomes unnecessary to refer to the several Decisions cited before us as to the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The three Decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by us to reach our conclusion, directly deal with the question involved herein. The Decision rendered in Venkatachalapathy's case by the learned single Judge does not refer to those Decisions and the conclusion reached therein is directly opposed to the ratio of the Decisions of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we over rule the said Decision.

    21. Now, coming to the facts, according to the petitioners - Muniswamy Reddy and his brother Ramachandra alias Ganesh, they learnt of their names being entered in the Rowdy Register when the police mentioned the said fact while opposing the bail applications filed by those petitioners in a Criminal Proceedings against them in the V Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore. After this, disclosure, they caused a legal notice dated 15.6.1988 issued to the third respondent demanding the deletion of their names; however, there was no response from the third respondent. These petitioners further allege that there has been constant illegal demands made from them by the police and that they were being harassed by the police.

    22. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2, it is averred that the name of second petitioner, Ramachandra alias Ganesh was never entered in the Rowdy Register; however, circumstances leading to the inclusion of Muniswamy Reddy's name in the said Register are narrated.

    23. At the time of hearing the relevant Register was placed before us for perusal. Earlier his name was in the Register between July 1977 to 20.1.1982 Thereafter again, it is entered on 18.3.1988 This entry on the second occasion should have been normally deleted at the end of the year 1988. Thereafter, the entries against his name show that they are not adverse and throughout behaviour was lawful. Therefore, the continuation of the name of the 1st petitioner after the end of the year 1988 was unwarranted; at any rate, there is absolutely no material to justify to keep his name continuously till date. This action is clearly opposed to the very purpose behind Order No. 1059 and is ultravires. Accordingly, we direct the deletion of the first petitioner's name from the Rowdy Register forthwith.

    24. The police should have kept the entry in the Rowdy Register confidential; it was entirely unnecessary and irrelevant for them to disclose it, even to the Court in the Criminal proceedings, while opposing the bail applications. We hope that the respondents would take sufficient care to keep such entries completely confidential, and that they could be disclosed only for administrative purposes amongst the police personnel only.

    25. Since the name of the second petitioner is not included in the Rowdy Register, his Writ Petition has to be dismissed as unnecessary. He was, obviously, misled by the vague statement made by the police while opposing his bail application. Further, the third respondent, on receipt of the legal notice should have informed him that the inference that his name was entered in the Rowdy Register was incorrect. Second petitioner had to file this Writ Petition to clarify the position and therefore, he is entitled to his costs.

    26. Allegations of malice on the part of the third respondent are made by these petitioners in the Writ Petitions; the third respondent has denied them by filing an affidavit. Third respondent was the Sub-Inspector of Police in charge of the Police Station wherein, first petitioner's name was entered in the Rowdy Register; however, entry was made after getting clearance from the Superior Officer, as provided in Order No. 1059. There is no sufficient material on record to hold that the conduct of the third respondent was malicious towards these petitioners. We reject the plea of the petitioners in this regard.

    27. It is not a case where we can award compensation to the petitioners, though Mr. Ravivarma Kumar seriously pressed for such a relief. The action taken to enter the name of this petitioner in the Rowdy List is not found to be malicious or arbitrary. The illegality lies in continuing the name all these years. It is not a case for any compensation.

    28. Petitioner in W.P No. 17064 of 1988 is not only a Member of the Village Panchayat, but missed becoming its Pradhan, because, in the election to the office of Pradhan, votes polled by him and his rival were the same; luck favoured the rival when lot was taken. A perusal of para 31 of the Statement of Objections shows that the allegations against him by the police are vague and there is nothing indicative of his conduct which may affect the maintenance of public peace and tranquility. The entry of his name in the Register of Rowdies is, therefore, uncalled for and is accordingly quashed.

    29. Petitioner in W.P No. 561/1989 seems to be not interested in prosecuting this Writ Petition. None appeared to argue his case. Hence it is dismissed for non-prosecution.

    We conclude as follows:

    (1) The entry in the Rowdy List in no way affects the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1) and 21 of the Constitution.

    (2) Order No. 1059 has a source in Section 21 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963. Even otherwise it cannot be held as violative of any of the Fundamental Rights.

    (3) Order No. 1059 is published in the Karnataka Police Gazette and has become part of the Police Manual and the question of its publication in any particular manner is not required, since no rights are affected by an action taken under the said Order. Whether it is published or not is of no consequence.

    (4) The continuation of the name of the petitioner in W.P No. 10394/88 in the Rowdy List is liable to be set aside. Similarly the entry of the name of the petitioner in W.P No. 17064/88 is also quashed. Writ Petition No. 10395/88 is dismissed as unnecessary; however the petitioner therein is entitled to costs which we compute at Rs. 750/- payable by the respondents-1 and 2.

    (5) Writ Petition No. 561/89 is dismissed for non-prosecution.

    Ordered accordingly.

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    K.M Muniswamy Reddy v. State Of Karnataka
    (Jul 21, 1992)